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2 Quasi-markets and welfare state reform  
  
2.1 Introduction 
 
It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a policy initiative with fashionable 
appeal must be in want of research. This book is about the recent introduction 
of quasi-markets in the implementation of social policy. They are a response 
to growing problems in the welfare state, notably of control and aim. Some 
programmes had spiralled out of control and were systematically exhibiting 
effects that had never been intended. In addition, many programmes seemed 
directed at social problems that had begun to disappear or shift. The change 
to a quasi-market system was one of the proposed solutions to these 
difficulties. What it involves is the decentralisation of financial risks to 
suppliers coupled with the strict regulation of supply and demand. The 
expectation is that suppliers will adapt to become more responsive to current 
needs, while rules of conduct and performance standards will safeguard the 
public interest.  
 
In a quasi-market, providers have more autonomy than they would have if 
held under direct control. This means that they will have more scope for 
voluntary decision-making and that efforts to control them will be more 
indirect. This, in turn, requires insight into how exactly they make their 
decisions. If organisations are to be tempted rather than coerced into acting in 
the proper way, it is vital to understand exactly what makes those 
organisations tick. Yet, curiously, this is an issue that has received relatively 
little attention. Policy documents rarely display clear notions of how exactly 
the various features of a quasi-market will affect the actions of providers. This 
book will explore the missing link in the policy rationale. It will try and 
fathom the depths of quasi-markets, in an attempt bring their inner dynamic 
to the surface. It does not focus on how these constructs should work, nor on 
the goals they are meant to serve; it looks at the actual effects of a quasi-
market setting on the behaviour of providers.  
 
The empirical case used for this analysis will be Dutch social housing. 
Although formally private, social housing providers had in the post-war 
period effectively become extensions of national housing policy. Through 
large-scale construction programmes, they were the state’s principal agents in 
eliminating the immense housing shortages. The housing market as a whole 
was governed by state regulation of a far-reaching kind. By the 1980s, though, 
the legitimacy of this arrangement was being questioned. The shortages had 
diminished considerably, weakening the case for intervention. Moreover, the 
tangled web of subsidies had grown so complex that it had become 
intransparant and difficult to contain. By the early 1990s these concerns 
resulted in a major liberalisation, one element of which was a shake-up of the 
system of provision. Providers themselves were given responsibility for the 
financial risks of provision, while simultaneously their behavioural controls 
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were relaxed. This created the quasi-market that is the subject of this analysis. 
The question is how providers have reacted to their new setting. For close to 
fifty years, they had been impelled by hierarchy and philanthropy; under the 
new system, they were prodded with financial incentives. What direction will 
they choose?  
 
This chapter will set out the issues and questions discussed in the remainder 
of the book. Paragraph 1.2 will describe the causes and nature of the recent 
changes in the welfare state. One of these changes is the transition to a 
governance paradigm. This will bring me to the subject central to this book, 
the introduction of quasi-markets. Paragraph 1.3 describes what quasi-
markets are exactly. They raise a number of different questions, which will be 
discussed in paragraph 1.4. This study focuses mainly on how the quasi-
market setting affects the behaviour of providers. Their decisions will be 
interpreted in light of the conditions that make a quasi-market effective. This, 
as paragraph 1.5 argues, is at least as important as looking at whether policy 
goals have been achieved. The theoretical approach for interpreting market 
behaviour will be introduced in 1.6. Finally, paragraph 1.7 will sketch the 
analysis ahead.  
 
2.2 Policy changes: from planning to governance 
 
2.2.1 Causes of policy change 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, European welfare states have undergone major 
changes. It was argued that the grand edifices built in previous decades had 
simply become untenable. “Many believe that the welfare state has become 
incompatible with other cherished goals, such as economic development, full 
employment, and even personal liberties; that it is at odds with the fabric of 
advanced postindustrial capitalism” (Esping-Andersen, 1996). Whether such 
concerns were justified or not, the final decades of the millennium 
undoubtedly fostered a growing sense that change was inevitable. Assertions 
to that effect were usually backed up with reference to one or several 
problems believed to undermine the viability of welfare state arrangements. 
Some affect the overall capacity of the welfare state to maintain protective 
arrangements, while others affect only the ability to sustain specific 
arrangements. Whether real or fictitious, they have been a driving force 
behind many recent policy initiatives.    
 
One class of problems undermines the welfare state’s general sustainability. 
Foremost among these are the supposed economic disadvantages that come 
with an elaborate welfare state. The costs and inflexibility associated with 
welfare state arrangements are supposed to give nations with an elaborate 
welfare state a competitive disadvantage in relation to those with a minimal 
welfare state.1 “In an economy whose core markets for capital, goods and 
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services are increasingly integrated on a global scale, there is little room for 
vastly different welfare states, with similar levels of labor productivity and 
production quality” (Castells, 1997, p. 253). A second difficulty is the inability 
of national states to contain the overall financial burden that welfare state 
arrangements entail, either at present or in the future. The budget cuts that 
shook welfare states during the 1980s and 1990s were part of efforts to ease 
the huge debts that governments had incurred. Such interventions were not 
only a response to present problems, but also to problems that were expected 
to surface in the course of time. For instance, the steadily ageing population is 
likely to make increasing demands on health care and social security. If 
present social rights are left unchanged, costs may spiral beyond control.  
 
Another problem is that a number of welfare state arrangements have become 
obsolete, at least in their present form. Past problems may have disappeared 
or evolved into other problems. For instance, the large-scale housing 
construction programmes of the post-war period were aimed at reducing 
great shortages that have now largely disappeared. This means that housing 
policy has had to shift its focus to issues associated with existing stock such as 
neighbourhood mix. Similarly, programmes may address the needs of a client 
population that has changed drastically. When this happens, arrangements 
may seem oddly off balance. For example, the breadwinner family notion that 
underpins many social security arrangements is somewhat out of date, 
because it does not take account of the great rise in female employment, the 
growth of single families and the change in attitudes that have occurred over 
the last few decades (Lewis, 1993).  
 
Finally, there have been difficulties in the implementation of welfare state 
programmes. Some have proved particularly vulnerable to calculated 
manipulation by both clients and provider. A fine example of the former is 
the Dutch disability programme, which employers had come to use as a 
covert unemployment scheme (Green-Pedersen, 2001; Van der Veen and 
Trommel, 1998). It has also been suggested that programmes create their own  
constituents, who will defend their budgets and rights regardless of actual 
needs (Pierson, 1994). Quite apart from wilful abuse, arrangements had 
grown so complex that they had become difficult to fathom and virtually 
uncontrollable. By the 1980s, housing subsidy schemes had evolved into such 
a labyrinth that it was hard to see where the money was going (see chapter 
two). Finally, welfare state providers have allegedly become unresponsive 
and inefficient. “ The debate about public sector reform in the welfare state 
countries is driven by an awareness about the inefficiency of the traditional 
institution in the public sector, the agency or public authority” (Lane, 1995, p. 
257).  
 
It is especially these implementation problems that the introduction of quasi-
markets has sought to address. It was one of the measures that followed a 
change in the co-ordination paradigm, in thoughts about the relationship 
between government and society.   
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2.2.2 From planning to governance  
 
Policymakers have come up with a number of solutions to these 
implementation problems. These invariably involve re-arranging the 
relationships between the state and other actors with a role in welfare state 
provision. Generally speaking, there has been a move from vertical to 
horizontal co-ordination, from hierarchy to markets and networks. These 
changes indicate a shift from a planning to a governance approach (Bressers 
and Kuks, 2001; Rhodes, 2000; Mayntz, 1998).  
 
Post-war policy was pervaded by a planning ethic. Policymaking was 
considered a matter of weighing the alternatives and assessing the 
consequences of each option in the light of unambiguous and politically 
determined goals (Lindblom, 1959). Through the bureaucratic apparatus, it 
was possible to gather all the information necessary to make the best possible 
combination of means and ends. The central state was thus visualised as the 
ultimate rational actor. Policy could be designed and executed step by step. It 
is typical that the Dutch government’s chief research agency, founded in 1973, 
is called “ the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau” . One element of the 
planning paradigm was that the national state was considered capable of 
controlling society from the top down. With the passage of time, confidence in 
this method began to erode. It appeared that society could not be 
“ programmed”  all that well (Boudon, 1982). State interventions were 
systematically characterised by unanticipated consequences. Examples are 
numerous, especially in housing. Subsidy methods based on the 1970s 
inflationary economy had disastrous effects for many providers when 
economic conditions changed. Efforts to meet the housing shortages 
consistently fell short of their target. Tax subsidies for home ownership were 
used for luxury expenses. Such events have often been explained away as 
incidents, but that may be somewhat deceptive (Engbersen and Van der Veen, 
1992). “ If one is always looking for unusual circumstances and dramatic 
events, he cannot appreciate how difficult it is to make the ordinary happen”  
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984, p. xii). Given the enormous complexity and 
potential for error in implementation, it is perhaps more striking that policy 
does not fail more often.  
 
At the heart of the problem is that the central state has turned out to be less 
rational than expected, and other actors more so. In practical terms, it was 
impossible to take account of all relevant variables and to predict them with 
sufficient accuracy. A rationalistic planning approach proved unrealistic. 
“ Although such an approach can be described, it cannot be practiced except 
for relatively simple problems and even then only in a somewhat modified 
form. It assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information that men 
simply do not possess, and it is even more absurd as an approach to policy 
when the time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem are 
limited, as is always the case”  (Lindblom, 1959, p. 80). Post-war housing 
policy is a good example: projections of housing need and construction 
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proved consistently off the mark for decades on end. As advocates of 
“ incremental”  policymaking have suggested, one solution is not to be overly 
ambitious and to take it one step at a time (although, as I will argue in chapter 
six, this does not work well in quasi-markets). Another option is to enlist the 
help of other actors. They are closer to the action and therefore possess more 
accurate and up-to-date information. The problem is that these actors have 
minds of their own, which points to a second flaw in the planning paradigm.  
 
Since policies do not carry out themselves, and national policymakers cannot 
do it either, there simply has to be an intermediary group of actors to fulfil 
this task. These actors are not mindless machines. For various reasons, they 
are likely to make choices of their own accord. In many cases, the state has 
deliberately granted a measure of discretion to its providers, in order to make 
better use of their professional skills or allow them to devise tailor-made 
solutions. This is common, for instance, in the medical profession. 
Furthermore, providers have to assure the continuation of their own 
existence, if they are to continue provision. This means that they have two 
types of goals, those relating to the organisation’s mission and those 
concerning its own welfare. Although the former should theoretically take 
precedence, organisational researchers have frequently observed that means 
may become ends in themselves (cf. Merton, 1964). When such goal 
displacement occurs, the organisation’s interests are more likely to direct its 
activities than are national policy goals. Some even go as far as to say that this 
is the natural state of affairs. For instance, public choice theorists have argued 
that the primary goal of bureaucratic officials is to maximise their budgets 
(Geveke and Steunenberg, 1995). There are thus good reasons to believe that 
formal policy is not the only variable that influences their decision-making 
process. Consequently, actual provision may be different from what was 
originally intended. 
  
In time, it came to be questioned whether it was not the method of planning 
rather than the planning process that was wrong. With twists and turns, this 
culminated in the concept of governance: “ a new mode of governing that is 
distinct from the hierarchical control model, a more co-operative mode where 
state and non-state actors participate in mixed public/private networks”  
(Mayntz, 1998, p. 7). The governance concept goes beyond the notion that the 
implementation of public policy is fraught with difficulties. It implies that the 
very idea that the state can impose policy upon society is naive and, indeed, 
undesirable. Policymaking is not the prerogative of a single actor, but a 
process that involves many parties inside and outside the state. To what 
extent the advent of governance notions indicates a change of circumstances 
or merely a change of thinking is uncertain. It has been argued that society is 
in actual fact becoming more network-like (Mayntz, 1993).2 Whether this is the 
case or not, it has led to a new style of policymaking.  
 
There are several ways in which the idea of governance has been realised. 
One type of measure involves a renewed emphasis on the responsibilities of 
actors other than the central state. Powers are decentralised to local 
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authorities, which are then expected to take a more active role in urban 
management. The unemployed are expected to search actively on the job 
market and participate in training schemes, unless they wish to be cut off 
from benefits. Another expression of governance is a change in the co-
ordination mechanism that guides the interaction between different parties. 
Quasi-markets involve both: greater powers and responsibilities for non-state 
actors, as well as the switch to a different mode of co-ordination.   
 
It is important to emphasise that the change in policymaking has not 
necessarily resulted in a radical break with the past. Many arrangements still 
remain under direct state control. Nor does the change imply that non-state 
actors have gained more influence. It has been argued, for instance, that 
deregulation in housing construction and allocation may actually diminish 
the autonomy of other actors (Peeters, 1992).3 Finally, there is no telling how 
much of it is going to last. Recent years have seen a tendency towards 
recentralising the decision-making process. It is as yet unclear whether this 
backlash constitutes more permanent retreat in reaction to failed experiments. 
Be that as it may, there is much to be learnt from the recent innovations. 
Quasi-markets are an entirely new method of managing society. Successful or 
not, they present a unique opportunity for learning about policymaking, and 
about the motives and processes that drive human action.   
 
2.3 The nature of quasi-markets  
 
Bartlett, Roberts and Le Grand have described quasi-markets as “ institutional 
arrangements [...] designed to extend the principle of markets and 
competition to the provision of the services”  which simultaneously upholding 
“ the principle of free and universal access, fundamental to the concept of the 
welfare state”  (Bartlett, Roberts and Le Grand, 1998, p. 1). Although welfare 
state provision is not necessarily free and universal, it is clear that quasi-
markets aim to combine the benefits of both the free market and public sector 
arrangements.4 There are various descriptions of the concept, but they 
invariably involve two elements: the decentralisation of financial risks and the 
strict regulation of supply and demand.   
 
The first element of quasi-markets is the decentralisation of financial risks. 
Organisations need certain resources, crucial to their survival. In welfare state 
provision, as elsewhere, the key resource is usually money. Hospitals, social 
housing providers and schools alike need it to pay their staff and buy goods 
necessary for carrying out their tasks. As long as they are part of the state 
machinery, their survival is guaranteed; indeed, such reliability is one of the 
strengths of direct state provision. However, this also implies that the state 
has to bear the financial risks of provision, even if they are caused by 
inefficiency or mismanagement on the part of providers. By shifting these 
risks down to the providers themselves, the state both sheds its financial 
responsibility and impels providers towards a change of behaviour.  
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The expected change of behaviour is based on the providers’ need to resolve 
uncertainty. This uncertainty is caused by competition, that is, by the threat of 
exit (Hirschman, 1970). When clients (or their representatives) are dissatisfied 
with the product or service they are receiving, they can take their money and 
acquire what they need from alternative sources. These include other 
providers as well as other types of provision.5 For instance, in the upper 
ranges of the rental market social housing providers may have to compete 
with other providers as well as with the home ownership market. If clients do 
use their exit option, the provider will suffer financial consequences. To avoid 
the risk becoming reality, the providers will, at least in theory, adapt their 
behaviour to attract new clients or to prevent present clients from leaving. It 
means they will have to become more responsive to the needs of their clients.  
 
However, markets may create new problems as they solve the old ones. To 
begin with, there is the risk that the market structure may not arouse 
sufficient competition. The market may be divided into several submarkets, in 
each of which there are monopolies or oligopolies. Housing and hospital care 
represent well-known examples of fields where the mobility of demand is 
limited and suppliers geographically concentrated. On the demand side, 
clients may not have sufficient information to use their exit option properly. 
Hospital patients cannot easily see whether they get value for money and are 
not likely to have an overview of the total supply on offer. Alternatively, 
clients may not be sufficiently interested to use the exit option. For instance, 
small employers are obliged to contract for social insurance, but may care too 
little to bother spending much time on the contracting process (Bergsma, Van 
den Brink, Burger and Cordia, 1999).  
 
Another potential problem is that certain activities that actors in markets 
undertake are acceptable in a “ pure”  market context, but not in welfare state 
provision. “ Far from being a sensitive and flexible response to the welfare 
needs of modern society, the market is itself highly impersonal and 
responsive only to its own inner logic”  (Stone, 1983, p. 594). For instance, 
“ creaming” , favouring those clients who are most likely to meet standards or 
easiest to handle, is perfectly legitimate in commercial recruitment agencies; 
but not in state-sponsored job counselling, which should (also) focus on the 
difficult cases (Lipsky, 1980). Another concern is that public funds may leak 
away through profits or transactions. For instance, when public and private 
activities are conducted under the umbrella of one organisation, publicly paid 
overhead may be implicitly used to subsidise commercial ventures.  
 
This is why there is a second element to quasi-markets, which is the strict 
regulation of supply and demand (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993). It would be hard 
to find markets without some form of regulation, but quasi-markets are 
characterised by very strong intervention on a fundamental level. First of all, 
there are rules that influence the relationship between supply and demand. 
On the demand side, there may be an intermediary actor to represent 
individual clients. This is the case in Dutch health care, where insurance 
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companies conduct the negotiations with hospitals. The idea behind this setup 
is that insurers have more expertise and are therefore in a better position to 
enforce their claims. Demand may be compulsory, as in the case of underage 
education. Alternatively, it may be expressed through vouchers or tokens 
rather than through financial means. In addition, its mobility may be 
restricted to a specific class of suppliers or geographical area. For instance, 
clients in health care have only limited access to commercial clinics, unless 
they wish to pay for the treatment out of their own pocket.     
 
Rules aimed at the supply side are designed to encourage competition 
between providers. While this may simply imply that suppliers should follow 
the rules that apply to all businesses (anti-cartel legislation and the like), it 
may take specific intervention to establish an effective market setting. Tasks 
that were originally carried out by a single provider may be divided into 
distinct activities, so that it is possible to support several suppliers during the 
initial contracting period and carry competition to the next. Alternatively, 
some activities may be kept out of the market because they could allow 
suppliers to hinder their competitors. Competition in public transport or 
communication usually involves separating the infrastructure of services from 
the services themselves. After all, a company that both maintains the network 
and delivers services could use the former activity to benefit the latter and 
thus gain an advantage over its rivals (Ouwersloot, 1997).  
 
A second type of regulation tries to prevent behaviour considered undesirable 
in welfare state provision. This almost always includes rules to prevent 
activities that could endanger access to public arrangements. For instance, 
health insurers in the Netherlands must accept all applications and are 
therefore prevented from filtering out clients on the basis of their health 
status. Usually there are also limits on the kinds of ventures providers can 
engage in. They are usually allowed to engage in some types of commercial 
activities, but not all. For example, social housing providers are allowed to 
build housing for sale, but only within a limited price range. The money 
earned through commercial ventures is expected to remain “ within the 
family”  and not to leak away to private investors. That is why public 
provision and commercial activities must generally be kept strictly separate.  
 
In short, quasi-markets involve the decentralisation of financial responsibility, 
combined with co-ordination through competition and regulation. They are 
entirely artificial constructs, built upon an existing foundation, but designed 
and imposed by state officials (cf. Pollitt, 1996, p. 181). It is this that makes 
them so interesting, and so risky. There are many variables involved in such a 
design and it is difficult to foresee whether they will work out as planned. 
This is why it is so important to know their logic, to understand how exactly 
they work. Accordingly, the analysis focuses on the following research 
question, specified for the field that will be empirically studied:  
 
How does the quasi-market in Dutch social housing work?  
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It is a simple question, which, unfortunately, requires a complicated answer.  
 
2.4 Asking the right question 
  
Although the question seems simple enough on the surface, it comprises 
several implicit steps. Moving from the ultimate effects of provision to 
national policy, there are at least three questions involved: (1) by what criteria 
outcomes should be judged, (2) how provision affects outcomes, and (3) how 
national policy affects provision.      
 
Tracking backwards, one should first wonder what criteria should be used to 
assess the effects of policy. Markets are usually said to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness, but by choosing these values as evaluation criteria one is in 
danger of judging different methods by different standards (Stone, 1988). 
Markets may indeed enhance efficiency and effectiveness –although this is 
often disputed- but public sector organisations have traditionally been 
designed to safeguard not only these, but many other values. “ Government 
organizations operate under greater public scrutiny, subject to unique public 
expectations for fairness, openness, accountability, and honesty. [...] Goals 
and performance criteria are more diverse, conflicting (with more difficult 
trade-offs), and intangible and hard to measure”  (Rainey, 1991, p. 35). A 
quasi-market hovers between the public sector and the market, which makes 
it all the more difficult to evaluate. When they sum up the criteria by which 
the success of a quasi-market can be measured, Bartlett and Le Grand set 
typical market goals like efficiency alongside traditional public sector goals 
such as equality (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993). Even if quasi-markets should 
prove more successful in attaining a goal like efficiency, there is the question 
whether this detracts from other goals. One would have to determine which 
criteria are relevant to an evaluation and what trade-offs can be deemed 
acceptable.    
 
Second, there is the issue to what extent ultimate outcomes, like the well-
being of citizens, can be attributed to welfare state provision. Let us suppose, 
for example, that one wishes to evaluate the results of government efforts to 
encourage home ownership. It is plausible that the generous tax subsidy for 
mortgages has contributed to the rise of owner-occupied housing. One would 
have to isolate the effects of this measure from the influence of the interest 
rate, rent levels, greater access to mortgages, favourable economic conditions 
(which, to complicate matters, were themselves influenced by the rise of home 
ownership), cultural changes and so on. An evaluation of state policy would 
be confronted with the grim task of isolating the effects of these variables. It is 
risky to judge the success or failure of policy solely by looking whether goals 
have been attained, because there is a serious danger of misinterpretation. 
There may be many variables involved of which policy is just one, perhaps 
not even one that is decisive.  
 
Finally, there is the question to what extent the activities of providers, the 
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agents who implement policy, can be attributed to national policy. What 
affects society is not so much policy itself as the actions of organisations or 
individuals charged with putting it to practice. But, as has been argued above, 
these are autonomous actors, not mechanistic extensions of administrative 
will. Especially when they are faced with complex tasks, they are likely to face 
various and conflicting demands. Policy goals may be at odds with the 
interests or values of the providers in question. Professionals may find 
themselves caught between directives that demand efficiency and a 
professional ethic that favours quality. Organisations may feel that the 
present standards set by the government will set undue strain on their 
resources and threaten their long-term stability. Alternatively, the rules and 
incentives set by policy may (deliberately or not) leave room for radically 
different strategies. Some providers in quasi-markets may attain their goals 
by engaging in commercial ventures and channelling profits back to their 
traditional tasks, whereas others may choose a more conservative approach. It 
is also possible that there are many actors involved in implementation, both 
inside and outside formal organisations, and that the shape of provision is 
determined in a process of complex interaction. In all these cases, it is not self-
evident how policy will ultimately affect provision. It will be just one of the 
variables influencing the choices of organisations charged with provision.   
 
This book focuses primarily on the last step, on measuring the effect of policy 
of the activities of providers. The prime reason for focusing on this aspect of 
quasi-markets is that it has been least covered in overall research. Policy 
documents tend to focus on the attainment of policy goals and the formal 
quasi-market design, but rarely explore the logic of provider behaviour in any 
depth. Yet by its nature, manipulating market behaviour requires precise 
information about how incentives translate into action. Knowledge of actual 
behaviour is critical to interpreting the results of market-based policy 
correctly and intervening in an effective manner. It is all too often that 
evaluations of quasi-markets jump to the question whether provision has 
improved, without a precise analysis of the preceding step. The research 
question can therefore be specified as follows:  
 
a. How does the introduction of the quasi-market affect the behaviour of 
providers?  
 
b. How can their behaviour be explained?  
 
2.5 The conditions for an effective quasi-market 
 
2.5.1 Focusing on conditions rather than goals   
 
If one can explain quasi-market behaviour, then the question that quickly 
follows is how this relates to the success of a quasi-market. After all, these 
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constructs were created for a reason, which was to improve welfare state 
provision. In their important study on quasi-markets, Bartlett and Le Grand 
defined a number of criteria by which provision can be evaluated, specifically, 
efficiency, responsiveness, choice and equity (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993). 
They also mentioned a number of conditions that quasi-markets must satisfy 
if they are to be effective in achieving those goals: there should be a 
competitive market structure and providers should have sufficient 
information, limited uncertainty, financially-inspired motives and no 
incentive for discriminating against more expensive clients (“ cream-
skimming” ). Policy proposals and evaluation pay relatively little attention to 
the conditions that make success possible, if only theoretically. They tend to 
focus on outcomes rather than the mechanisms behind market behaviour (e.g. 
competition) and the conditions that sustain such mechanisms. For example, 
there has been a strange lack of interest in market structure, when this is so 
crucial for maintaining competition (Bartlett, Roberts and Le Grand, 1998).  
 
Yet if the success of quasi-markets is attributed to the existence of particular 
conditions, then obviously failures must foremost be explained by the absence 
of those conditions. It may in fact be highly deceptive to analyse a quasi-
market only in light of its success in meeting certain targets. Quite apart from 
the question whether this achievement can be attributed to policy, it is very 
well possible that the quasi-market is threatened in the long run even when 
provision improves in the short term. For instance, providers may entrap 
clients with package deals that effectively thwart competition (cf. Van den 
Brink, Brandsen and Putters, forthcoming). In this case one could argue that 
providers offer better services, but that would show only one side of the coin 
and divert attention from the conditions central to the quasi-market design. It 
is striking how few studies and policy documents regarding market-based 
policy (including those concerning social housing) make a thorough analysis 
of the contingencies that make a quasi-market effective. In the face of this 
glaring gap, I have added the following element to the research question:  
 
c. How does the behaviour of providers affect the conditions that make the 
quasi-market effective?  
 
This means I will not evaluate behaviour by the attainment of goals, but by its 
effect on the conditions that make it possible to meet those goals. For the sake 
of argument, I will assume that the conditions implicit in the quasi-market 
design are in actual fact the conditions for success. This is not necessarily the 
case in practice, because some of the assumptions underlying the design may 
not be valid. For instance, providers may deliver good services even in the 
absence of competition because they are motivated by ethical considerations. 
However, that could hardly count as a policy success.  
 
2.5.2 Redefining the conditions 
 
Before this aspect of the research question can be addressed, it is important to 
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specify exactly which conditions should be met. Those that Bartlett and Le 
Grand identified were in some ways specific to particular quasi-markets 
(notably health provision in the UK) and to the authors' neo-institutional 
economic framework. However, with a number of alterations they can be 
applied more generally. I will use the following:  
 
- Market structure: all quasi-markets hinge on the premise that there is 
competition. “ There should be many providers, each unable to influence 
the market price by changing their output, and many purchasers, each 
unable to influence price by changing their purchases. If there are not 
enough actual providers, there should be the potential for competition: 
that is, there should be an opportunity for new providers to enter the 
market relatively costlessly. There should also be the possibility of exit 
from the market: that is, providers should face the risk of bankruptcy, or, 
more generally, that if they consistently make losses they will cease to be a 
provider”  (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993, pp. 19-20).  
- Motivation: the system can only work when providers are motivated by a 
desire to survive. This makes them sensitive to the financial incentives 
central to the competitive mechanism. In this analysis, it will be assumed 
that they have the proper motivation (see chapter three).  
- Information: providers should find effective means of dealing with 
information problems. This is somewhat different from Bartlett and Le 
Grand’s original proposition. They argued that if providers and their 
clients have insufficient information about each other, they run the risk 
either of falling victim to opportunistic behaviour or of spending excessive 
effort on gathering the necessary information. This is a good point, but it 
can be developed further. Some areas suffer particularly from information 
problems. To take the example of health care, the quality of medical 
treatment is notoriously hard to determine. Other variables such as future 
demand and prices are also difficult to pin down. In other words, the 
uncertainty regarding the variables involved in the transaction is 
considerable, nor is it likely to be resolved. What has then been observed 
is that providers and their clients engage in long-term relationships based 
on trust rather than detailed monitoring (Bartlett, Roberts and Le Grand, 
1998). This does not necessarily increase the available information, but it is 
a method of dealing with the problems that the lack of certainty could 
result in. In other words, what matters is not so much whether sufficient 
information is available, but what way the parties find to deal with the 
uncertainty. In the example of health care, providers might have opted for 
opportunistic behaviour. The interesting question for research would be 
why they preferred mutual trust instead. Chapter three addresses this 
issue and tries to devise a general model of how providers deal with this 
kind of cognitive uncertainty. In terms of conditions for an effective quasi-
market, it is important that providers do find an effective way to deal with 
the many contingencies involved in market provision. If they do not, then 
the costs of acquiring the information they need (in economic terms, 
transaction costs) may grow so high that they exceed the benefits of a 
market-based system. In practical terms, they will be able to respond to 
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market conditions only very slowly or inadequately.  
- Intervention: the state should have effective means for correcting 
undesirable behaviour. This is a radical re-interpretation of Bartlett and Le 
Grand’s suggestion that providers should not have an incentive to 
discriminate against particular clients. This suggestion in turn derives 
from the goal of equity. However, it is rather arbitrary to single out this 
one type of undesirable behaviour as a fundamental condition. One could 
equally well argue that providers should not have an incentive to waste 
resources, to provide low quality service and so forth. In other words, 
providers should not have an incentive to perform activities that are 
inconsistent with quasi-market goals. This is in itself a superfluous point, 
but there is a crucial message underneath it. It is always possible that the 
introduction of a quasi-market results in some form of undesirable 
behaviour, whether it be creaming or otherwise. Few systems of provision 
anywhere have run flawlessly from the start. But what Bartlett and Le 
Grand argue is that, if creaming should occur, the state could adjust the 
financial compensation formula for different types of customers. In that 
case, they change the market incentive so as to avoid undesirable 
behaviour. Alternatively, the state could add regulation that would 
prevent the impulse for undesirable behaviour from translating into actual 
behaviour (e.g. by imposing a distribution system that makes creaming 
impossible). The more general point is that the state should have effective 
means for correcting unacceptable behaviour. If it had no means to stop 
providers from favouring certain clients over others, it would seriously 
have to consider whether the quasi-market is an acceptable system of 
provision.  
 
The meaning of these conditions for specific quasi-markets will vary. For 
instance, where the market structure naturally limits the scope for 
competition, the information becomes more important. Chapter two will 
discuss the specific conditions that govern the quasi-market in Dutch social 
housing.  
 
Now that the research questions have been posed, it is time to consider how 
they can be answered. What is needed is a theoretical toolkit that is sensitive 
to the specific characteristics of quasi-markets and to the conditions that make 
them effective. This, as I will argue in the next paragraph, makes the 
traditional economic tools for market analysis less applicable and invites a 
more suitable sociological approach.  
 
2.6 Choosing a theoretical approach to quasi-markets  
 
2.6.1 The limits of the neo-classical view 
 
When one thinks of market analysis, one tends to picture the smooth curves 
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of demand and supply graphs, which join together at one point to provide the 
ideal solution. It is an image based on neo-classical economic teachings, an 
approach that has continued to dominate economic studies and that has 
informed many of the market-based policies of the 1980s and 1990s. This 
approach assumes that actors are atomised and that they have no direct social 
relationships with one another, or that these relationships are irrelevant. The 
interaction between actors is co-ordinated solely by the aggregate relation of 
supply to demand, which they cannot influence in any way. Moreover, it 
assumes actors to be rational only in an instrumental fashion. They compete 
for scarce means in order to maximise their own utility; no more. The neo-
classical perspective also supposes the preferences of actors to be stable and 
exogenous, nor very much different between actors (Becker, 1976). Finally, it 
assumes these conditions to be universal and unchanging. In other words, 
these same assumptions are held to apply to every single market. This means 
that institutions are basically considered irrelevant.   
 
This approach is not very suitable for the present analysis. One reason is that 
the kind of market to be studied here is completely unlike the idealtypical 
image of markets. In Dutch social housing, supply and demand are strongly 
regulated, so much so that concepts based on the free interplay between these 
forces seem slightly off the mark. But even a bare, untouched housing market 
would only faintly resemble the idealtype (Barlow & Duncan, 1994). Houses 
have the peculiar characteristics of being durable, fixed and costly (see 
chapter two). Even when there are surpluses in one place and shortages in 
another, the present supply of dwellings cannot be moved so as to bring 
balance. In addition, building new units is slow and costly. As a result, supply 
is less flexible than in most markets. Demand is also relatively immobile. 
Since one’s place of residence is tied up with so many things –work, social 
life, family, lifestyle- and moving is costly, people generally move about 
slowly and across small distances. Consequently, the housing market is in 
practice a constellation of geographically separated pockets of supply and 
demand. There is no efficient clearance, nor is the housing market as a whole 
at all transparent. 
 
But there is also cause to criticise the neo-classical economic approach on 
more fundamental grounds. There is some risk in doing this, for it is a diverse 
tradition and one is bound to disregard one variety or another. As Bourdieu 
has noted, economics is like a hydra: chop off one head and another appears 
immediately. Critics will inevitably face the charge of being ignorant or unjust 
(Bourdieu, 1997). One must also make allowance for the fact that many 
assumptions of economic theory regarding the behaviour of actors are made 
for methodological purposes and do not claim to represent empirical reality 
as it is.6 However, the following three points can be said to apply on 
aggregate (Brandsen, 2001): (1) actors are embedded in a historically specific 
context; (2) this context consists not only of economic relationships, but also of 
other kinds of ties; and (3) actors not only passively adapt to their context, but 
also take an active part in constructing it. 
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The first is that action, including economic action, is embedded in a 
historically and geographically specific context rather than a universal void. 
The fact that economic analysis largely disregards the specific characteristics 
of actors could be justified, given that it focuses on the level of aggregate 
decisions. But even at the aggregate level, it is quite obvious that one market 
varies significantly from another. This is because there are many variables 
involved that are usually excluded, such as product characteristics, social 
networks, regulatory regimes and cultural conceptions. It is hard to maintain 
that these market characteristics ultimately do not matter. Markets may be 
similar when the variables that really distinguish them are not taken into 
account, but what does that kind of analysis say about the actual markets?     
 
A second point is that actors are not related only through aggregate supply 
and demand (Mayntz, 1993). If they were, a great number of problems would 
arise. For instance, nothing could account for the basic order that must exist if 
markets are to function properly. Why do actors not all resort to crime to 
satisfy their interests? In Hobbes’ classic account of the “ state of nature” , this 
problem is solved by complete surrender to hierarchical authority (Hobbes, 
1985). In the neo-classical approach to markets, it results in total submission to 
the laws of supply and demand. In that sense, undersocialisation and 
oversocialisation are two sides of the same coin (Granovetter, 1985). But even 
when it is assumed that such ground rules are in place, problems remain. For 
instance, what happens when the economic context offers more than one 
optimal alternative; in other words, when there are multiple equilibria? 
Actors will make a choice, but neo-classical economics provides no tools for 
interpreting it. This is because this perspective recognises only one type of 
relationship that structures the choices of actors. As a result, its conception of 
rationality is rather narrow. Explanatory variables such as customs, fashions 
and trust also structure the way people act upon their preferences –not to 
mention the preferences themselves. While supply and demand relationships 
are no doubt important, they are unlikely to be the only variable that 
determines market behaviour.  
 
A final point of criticism is that actors take a more active part in the 
construction of markets than is usually recognised in economic analysis. 
Actors find ways to diminish the strength of the incentives to which they are 
subject. This is why there is anti-trust regulation: market actors try to limit 
competition by creating monopolies or oligopolies. However, since economic 
analysis recognises only one type of relationship between actors, it also fails 
to see the many other ways in which they can create their own market. Actors 
can urge the government to revoke or create regulation. For example, private 
builders have in the past lobbied against the preferential treatment of social 
housing. They can create new perceptions about what constitutes proper 
market behaviour. For instance, social housing providers can restrict 
themselves to local competition, if they believe that is their natural 
battleground. Actors can also change the nature of the product (e.g. making a 
house on wheels) so that all established positions fall apart. The possibilities 
go much further than influencing the supply and demand relationship.  
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All this suggests that it would be better to use a different approach for this 
analysis. It tries to uncover the logic of this particular quasi-market, not of 
markets generally. What it needs is a theoretical perspective that is more 
sensitive to the specific characteristics of the quasi-market in Dutch social 
housing, which are so very different from those of an idealtypical market.  
 
2.6.2 A sociological approach to markets   
 
Fortunately, sociology offers alternative concepts and theories for the study of 
markets that are more suitable for the present analysis. These essentially date 
back to the founding days of the discipline. In recent years these have been 
given a boost by the visible failure of neo-classically inspired policies in 
developing countries and by the revival of the institutional approach in social 
science.7 They have their roots in Max Weber’s sociological discussion of 
economic phenomena (Weber, 1995; 1968). Essentially, they do not treat the 
economy differently from any other object of sociological study. Economic 
activity, though important, is simply a specific type of social activity 
(Swedberg, 1998). All the variables normally used to explain human activity –
formal rules, norms, values, power, perceptions, social relationships- also 
apply in markets. This is not to deny the rationality of market behaviour. 
What this perspective suggests is that there are different kinds of rationality, 
each shaped by the particular context in which it is embedded. It is an actor-
centred rather than a structuralist approach (Brandsen, 2001).8 What this 
means is that the behaviour of the individual actors is taken as the starting-
point of an analysis. This is marked departure from the neo-classical 
approach, which is ultimately interested only in aggregate behaviour. This 
means that it is not only important to observe how actors contribute to 
aggregate outcomes, but also to understand why they contribute to them in 
the way that they do.   
 
It will be necessary for the analysis to incorporate these elements, because the 
introduction of the quasi-market has implications that go further than the 
adaptation of supply to demand. To begin with, there is more than one way in 
which social housing providers could have reacted. The decentralisation of 
financial risks implied that there was no longer any guarantee that they 
would get the money they needed. They have had to devise market strategies 
to avert the risks. Of course, what policymakers would like most is that they 
will try to entice their customers with better products. But, as has been argued 
earlier in the chapter, there are other ways to avert market risks. 
Organisations can instead try to spread risks or try to weaken the incentive 
that causes it by diminishing competition. One of the main pitfalls of quasi-
markets is precisely that they are vulnerable to this kind of behaviour, which 
undercuts one of the conditions for their effectiveness. It is absolutely 
necessary to incorporate this possibility into the analysis and not simply to 
think of market behaviour as adaptation. It is for this reason that the analysis 
will use resource dependence theory, a sociological interpretation of market 
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behaviour that emphasises how individual actors can resist market pressure.  
 
Another important issue is that providers may not know how to deal with the 
uncertainty they now face. Under the old system, providers had a largely 
administrative function. All of a sudden they have had to adapt to a 
completely new setting, in which old habits no longer apply. In effect, they 
are faced with two kinds of uncertainty. One is caused by the fact that they 
may not get the money they need, the other by the possibility that they may 
not know how to get it. They will have to find new ways of carrying out their 
tasks. This element of knowledge will have to be included in the analysis, for 
empirical studies have shown it to be an essential part of organisational 
change. In that respect, it is also essential to look at social and cultural 
relationships, because these are a major source of information. A lot of what 
people learn is not of their own making. They have picked it up from 
teachers, colleagues, friends, the media and so forth. Processes of innovation 
in markets are essentially similar and an analysis should therefore take 
account of the social networks that influence them. In doing so it will draw 
upon the institutional tradition in organisational sociology, particularly the 
cognitive variety. This variety of theory has focused specifically on the 
creation and diffusion of knowledge.   
 
It is with the help of these two theories that the sociological approach to the 
quasi-market will be fleshed out. The analysis will attempt to bring out the 
real and complex issues that providers are faced with, yet within a framework 
that makes these both manageable and measurable.  
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2.7 The questions, object and structure of the book 
 
2.7.1 The questions 
 
One of the elements of recent welfare state reforms was the introduction of 
quasi-markets in the implementation of social policy. The research question 
has been defined as follows:  
 
How does the quasi-market in Dutch social housing work?  
 
This analysis will focus on the behaviour of providers within the quasi-
market. It will interpret the findings in light of the conditions that make the 
quasi-market successful. The research question has accordingly been specified 
in the following way:  
 
a. How does the introduction of the quasi-market affect the behaviour of 
providers?  
b. How can their behaviour be explained? 
c. How does the behaviour of providers affect the conditions that make the 
quasi-market effective? 
 
2.7.2 The choice of object 
 
The enquiry needs a well-chosen object, and social housing in the Netherlands 
is a very suitable one. It has two major advantages. To begin with, the quasi-
market in this field was introduced relatively early and has not been 
fundamentally changed since. Furthermore, there are methodological 
advantages to housing that cannot easily be found elsewhere, because its 
market is so strongly fragmented.    
  
Originally, the Dutch social housing providers arose as small semi-
philanthropic institutions, founded by gentry and businessmen in the late 19th 
century.9 After the Second World War, they became part of the government’s 
drive to eliminate the immense housing shortages. This meant that all of a 
sudden these amateur organisations were eligible for vast subsidies. The flip 
side of the coin was that regulation concerning social housing became very 
dense, up to the point that these private housing providers effectively became 
extensions of national housing policy. This situation lasted up to the late 
1980s, when the government announced its intention to liberalise the system. 
At that point, the providers controlled about 40% of the total housing stock. 
Most were fairly small. By the mid-1990s, they had been given financial 
responsibility for their own actions, in exchange for a relaxation of 
behavioural controls. Since that moment, the system has remained 
fundamentally untouched, which means that the reaction of providers to the 
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quasi-market context can be studied without all sorts of intervening policy 
measures. That is not at all the rule in such settings. Quasi-markets often 
suffer repeated top-down intervention and remain in a state of constant flux. 
Housing, with its slow and firm pace, offers an oasis of stability. 
 
A second reason for choosing social housing as the object of study is 
methodological in nature. I will argue in the course of this book that 
behaviour is determined not only by an organisation’s efforts to acquire 
crucial resources, but also by its need to acquire knowledge and to co-
ordinate its actions with those of other players in the field (see chapter three). 
An empirical analysis will have to disentangle the complex web of influences 
in which organisational decisions are shaped. The problem is that many actors 
in the organisational environment play different roles simultaneously. They 
are both members of the same community and rivals for the same resources. 
This has often made it difficult to determine by which considerations actions 
are motivated. The two are hopelessly intertwined. Yet it is only possible to 
uncover the logic of quasi-market behaviour when the two can be analytically 
separated. Housing offers somewhat better opportunities to do this than most 
fields, because it is divided into many local and regional submarkets (see 
chapter two). Whereas the community of social housing providers stretches 
across the nation, they only compete over tenants with the few other 
providers active in their local market. By studying the variation between 
national and local patterns of decision-making, it will be possible to trace the 
origin of decisions mote accurately. Problems remain, particularly at the local 
level, but it is a step forward.  
 
2.7.3 The remainder of the book 
 
In the remainder of the book, each of the issues discussed in this first chapter 
will be dealt with more elaborately. From laying out the tools for the analysis, 
I will proceed through the empirical study to the point where the logic of the 
quasi-market can be unearthed.  
 
Chapter two will describe the setting of the analysis. This will involve a 
description of the product characteristics of housing and of the history of 
Dutch social housing provision. This will set the context of quasi-market 
behaviour and specify the conditions necessary for the quasi-market to be 
effective. The chapter will also consider the position of this sector in welfare 
state research.  
 
Chapter three will develop a theory to interpret quasi-market behaviour. This 
theory will consist of two main components. The first is resource dependence 
theory, which explains how providers can avert the uncertainty associated 
with acquiring resources in a market situation. The second component is the 
institutional theory of organisations, which focuses on how providers choose 
between means of averting uncertainty. The two types of theories will be 
combined into a single model that will serve as the backbone for the analysis.  
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The fourth chapter will then translate this theory into a practical framework 
for the empirical analysis. The data will be collected mainly through 
qualitative fieldwork within a case study design, but will be complemented 
with national statistics where available. The research focuses on the period 
1994-2000, from the introduction of the quasi-market to the end of this 
research project. The logic of the quasi-market is complex and it takes 
elaborate evidence to bring it out. It is an effort that prepares the ground for 
chapter five, which describes the findings of the research.  
 
Chapter six will analyse the empirical evidence from chapter five and 
examine whether the theory developed in chapter three has satisfactorily 
explained quasi-market behaviour. It will also reflect on the repercussions of 
this behaviour on the conditions that make this particular quasi-market 
effective. The chapter will end with a short epilogue on the future of Dutch 
social housing.   
 
Next to the main body of text, there is an appendix. This contains a more 
elaborate treatise of the methodological and theoretical issues that were raised 
in previous chapters. I have felt it necessary to separate this part from the 
main body of text in order to allow the argument to proceed more smoothly. 
The few who care for such matters will find ample nourishment; the many 
that do not will be spared the effort of skipping several pages. 
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3 Social housing in the Netherlands: past and present  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that the analysis of a quasi-market 
requires sensitivity to its specific characteristics. This chapter will describe the 
two most significant features of Dutch social housing.10 First, it will discuss 
the nature of the product in question.11 Housing has intrinsic characteristics 
that raise particular dilemmas and shape the alternatives for choice. Next it 
will focus on the system of rules and structures as it has historically 
developed. This involves a brief description of past housing policy since the 
start of the 20th century. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the 
position of housing in the welfare state.    
 
The dynamics of housing are partly shaped by its characteristics as a product. 
The combination of consumption, capital and physical presence creates 
dilemmas and alternatives particular to this field. The historically evolved 
shape of housing provision and current housing policy determine how these 
basic properties translate into concrete arrangements. What is typical of 
housing provision in the Netherlands is that a major share of the housing 
capital is collectively owned by private non-profit organisations. Post-war 
housing policy has been largely directed by goals in other policy areas. It has 
also been consistently marked by strong intervention and by disagreement 
over who should control the housing stock. Recent reforms have shifted the 
dynamics of housing further downward and created the quasi-market that is 
the subject of this analysis.   
 
In the previous chapter, the introduction of the quasi-market was described as 
an element of the attempt to re-establish welfare state arrangements on a new 
footing. However, one could wonder whether the policy change in housing 
should really be interpreted in terms of welfare state reform. For a start, 
housing may not have been part of the welfare state to begin with. It has been 
largely absent from recent welfare state debates. Moreover, the introduction 
of the quasi-market may signal the decline rather than the preservation of 
social housing. There has been a downward turn in social housing all over 
Europe. However, any doubts regarding the position of housing in the 
welfare state are unjustified. The exclusion of housing from mainstream 
welfare state research is caused by a conceptual bias for income transfer. It is a 
fate that has befallen quite a few other welfare state areas. Moreover, there are 
as yet no grounds for saying that social housing the Netherlands is in decline. 
Housing researchers have devised typologies for distinguishing between 
different systems of provision, which roughly boil down to two types: mass 
and residual. Dutch social housing is still firmly in the mass category.   
 
Paragraph 2.2 focuses on the product characteristics of housing. Paragraphs 
2.3 and 2.4 describe the historical development of the sector, the former the 
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period up to the 1980s, the latter the reforms of the late 1980s and 1990s. In 
this context I will also discuss the specific conditions that are necessary for the 
quasi-market in social housing to be effective. The position of housing in 
welfare state research will be examined in 2.5. The concluding paragraph 2.6 
will sum up the most important conclusions from the previous paragraphs.    
 
3.2 Housing as a product   
 
Product characteristics are the inherent features of the commodity traded on a 
(quasi-)market. Barring drastic technological or cultural changes, these are of 
a permanent nature.12 They have received relatively little attention in welfare 
state research, because the latter has tended to concentrate on one type of 
provision only. The features of housing can be summed up as follows (Floor, 
1971): 
  
- Most of the costs of the good have to be borne in advance. The 
“ consumption”  of the good will take place over an extended period.   
- Housing is very expensive, which means that individuals will usually pay 
for it either by pooling resources or by attracting loans.  
- It consists of a large stock, which changes at a very slow pace;  
- Houses are fixed to a specific geographical spot and cannot be moved.  
- They are a necessary good and cannot easily be replaced with another 
type of good.  
 
Since most of the costs are paid in advance and because these costs are 
considerable, a house is in effect both a source of housing “ consumption”  
(having a roof over one’s head) as well as a tradable financial commodity. 
“ What makes housing unique among social programs is that it constitutes a 
stock of (sometimes literally) concrete assets, requiring very long-term 
investments. Although housing is a necessity, very few can afford to purchase 
their shelter outright. Various arrangements have to be made (e.g. renting, 
mortgages, public construction, provision, and subsidization) to spread the 
costs of housing over time”  (Pierson, 1994, p. 74). The tension between one-off 
investment, limited affordability and protracted consumption can be resolved 
through a variety of arrangements that each have a different way of 
spreading costs and benefits over generations and populations.  
 
Policymakers can use this property to pursue their policy goals, and not 
necessarily those of housing policy. In the context of welfare state cuts, 
Pierson has noted that housing “ created tremendous opportunities for 
retrenchment advocates to buy off potential losers and lower the visibility of 
cutbacks”  (p. 74). By selling council housing to present tenants at a discount, 
the British Conservative government could win popularity in the process of 
dismantling a welfare state arrangement –rare indeed. The new owners could 
pocket the surplus value of their homes, but did so to the detriment of present 
tenants who could not afford to buy, future tenants to whom this part of stock 
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was no longer available, and past generations of tenants and taxpayers who 
had effectively paid for the discount.   
 
But the opportunity to shift and spread costs can also be used for less cynical 
purposes. The owners of a large stock of public housing can subsidise the 
rents of poor tenants with the revenues of others to dampen inequalities in 
living conditions. They can also invest profits in the construction of new 
stock, which will lower the rents of future tenants. When collectively owned 
stock can be continually renewed by re-investing its own revenues, it becomes 
a “ revolving fund” , a self-supporting social programme. It will be able, not 
only to pursue public goals, but also to limit the risks of ownership. Since 
costs, revenues and the conditions that influence them have to be calculated 
years, if not decades in advance, ownership demands either luck or great 
foresight. Since dwellings are expensive assets, even relatively small losses or 
gains will be substantial. In collective rental housing, ownership and 
consumption are deliberately separated to protect tenants from the risks (and 
benefits) of changes in the market value of the property. Home ownership 
combines these two functions and spreads costs over time between 
generations, usually favouring the elderly. The profits of owner-occupied 
housing are usually spent either on upgrading the property itself or on 
consumption outside housing. From an individual perspective, the potential 
capital gains from home ownership are greater than those from rental 
housing, but so are the risks.  
 
Another effect of the product characteristics is that the housing market is 
divided into a large number of local markets. This is because demand and 
supply are not very mobile. Not only do most people need a home, they will 
not easily change it. Moving requires a great investment of time, money and 
emotion. Moreover, people are tied to particular areas through their social 
networks and jobs. The effect of all this is that demand is relatively immobile. 
Supply is even less mobile, since houses do not yet come on wheels. Even if 
there is a shortage in one area and a surplus in another, supply cannot be 
transferred to where it is needed. This makes housing provision potentially 
risky, since investment is tied up for long periods. As will be shown in the 
course of the analysis, this partly shapes the reactions of social housing 
providers to the introduction of the quasi-market.     
 
The physical nature of housing is a major component of the cities and villages 
as we know them today. The proximity of so many dwellings affects both the 
quality of consumption and the market value of individual homes. This is 
relevant to their owners, whether individual or collective. For instance, a 
house in a “ bad”  neighbourhood is likely to have a lower value than the same 
house in a “ good”  neighbourhood. The technical quality of the house will 
only be one aspect of the quality of consumption. This means that attempts to 
upgrade neighbourhoods are made not only for social reasons, but also (and 
perhaps more often) with an eye to potential financial gains. The physical 
aspect of housing also affects other areas of human life. Housing policy in the 
Netherlands originated in response to poor health conditions and the fear of 
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epidemics in the overcrowded inner cities. More recently, there have been 
concerns about the segregation of socio-economic and ethnic groups, which is 
believed to have been caused by the homogeneous construction programmes 
of the early post-war period. While it is not generally regarded as a problem 
in itself, some believe that it encourages crime, unemployment and all sorts of 
other social evils.13  
 
All in all, the complex and unique nature of housing makes it the subject of a 
multitude of pressures. Because it intersects so many spheres in society, it can 
be used for various purposes. This is indeed borne out by the history of Dutch 
housing policy during the twentieth century, in which it has been used for 
health improvement, economic reconstruction and income redistribution. 
Whoever can bring the enormous bulk of the housing stock in motion is 
bound to create an impact, even if the result is not always what was intended.    
 
3.3 Housing as a policy area: a short history 
 
There is controversy about the extent to which product characteristics 
determine the development of housing provision. Some argue that the capital 
aspect of housing makes it particularly vulnerable to exploitation and 
therefore untenable as a welfare state arrangement (see 2.6). Others believe 
the product only structures the choices actors make, without ultimately 
determining them. If this is true, the future of housing provision cannot be so 
easily predicted. Be that as it may, processes in the present quasi-market 
cannot be understood without taking into account how provision has 
historically developed. This paragraph will give a brief description of housing 
policy from the late 19th century onwards, ending just before the reforms of 
the 1980s and 1990s.    
 
3.3.1 The early years: before 1901 
 
In the 19th century, the quality of housing in many Dutch cities was 
deplorable. When Holland’s late industrialisation brought increasing 
numbers of workers to the major towns, great shortages arose. The housing 
private landlords were able or willing to offer was either too little, too 
expensive or of poor quality. The result was that the major cities were 
frequently confronted with plagues and riots. These problems finally made 
the gentry sit up and pay attention to the housing question. This was not 
regarded as an issue of significance in itself, but rather as part of the more 
general “ social question” , the task of pacifying the working class and 
integrating them into existing social structures. Attention to housing issues 
was generated not exclusively by compassion and notions of solidarity, but 
also by self-interest. After all, the establishment benefited from an 
economically adequate pool of labour resources and feared social upheaval. 
The exact balance between self-interest and selflessness is a matter of 
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historical interpretation. In any case, concern for the working classes 
translated into attempts to regulate working conditions within working hours 
(like Taylorist management techniques) as well as attempts to prevent 
irregularities outside working hours. Intervention in housing was part of this. 
In its early stages it was seen largely as a health issue. This is only the first 
instance in which housing policy was driven primarily by considerations that 
had little to do with housing itself. A recurrent theme in the history of 20th 
century Dutch housing is its function as an “ emergency exit”  for other areas 
of state policy (Helderman, forthcoming). In that sense, one must beware of 
interpreting the historical development of housing policy as a consistent and 
rationally designed trajectory.   
 
The first initiatives for improving the housing situation certainly did not come 
from the national state. The government was controlled by conservative 
liberals who were opposed to state intervention of any but the most basic 
kind. On the local level, wealthy citizens did take efforts to alleviate the worst 
problems. From the mid-19th century onwards members of the gentry and the 
industrial elite founded so-called social housing providers, private 
philanthropic organisations for the provision of rented housing to the 
working class.14 These people did not lose money in this charitable work. 
Their sense of social obligation was expressed in that they were willing to 
settle for a limited profit. This implied that rents were still at levels that were 
unattainable to all but the top of the working class, the educated and well-
paid. In addition to financial mechanisms of selection, there were usually 
rigorous application procedures to ensure that only “ decent”  people came in. 
Some of the social housing providers even appointed professional overseers 
to check on the behaviour of tenants (De Regt, 1984).  
 
It was only in the 1880s, at a time of more general social unrest, that the 
housing issue was extensively discussed in national politics. This was also 
encouraged by the availability of new and improved statistics, which clearly 
showed the miserable social conditions that large segments of the population 
were subjected to. Progressive liberals now took the upper hand and enacted 
various measures of social legislation, including the 1901 Housing Act.    
3.3.2 After 1901  
 
The 1901 Housing Act formally forced local authorities to set up a municipal 
housing policy. They were obliged to define minimum quality standards in a 
local housing act and to improve or demolish dwellings that did not conform 
to these standards. The law was broadly phrased, though, and local 
authorities were in practice free to determine the scope of their intervention. 
The Housing Act also extended the powers of the national authorities. What 
was especially innovative in the Dutch context was the ability to grant loans 
and subsidies for the purpose of lowering rents. Subsidies were attached to 
objects (the housing itself) rather than subjects (households). Object subsidies 
covered the gap between cost and price (rent), given that the former exceeds 
the latter. By implication, subsidies expanded as rents went down or costs 
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went up. That is why subsidies were accompanied by regulation concerning 
rent and cost levels. In time, this system would become increasingly 
complicated.  
 
The 1901 Housing Act has left a legacy that can still be seen today. It made 
some important choices. Most significant in this context was the decision to 
subsidise rented housing rather than home ownership. Although there is 
subsidised rented housing for the poor in most developed countries, 
emphasis on this segment in housing policy is by no means common. In the 
UK, for instance, home ownership spread relatively soon (Harloe, 1995). But 
the policymakers of the time regarded Dutch workers as unfit for home 
ownership. Could one really expect these commoners to maintain their homes 
well? More likely, they would soon sell this valuable asset to solve their 
inevitable financial problems. This line of reasoning, however out of fashion 
nowadays, is partly responsible for the powerful social housing sector that 
exists in the Netherlands today. A second important choice enclosed in the 
1901 Housing Act was that subsidies should be focused on two types of 
providers, local authorities and private social housing providers. The liberals 
in the government preferred the latter, since they were privately rather than 
publicly owned. Moreover, they were both less fragmented and less profit-
oriented than individual landlords. Construction by local authorities was 
condoned, if not encouraged. The law was in that sense a clever piece of 
legislation: one that set the general direction for the future development of 
policy, yet accommodated various interpretations at the national and local 
level, as well as relatively easy adaptations of policy over time. 
     
Since it gave financial support to privately owned providers, the government 
was forced to design regulation to ensure that subsidies were used for the 
proper purpose. Social housing providers were therefore pulled into a 
regulative framework that exists to this day, even if its content has been 
changed and expanded greatly in the course of the century. It effectively 
represents a permanent contract, trading autonomy for certain privileges. 
Privileges (subsidies, tax exemptions, priority treatment) were exchanged for 
control. This guaranteed a measure of security, but also tied the fate of the 
social housing providers to changes in national policy. The pre-1940 period 
shows this all too clearly. In the period directly after 1901, the government’s 
interpretation of the Housing Act was very limited. If subsidies and loans 
were granted at all, it was only for the replacement of the worst of dwellings. 
The government also decided (on economic grounds) that houses should only 
be let at market prices. Again, this shows that early social housing was an 
arrangement for the top of the working class and definitely not for the 
poorest, who were unable to afford rents at the market level.   
 
The First World War temporarily forced the government to intervene more 
extensively. Although the Netherlands were neutral during this war, they did 
feel its effects through the general scarcity of capital and construction 
materials. Private building slumped and housing shortages increased. 
Simultaneously, speculators were making huge profits out of the crisis. The 
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resulting social unrest was greater than it had been before and the 
government found itself on the defensive, especially with the growing 
influence of christian and social-democratic parties. For a short period it 
actively encouraged new constructing, starting an exponential growth in the 
number of social housing providers. It also froze rents to prevent private 
landlords from cashing on the scarcity. This in turn begged legislation for the 
protection of tenants, since without it the landlords could easily circumvent 
the rent freeze by evicting present tenants and reletting their houses at a 
higher price. This phenomenon was to occur time and again in the history of 
housing policy: each piece of legislation left gaps that could only be filled by 
another, leading to an increasingly complex and interlocking system of 
regulation.  
 
But this is not to imply that the government should have abstained from 
tampering with the housing issue. The developments of the 1930s show well 
what a non-interventionist approach may entail. When economic conditions 
became somewhat more stable, the government withdrew its financial 
support in the blink of an eye. It consistently maintained its position that 
housing provision was a private matter, emergency situations excepted. The 
results were disastrous. The number of dwellings built with financial support 
collapsed almost entirely and social housing providers went bankrupt by the 
dozen. Their share in new construction collapsed from 87% in 1920 to 16% in 
1926 (Van der Schaar, 1987a). Private builders did engage in construction, but 
only in the more expensive and most profitable segments of the market. They 
continued to do so even when surpluses began to appear in middle class 
segments, while shortages in working class housing were still growing.   
 
But even though the potential of new legislation was used sparsely, the 
choices made in the Housing Act would prove to be very significant in the 
following years. They favoured rented housing over home ownership and 
introduced some policy instruments that would be extensively used in later 
periods. Moreover, they had established private non-profit organisations as 
the main agents of housing policy.  
 
3.3.3 Housing policy as an instrument for reconstruction  
 
At the end of the Second World War, the country found itself faced with 
immense housing shortages, higher than those of most European countries. 
During the occupation construction had ground to a halt and many dwellings 
had been demolished or destroyed. These developments had added 
significantly to the great shortages that had existed before the war. In other 
words, it was time to start building. However, the housing market of the time 
was (still) wholly incapable of meeting the shortages. Building materials and 
capital were scarce. Moreover, private builders delayed their investments in 
the hope that conditions might soon improve. The government could not 
possibly have refrained from action, even if it had wished to. But by this time 
power had shifted to parties who were in any case in favour of more active 
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intervention. The new governing coalition consisted of catholics and, for the 
first time in Dutch history, social-democrats. With broad support, it enacted a 
large-scale construction programme with extensive financial support.  
 
Conditions were difficult, though. Many components of housing policy were 
not driven by considerations pertaining to housing, but served as support for 
policy in other areas. Economic modernisation had priority above everything 
else. In the first few years after the war, the available building capacity was 
used mainly for the reconstruction of industrial capacity and infrastructure. 
Consequently, it was only by the 1950s that new housing began to be built on 
any scale. The conditions for investment in housing, pretty awful in any case, 
had been made worse by the rent freeze enacted by the Germans in 1940 and 
maintained by the new Dutch government. At first this measure was meant to 
prevent the exploitation of scarcity by greedy landlords, but in time it became 
part of economic policy. The employers’ organisations and trade unions had 
come to an agreement that the latter would abstain from strikes, if the former 
promised to encourage full employment. The unions were willing to postpone 
demands for wage rises on the condition that increases in the costs of living 
(including rents) would be compensated for. This meant that rent rises would 
automatically translate into wage rises, which might undermine the 
international competitiveness of the Dutch economy. So even though rent 
rises would have encouraged expansion of the housing stock and would have 
enjoyed the support of virtually all actors in the housing sector, rents 
remained frozen until 1951. Until the 1960s, they were only allowed to rise 
sporadically.  
 
Long-term regulation of rents may have unintended consequences. Because 
houses are let at a price below cost, it becomes necessary to provide subsidies 
in order to cover the loss. Since the cost of new housing increases perpetually 
(due to rises in building costs), an increasing gap emerges between the rents 
of newly built stock and those of existing stock. This will make newly built 
dwellings less attractive, which in turn will discourage potential investors. 
The low rents of existing stock may also discourage owners from investing in 
maintenance and improvement. Finally, tenants who occupy a high-quality 
dwelling in the existing stock at a low rent will not move (or be moved) 
easily. Entrants in the housing market are then forced into poor or expensive 
housing. These problems can be solved by forcing down the rents of newly 
built dwellings with increased subsidies or by raising rents in existing stock to 
the cost level or somewhere near it (“ harmonisation” ). The disadvantage of 
the latter option is that, unless compensation is granted, tenants are faced 
with a considerable rise in costs of living (as occurred in the 1980s). Then 
again, it may prompt tenants who rent cheaply to move away, vacating 
relatively cheap dwellings for those of modest means. In short, rent policy 
may have strong side-effects. But again it must be stressed that such side-
effects are mirrored by failures of the housing market itself. Rents in existing 
stock generally adjust very slowly to rent rises in newly built stock, so there 
tends to be a gap between quality and price even when rents are not 
 31
regulated. The state can even choose to raise rents in existing stock artificially 
in an attempt to simulate the effects of an idealtypical market.  
 
But until the end of the 1950s rent policy was driven mainly by economic 
considerations. Rents were therefore kept low. Oddly enough, even when 
wage and price controls were relaxed, rent rises continued to be low for years. 
Everyone agreed they had to rise, sure enough; but who was to profit from 
the extra revenues? Some thought landlords themselves should retain the 
additional income, so that they could finally invest in maintenance and 
improvement of their assets. Others, particularly social-democrats, argued 
that additional revenues should be pooled in a collective fund that could be 
drawn upon when necessary. This discussion expresses a fundamental 
question that always hovers over the social housing stock: who owns it? Since 
the capital is composed of contributions from tenants and the state, and 
formally owned by non-profit providers, there is no easy answer. The catholic 
minister Witte (1952-58) evaded the dilemma by keeping rent rises so low that 
there was effectively nothing to distribute. This was of no use to anyone, but 
it stifled conflict.  
 
3.3.4 The implementation of housing policy 
 
The implementation of policy also reflected a compromise. The social housing 
providers and local authorities were (again) the most important actors in the 
implementation of national housing policy. The former found themselves in a 
very comfortable position. They were expressions of private initiative, which 
made them the favourite of the christian parties. This was not unimportant, 
since from 1954 to 1974 the Ministry of Housing was controlled by ministers 
from the religious parties. The private nature of the organisations to some 
extent accommodated liberal preferences. The fact that they were non-profit 
oriented appealed to the social-democrats, even if the latter preferred local 
authority provision (cf. Aquina, 1992). They were also relatively easy to 
control through the legal framework from before the war. Through their 
national branch organisations they maintained close links with trade unions 
as well as with the catholic and social-democratic parties (Gerrichhauzen, 
1990). All in all, they could count on broad support.  
 
The support carried with it massive funds, which translated into an enormous 
expansion of their stock (see table 2.1). Nonetheless, there were many local 
authorities that took it upon themselves to build and maintain stock. This did 
have certain advantages. The local authorities controlled the distribution of 
land, the planning process and the distribution of stock, allowing for a more 
co-ordinated process. Furthermore, their administrative structures were far 
more professionally organised than those of the semi-philanthropic social 
housing providers, making them more suitable for co-ordinating large-scale 
building projects (Brakkee, 1997). Indeed, in the early post-war years, local 
authority construction outstripped that of the private social housing 
providers. 
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Table 2.1: Social housing stock by type of provider, in absolute numbers  
(x 1000) and in relation to the overall housing stock  
 
 Private non-profit 
housing providers 
Local authorities  
 Amount 
of stock  
Share of 
total  
Amount of 
stock 
Share of 
total 
Overall share 
of stock 
1947 196 9% 69 3% 13% 
1956 314 12% 286 11% 24% 
1967 745 22% 462 13% 35% 
1975 1277 29% 519 12% 41% 
1982 1352 27% 339 7% 34% 
1989 1808 32% 322 6% 37% 
1994 2167 35% 122 2% 37% 
1997 
1999 
2355 
2362 
37% 
36% 
24 
14 
0% 
0% 
37% 
36% 
 
Source: CBS, Housing Statistics; Ministry of Housing, Public Housing in Figures.  
 
3.3.5 The neverending story  
 
But the important role of local organisations should not disguise the fact that 
the dynamic of policy was very much centralised, especially in the early post-
war period. The state hierarchically determined the size and nature of the 
building programmes on the basis of estimates of need and building capacity. 
The drive for extensive housing construction, combined with the need for low 
rents, caused a swift proliferation of object subsidies, for newly built as well 
as for existing stock. Subsidies were no longer used only for replacing the 
worst parts of stock, as they had been in the interwar period, but for building 
housing for a broad segment of the population. After 1958, capital for social 
housing was provided directly by the state (up to 1968 at an interest rate 
below the market level). This was deemed necessary because the capital 
market was unstable and unlikely to support sustained construction. 
Regulation of rents diminished the scope for negotiation between tenants and 
landlords, which called for an extension of tenant protection. Housing 
distribution was strictly regulated through a system of permits and 
distribution criteria, so that scarcely available space might be allocated as 
fairly as possible. In short, nearly all phases of housing provision were under 
direct state control. Policy instruments locked together to form a complex 
system that became difficult to fathom.  
 
When stringent macro-economic policy was finally rewarded with steady 
growth, the building programme could truly take off. Until the 1960s nearly 
all construction in housing was subsidised. The quality of dwellings was 
deliberately kept at a modest level to save money and building capacity. After 
all, quality improvement would cause an increase in cost and therefore a 
direct increase in subsidies. Limited budgets would not have allowed it, what 
with the large number of houses that were planned for construction. The 
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government encouraged the large-scale industrialised production of small, 
modest dwellings. There was little continuity in the production process, 
though, because construction was also used to fan economic growth and 
employment. If economic growth slowed down, construction was intensified 
and vice versa. Funnily enough, this type of policy often proved to have an 
effect that was completely opposite to what was intended. Due to bad timing, 
measures turned out pro-cyclical rather than anti-cyclical (Adriaansens and 
Priemus, 1986). Not only did construction fluctuate sharply, it proved 
incapable of dampening overall housing shortages. Because of the baby boom 
and the immigration from the colonies demand only kept rising and newly-
built housing was sufficient only to keep the shortages in check. Policymakers 
made a habit of underestimating demand.  
 
3.3.6 From quantity to distribution and quality 
 
At the end of the 1950s, the emphasis in policy shifted slightly from building a 
lot of cheap dwellings to building a lot of cheap dwellings. Now that the worst 
of the crisis was over, attention increasingly focused on the distribution of 
scarcity. This was encouraged by the collapse of the catholic/social-
democratic coalition in 1958 and its subsequent replacement by a 
protestant/liberal government. Most of the shortages were still in the bottom 
end of the market, since this was the segment most badly neglected before the 
war. The wish to build cheap housing effectively thwarted any attempt to 
reduce state-driven construction, since private builders generally operated in 
the more expensive and more profitable segments. The issue was politically 
very controversial. The protestant minister Van Aartsen (1959-63) tried to 
enact a programme of liberalisation, arguing that local authorities and non-
profits should only build housing for the poor sections of society. He lowered 
construction subsidies and targets for social housing, while raising those for 
the private sector. Simultaneously, he attempted to liberalise rents, which 
inevitably involved rises. Although initially successful, he was in the end 
forced to retrace his steps as the effects of his reforms began to be felt. 
Construction rates were set to drop, which was politically unacceptable at 
that time; yet only local authorities and non-profits could be expected to meet 
the targets with any degree of certainty. There were also grave concerns that 
the rise in private construction would threaten the growth of cheap market 
segments, where shortages were still higher than in the housing market 
generally. The minister was forced to raise the construction targets for social 
housing closer to their former level. The liberalisation was over before it had 
truly started.  
 
Van Aartsen’s successors of the 1960s, the catholic Bogaers (1963-67) and the 
protestant Schut (1967-71) realised that major reforms of housing policy 
would be impossible until the shortages had been alleviated. Accordingly, 
they quickly expanded the construction programme to record heights. At the 
close of the 1960s they finally succeeded in tilting the balance towards private 
construction (see table 2.2). This was possible because of the increasing desire 
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to add quality to quantity. Rising incomes had prompted demand for housing 
that was larger and more luxurious. The first of the regular national surveys 
of housing needs revealed that many people were living below their means. 
They wished to move to more expensive housing, but such housing was 
simply unavailable. Consequently, the technical quality of new housing was 
raised and rents were to some extent harmonised to address the need. 
However, it did not work out as expected because many newly-constructed 
units, in peripheral high-rise estates, were unpopular and therefore ill-suited 
to satisfy demand. The revival of private construction provided a welcome 
alternative, yet it was still unable to quench the ever increasing need. Demand 
was underestimated time and again.   
 
Table 2.2: Housing construction in absolute numbers (x 1000), as spread 
over local authorities, private non-profit housing providers and for-profit 
builders.  
 
 Total LAs Non-profits For-profits  
1946 1,6 0,4 0,2 1 
1949 42,8 18,3 14,1 10,4 
1959 83,6 24,7 22,9 36 
1969 123,1 23,4 39,1 60,7 
1979 87,5 2,6 23,8 61,1 
1989 111 3,8 32,3 74,9 
1994 87,4 1,1 23,6 62,7 
1997 
1999 
92,3 
78,6 
0,5 
0,4 
24,6 
17,3 
67,2 
61,0 
 
Sources: CBS (1989) and Ministry of Housing, Public Housing in Figures  
 
3.3.7 The social housing providers: coming of age 
 
Nonetheless, the non-profit sector still retained a considerable share in the 
growth of supply. The local authorities had been dominant in this segment 
immediately after the war, but were soon eclipsed by the private non-profit 
providers. Although the role of these organisations in the implementation of 
housing policy was virtually uncontested, their position in relation to the state 
was increasingly controversial. They had originally been embraced as 
representatives of private initiative, but had effectively become little more 
than administrative agencies. What with increases in scale and the shift of 
control over distribution to local authorities, they had lost touch with their 
members. Because they were obliged to repay subsidies when possible, they 
were unable to build up reserves. Consequently, their financial autonomy was 
negligible. They were also heavily dependent on local authorities, which 
acted both as contractors, providers of capital and financial controllers. There 
were increasing calls to grant the private non-profits a greater share of 
autonomy.  
 
In the early 1960s, the catholic minister Bogaers decided to act and dug up a 
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report by the committee-De Roos that had been resting in a drawer for two 
years. This report argued that the social housing providers should have a 
broad mission and greater freedom, complementing rather than replacing the 
for-profit sector. These recommendations were soon enacted. The obligation 
to repay subsidy was scrapped, which amounted to a gift of two billion 
guilders (Faber, 1997). Simultaneously, the influence of local authorities was 
curbed somewhat. They lost the ability to set additional conditions when 
locally allocating national state subsidies (a powerful instrument) and were 
relieved of part of their financial monitoring function. Finally, the 
government decreed that social housing providers would legally be favoured 
over municipal housing companies in awarding construction projects. These 
measures were very important, as they greatly strengthened the position of 
social housing providers both as the main providers of social housing and as 
(relatively) autonomous providers. But this in turn aroused controversy, as 
many criticised the privileged treatment of social housing providers over 
private for-profit builders. It prompted another significant policy move at the 
end of the 1960s: rather than reducing the existing privileges of social housing 
providers, the government introduced an equality principle into its subsidy 
system. This created similar eligibility criteria in awarding subsidies to non-
profit as well as for-profit providers, allowing each to build in both the lower 
and middle segments of the housing market. In the end, this only 
strengthened the social housing providers. They took full advantage of 
opportunities to build in more profitable segments, while for-profit builders 
stuck to their traditional territory.  
 
3.3.8 Increasing complexity and crisis  
 
Construction numbers might have risen, but this came at the cost of an 
increase in the burden of subsidies. At the end of the 1960s, the government 
started to develop new instruments to control expenditure. One of these was 
individual rent subsidy, an instrument that concentrated financial support on 
the most needy. The idea was that this type of subject subsidy might help 
bring down the less discriminate object subsidies. But on the whole attempts 
at reform met with strong resistance. Successive ministers had tried to 
introduce elements of liberalisation in the course of the 1960s, but had faced 
fierce resistance from the powerful catholic and social-democratic parties. 
Minister Schut introduced a system of small yearly rather than large irregular 
rent rises, in the hope that rises would face less opposition if they were 
implemented in small steps. It proved to be a gross miscalculation: the intense 
discussion over rent rises now returned on a yearly basis. In the early 1970s 
the protestant minister Udink (1971-1973) tried a head-on approach, setting 
ambitious targets for the harmonisation of rents and the reduction of 
subsidies. The resulting commotion helped usher in the government headed 
by Den Uyl in 1973, the first ever to be led by social-democrats. At that time 
there was still no room for radical shifts in housing policy, since it was too 
strongly embraced by other policy areas.  
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The social-democratic cabinet was the first since the war to have a 
comprehensive vision on housing. With heavyweights like Van Dam and 
Schaeffer (1973-77) at the top, the Ministry of Housing was in a stronger 
position to develop a policy of its own, despite worsening economic 
conditions. The social-democrats discarded the assumption held by previous 
governments that housing policy was merely a response to unusual economic 
disturbances and argued instead that state intervention in housing should be 
permanent. Good housing was regarded as the right of every citizen rather 
than a mere market product for the few. To underscore this they strengthened 
tenant protection and extended individual rent subsidies. They also diverted 
attention from new construction to existing stock, starting large urban 
renewal projects. Yet despite all this, the social-democrats did not really create 
a break in the underlying dynamic of housing policy, in that they retained the 
basic instruments of housing policy and allowed the growth of private 
construction (especially for home ownership) to continue. Moreover, the 
extension of individual rent subsidies increased the scope for lowering object 
subsidies with rent rises. In this way, the social-democratic interventions 
paved the way for future housing policy.    
 
The urban renewal projects, combined with suburbanisation, added to the 
spatial concentration of disadvantaged groups. These groups (many of whom 
were immigrants) used to live with private landlords, often in housing of 
poor quality. This was partly because rents were relatively low, partly 
because social housing providers attempted to keep them out (SCP, 1995). 
This type of housing was in many cases demolished or improved, leading to 
an influx of its inhabitants into dwellings vacated by more wealthy tenants 
who had moved to the suburbs (Van den Berg, Braun and Van der Meer, 
1997). This resulted in socio-economically homogeneous neighbourhoods, as 
well as a shift in the composition of the tenant population in social housing.    
 
The recession that came at the end of the 1970s resulted in the collapse of 
private construction and the value of stock. Again, the governments of this 
period found themselves forced to return to politics of crisis. Construction 
was encouraged by expanding subsidies, at a time when significant rent rises 
were politically unacceptable. Housing expenditure reached new records. The 
Ministry of Housing partially succeeded in suggesting budget cuts by 
inventive bookkeeping, particularly the transfer of state loans away from the 
regular budget. In reality, housing expenditure was spinning out of control.  
 
When private building revived in the course of the 1980s, the end of overall 
shortages finally came in sight. Mission accomplished! But there was little 
cause for celebration. Now that housing shortages had all but disappeared, 
housing policy soon lost its political priority, especially now that a large share 
of the middle-class electorate had deserted the social housing sector for home 
ownership. Housing policy became an easy target for the spending cuts 
enacted by the christian/liberal cabinets of the 1980s. In 1986, a parliamentary 
enquiry into construction subsidies painfully exposed the intransparancy of 
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the housing policy network, in which the ultimate destination of subsidies 
often could not be accounted for. The housing professionals were strongly 
condemned. They might have attained their goal, but they did so at the wrong 
time. When housing policy was high up on the political agenda, it was 
accepted that the goal justified the means; however, at a time when efficiency 
and financial accountability were the dominant goals, the actions of the past 
were condemned in retrospect.  
 
Criticism focused mainly on the open-ended nature of subsidy arrangements. 
Fictitious budget cuts were no longer sufficient. The government lowered 
subsidies by raising rents sharply, while at the same time cutting individual 
rent subsidies. The result was that housing expenses were a major factor in 
the growth of inequality (see table 2.3). After some years, crude cuts no longer 
proved to be sufficient and housing policy was completely revamped. 
Reforms were led by the christian-democratic secretary of state Heerma (1986-
1994). It is typical that housing, once important enough to command a 
politically significant ministry, was now handled by a mere department 
headed by a secretary of state.  
 
Table 2.3: Rent sharesa 
 
 1982 1986 1990 1994 1999 
Rent share for all tenants 15,8 18,1 19,7  21,1 23,8 
Rent share for target groupb 19,8 21,0 23,7 25,7 28,4 
Rent share for other tenants 11,7 13,8 15,0 16,2 18,8 
 
a.  The percentage of net income used for paying rents, excluding rent subsidies.  
b. Households with members under 65 years of age with an income below f 35000, - guilders 
(single-person) of f 46000,- (two or more) or over 65 with an income of 29.000,- or. f 
39.000,- guilders respectively.  
 
Source: CBS, Housing Statistics 
 
3.4 Reform  
 
3.4.1 The motives for policy change  
 
The reforms in housing were massive, but strangely enough they were 
implemented with little controversy or even attention. They have therefore 
often been referred to as “ the silent revolution in housing” (Klijn, 1996).15 It 
reflects the low priority of housing at this time, as well as the technocratic 
nature of the professional network in this policy area. The changes were 
justified with three main arguments (Ministry of Housing, 1989):  
 
- The nature of the housing market was changing. The government felt the 
need to shift attention from new construction to existing stock. Now that 
the overall housing shortage had been all but resolved, persisting mainly 
 38
in the urbanised western part of the country, policy increasingly 
concentrated on the maintenance, improvement and distribution of 
supply, particularly in the inner cities. Moreover, it was considered 
desirable to encourage individual ownership. The Dutch housing market 
used to consist mainly of rented housing, but home ownership was fast 
becoming the largest segment (see table 2.4). 
 
Table 2.4: The shares of rented housing and home ownership in the overall 
housing stock 
 
 1947 1956 1967 1975 1982 1989 1994 1998 1999 
Rented housing 71 72 67 61 58 55 52 50 48 
Home ownership 29 28 33 39 42 45 48 50 52 
 
Source: CBS, Housing Statistics, and Ministry of Housing, Public Housing in Figures 
 
- The government aimed to target housing policy on specific segments of 
the population, such as low-income groups and the elderly. Object 
subsidies favoured anyone who happened to occupy a dwelling and were 
no longer considered proper when shortages were gone. The intention 
was to replace them with individual rent subsidies where needed.  
- The government also desired to reorganise implementation, for a number 
of reasons. To begin with, it aimed to re-organise the system so that 
expenditure and the complexity of regulation would no longer run out of 
bounds. Furthermore, it wished to transcend traditional boundaries and 
encourage co-operation between professionals from different policy areas, 
non-profits, commercial businesses, and individual citizens. In urban 
development, for instance, housing professionals were encouraged to take 
part in programmes encompassing other urban issues such as welfare, 
education, economic policy and recreation. Finally, the government 
desired a shift from direct to indirect control. Rather than defining 
detailed targets and rules of process from a central vantage-point, it would 
instead allow providers to meet broad criteria in a manner of their own 
choosing, within limits.  
 
The actual reforms comprised many different changes (Walker, 1998; Van der 
Heijden, 1993). They will here be discussed only insofar as they affected the 
quasi-market in social housing provision.16 It is possible to distinguish three 
types of measures: the decentralisation of financial risks, the deregulation of 
legal constraints on both supply and demand, and the creation of new 
procedures for accountability and supervision. Together, they created the new 
quasi-market.  
 
3.4.2 The decentralisation of financial risks 
 
The non-profit providers came to carry the risks of their trade. In a dramatic 
move, the government calculated the net value of future subsidies and paid 
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them out all at once, after deducting the loans that were still to be repaid. This 
amounted to a one-off subsidy for the social housing providers, after which 
formal financial ties were completely severed. The providers themselves were 
accountable for any miscalculations in this operation. In short, they were 
financially liberalised. The risks that they faced were somewhat dampened by 
a number of tax privileges and two large capital funds, set up before 
liberalisation. One was designed to guarantee their loans on the capital 
market (allowing lower interest rates), the other to rescue providers in 
financial trouble. It should be stressed that the existence of this backup fund 
does not remove the market incentive. Once the fund is forced to step in, the 
organisation in question will lose a major part of its autonomy and 
temporarily receive direct orders from the Ministry. If it is allowed to 
continue independently, it will be only after a financial cleanup and a major 
reorganisation.17  
 
There was also a change in the way that the few remaining subsidies were 
allocated. In the 1980s, local authorities only functioned as administrative 
agencies when it came to subsidies. The processes of awarding, paying out 
and monitoring funds were all co-ordinated centrally. This responsibility was 
decentralised and the budgets for various types of subsidies were merged, so 
that local authorities had some freedom in allocating the money (although the 
amount of money was significantly less overall). Subsidies were no longer 
tied to real costs, only to predictions of costs. If they proved too low, no 
compensation was awarded. The social housing providers therefore carry the 
risks involved in calculating subsidies, including those of future subsidies.  
 
3.4.3 Deregulation of demand and supply 
 
Housing regulation was liberalised in the course of the 1990s, both for supply 
and demand. On the demand side, the freedom for individuals to choose their 
place of residence was also increased considerably. It was no longer as easy 
for local authorities to refuse access to their local housing markets. On the 
supply side, social housing providers gained greater freedom in making their 
own decisions. To begin with, their ability to set their own prices was 
significantly increased. They used to be obliged to increase their prices by a 
fixed annual percentage; after a period of gradual relaxation, the government 
only set maximum and average rent rises, with providers free to create 
variation in their overall stock. There were also fewer instances in which 
providers had to ask permission for major decisions. This used to extend to 
basic activities such as sale and construction, but step by step it came to apply 
to an increasingly limited number of far-reaching decisions, such as mergers 
or the transition to a new legal structure.  
 
However, despite the relaxation of behavioural controls, social housing 
providers were still closely guarded. There was still the requirement to re-
invest profits in social housing, to prevent money from leaking away. Many 
behavioural controls remained, such as restrictions on the discount at which 
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stock could be sold, price limits on housing constructed for sale, limits on the 
geographical area in which providers were allowed to operate, allocation 
rules and so on. The regulatory element of the quasi-market was still quite 
strong, even if it was a far cry from the regime within which providers 
operated prior to liberalisation.    
 
3.4.4 Accountability and monitoring 
 
The change to a quasi-market system has not relieved providers of their 
public responsibilities, but it has cast them in a new form. Rather than setting 
detailed targets, the state has now defined a number of broad criteria for 
social housing providers to follow. These include the provision of housing for 
low-income families, the maintenance of technical quality, care for the built 
environment, the participation of tenants in decision-making and a sound 
financial position; in other words, criteria that could mean virtually anything 
in practice. They were meant to be the starting-point for negotiations between 
providers and local authorities, during which the real performance targets 
would be specified. In that sense, local authorities were put in a position 
similar to those of intermediary organisations in other quasi-markets, with the 
crucial difference that they were not the actual purchasers. Tenants 
themselves make individual deals with providers; local authorities must see 
to it that providers acted in accordance with the collective (local) interest. 
Given that local needs in housing differ sharply, the nature of the collective 
interest would be defined territorially and balanced against the private 
interests of the providers.  
 
This element of the quasi-market was a deliberate attempt to shift the weight 
of policymaking to the local level. The targets coming out of the negotiations 
were meant to strike a balance between public and private responsibilities. 
This was reflected in one of the basic tenets of the new system, which was that 
local parties were “ equal in principle” . However, it is obvious that equality in 
principle must be accompanied by practical equality if it is to become reality. 
If local authorities are in a weak position, there is little guarantee that the 
public interest will be in safe hands. But if local authorities make too many 
demands on the providers in their municipality, the autonomy (not to 
mention the survival prospects) of the latter would be severely affected. A 
perfect balance is never likely to be achieved, but one party should not come 
to dominate over the other. The local authorities were given no specific 
instruments to further their interests, but could (ultimately) call upon the 
Ministry if they felt providers neglected their duties. However, more 
important than legal instruments is the control local authorities exercise over 
public spaces and facilities. Investment in the private housing cannot be 
effective unless it is accompanied by investment in the built environment. To 
illustrate this in a simple way, the market value of a house diminishes 
considerably when it stands in an area where the streetlamps are broken and 
the pavement littered with garbage. This creates mutual dependence and 
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therefore gives local authorities a bargaining position. It has become their key 
asset in negotiations with social housing providers. 
 
Formal monitoring used to be the province of local authorities, but their 
performance of this task was less than successful (Algemene Rekenkamer, 
1996; Giessen and Gerrichhauzen, 1986). In practice, local officials proved 
unable to separate their roles as independent supervisor and local partner. 
Damning reports by the National Auditing Chamber and some well-
publicised scandals led to a policy change that shifted monitoring to the 
Ministry of Housing and one of the national funds. These monitor whether 
providers live up to their performance criteria as they have been specified at 
the local level. The Ministry’s inspection bodies did not have the power to 
intervene directly, but could appeal for the minister to make a binding 
recommendation or, in the worst instance, to appoint a new manager. Again, 
this hardly ever occurred. In addition to external monitoring, the law also 
required providers to have internal monitoring bodies (Godfroij and De Jager, 
1997).  
 
There have been few fundamental changes to the system over the past years. 
Since the introduction of the quasi-market in 1994, when financial risks were 
decentralised, reform has proceeded incrementally. At the end of the 1990s, 
the Ministry of Housing evaluated the reforms and set out guidelines for 
future policy (Ministry of Housing, 2000). While the proposed changes show a 
slight tendency towards recentralisation, the discretion of the providers 
remains largely untouched. In social security, the quasi-market went through 
a major overhaul before it had even been formally introduced. But in social 
housing the system has so far proved stable. 
 
3.4.5 The conditions for the effectiveness of the quasi-market 
 
The quasi-market design that emerges from these changes is complex. It has 
never been quite clear how exactly the different mechanisms of co-ordination 
are mixed. However, the basic features of the system can be summed up as 
follows: 
  
- Competition, though rarely mentioned explicitly in policy documents, is a 
logical consequence of decentralising financial risks, for providers that 
operate in one local market dip into the same pool.  
- Regulation circumscribes the discretionary freedom of the parties involved 
and broadly defines the goals to which they should aspire.    
- Local negotiation is the third basic ingredient. It is through this mechanism 
that the broad goals must be specified and realised.   
 
On the basis of the previous description of the field, it is possible to specify 
the conditions for the effectiveness of quasi-markets identified in chapter one. 
As noted before, it will be assumed that the providers are motivated by 
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financial considerations (see chapter three). The conditions that make the 
quasi-market in Dutch social housing work properly will be assumed to be 
the following four, of which one is specific to this particular quasi-market: 
 
- Market structure: there must be the potential for competition. What is 
distinctive in this quasi-market is that is very fragmented. This means that 
competition must exist within each separate local or regional market.   
- Information: providers must find a way of dealing with the uncertainty 
inherent in a market-based system. This condition applies to all quasi-
markets and is no different here.  
- Intervention: the state must have effective instruments for correcting 
undesirable behaviour. In this sense, the requirements for the Dutch social 
housing system are not fundamentally different from those in other quasi-
markets either.    
- Local specification of targets: the relationship between local authorities 
and social housing providers must be balanced. The two parties must 
agree on how to translate the legally proscribed performance criteria into 
practical goals. These goals should represent a proper mix between public 
goals and private responsibility. This, in turn, can only be guaranteed 
when the relationship between the actors is broadly symmetrical.  
  
It is with reference to these four conditions that quasi-market behaviour must 
ultimately be evaluated, for they determine whether the system can be 
successful in the long term (see chapter six).  
 
3.5 Housing as part of the welfare state 
 
In chapter one, the introduction of the quasi-market in social housing was 
described as an element of welfare state change. It was interpreted as an 
attempt to preserve one of the areas of welfare state provision by establishing 
a system of implementation that could be more effectively controlled. 
However, there are reasons to doubt whether the change in housing policy 
should be described in these terms. For a start, one could question whether 
housing was really part of the welfare state in the first place, since it has been 
largely absent from the mainstream debate in social policy research. Its 
characteristics are not easily compatible with the theoretical concepts used in 
that debate. Moreover, the policy change could be explained as an effort to 
reduce the role of social housing rather than to preserve it. Social housing 
appears to be on the retreat throughout Europe, even in those countries 
where it has traditionally been strongest. Many have interpreted this as the 
end of housing as a major welfare state arrangement. What remains will be 
residual, of little significance in the overall housing market and of only minor 
importance to the overall welfare state. However, the absence of housing 
from mainstream welfare state concepts merely indicates a flaw in these 
concepts. There is no inherent reason why housing should be excluded from 
general welfare state research. It is also very doubtful whether social housing 
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in the Netherlands is fading into a marginal existence, at least in the short 
term. This paragraph will address the former issue, paragraph 1.6 the latter.  
 
Housing is only marginally present in welfare state studies and remains 
confined to specialist discussions, usually in separate fora. This is because the 
dominant stream in social policy research has conceptually grounded the 
welfare state in the labour market. It has pegged the goals of enhancing 
material welfare and social integration to the position of the individual on the 
labour market. The need to acquire income through selling labour is then set 
against an individual right to receive income through welfare. The impact of 
welfare arrangements upon the social order is reflected in the way that they 
affect labour market inequalities. This assumption has marked effects upon 
welfare state typologies, which have become one of the most popular tools of 
social policy research in recent years. These are classifications based on 
idealtypical representations of national welfare states.18 Idealtypes should be 
constructed on the basis of significant components of the real-life object; 
however, the commonly used welfare state types have only limited relevance 
for housing, because they neglect those features of public programmes that 
are essential to an understanding of housing provision.  
 
The most famous example is Esping-Andersen’s typology of three welfare 
states types or “ regimes”  (Esping-Andersen, 1990). It is a categorisation 
originally developed on the basis of a power resource perspective, more 
specifically, one that attaches great importance to the role of the labour 
movement. Esping-Andersen identifies three clusters of national welfare 
states (liberal, corporatist and social-democratic) which differ in terms of 
decommodification (the separation of provision from labour market position) 
and stratification (the relationship between citizenship and social class). This 
model can be interpreted as a reaction to studies that regarded the 
development of the welfare state as a linear and universal process, for 
instance, a phenomenon inevitably connected to economic growth and 
industrialism (Wilensky and Lebaux, 1958). Such studies have classified 
welfare states on the basis of spending levels. Esping-Andersen argues that 
this type of approach wrongly assumes that all spending counts equally. For 
instance, in one country most of the budget may be spent on luxurious 
arrangements for a happy few, while in another it may be spread equally. 
Moreover, it would be impossible to determine what extent of spending 
amounts to a welfare state without some additional criterion.  
 
It is beyond doubt that the regime approach has made a significant 
contribution to the welfare state debate. It has spurred on discussions for a 
decade and refined the analytical categories designed by welfare scholars 
such as Titmuss (Titmuss, 1974). The problem is that its conceptual 
framework is based on income transfer and that it is therefore not easily 
compatible with the characteristics of housing. It is not surprising that Esping-
Andersen excluded housing from his regime analysis, for it poses obvious 
difficulties. For a start, it is an area in which one of the central variables of his 
analysis, “ decommodification” , appears to be less relevant (Harloe, 1995). 
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There is no capitalist welfare state in which housing is not closely linked to 
market spending power, even if the strength of the link differs between 
countries. Moreover, variations in patterns of housing provision cut right 
across the welfare regime clusters that can be identified in social security. In 
an earlier study Esping-Andersen himself noted that the housing 
arrangements of Sweden, Norway and Denmark could not possibly be any 
more different, even though these countries are all part of the social-
democratic welfare cluster (Esping-Andersen, 1985).19 
 
Discussions on categories such as these eventually boil down to the question 
how the welfare state should be defined. A great number of welfare state 
researchers simply seem to equate the welfare state with mechanisms for 
income transfer. They often identify state activities connected to the labour 
market as the “ core”  sectors of the welfare state (e.g. Giddens, 1998; Kuhnle, 
1996; Schuyt, 1991). However, it is difficult to see any systematic line of 
reasoning behind such a core/periphery distinction. It could certainly not be 
based on individual need, as there is no reason to assume that income is more 
significant to well-being than access to good health facilities and housing. Nor 
could the distinction be based on spending levels, for that would imply a 
return to the kind of argument opposed by the regime approach. Another 
argument is that goods and services necessary for individual well-being can 
only be acquired with money and that this money mostly comes in the shape 
of income, which is in turn acquired through labour market participation or 
public arrangements that replace such participation. However, a lot of state 
funding is channelled through the providers of welfare state arrangements 
rather than through their clients. In housing, for instance, construction 
subsidies used to be far more important than individual rent subsidies. To 
focus on income-based programmes is to ignore the large-scale investment in 
supply. The right to receive adequate shelter and the existence of rent subsidy 
schemes have no practical consequence unless there is sufficient stock to 
house people. All in all, the exclusion of housing from mainstream welfare 
state research appears to have no logical grounds.    
  
3.6 Towards practical insignificance?  
 
3.6.1 Mass and residual housing provision 
 
Throughout Western Europe, social housing has been on the retreat in recent 
years. “ The social rented sector is on the defensive and will probably remain 
so for years to come”  (Priemus and Dieleman, 1997, p. 424). Some go as far as 
to say that this heralds the end of social housing as a mass welfare state 
arrangement (Harloe, 1995). They believe what little will remain of housing 
policy will be targeted at the poorest sections of society. This implies that, 
even if there is no conceptual basis for ignoring housing, there may be 
practical grounds for doing so –if not now, in the foreseeable future. If this 
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also applies to the Netherlands, then the introduction of the quasi-market 
should be interpreted as the beginning of the end of social housing, not as an 
attempt to preserve it.   
 
But does this general decline also affect social housing in the Netherlands? To 
answer that question, it is necessary to define more clearly what “ decline”  
means exactly. In housing studies, it usually refers to the notion that welfare 
states will converge towards a single type, one similar to the marginal 
facilities found in most of the Anglo-Saxon countries. Decline could then be 
described as the move from one type of provision to another. However, as 
noted in the previous paragraph, the concepts that mainstream welfare state 
research uses to describe types of provision are based on income transfer and 
are therefore unsuitable for housing. Fortunately, a major share of the welfare 
state debate of the 1990s has concentrated on expanding and redefining the 
analytical categories used in identifying different types of welfare states 
(Abrahamson, 1999). This has led to a proliferation of modifications, additions 
and alternatives, each trying to incorporate some new angle or new area into 
popular typologies. For instance, some critics have argued for adding further 
types, such as a Southern European or an Antipodean one, reworking the 
regime categories in the process (Ferrera, 1996; Castles and Mitchell, 1993). 
Esping-Andersen has recently given the family a more prominent place in his 
own classification, although the change has not been as radical as some of his 
feminist critics have argued for (Esping-Andersen, 1999).  
 
Similarly, there have been attempts to modify the categories for use in 
housing research, while retaining its basic framework (Kleinman, 1996; 
Barlow and Duncan, 1994). Others have gone further. They have retained the 
notion of different categories, but have fundamentally reconsidered the 
criteria for defining them. The classifications they have developed are 
applicable to housing only and make no claim to cover the entire welfare 
state. Indeed, Harloe has questioned whether such broad classifications are at 
all useful. “ There is no reason to believe that, in the absence of contrary 
evidence, that theories which have been developed to cross-national 
variations in one, albeit major, aspect of the welfare state will be equally 
applicable to other sectors, let alone to the overall ‘regime’ (if such a holistic 
conception is thought to be empirically identifiable and/or of analytical 
utility)”  (Harloe, 1995, p. 535).20  
 
The categories developed specifically for housing can be roughly reduced to 
two major types, even if researchers have different views on how they come 
into being and where they are headed. Harloe has named the two “ mass”  and 
residual”  housing provision, terms which I will retain in this analysis.21 In the 
mass system of provision, social housing comprises a large section of the 
overall housing stock and covers various segments of the population, 
including a large share of the middle classes. There is no stigma attached to 
social housing, because it is not regarded as a facility for the poor. In a 
residual model, by contrast, social housing is a welfare state arrangement 
targeted at the poorest, who cannot procure a dwelling of adequate standards 
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on the regular housing market. It is low-quality and somewhat disreputable, 
which is why those who can will opt for home ownership. The mass model 
can be found in countries like Sweden, Germany and France, while the 
residual model is common to the Anglo-Saxon countries. While there is 
overlap with the distribution of social security arrangements, the distinction 
between the social-democratic and corporatist regimes becomes problematic.22 
 
3.6.2 Will Dutch social housing become residual?  
 
The two types of provision help to define what it means if social housing is in 
decline. It can be described as the move from a system with the characteristics 
of mass provision to one with the characteristics of residual provision. More 
specifically, it would entail (1) a significant drop in the share of social housing 
in the overall stock, combined with a rise in home ownership rates, and (2) a 
shift within social housing from a diverse, high-quality to a low-quality, 
targeted stock. This is what is implied in Harloe’s definitions of mass and 
residual housing provision. The Netherlands still clearly have a mass system 
of housing provision. In fact, the social housing sector is still the largest of the 
capitalist world. In 1994, social housing covered 37% of total stock, when it 
was 22% in Sweden, the nearest rival, and 18% in the EU as a whole (Balchin, 
1996, p. 70). By the end of the research period, the market share had only 
dropped by one point. In addition, the social housing providers own stock of 
high quality, with financial reserves that are strong on average (Helderman 
and Brandsen, 2000). Consequently, there is as yet no ground for arguing that 
the introduction of the quasi-market has led Dutch social housing to the 
margins.   
 
Of course, that could still happen in the long term. Social housing is losing 
many tenants to home ownership, even though its market share has so far 
remained stable. It is at this point impossible to tell whether this trend will 
continue to the point where home ownership becomes the dominant form of 
tenure. There are also doubts whether all of the social housing stock can be 
kept on board. It is possible that the government will force the sale of parts of 
the stock, like in the UK, or that some of the providers will opt out of the 
system. Each of these events would bring residualisation several steps closer. 
Chapter six will take a peek into a future and discuss these doom scenarios in 
more detail.   
  
3.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has described Dutch social housing. These were the most 
important points:  
 
- Housing allows many different opportunities to shift or spread costs, 
benefits and risks over time.  
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- Until the 1980s Dutch housing policy favoured rented housing, owned and 
maintained by private non-profit providers.   
- The bulk of state support was channelled through supply rather than 
demand.  
- The liberalisation of the 1990s shifted the risks of provision down to the 
social housing providers themselves.  
- Simultaneously, rules regarding the behaviour of providers were relaxed. 
Their behaviour was to be evaluated on the basis of broad performance 
criteria, specified at the local level during negotiations between providers 
and local authorities.  
- The introduction of the quasi-market must be regarded as an attempt to 
preserve social housing provision rather than to reduce it.   
 
The characteristics of social housing have major consequences for the analysis. 
For a start, the activities of providers will have been directed by the type of 
product and by the system of rules in which they operated. The risks 
associated with housing provision are caused largely by the inflexibility of the 
product, because investment in housing is so strongly tied up. In other words, 
one should interpret quasi-market behaviour as an attempt to overcome this 
inflexibility. Furthermore, the regulation forecloses and enables the 
alternative choices they can make. In short, the features of social housing 
provision described in this chapter structure the way providers react to the 
quasi-market, even if they do not determine it. Chapter three will develop a 
general theory of (quasi-)market behaviour. The fourth chapter will place this 
theory within its present context and develop methods for interpreting the 
raw empirical data.  
 
The design of the quasi-market described in this chapter implies five 
conditions which should make the quasi-market work effectively, at least 
according to the blueprint:  
 
- The market structure must be competitive within local markets. 
- Providers must be motivated by financial considerations (this will be 
assumed to be the case). 
- Providers must find adequate ways to deal with uncertainty. 
- The state must have effective instruments for intervention. 
- The relationship between local authorities and providers should be 
balanced. 
 
Chapter six will examine how the behaviour of providers affects these 
conditions in practice, using the empirical evidence described in chapter five.  
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4 A theory of (quasi-)market behaviour   
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will provide the tools for the analysis. The first chapter described 
recent changes in the welfare state, one of which was the introduction of 
quasi-markets in the implementation of social policy. It was a whole new 
situation for providers and one that required more than a little flexibility on 
their part. The question is how they have responded. This chapter will argue 
that the quasi-market confronted them with two kinds of problems. To begin 
with, they no longer had the certainty that they would get the resources they 
needed to function independently. Second, the old methods of handling 
housing provision no longer applied in a quasi-market context. Providers 
have had to devise new ways of dealing with uncertainty.   
 
Now that the financial risks of provision have been decentralised, social 
housing providers no longer have the guarantee that they will receive the 
money they need to ensure their financial continuity. This means they will 
have to find ways of keeping the money flowing. What policymakers had 
hoped for, of course, is that the increase of uncertainty would impel providers 
to improve their products with the aim of enticing customers. However, there 
are other ways of averting the risks of provision. For instance, expansion into 
other markets will make providers less dependent on any particular group of 
customers. This chapter will describe a theory that is very suitable for 
explaining these kinds of decisions, the resource dependence theory. It shows 
the various ways in which providers can acquire the resources they need, 
even those that run counter to the quasi-market design.  
 
But the social housing providers also faced a second kind of uncertainty. 
Under the old system, they knew what to do, but with the introduction of the 
quasi-market at least part of that knowledge became irrelevant. The routines 
that worked when they were in effect administrative agencies were 
inappropriate in the new setting, where they were forced to think in a more 
business-like manner. As resource dependence theory will show, there are a 
number of alternative actions they can pursue to replace the old ways. But it 
is by no means certain that they will be aware of all these options, nor that 
they will know which to choose. Even if they have chosen a general approach 
to the quasi-market, they may not know how to translate it into concrete 
decisions. In other words, they face a problem of knowledge as well as of 
resources. This aspect of behaviour will be analysed with the help of the 
institutional theory of organisations, which has many interesting things to say 
about limited rationality.  
 
Paragraph 3.2 will describe resource dependence theory and note its benefits 
and shortcomings. Although very useful in some respects, it pays little 
attention to the cognitive dimension of action, which has been at the heart of 
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recent institutional organisation theory. This will be discussed in 3.3. When 
old habits no longer work, as can be expected in such a different kind of 
setting, actors will need new knowledge. There are several ways of meeting 
this need, individually and collectively, all summed up in 3.4. Together, these 
theories go a long way in explaining quasi-market behaviour. Not only do 
they highlight the different kinds of uncertainties that providers face, they 
also correct each other’s weaknesses. Paragraph 3.5 will combine them into a 
single theoretical model. To expand this into a theory, two more steps have to 
be taken. First, the action needs to be placed in context: when can be expected 
to make which choices? Second, the actions themselves must be spelled out in 
more detail, if they are not to be misinterpreted. These issues will be dealt 
with in 3.6 and 3.7 respectively. It will allow me to complete my theory of 
(quasi-)market behaviour in 3.8. The concluding paragraph 3.9 will examine 
whether the theory has any direct implications for the conditions that make a 
quasi-market operate effectively.  
 
This chapter will take a fairly straight path towards its goal, with few stops 
and detours. The theories will be treated solely as instruments for the analysis 
ahead. Paragraph A.2 of the appendix contains a more elaborate description 
of the traditions from which they arose.  
 
4.2 Resource dependence theory  
 
4.2.1 Environments through resource exchange 
 
The first building block of the theoretical framework is the so-called “ resource 
dependence theory”  (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). It is an interpretation of 
market behaviour that is very suitable for demonstrating the benefits of an 
actor-centred approach. Its core assumption is that the behaviour of 
organisations is governed by their relations with the organisational 
environment. It rejects the focus on the internal workings of organisations 
that characterised many studies of the 1950s and 60s. The latter conceived of 
organisations as rational instruments for the attainment of a set of goals and 
stressed the importance of individual leadership.23 The next generation of 
research shifted its perspective outward and began to study the ways in 
which organisations are influenced by their environments. It suggested that 
organisational action cannot be understood only by studying the organisation 
itself. An analysis must place organisations within their surroundings and 
take account of the various demands made upon them. Only then will it be 
clear why they make particular choices and how they manage to survive. 
Resource dependence theory picks up this thread and combines it with an 
emphasis on the political nature of action.   
 
The theory conceives of interaction with the environment as the exchange of 
resources. This comprises not only the exchange of goods and services for 
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money, but, as Zald has nicely phrased it, “ the exchange of goods and 
incentives that bind men to each other”  (Zald, 1970, p. 19). Since organisations 
are rarely entirely self-sustaining, they will need to enter into exchanges with 
their environment to acquire the resources they need to survive (Levine and 
White, 1961). To borrow an example: 
 
Even seemingly self-sustained organizations require some transactions with their 
environment for survival. The convents and abbeys that flourished during the Middle Ages 
were designed to be virtually self-sufficient. Needs were kept to a minimum; foods were 
grown within; and many required utensils, tools, and clothing were made by the abbey’s 
available labor. An attempt was made, consciously, to isolate the organisations as much as 
possible from the secular world outside. But abbeys were peopled by people, usually of one 
sex, and humans are mortal. This meant that new members had to be recruited from the 
outside, which required the organization to maintain relations with sources of recruits –
prisons, wealthy families with illegitimate offspring, and so forth. Recruitment on the outside, 
therefore, imposed on the organisation a need to devote some energy to elaborate 
socialization and indoctrination procedures. Moreover, these religious organizations had land, 
and to maintain their land, it was necessary to ensure a position of social legitimacy and 
political acceptance so that other groups would not attempt to seize the land for themselves 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, pp. 2-3).  
 
If this applies to abbeys, then it does even more so for organisations in a 
market context. Given the assumption that they wish to survive, they will 
need to acquire staff, tools, and money. In social housing, that would include 
financial capital for investment, building materials, land, offices, as well as 
expertise and manpower to carry out tasks such as construction, maintenance 
and administration. Organisations will depend on other actors to provide 
those resources. This, in turn, means that they will have to maintain 
relationships of dependence with various actors in its surroundings. For 
instance, they need suppliers to buy raw materials from and customers to get 
money. The organisation is even indirectly dependent on its competitors, for 
they are all fishing in the same pool. Its ability to get money from customers 
hinges critically on the (in)ability of other organisations to attract these same 
customers.  
 
The flow of resources may not be assured. For instance, customers may decide 
to spend their money elsewhere, even though the organisation needs that 
money to survive. This creates uncertainty, a situation in which future 
conditions cannot be predicted to a sufficient degree.24 As organisations prefer 
a predictable environment that can be relied upon to provide critical 
resources, they are likely to try and reduce the level of uncertainty. It is this 
kind of logic that underpins the introduction of quasi-markets. Providers 
need resources to carry out their tasks and within the fold of the public sector 
these resources are guaranteed to arrive. When the state carries the financial 
risks of provision, it ultimately does not matter whether customers stay or 
not. The loss of income their exit incurs will be compensated for. But when 
the risks are decentralised to the organisations themselves, they will have to 
find other ways of ensuring that the money keeps coming in. They may have 
to stop customers from leaving.    
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4.2.2 Asymmetric dependence and attempts to overcome it 
 
When one actor needs another more than the other needs him, the latter is in a 
position to exercise influence over the former.25 For instance, customers may 
use their exit option to influence the products that suppliers bring to the 
market. Similarly, when customers are solely dependent on one company for 
a crucial product, the latter may exploit this situation by demanding 
extravagant prices. Whether dependence relations are “ asymmetric”  is 
determined not only by the importance actors attach to particular resources, 
but also by the overall distribution of resources in the environment and by the 
rules governing interaction. Asymmetry arises when resources are 
concentrated in one or a few actors and when these resources cannot easily be 
replaced. The oil market is a good example. OPEC countries have been able to 
raise price levels more or less at will, because they have the single largest 
stock of an essential type of fuel. Regulation may affect relationships of 
dependence by increasing or diminishing the significance of a particular 
resource, by restricting or enabling access to it and by encouraging its 
concentration or diffusion. For instance, the state may force underage citizens 
to undergo education, making it indispensable; then it may go on to award 
grants and set maximum fees so that even children from poor families will 
have access to educational facilities; finally, it can encourage diversity among 
schools so that parents will have a greater degree of choice.     
 
Asymmetric dependence relationships are uncomfortable for the organisation 
at the wrong end of the bargain, since there is always the threat that the other 
will withhold his resources or make unreasonable demands. Faced with this 
situation, it is likely that the organisation will look for a way to strengthen its 
position. It is in the recognition of this kind of behaviour that resource 
dependence theory really distinguishes itself from the contingency theories 
that preceded it. Contingency theorists argued that an organisation has no 
choice but to adapt to its environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Woodward, 1965). If the organisation wants to survive, it simply has to accede 
to the demands of the system, whether these concern its technology, its 
structure or any other decision. It is also conceivable that an organisation will 
try to adapt the environment rather than vice versa. Indeed, there is a lot of 
evidence to show that systems can be unravelled and undermined from 
within. Government agencies insulate themselves from unfavourable policies. 
Businesses band together to thwart competition. Interest groups lobby the 
government and fund political campaigns in order to change regulation. 
Resource dependence theory stresses that actors are able manipulate the 
context in which they are embedded, to the point where they can avoid or 
even defy pressure from other actors.26 
 
There are basically three strategies for reducing dependence. To begin with, 
actors can try to control other actors who are in a position to affect the 
former’s dependence on a particular resource. One way is to control those 
who control the resource. For example, businesses can incorporate parts of 
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their supply chain so that they will be less dependent on outside producers. 
Since they are indirectly dependent on competitors, they can also choose to 
band together horizontally through cartels or mergers, in order to command 
more resources and weaken their dependence on competitors. The existence 
of anti-trust policy implies a recognition of this possibility (Pfeffer, 1979). A 
second strategy is to find alternative sources, so that dependence on any 
single source is diminished. Businesses may try to attract different groups of 
customers, so that the loss of one type of customer will not immediately 
plunge them into ruin. Finally, actors can reduce their dependence on a 
particular resource by finding an alternative that fulfils the same need or 
simply by kicking the habit. For instance, the Western world could reduce its 
dependence on oil-producing countries by developing alternative types of car 
fuel not based on oil. It could also abandon car travel.  
 
It is comforting to know that, at least in theory, actors have the option to resist 
outside pressure. It is a major source of change in contemporary society. The 
problem is that such change may not always be welcome. The example of 
anti-monopoly regulation shows that it may take a watchdog to keep 
organisations within bounds. This is one of the main problems associated 
with the introduction of quasi-markets. Providers may well take other actions 
than were taken account of when the quasi-market was designed. Their 
actions may even eat away at its very foundations. For instance, providers 
may establish long-term relationships with their clients that are based on trust 
rather than competitive contracting (Lapsley and Llewellyn, 1997).27 This kind 
of inner erosion, so undesirable from the perspective of policymakers, will 
also surface in the analysis ahead.   
 
4.2.3 The political nature of organisational action  
 
Given the fact that organisations need to acquire several resources from their 
environment, their goals and efforts will reflect the various demands of other 
actors. To balance these may be difficult, for they may be contradictory or too 
great a burden. “ Many of the problems organizations face in attempting to 
adapt to their environments stem from the inability to predict or assess the 
potency and demands of various interest groups, how these demands conflict, 
or how they constrain the organization’s actions”  (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, 
p. 84). This is fairly self-evident in the case of state bodies, one of whose main 
tasks is to juggle with the claims of diverse interest groups. Yet the same 
applies to other types of organisations, such as commercial businesses. For 
example, a food producer may have to balance shareholder interests with the 
demands of consumer groups and state authorities. The former’s demand for 
quick profits may collide with the latter’s insistence on investment in safety. 
The organisation’s strategy will somehow have to strike a balance between 
these competing claims. This means that organisational goals should not be 
regarded as a coherent and neutral set of objectives, but rather as a temporary 
compromise. Again, this notion is directly applicable to quasi-market issues, 
particularly to the potential contradiction between public responsibility and 
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commercial sense. For instance, housing providers may wish to target more 
profitable segments of the market, when local authorities would rather they 
focus on low-income groups.  
 
Although resource dependence theory has focused mainly on interaction with 
the external environment, its extends its logic to the internal dynamics of 
organisations. The outside world may consist of actors with diverse interests 
and resources, but so does the organisation itself (March, Simon and 
Guetzkow, 1967).28 They are not machines singularly focused on the 
attainment of goals, but “ loosely coupled”  systems in which subunits have 
considerable autonomy (Weick, 1995). The extent to which they are coherent 
differs radically and depends on the kind of organisation concerned. For 
instance, small military units may have a tight chain of command. But 
hospitals and schools, where professionals have a larger measure of 
discretion, will probably be far more fragmented (Meyer and Rowan, 1992; 
Moss Kanter and Summers, 1987). Some units may be more closely allied to 
actors in the environment than to other units within the organisation.   
 
Organisational units may encourage specific methods of coping with the 
environment, in the hope that the success of these methods will boost their 
power within the organisation. For example, the general shift to 
diversification strategies in American businesses was accompanied by the rise 
to power of marketing specialists within those businesses (Fligstein, 1990). 
Organisational goals should therefore be regarded as the outcome, not only of 
interaction with the environment, but also of internal conflict. Indeed, some 
interactions with the environment are pursued primarily for their internal 
effects. 
 
4.2.4 Benefits and shortcomings of resource dependence theory  
 
The basic tenets of resource dependence theory can be summed up as follows:  
 
• Organisational action is shaped in interaction with the environment;  
• The interaction with the environment is conceived of in terms of resource 
exchange; 
• An organisation’s need for particular resources forces it to maintain 
relationships of mutual dependence with other actors; 
• When relationships are asymmetric, one actor may exercise influence over 
the actions of another;  
• The relationship between an organisation and its environment is not one-
way. The organisation’s actions are influenced by its relationships of 
dependence with the environment, but it may try to manipulate those 
relationships; 
• Organisational goals and actions represent the interests of actors inside as 
well as outside the organisation. They are not of a neutral or technical 
nature.  
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The theory thus combines the notions of exchange and power, while 
refraining from normative assumptions concerning the outcome of 
organisational action. It is this combination of elements that allows it to 
absorb and integrate various other theories. Hasenfeld goes as far as to speak 
of a “ converging framework”  (Hasenfeld, 1983, p. 43). Its flexibility is 
certainly a great merit: it is applicable to various types of organisations, levels 
of analysis and organisational issues. It has traditionally been applied to  
market contexts, but can also be adapted to organisations in quasi-markets 
and in the public sector. Its scope potentially extends from large 
organisational fields down to the individual level, with the ability to shift 
between various units of analysis. This is a talent it shares with mainstream 
economic theory. As noted before, it is also suitable for bringing out the 
double-edged nature of interaction between organisations and their 
environments. However, there are also drawbacks to the theory’s generous 
nature. For a start, it ignores the element of cognition: the fact that action is 
not only based on interests, but also on knowledge. Second, there is an 
inherent tension in resource dependence theory that leaves a gap in its 
explanation of market behaviour.  
 
Resource dependence theory fails to incorporate the role of cognition in 
explaining organisational processes. Actions are not inspired by the 
environment as it is, but by the environment as it is perceived. They act upon 
the environment as they know it, weighing the alternatives they are aware of 
and using the means they know how to use. In their description of resource 
dependence theory, Pfeffer and Salancik do touch upon this issue: “ The 
events of the world around us do not present themselves to us with neat 
labels and interpretations. Rather, we give meaning to the events”  (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978, p. 72). They then go on to list determinants of 
organisational perceptions, such as the organisation’s system for processing 
information, filters for screening out undesired information and informational 
politics. They argue that information, like other aspects of the organisation, is 
subject to manipulation and conflict. “ One would suspect that subunits, 
which are themselves concerned with their own survival and power in the 
organization, would collect information which enhances their own value in 
organizational decision making or which convinces others in the organization 
that they have information needed for organizational problems. In either case, 
attentional processes are determined by the organization’s own structure of 
influence”  (p.77). However, this discussion falls short of a systematic link 
between an organisation’s strategy to cope with environmental demands and 
its perception of those demands. The role of perceptions could easily be left 
out (as, indeed, it often is) without impairing the theory as a whole. This gives 
a mechanistic tinge to the theory, as if actors simply adapt to an objective set 
of circumstances (Donaldson, 1995).   
 
A second problem with resource dependence theory is the tension between 
autonomy and control. One of the assumptions of the theory is that 
organisations will try to reduce their uncertainty concerning crucial resources. 
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When they are dependent on others for those resources, they will try to 
reduce the dependence. On the one hand, this should cause them to pursue 
autonomy, freedom from the rein of dependence relationships. On the other 
hand, control over resources can often be gained by joining with other 
organisations. This entails a loss of autonomy, but also a stronger grip on 
crucial resources. It is not self-evident which of these options should take 
precedence. This reveals a gap in the theory’s line of reasoning, which may 
cause a serious –although not easily detectable- problem in the interpretation 
of empirical events. It can only be solved by looking beyond resources and 
recognising other environmental influences that may sway a decision one 
way or the other.   
 
For instance, what makes organisations choose between mergers, cartels and 
the various other forms of interorganisational co-operation? Pfeffer and 
Salancik argue that organisations will opt for others forms of co-ordination 
only when control through ownership is impossible. This appears plausible, 
given that ownership allows for greater control. However, they also argue 
that these forms of co-ordination are more flexible, since they require less 
commitment. Therefore it could be argued with equal plausibility that 
mergers are a less preferable option than other types of co-ordination, since 
they diminish the autonomy of the organisations involved. This problem may 
fail to surface in empirical studies, because it does not show on hindsight. It 
requires a thought experiment: why did they not do something else? On a 
fundamental level, resource dependence theory cannot resolve the dilemma, 
which flows from a problem in defining the organisation. According to the 
logic of the theory, the organization’s boundaries are “ where the discretion of 
the organization to control an activity is less than the discretion of another 
organization or individual to control that activity”  (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, 
p. 32). Yet this discretion is itself defined by the organization’s boundaries. 
When an organization merges, one could argue both that it loses or gains 
discretion over resources, depending on whether one takes the old or the new 
organization as the unit of analysis. This is what happens when organizations 
are viewed only in terms of resource control, without consideration of more 
durable features like history and culture. These also identify the organization 
as a distinct unit.      
 
These shortcomings limit the theory’s otherwise considerable potential to 
interpret market behaviour. Fortunately, both can be overcome. To do this, I 
will call in the aid of institutional theory, particularly of its branch in 
organisational sociology. This is a tradition that has in recent times focused 
specifically on the cognitive aspect of organisational environments. As I hope 
to demonstrate in the remainder of this chapter, incorporation of the cognitive 
element not only enriches the theory, but also helps to resolve the 
autonomy/control dilemma.   
 
4.3 The limits of rationality 
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4.3.1 The cognitive aspect of human behaviour 
 
It has come to be recognised that actors do not see or know anything. Reality 
is extremely complex, too much to grasp for our limited information 
processing capacities. At best, we can achieve only limited rationality (Cyert 
and March, 1963; Simon, 1945). Obviously, this has implications for the 
process of making decisions. When actors are faced with something they 
perceive as a problem, they will have only incomplete information about 
possible actions and their ultimate consequences. Therefore they will not go 
for the very best solution that is objectively possible, but for one that is 
satisfactory. This modest claim has proven crucial to understanding 
organisational behaviour.  
 
The only way to grasp an overwhelming reality with a limited capacity for 
understanding is to simplify. Consequently, actors direct their attention only 
to a selective number of characteristics of reality. They filter out information 
that has no relevance within their scheme. At that point, information becomes 
knowledge: the overflow of impressions is reduced to a limited selection of 
pieces of information, connected in a meaningful way. There are various ways 
for organisations to handle information processing. Organisations are 
themselves means to focus on a limited number of tasks and to handle these 
in a standardised, selective manner. Routines, rules and habits make 
behaviour predictable and therefore reduce uncertainty (March, Simon and 
Guetzkow, 1967). When I act on tradition, I have no need to consider whether 
I am going about things in the proper way or, indeed, whether I am pursuing 
the right goals. Habit must therefore not be interpreted as mere passivity, but 
as an effort to reduce complexity.  
 
Depending on the level of uncertainty, organisations will use different means 
to reduce complexity (Galbraith, 1977). When uncertainty is low, the 
organisation can rely on procedures (formal or informal) to manage its 
environment. When the amount of information that needs to be processed is 
relatively low, it is easy to plan a standardised response in advance. But as the 
environment becomes more complex and less predictable, this is increasingly 
less viable. An alternative is then to create the capacity for dealing with a 
higher level of uncertainty. This usually involves a less tightly coupled, more 
flexible organisation (cf. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). For instance, changes in 
the global economy have forced certain kinds of businesses to reorganise their 
production processes. It is no longer possible to organise them step by step: 
different departments have to work on the same product simultaneously. Co-
ordination relies less on formal systems and more on sophisticated 
communication systems and trust (see 3.6.3). Another alternative is to reduce 
the need for information by controlling outputs rather than processes. Finally, 
organisations can try to reduce the uncertainty in their environment, in order 
to diminish the strain of always keeping up-to-date and staying on top. This is 
where cognitive theory links up with resource dependence theory.  
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4.3.2 Knowledge as a resource and as an institution  
 
There are two ways of looking at knowledge, one instrumental, the other 
institutional (cf. Scott, 1991). To begin with, knowledge can be treated as a 
tool for dealing with technical problems. Like money, labour and time, it is 
simply one of the resources necessary to accomplish a task. In this sense, 
knowledge can be consciously adopted, rejected, traded or used at will. 
According to resource dependence theory, organisational information 
processing systems can be subject to calculated manipulation. For instance, 
many people use statistics to support their claims, knowing very well that 
they could easily find statistics that say the opposite, and not caring. On a 
more constructive note, knowledge can also be a tool for identifying and 
solving problems. When I have to perform a task that is unfamiliar to me, I 
can go the library and look up what I think I should know. Taken in this 
sense, knowledge is created very consciously, carefully sifted from the huge 
amount of information that comes available. It will be open to question and its 
use will have to be justified.  
 
If everyone come to shares a particular notion about how things work, then it 
will after some time become difficult to imagine that there is any other way of 
thinking. It will become a self-evident truth. When this happens, knowledge 
grows beyond instrumental status and becomes a frame of reference, a way of 
thinking that has an objective appearance (cf. Berger and Luckmann, 1967). 
Interpretations of reality will be internalised and actors will detect and solve 
problems on the basis of mental scripts, usually recognised as such only when 
they are broken (Garfinkel, 1967). There will be less and less need to justify 
ideas with reference to their merits. They will be passed on as facts. 
“ Transmissions of acts high on institutionalization is not problematic. The 
actor doing the transmitting simply communicates them as objective fact, and 
the actor receiving them treats them as an accurate rendition of objective fact”  
(Zucker, 1991, p. 87). Knowledge will be “ institutionalised” . At this point, the 
filtering process will become very strong. Information that does not fit the 
dominant interpretation of reality will be ignored, explained away or simply 
left unseen. “ An institution then starts to control the memory of its members; 
it causes them to forget experiences incompatible with its righteous image, 
and it brings to their minds events which sustain the view of nature that is 
complementary to itself”  (Douglas, 1986, p. 112).  
 
Of course, there is a whole range of stages between knowledge that is fully 
institutionalised and knowledge that is merely instrumental. The less 
institutionalised knowledge is, the more vulnerable it is to change. The 
highest degree of institutionalisation has occurred when knowledge is so 
taken-for-granted that it is no longer even consciously perceived. Such a 
cognitive institution remains stable because no-one even thinks of questioning 
it. As actors become more aware of the knowledge they use, they are more 
likely to question it. Whereas institutionalisation creates order, de-
institutionalisation creates choice (Jepperson, 1991). Knowledge that was once 
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accepted as natural may become no more than an alternative up for 
consideration, one of many potential interpretations of reality. In that case an 
institution that has endured for long a period will have gone through a cycle 
of growth, stability and decline. First it has structured a disorderly situation, 
leading to repetitive rather than random or improvised choices; its basic 
structure became more refined and expanded; the institution endured; and 
then it fell.  
 
De-institutionalisation takes either a dramatic external shock (a “ critical 
juncture” ) or internal friction to break down a view that has been so strongly 
internalised. The shift from Keynesianism to monetarism, two entirely 
different interpretations of how the economy operates, has been attributed to 
the oil crises of the 1970s (Hall, 1993). These undermined the effectiveness of 
the firmly entrenched Keynesian policy paradigm and greatly boosted the 
credibility of monetarist critics. A second cause of change is inherent friction 
that slowly but inexorably wears down the institution (Beck, 1992). Markets 
have the tendency to eliminate themselves through their own mechanism of 
competition. David Stark has likened them to the boardgame of Monopoly: 
the aim is to drive all the other competitors out of business and end the 
game.29 The two causes of change are not mutually exclusive. The de-
institutionalisation in the Dutch social housing sector could be explained with 
reference to the external shock of liberalisation; yet one could also argue that 
this liberalisation was merely a reaction to previous institutionalised 
practices, which in their sustained and successful quest to meet housing 
shortages ultimately undermined their own political basis. 
 
The interest in bounded rationality was sparked by members of the Carnegie 
school in organisation theory. “ March, Simon, Richard Cyert, and their 
colleagues have developed an array of insights that students of organization 
now regard as foundational elements: the importance of uncertainty and its 
reduction through organizational routines; the notion that the organization of 
attention is a central process out of which decisions arise; the concern with the 
implications for decision making when choices are made under conditions of 
ambiguity about preferences, technology, and interpretation; and the many 
insights that follow from the view of decision making as a political process 
involving multiple actors with inconsistent preferences”  (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991a, pp. 18-19). These ideas of the Carnegie school gradually seeped 
into various other disciplines, in a process known as the “ cognitive turn” . In 
organisational sociology, they have had various applications. Resource 
dependence theory has obviously picked up on the notions of multiplicity 
and ambiguity; the institutional theory of organisations has instead focused 
on the stability and endurance of processes and structures. A major 
shortcoming of the latter used to be that it had a determinist streak and did 
not recognise how actors could break away from established ways of 
thinking. More recent work has explicitly tried to infuse institutional theory 
with concepts of action and change. The analysis in this book must be viewed 
as part of this attempt (for more on the history of institutional theory, see the 
appendix).  
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The term “ institutions”  will in this analysis refer to spatially and historically 
distinct, stable, socially constructed and shared frames of reference or 
definitions of situations (cf. Scott, 1995, p. 47). Though it may not look it, this 
is a narrow definition, because it only uses the term “ institution”  in a 
cognitive sense. The analysis will take account of phenomena that have been 
called institutions in other studies: legal rules, organisations, shared values, 
official guidelines and so forth. However, to avoid confusion it is imperative 
to choose a single clear definition. The choice to describe institutions in terms 
of knowledge is a deliberate departure from the institutionalist studies of the 
past that usually referred to them in normative terms. A cognitive focus is 
more consistent, not only with recent work in organisational sociology, but 
also with the other pillar of this analysis, the resource dependence theory. The 
latter explains behaviour on the basis of self-interest, defined as survival in a 
(quasi-)market. As shown earlier in this paragraph, this assumption is easily 
compatible with the notion of bounded rationality and the pursuit of 
knowledge. But when behaviour is inspired by norms, it is the norm that 
must take precedence, not the actor’s self-interest.30 That makes a normative 
approach less compatible with resource dependence theory. Of course, it may 
turn out that quasi-market behaviour cannot be adequately explained without 
taking into account norms and values, but that would be an empirical finding 
rather than a theoretical assumption.  
 
4.3.3 The benefits of institutions  
 
There are two ways in which institutions reduce uncertainty in (quasi-) 
markets. In the first place, actors will know what their problems are and how 
to handle them. “ Market actors live in murky worlds where it is never clear 
which actions have which consequences. Yet, actors must construct an 
account of the world that interprets the murkiness, motivates and determines 
courses of action, and justifies the action decided upon. In markets, the goal of 
action is to ensure the survival of the firm. No actor can determine which 
behaviors will maximise profits (either a priori or post hoc), and action is 
therefore directed toward the creation of stable worlds.”  (Fligstein, 1996, p. 
659). Routines save actors from complexities they may not be able to handle. 
At the very least, they save energy.  
 
But institutional knowledge not only reduces uncertainty because it provides 
solutions to technical problems. The very fact that other actors have 
internalised the same concepts means they are bound to act in a predictable 
manner. This in itself reduces uncertainty. They may still compete with one 
another, but on the basis of a shared view of competition. By creating shared 
notions of how a market works, institutions also help interpret what 
competitors mean when they undertake particular actions. “ Actors in two 
different markets might use product diversification, but one might view it as 
diversifying the financial portfolio (a financial perspective), while the other 
might see it as carrying a full line of goods (a marketing perspective). 
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[Institutions] allow actors to interpret what a particular strategic move by 
competitors might mean.”  (Fligstein, 1996, p. 660).  
 
This is also the basis of recreational games. What makes them recreational is 
that they are relatively easy to learn and less harmful than ordinary life. If it 
was necessary to invent the rules during the game, it would hardly be 
relaxing. It would be impossible to devise a strategy, because the behaviour of 
the other players would be completely unpredictable. If football players 
suddenly decided to use their hands as well as their feet, all traditional 
football tactics would become worthless. Moreover, there would be no 
guarantee that players would be shielded from harm. A game of chess is the 
more enjoyable because the rules of conduct forbid my opponent from 
suddenly hitting me on the head. In a game of boxing, I would expect this and 
prepare myself as best I can. In these cases it is very helpful that the game 
rules are generally known and accepted. But what happens if there are no 
rules and there is no-one to impose them?   
 
4.4 The process of institutionalisation  
 
4.4.1 The need for innovation  
 
Rational choice theories, and resource dependence theory among them, 
assume that actors know how to handle uncertainty. For example, when 
caught in an asymmetric relationship of dependence, they will pursue one of 
the strategies mentioned before: control the actors who control the resources, 
find an alternative source etc. Presuming they have decided on the goals they 
wish to pursue, they devise a strategy and carry it out. But, as institutional 
literature shows, actors may not know what their goals are, or what strategy 
is best, or how to implement their strategy. What happens if they do not 
know what to do?  
 
This question is of considerable importance for the analysis of social housing 
provision. Until the financial risks were decentralised, providers were 
shielded from the rigours of the market and most decision-making 
responsibilities. They had little room for initiative and could largely function 
as bureaucratic extensions of national housing policy. The introduction of the 
quasi-market has changed everything. It has made old routines inappropriate, 
for a bureaucratic ethic is unlikely to work well in a market context. In other 
words, the providers face a serious cognitive gap. If they are to survive, they 
will most likely have to go through a process of de-institutionalisation, 
shedding the scripts that have guided them for decades. These will have to be 
replaced by others more suitable for the new conditions. This process will be 
referred to as “ innovation” , the deliberate effort to replace old routines in 
order to achieve organisational goals (in this case survival).31 But it is not at all 
certain they will be able to cope. The organisations were not designed for 
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these conditions, nor were their staff recruited with the quasi-market in mind. 
How will they manage? Will they manage at all?   
 
When old routines no longer apply, actors can invent new ideas by 
themselves. For instance, a social housing provider could think of where to 
position itself in the housing market, what new products to present, what 
groups to target, how to remodel its organisational structure. But this is a 
very demanding process. It involves shedding deeply ingrained habits, which 
is in itself difficult, and simultaneously finding new ones. It requires energy. 
Only when knowledge has become institutionalised will it start to require less 
energy. “ A pattern of given complexity, once stabilized, uses less energy than 
was required to bring it into existence. [...] To write of institutions as complex 
patterns of information [...] should lead to considering the amount of energy 
used for making a particular kind of institution and how it is deployed in a 
more complex or less complex pattern”  (Douglas, 1986, p. 112). Actors do not 
all possess the same level of innovative capacity. In other words, they are not 
equally capable of creating new knowledge autonomously, especially when 
there is pressure to change quickly.32 Some people are more creative than 
others. Similarly, some organisations have the people, the culture, the 
structure or the funds to come up with more ideas than others. It is one of the 
most important assets in a competitive environment. Those with little 
innovative capacity may find themselves in troubles, for they may not be able 
to adjust as well as they should. Fortunately, there is an alternative to 
individual innovation. Just as knowledge can be maintained collectively, it 
can be created collectively. This occurs through processes of collective 
innovation.  
 
4.4.2 Collective innovation through reciprocity 
 
There are two ways to innovate collectively, the first of which is through 
reciprocity. In a process of repeated resource exchange, actors may reach joint 
decisions that are innovative in nature. This phenomenon has received special 
attention in studies on corporatist policymaking. “ By deliberate mutual 
adjustment and repeated interaction, these comprehensive, monopolistically 
privileged actors avoid the temptation to exploit momentary advantages to 
the maximum and the pitfall of landing in the worst possible situation. In 
short, they avoid the prisoner’s dilemma through inter-organizational trust”  
(Streeck and Schmitter, 1985, p. 13). This is not simply a matter of reaching a 
collective decision, but also of creating a decision that did not belong to the 
previous institutional repertoire. Collective action is given a cognitive twist: 
joint decisions create new alternatives for action.33 This is possible because the 
repeated interactions allow the actors to become more familiar with each 
other, create shared understandings and to build up a relationship of trust 
(see 3.6.3). “ Strategic capacity is low if the individual members, or the 
subgroups, of a collective are committed to divergent or even 
incommensurable cognitive maps, and it increases as the worldviews and 
causal theories of relevant subgroups converge on common –and empirically 
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true- interpretations of a given situation and of the options and constraints 
inherent in it”  (Scharpf, 1997, p. 58). Through this type of exchange, it is 
possible to find creative new solutions for collective action problems.    
 
A well-known example is provided by Visser and Hemerijck’s description of 
the so-called “ Dutch miracle” , the economic success brought about by 
negotiations within the Dutch corporatist system (Visser and Hemerijck, 
1997). Employers, trade unions and the state made a famous bargain in which  
moderate wage rises were exchanged for the creation of new jobs. This forced 
the actors involved to forego their short-term interests, but by doing so they 
created a new, long-term solution that eventually benefited all: the Dutch 
economic consensus model that in subsequent years led to remarkable job 
growth. In the process that Visser and Hemerijck describe, corporatist 
decision-making structures put the actors in a position where they could 
influence policy more directly than would otherwise have been possible. 
However, it also made it more difficult for them to take the easy way out. This 
made co-operation a more feasible option and as a result policy innovation 
was encouraged, if not guaranteed. In a similar vein, Helderman has 
described how the difficulties of dipping into the rich resource pool of Dutch 
social housing eventually allowed social housing providers to be privatised, 
an option that might otherwise not have existed (Helderman, forthcoming). 
 
4.4.3 Collective innovation through reproduction  
 
A second method of innovating is through reproduction. This is a process not 
dealt with by resource dependence or in fact any theory of scarcity, since it 
does not necessarily involve exchange. When innovations are reproduced, 
they are transferred from one actor to the other without the former losing it. 
The voluntary adoption of an innovation is therefore not necessarily an 
exchange, since the innovating organisation may gain or lose no resources as 
a result of the action.34 It may of course lose or win indirectly. For instance, 
imitation by others may cause its innovation to become less distinctive and 
therefore less valuable. Then again, imitation may create a stability and 
predictability in its environment that works to its advantage. This is not to say 
that the reproduction of innovations never involves exchange. Knowledge 
may be bought at a price –consider, for instance, an author’s fee- but in theory 
innovations could be reproduced almost infinitely. In this analysis, it will be 
assumed that knowledge can be freely passed on.  
 
One of the best-known mechanisms of reproduction in an organisational 
context is institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b). DiMaggio 
and Powell suggest that. once organisations are structured into a field, forces 
come into play which encourage similarity. In each organisational field there 
are a few true innovators who have the desire and the capacity to improve 
their performance by coming up with innovations. Other organisations will 
copy the ideas of these innovators, rather than innovate themselves. 
Particular innovations will thus gradually spread throughout the field. The 
 63
aggregate effect of change will be diminished diversity, if not outright 
homogeneity, in the community that shares the innovations. One of the 
mechanisms through which this drive towards homogeneity occurs is 
imitation. Organisations voluntarily copy strategic elements from other 
organisations in their field (“ mimetic isomorphism” ). Another way is for 
people with similar educational backgrounds to come to dominate within 
fields of organisations (“ normative isomorphism” ). As they become more 
widespread, the innovations become more legitimate simply because they are 
widespread. Finally, the state or other powerful bodies in the environment 
may force organisations to adopt particular changes (“ coercive 
isomorphism” ). 
 
Fligstein illustrates these processes in his study of large American 
corporations (Fligstein, 1991; 1990). Over a century of competition, he 
identifies four distinct “ conceptions of control” , cognitive views that 
businesses had on how to control the environment. Such conceptions were 
generally shared by the largest companies, but were each replaced by another 
after a few decades. For example, whereas in the late 19th century the key to 
success was to incorporate or neutralise competitors through aggressive 
tactics (the conception of “ direct control” ), from the 1920s onwards this 
changed to a vision in which integration of the entire production process was 
considered vital (a “ manufacturing conception” ). These conceptions of control 
arose within the very largest companies and then spread across to other 
organisations in the field, setting a new standard for proper market 
behaviour. These developments were in part forced by the large companies 
themselves with the power they could exercise through their production 
networks; however, they were also spurred on by the voluntary adoption of 
new conceptions by other businesses, who could benefit from the guidance 
they offered. This process is also known to occur at the level of nation-states 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). For instance, it has been used to explain the 
diffusion of monetary policy across member states of the European Union 
(Radaelli, 2000). In the Dutch context, Grit has described the diffusion of 
market-based concepts in the public sector (Grit, 2000).  
 
4.4.4 Institution-building through innovation? 
 
When actors innovate collectively, they may establish new institutionalised 
routines in the process. Because they adopt similar knowledge, the use of this 
knowledge may again become self-evident and slip into the unconscious. This 
not only diminishes uncertainty, but also re-inforces or creates group 
boundaries (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b). Organisational “ fields” , as they 
are known in organisational sociology, are themselves institutions. Like any 
social group, they depend on the recognition of its members that they are in a 
group. “ The existence of organizational fields is established by the mutual 
recognition of actors in different firms of their interdependence. These actors 
share a similar conception of legitimate action and the place of each 
organization in that field”  (Fligstein, 1990, pp. 5-6). Knowledge of the playing 
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field in itself reduces uncertainty considerably. By implication, a field that is 
no longer held together by shared knowledge may fall apart. Actors may 
perish, join other fields, or stay caught in a permanent state of flux.    
 
There is every reason to believe that the introduction of the quasi-market has 
impelled Dutch social housing providers to innovate. Although formally 
private, their post-war activities were for the most part controlled and 
directed by state policy. They were public agencies all but in name. This is 
reflected in the internal structure common to these organisations. Until 
recently, it invariably consisted of a financial, an administrative and a 
technical department, organised along bureaucratic lines (see 5.9). Although 
useful for its former purpose, it is very doubtful that such a structure would 
be sufficiently flexible and responsive in a market context. The question is 
whether providers have proved capable of adapting. Have they been able to 
develop new routines? Has there been a process of re-institutionalisation or 
has the organisational field evolved towards a state of fragmentation?  
  
4.4.5 Conclusion: the benefits and shortcomings of institutional theory 
 
Institutional theory is very diverse and it must be stressed that this discussion 
focused only the tradition in organisational sociology and specifically, on the 
cognitive variety. Its features can be summed up as follows:  
 
• Actors cannot understand reality as it is. To deal with its complexity, they 
simplify.  
• To do this, they create or adopt routines that shut out complexity and 
alleviate uncertainty. 
• When a group share routines, these can become taken-for-granted and 
beyond questioning. Knowledge will become institutionalised.  
• It will take either a great shock or systematic internal friction to dislodge 
such deeply entrenched ways of thinking.  
• When institutions topple, actors have to create new ways of reducing 
complexity. This process is very demanding. It can be conducted 
individually, with each actor relying on his own innovative capacity, or 
collectively, through exchange or diffusion.  
• When actors collectively create new knowledge, it may again be 
institutionalised.  
 
The strength of this theory is its ability to show how knowledge affects action. 
People struggle to grasp the complexity around them and somehow manage 
to cope with the help of various tricks, sometimes individually, sometimes as 
a group. By delving into this complex process, institutional theory makes 
organisational environments richer and more colourful. However, despite 
efforts to strengthen its “ micro-foundations” , it still lacks the kind of crisp 
theory of action that characterises rational choice theory. Past institutional 
theory, best known through the work of Berger and Luckmann, was accused 
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of being too static. It focused mainly on how actors reproduced existing 
institutions. More recent varieties of the “ new”  institutionalism have faced 
similar criticism. For instance, the isomorphism concept has been called 
“ crypto-deterministic”  because it focuses primarily on processes that lead to 
continuity and stability (Hemerijck and Helderman, 1994). Oliver has also 
noted the tendency of institutional theory to emphasise conformity to 
institutional pressure (Oliver, 1991). But this is just one side of the coin. Even 
if most of their time is spent in maintaining institutions, actors do occasionally 
rebel against them. If not, change could only come from the outside and man 
would simply be at the mercy of uncontrollable forces. As the self-destructive 
nature of competition shows, actors can actively contribute to institutional 
decline. However, institutional theory has paid little attention to such 
processes (Scott, 1995; Trommel, 1995). It is for this reason that the match with 
resource dependence theory will prove fruitful.   
 
4.5 Combining the two theories 
 
Together, resource dependence theory and sociological institutional theory 
meet the criteria set out in the first chapter. The former excels at showing how 
actors cope with influences from their environment and how they sometimes 
manage to alter that environment in their favour, rather than always going 
with the flow. This is especially relevant for an analysis of quasi-markets, 
many of which suffer from the calculated exploitation of weak spots in their 
design. However, it is basically a rational choice theory: it assumes that actors 
will know what to do. Institutional organisational theory has shown, by 
contrast, that actors have only limited rationality and that they do not always 
know how to proceed. There are various ways, individual and collective, to 
create new knowledge, which may ultimately result in shared perceptions of 
the environment. This too is very helpful for the present analysis, since the 
introduction of the quasi-market is exactly the kind of change that will spark 
a search for new knowledge. The problem with institutional theory is that it 
does not show for what purpose actors need knowledge. Moreover, it is better 
at showing how actors conform to their environment than how they change it. 
The strength of one theory is the flaw of the other. The logical course of action 
is to combine them and take the best of both. There is no fundamental 
problem in this, because the theories share some basic assumptions in 
common:35   
 
- Both start from the premise that the nature of action is largely determined 
through interaction between the organisation and its environment. They 
both conceive of interaction in terms of the reaction of an organisation to 
developments in its environment.  
- Both identify the need to cope with uncertainty as the basic motive for 
organisational action, even if they focus on different kinds of uncertainty.  
- Both place action within a historically and geographically specific 
environment. While it may be possible to make general claims about 
organisational action, these are always contingent rather than universal.  
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- Both are neutral to the “ objective”  outcome of action. In other words, they 
reject the economic claim that the outcome of action in a market context 
must necessarily be optimal. This assumption separates these theories from 
mainstream economics and even most of institutional economics.  
 
This means the two theories can be combined into a single model. At the basis 
of this model is the assumption that actors wish to survive in the market. 
They are faced with two major sources of uncertainty. To begin with, they 
need to secure resources for their survival. The quasi-market design has made 
them more dependent on their clients, creating an asymmetric relationship. 
Resource dependence theory claims that actors will try to alter the balance 
and names three kinds of actions for doing this: (1) controlling the actors who 
control the resources, (2) finding alternatives sources, and (3) finding 
alternative resources. The second source of uncertainty is of a cognitive 
nature. The organisations have no real experience with markets and may not 
know what the options are or which works best.  
 
First they must decide how they should proceed. If they can, they can 
innovate individually. Otherwise, they must take part in collective processes 
if they are to innovate. This process will produce an action that will help them 
to survive in the quasi-market, that is, one of the possibilities suggested by 
resource dependence theory. Analytically, the decision-making process can be 
conceived of as a sequence of two steps, the first to reduce cognitive 
uncertainty, the next to reduce uncertainty about the flow of resources. The 
more actors choose to innovate collectively, the more likely it is that the 
newly-adopted knowledge be institutionalised. This will have the effect of re-
inforcing the boundaries of the organisational field, or, if there have been 
great shifts in the population of actors, it will establish a brand new one. If, 
however, some organisations follow this strategy and others that, re-
institutionalisation will not occur and the field will become or remain 
fragmented.       
 
In collective innovation processes, individual actors can take up two different 
positions. They can be innovators, devising their own strategy, and take the 
initiative in processes of exchange or diffusion. The others will be followers 
and adopt whatever the innovators propose. In other words, innovative 
capacity determines whose choices become popular. This distinction between 
innovators and followers at least partially fills up the gap within resource 
dependence theory. When organisations are faced with the control/autonomy 
dilemma (a cognitive problem) they may look to their peers to sway them one 
way or the other. What this means is that the two theories are locked in a 
perfect embrace. While resource dependence theory supplies institutional 
theory with a basic drive for action, the latter refines the former and helps it 
to proceed where it falters.  
 
 Figure 3.1: Coping with uncertainty 
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The theory of market behaviour used for the empirical analysis will be 
constructed on the basis of this model. However, it needs fleshing out. It 
should spell out under what circumstances actors can be expected to choose 
particular courses of action. Paragraph 3.6 will describe the conditions that 
favour different kinds of innovation.36 The theory should also have a more 
refined notion of market behaviour. Decisions are not holistic entities, but 
layered processes of choice. If this is not recognised, an analysis of 
organisational behaviour can run into serious measurement problems. This is 
the focus of paragraph 3.7.  
 
4.6 The conditions for collective innovation  
  
4.6.1 Innovative capacity and the need to innovate 
 
Actors can only be expected to innovate when they need to. It is an activity 
that by its nature demands more effort than following routines. One of the 
main purposes of routines is to economise on the energy involved in 
innovation. Actors will therefore usually innovate only when they feel they 
have no choice.37 In many organisational studies, including this one, this sense 
of urgency is created by the market incentive. The market incentive creates 
uncertainty, with which organisations feel they have to cope if they are to 
survive. If there is no immediate threat that spurs actors into movement, it 
can be artificially created. In Visser and Hemerijck’s study, the unions and 
employers were encouraged to innovate by the “ shadow of hierarchy” : the 
threat that the state would curtail their involvement in policy-making unless 
they came to some sort of agreement (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997).  
 
The question that remains to be answered is when actors will opt for which 
type of innovation. Resource dependence theory starts from the assumption 
that they will try to reduce their dependence on others. Collective innovation 
is a process that does imply dependence, because some organisations will 
need others to acquire knowledge (a resource). Logically, one should 
finding other resources
controlling other actors
finding other sources
collective innovation 
actors 
individual innovation 
finding other resources
controlling other actors
finding other sources
cognitive uncertainty
resource uncertainty
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therefore assume that these organisations will prefer to innovate 
autonomously without depending on their colleagues. If they do not, then it 
must be because they are unable to. This ability will be referred to as 
innovative capacity: the ability to generate new knowledge without the aid of 
other providers. If actors do not have sufficient capacity, then they must find 
a collective way of coping with uncertainty, or not innovate at all –which 
would threaten one of the conditions for an effective quasi-market. When this 
capacity is unevenly spread across organisations, those with high capacity can 
be expected to be the innovators in the process, the others the followers. It is 
not necessary for knowledge to be new in an absolute sense. That is virtually 
impossible in any case. What matters for organisations to be innovators is 
whether they are capable of innovation regardless of their peers. If they are, 
then they are innovators in their community. This could mean, for instance, 
that they pick up an idea from TV which others have not seen or failed to 
associate with their own needs.   
 
But collective innovation will not occur because it would make the quasi-
market more effective. That kind of reasoning would be bad functionalism. 
The process is possible only under certain conditions, and even then it is not 
guaranteed to occur. These conditions are mutual dependence (in the case of 
reciprocity) and a suitable social structure.  
 
4.6.2 Mutual dependence  
 
In an exchange situation, actors must have something to offer each other. 
After all, the theory assumes that actors are selfish: they will not knowingly 
give away resources, including knowledge. If one actor believes that 
interaction will yield few benefits or that it will mostly benefit others, he will 
have less reason to take account of the others. Innovation through reciprocity 
therefore rests upon a degree of mutual dependence and symmetry in the 
resources of the actors involved (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985). By implication, 
it should be seen most in those areas where mutual dependence is highest.  
 
As far as reproduction is concerned, there is no need for mutual dependence 
to spark a process of diffusion. Given that innovations cannot be patented or 
kept secret (which is doubtful in the context of welfare state provision) they 
can be copied without any kind of exchange. The actor supplying the 
knowledge may not know that his ideas are being studied and copied. He 
even stands to lose from this, for another actor’s choice to imitate him 
diminishes his distinctiveness.  
 
4.6.3 Social structure 
 
Finally, collective innovation is encouraged by certain types of social 
networks. Roughly speaking, collective innovation through reciprocity is 
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most likely to occur in closed networks, whereas reproduction requires 
elaborate social networks.  
 
Resource dependence theory argues that when actors are caught in 
dependence, they will try to reduce it. This could involve escaping from the 
relationship (e.g. by entering another market) or making it asymmetrical in its 
favour. Yet it was noted before that the process occurs only after sustained 
interaction between actors who have something to gain by co-operating 
(Scharpf, 1997). By implication, attempts to diminish dependence also 
diminish the chances of collective innovation through reciprocity. The process 
is therefore most likely to occur when there is a structure of social ties, formal 
or informal, that stops actors from walking out and keeps them roughly 
balanced. This social structure should be such that it effectively keeps actors 
within a situation of mutual dependence, from which they can only profit by 
engaging in exchange. Streeck has coined the notion of “ productive 
constraints” : in certain cases, structures that prevent some actions may induce 
others that are considered more desirable (Streeck, 1997). Quasi-market 
regulations have been known to have the same effect. When entry and exit are 
foreclosed, the interaction between supply and demand takes place between a 
limited number of providers and clients. This encourages them to develop a 
mutually beneficial working relationship.  
 
Reproduction also flourishes within a specific kind of social structure, but one 
that is somewhat different. If innovations are to be reproduced, the actors that 
could adopt them must be aware of them. Therefore there must be adequate 
channels for carrying innovations across interorganisational boundaries 
(Leene, 1997). These can be media, schools, formal and informal social 
networks, shared projects and even shared advisors. When organisational 
fields are stable, like when the same actors have been working in the same 
line of business for many years, such communication channels are more likely 
to be in place. As DiMaggio and Powell have noted, “ fields that have stable 
and broadly acknowledged centres, peripheries, and status orders will be 
more homogeneous both because the diffusion structure for new models and 
norms is more routine and because the level of interaction among 
organizations in the field is higher (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b, p. 77).   
 
But in both cases, social ties are not in themselves sufficient. Actors still run 
the risk of being taken advantage of or of betting on the wrong horse, and this 
may stop the development of innovations dead in its tracks. Even when they 
are condemned to look each other in the face, actors are unlikely to co-operate 
when they are wary about how the other parties  will react to their efforts. 
After all, they would risk moral hazard, the possibility that their willingness 
to make concessions is taken advantage of. Such a situation can result in a 
complete stalemate. One example of this is the “ immobile corporatism”  that 
once paralysed Dutch economic policy (Hemerijck and Helderman, 1994). Nor 
can actors be expected to imitate just everyone. They will only copy 
innovations from sources that they consider reliable. It would be foolhardy to 
imitate someone who has a bad record or no record at all, especially when 
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there is little information about the effectiveness of the innovations 
themselves. Their feelings of uncertainty must be alleviated by trust.  
 
In recent years trust has become a popular subject in organisational theory.38 
Trust in exchange relationships can be defined as consisting of three elements 
(Lane, 1998, p. 3): (1) interdependence between truster and trustee; (2) the 
ability to cope with risk or uncertainty in exchange relationships; and (3) the 
expectation that the vulnerability resulting from the acceptance of risk will 
not be taken advantage of by the other party. This is based on the work of 
Simmel, who first used the concept to explain the leap of faith that 
accompanies joint action (Simmel, 1950). If I am to define predictions about 
market behaviour, it is important to know whether such faith is likely to exist 
in the context of the analysis. That, in turn, requires knowledge of the origin 
of the phenomenon. Zucker has identified three types (Zucker, 1986). One is 
trust is built up incrementally as a result of past successful exchanges, for 
instance, when business partners have worked together for years. The second 
is based on shared characteristics, such as those that members of social 
communities share. Finally, there is impersonal trust, tied to institutions that 
impart legitimacy to actors or innovations, regardless of their history or 
identity. For instance, the state can provide the minimum of trust necessary 
for trade by guaranteeing property rights and the validity of contracts.  
 
The definition and typology described above apply mainly to reciprocity. In 
the case of reproduction, the nature of the relationship between the actors is 
somewhat different, since there are other benefits and risks to consider. The 
imitating party does not run the risk of opportunism so much as the risk of 
receiving “ bad advice” . Trust is still crucial for the interaction, as the problem 
still boils down to one of time and foresight: the imitator does not always 
have the resources to gather sufficient information about the object of 
imitation –as in  housing, where the effects of decisions take long to 
materialise- nor does he have any guarantee that what worked for someone 
else will work for him. The risk can be partially averted when an innovation is 
flexible and adaptable to the specific needs of the organisations that adopt it. 
 
The degree of trust is likely to be greater when several types of trust are 
combined, such as when people belong to the same social group and also 
know each other well from past encounters. Research indicates that imitation 
is often founded on characteristic-based trust, since organisations will copy 
from others with which they share certain characteristics (Lane, 1998).39 But 
the likelihood that imitation will occur is greater when there are other forms 
of trust to back up these shared characteristics. Certain organisations may 
achieve the status of opinion leaders through an incrementally built 
reputation. Third parties may alleviate the risks associated with imitation by 
providing aid when there are serious financial losses. They may also lend 
legitimacy to innovations by awarding quality certificates or setting up test 
cases.40 Only empirical study can show which type of trust is strongest, but it 
can be safely stated that imitation is most likely to occur when there is a 
combination of trust types. 
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4.6.4 Conclusion 
 
Summing up, collective innovation has the highest chance of being observed 
under the following conditions:  
 
- When there is a need to innovate and actors generally do not have the 
capacity for doing it all by themselves. 
- When there is strong mutual dependence 
- When the social structure creates a “ no exit”  situation and/or when there 
is extensive scope for communication.     
 
Table 3.1: The conditions under which collective innovation is most likely 
to occur 
 
Type of collective 
innovation 
Innovative capacity Relationships of 
dependence 
Social structure 
 
Reciprocity 
 
Low 
 
Mutual dependence 
 
No exit, infused with trust 
 
Reproduction 
 
Low 
 
No need for mutual 
dependence 
 
Communication channels, 
infused with trust 
 
Determines: 
 
 
Whether actors need 
to innovate 
collectively; who are 
innovators and 
followers 
 
 
In what areas 
collective 
innovation through 
reciprocity will 
occur 
 
 
Whether collective 
innovation is possible or 
not 
 
 
4.7 Goals, strategies and decisions  
 
Until now, I have mostly spoken of organisational actions as if they 
comprised a single choice. However, they are in fact composed of a number of 
choices, piled on top of one another (cf. March and Olson, 1976). There is no 
end to the detail with which actions can be dissected, but this analysis will 
distinguish three layers of behaviour:  
 
1. Goals, like “ survival” , “ risk avoidance”  or “ utility maximisation” , are at 
the basis of all organisational action. They posit what the organisation 
ultimately wants to do. However, they are usually so abstract that in 
practice they are often a theoretical assumption rather than an empirically 
verifiable phenomenon. In themselves they have little empirical 
significance since they can be translated into virtually any number of 
practical actions, depending on the definition of survival, risk or utility. 
For instance, the tendency of large groups of lemmings to throw 
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themselves off cliffs has been interpreted as a survival tactic. In this 
analysis, the fundamental organisational goal is assumed to be survival in 
the quasi-market, in line with resource dependence theory. The empirical 
analysis will focus on the next two layers of behaviour, strategies and 
decisions.     
2. Strategies comprise “ an explicit understanding of the goals of the 
organisation and the construction of appropriate courses of action for 
reaching those goals”  (Fligstein, 1990, p. 12). They translate the 
fundamental goals into more specific (though still abstract) principles that 
guide behaviour towards the attainment of those goals. They imply views 
on which aspects of the environment are relevant and how these aspects 
are related. In this analysis, strategies tell social housing providers how to 
secure the resources crucial for their survival in the quasi-market. For 
instance, a strategy of diversification (discussed in the next chapter) tells 
the organisation that it should spread its dependence over a number of 
sources, so that the loss of one source will not immediately threaten its 
livelihood.  
3. Decisions are the choices that organisations ultimately make. They 
translate the strategy’s abstract principles into concrete actions. Contrary 
to the other layers of behaviour, they can be directly observed, simply by 
looking at what providers do. For instance, one can watch them build a 
house or knock it down with large bulldozers.   
 
It is often assumed that these three layers of behaviour are logical extensions 
of one another. For instance, Chandler’s famous statement that “ structure 
follows strategy”  suggests that the decision to choose a particular 
organisational structure follows directly from the strategy the organisation 
has adopted (Chandler, 1962). Indeed, it is only logical that the choice of a 
particular strategy should result in a predilection for certain types of decisions 
and the exclusion of others. A strategy of diversification encourages providers 
to focus their efforts on several groups of customers and operate in various 
markets, so one would expect them to adopt an organisational structure that 
consists of a number of market- or product-based divisions. However, 
although the layers of action influence each other sequentially, they each 
imply a separate choice. In other words, none of the steps usually determines 
the following step completely.  
 
One reason for this is that there are many different strategies that are in 
accordance with one goal, and many decisions that are consistent with one 
strategy. For example, resource dependence theory mentions three strategies 
that all serve survival (see 3.2.2). The choice between these alternatives is not 
simply a matter of logic, but also of circumstance. A second reason is that 
different layers of behaviour are not necessarily consistent. Organisational 
theory has shown that structures and activities may be incoherent and even 
contradictory (March, 1999; March, Simon and Guetzkow, 1967). For instance, 
an organisation with a diversification strategy may have a classic bureaucratic 
structure. There may be various reasons for such dissonance. It may be a 
compromise or an involuntary decision. For instance, the state may have 
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forced the provider to adopt a bureaucratic structure in order to improve its 
accountability. Alternatively, decisions may be inconsistent with strategy 
because the provider is not yet capable of creating a better one. Perhaps it is 
hoping to adopt a divisional structure in the future, but does not have the 
resources to do so at present.   
 
The distinction between layers of behaviour allows greater choice. Previously, 
it was argued that providers could either innovate collectively or 
individually. But if strategies and decisions are separate choices, it is possible 
that providers innovate individually on one layer and collectively on another. 
For instance, they can invent a strategy individually and then copy a decision 
that is consistent with it. This is possible because the strategy usually does not 
specify the exact decision that should follow upon it, but only the 
characteristics that this decision should have. For example, a strategy of 
specialisation dictates that the provider should look for a group of customers 
that it can target and develop special products for. However, it does not 
specify which group or which products. So if the provider hears that others 
are targeting the elderly with home care packages, it may decide to copy this 
interesting idea. Its strategy (specialisation) will be individually invented, its 
decision (making home care packages for the elderly) by imitation. The 
reverse is also possible: a collectively chosen strategy followed by an 
individual decision. For instance, the state may force providers to target only 
low-income groups in the housing market, yet without specifying how. Some 
providers may then approach this segment with elaborate package deals, 
while others will focus on providing housing that is as cheap as possible. The 
strategy (specialisation) is collective, but the decision (competing on the basis 
of quality or price) is individual. Of course, it is also possible that both are 
collective or individual. Instead of two kinds of innovation, there are now 
four.  
  
4.8 A theory of (quasi-)market behaviour  
 
Paragraph 3.5 defined alternative types of (quasi-)market behaviour. The 
refinements proposed in the previous two paragraphs affect these in two 
ways. The distinction between goals, strategies and decisions (in paragraph 
3.7) has expanded the number of options open to providers in terms of 
innovation. Specifying the conditions for collective innovation (in paragraph 
3.6) has shown when providers are expected to choose which option. They 
combine into a theory that helps to interpret quasi-market behaviour. It 
distinguishes four different types of behaviour, each of which is expected to 
be chosen under a specific set of conditions (see figure 3.8). Analytical 
methods discussed in chapter four will help to separate strategies from 
decisions and collective from individual innovation, so that it will be possible 
to distinguish the alternate kinds of behaviour in practice.  
 
The first option is that providers invent everything by themselves. This is 
expected to occur when innovative capacity is high and mutual dependence 
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low. Alternatively, actions can be completely determined by collective 
innovation processes. This is expected to happen when there is high mutual 
dependence, low innovative capacity and a social infrastructure that 
encourages the exchange and/or diffusion of knowledge. Under these 
conditions, the chance that knowledge will become institutionalised is 
highest. The other two options fall in between and will be chosen when the 
conditions are mixed. One is that providers choose their own strategies, but 
pick up decisions from their environments. This will save them the energy of 
coming up with new ideas of their own, while still plotting their own course. 
Why re-invent the wheel when there is something good around? Another 
option is that they have shared strategies, but that they implement these 
according to their own logic. For instance, suppose that a few large companies 
are caught in a price war that harms them all. They meet secretly and decide 
to compete over quality, keeping the price at a minimum level. Because they 
are so strongly dependent on one another, they choose to compete on the 
basis of shared principles that limit harm (cf. Fligstein, 1996). However, that 
does not prevent them from trying to distinguish themselves on a less 
fundamental level.  
 
The empirical evidence will be interpreted in light of these alternatives. If the 
theory is an adequate representation of reality, providers will choose each of 
these options when they are expected to. Whether correct or not, it will serve 
as a tool for helping to understand the logic of quasi-market behaviour. Of 
course, the closer actual and expected behaviour come together, the easier it 
will be to understand what has happened.    
  
Figure 3.2: The choices actors are expected to make 
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4.9 The implications of the theory for the quasi-market 
 
This chapter has constructed a theory of (quasi-)market behaviour, which has 
tried to strike a balance between realism and applicability. It is a theory that 
builds upon the sociological approach to markets and attempts to combine 
calculation and cognition in a single model. It will help to explain quasi-
market behaviour and thus to answer part of the research question. But what 
does the theory tell us about the effectiveness of the quasi-market? Chapter 
one suggested that this issue should be approached by looking at the 
conditions that (so it is assumed) make the system work as it should. These 
conditions were that (1) the market structure should be competitive, (2) 
providers should find ways to deal with uncertainty, (3) the relationship 
between local authorities and providers should be balanced, and (4) the state 
must have effective instruments for correcting undesirable behaviour. 
Supposing that providers choose one of the theoretical options identified 
above, does that tell us anything about how their behaviour will affect the 
conditions?  
 
This is not the case for the conditions regarding market structure and the 
relationships between providers and local authorities. Although the theory 
can help to explain behaviour that affects these conditions, it cannot draw a 
direct link between alternative kinds of behaviour (e.g. collective or 
individual innovation) and particular effects on the quasi-market conditions. 
For example, the research may show that providers undermine competition 
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as part of a collective innovation process, but this does not follow from the 
notion of collective innovation in itself. In theory, one could equally well find 
that these actors sustain competition in the course of collective innovation. 
What happens in actual reality depends on many variables and can only be 
deduced from empirical evidence.  
 
It is different for the other two conditions. Given that innovative capacity in 
the organisational field has its limits, then it is clear that widespread collective 
innovation will help providers to deal with uncertainty more effectively. This 
is because the knowledge that exists will be shared across a larger population. 
It is due to an interesting characteristic of this resource: if it is passed from 
one actor to another, the former does not lose it. The theory also has 
implications for the fourth condition, which is that the state should be able to 
intervene effectively when it detects undesirable market behaviour. To 
explain this, let me return to the basics of the quasi-market. It consists of two 
main components: market incentives and regulation. The incentives increase 
the level of uncertainty for providers, which (it is hoped) encourages them to 
change their behaviour for the better. However, experience indicates that they 
could also respond to the incentives in ways that are not considered 
acceptable. Given that the quasi-market is a system for welfare state 
provision, the definition of what is acceptable will be tighter than in regular 
markets. This is why there is strict regulation to keep behaviour within the 
proper bounds. When the state observes undesirable developments after the 
introduction of the quasi-market, it can add further regulation to counter it.   
 
The problem is that this can only be done sparingly. To understand this, one 
has to look back to the period before the quasi-market. One of the major 
problems of the previous systems of provision was that providers adapted to 
their systems of rules and incentives. The latter learned to skirt the rules, to 
exploit gaps and inconsistencies, and to buffer themselves from incentives. 
This lead to a cycle of policy accumulation (In ’t Veld, 1995). The state would 
react to their behaviour by imposing new regulation, which in turn would 
incite a reaction from providers, and so on. Especially when many actors were 
involved in provision, the more difficult it became to prevent the proliferation 
of policy. One rule invited another. For example, when the Dutch government 
imposed an economic policy of wage moderation, it was subsequently forced 
to create new legislation to keep rent rises low. However, there was a danger 
that private landlords would evict some of their present tenants and offer the 
dwellings to new tenants at higher rents. In this way, they could have skirted 
the price restrictions. The government therefore felt obliged to strengthen 
tenant protection (Brandsen, 1999; Van der Schaar, 1987a). When actors are 
caught in a spiral of mutual adaptation, the only way to break free is to wipe 
the sheet clean and devise an altogether new system that escapes this perverse 
cycle. This is exactly what quasi-markets are expected to do.  
 
By implication, this means that regulation to correct undesirable 
developments can only be used within limits. If the state is forced to intervene 
again and again to arrest developments that it does not like, the cycle of 
 77
policy accumulation may simply start all over again. In the end, the behaviour 
of providers will be so constrained that their autonomy is severely reduced. 
That would defeat the whole point of the quasi-market. This, in turn, means 
that the quasi-market can only be successful when it does not systematically 
produce undesirable behaviour. To rephrase that, the market element of the 
quasi-market should not systematically produce such behaviour. 
Policymakers should be able to rely on the assumption that this will not 
happen. This implies that the market should of itself encourage some kinds of 
behaviour and discourage others. Since the market operates by way of 
uncertainty, it means uncertainty should give some direction to quasi-market 
behaviour.  
 
However, the theory suggests that this cannot be the case, because the level of 
uncertainty does not in itself determine the nature of quasi-market behaviour. 
There are various ways to deal with uncertainty, which are chosen on the 
basis of a number of variables, notably innovative capacity, relationships of 
dependence and social structure. By implication, market incentives cannot be 
used as an instrument for correcting undesirable behaviour. Even when they 
are increased, they do not ultimately determine the choices providers make. 
The consequence is that the state lacks effective instruments for intervention, 
should the introduction of the quasi-market result in continued deviations 
from accepted practice. Incentives will not correct behaviour and additional 
rules will eventually stifle the system they are meant to save. In short, if the 
theory affords a correct interpretation of quasi-market behaviour, then it may 
be difficult to sustain this system of provision in the long term.  
  
Of course, it is quite possible that the theory does not work and that the 
problem will not materialise. For example, providers may have ethical 
considerations that make them do what is right of their own accord. But at the 
worst, the quasi-market will run out of bounds and end up on the heap of 
ambitious, but failed experiments. There is an old Jewish story about Rabbi 
Löw, who created a man out of clay.41 This man-made man, the “ golem” , 
worked well enough when he was given clear orders and was of great service 
to the community. On Friday afternoons, the rabbi would give his orders for 
the Shabbat in advance, because he believed he should not give orders on the 
day itself. But once Rabbi Löw forgot to do so, because he left the house 
earlier than usual. “ The golem was sitting idle in the rabbi’s house for many 
hours and his strength was accumulating, like the water of a river constantly 
gathering behind a dam that stands in its way. Late in the afternoon he felt so 
much strength that it was impossible to hold him back. Like a madman, he 
broke out from the rabbi’s house into the streets, sprang up and tore off shop-
signs, broke and crushed everything that got into his hands” . Finally the rabbi 
caught up with him and ordered him back home. Later Rabbi Löw remarked 
to one of his pupils: “ Don’t forget this event. Let it be a lesson to you. Even 
the most perfect golem, risen to life to protect us, can easily change into a 
destructive force. Therefore let us treat carefully that which is strong, just as 
we bow kindly to that which is weak. Everything has its time and place.”  Are 
quasi-markets an inventive solution to current problems, or will they present 
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us with a modern version of an old tale?  
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5 Putting the theory to practice  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Let me turn back to the starting-point and see what all this theorising has 
been good for. There were three questions: (1) how the introduction of the 
quasi-market affected the behaviour of providers, (2) how their behaviour 
could be explained and (3) how it affects the conditions that make the quasi-
market successful. The theory built in chapter three is an explanation of 
market behaviour, which will need to be confronted with empirical reality. 
Unfortunately, organisational decisions do not neatly present themselves in 
terms of the theory: as this or that strategy, of individual or collective 
innovation. The raw data will have to be analysed and classified in terms of 
the alternative choices the theory recognises. This chapter will describe the 
methods used for this process (4.2). The first of these looks at the variation in 
patterns of decision-making as an indication of whether decisions are 
collectively or individually inspired. The second method investigates whether 
the decisions providers make are in harmony with the strategies they have 
defined for themselves. This determines to what extent these decisions are 
really collective or individual. To make this method work, it is necessary to 
provide a definition of potential strategies (4.3) and the kinds of decisions that 
are in accordance with them (4.4). The third and final method consists of 
obtaining accounts of what has happened from the actors themselves, which 
can then be compared with the findings from the other two methods. The 
methods for measuring the intermediary variables will be discussed in 4.5. 
The manner in which data have been collected is described in 4.6.  
 
With the use of this research design, it will be possible to answer the first two 
research question. The third focuses on the implications of the findings for the 
effectiveness of the quasi-market. This system of provision can only work 
successfully when certain conditions are in place: (1) a competitive market 
structure, (2) a balanced provider/local authority relationship, (3) effective 
ways of dealing with uncertainty, and (4) effective instruments for state 
intervention. The behaviour of providers could affect these conditions. 
However, as was noted at the end of the previous chapter, it is not always 
possible to derive any conclusions directly from the theory. There is no logical 
link between the choice for this or that kind of theoretical option and the 
sustainability of a competitive market structure and a balanced 
provider/local authority relationship. However, it is possible to say 
something on the basis of the theory about the other two conditions. If there is 
a lot of collective innovation, and given that overall innovative capacity is 
limited, providers can be expected to deal with uncertainty more successfully. 
As for intervention, it was argued that the theory (if correct) questions the 
effectiveness of market incentives, because these work by increasing the level 
of uncertainty. However, the theory implies that the level of uncertainty does 
not in itself determine the choices providers make.   
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This last point would be more convincing if it could not only be proven 
indirectly (the theory correctly explains quasi-market behaviour), but also 
directly (the level of uncertainty does not explain quasi-market behaviour). 
Fortunately, the housing market offers the rare opportunity to do the latter 
with relatively few methodological problems. Due to the fragmented nature 
of the housing market, it is possible to study the effects of varying levels of 
uncertainty within the same regulatory framework. At the time when the 
quasi-market was introduced, there was still considerable variation between 
local markets. By implication, the market incentive central to the quasi-market 
operated differently. By studying providers in different local markets, it will 
be possible to see whether the choices they make vary in a manner that is 
consistent with the strength of the market incentive. Accordingly, cases will 
be selected on the basis of the level of uncertainty. If the theory works, this 
should not produce a systematic pattern that makes any sense. The case 
selection will be discussed in 4.6. The chapter will end with a short summary 
in 4.7.   
 
5.2 Methods for interpreting the empirical data   
 
5.2.1 Three methods for interpreting decisions 
 
The theoretical model developed in the previous chapter visualises 
organisational decision-making as a layered process. It starts with the 
organisation judging whether it should innovate or not, and if so, whether to 
do it alone or in concert with others. Once it knows what to do, it takes action 
to secure the resources that it needs. The practical choices that organisations 
make are therefore composed of different steps, which must analytically be 
disentangled. Only when each step can be accounted for on its own can the 
final choice really be understood. The challenge is to find methods for 
measuring them separately.  
 
Three such methods will be discussed in this chapter. The first focuses on the 
variation in decisions across groups of providers. This helps to find out 
whether choices have been made collectively or individually. The second 
method looks whether the decisions that providers have ultimately taken are 
in accordance with the strategy that they have previously defined. This shows 
how deep or superficial the collective nature of action really is. The third 
method looks whether verbal and written accounts by members of the 
organisations back up the interpretation suggested by the other methods. This 
will not only verify the other evidence, but also fill in its cracks and holes. 
Together, the three methods fit empirically observed actions within the 
framework of the theory.  
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5.2.2 The method of studying variation in decision-making 
 
According to the theory, providers can make their choices either collectively 
or individually. Either they figure out what to do by themselves, or they do so 
together with others. It will be assumed that when choices are made 
collectively, they will be the same for different organisations. In other words, 
collective innovation will lead to homogeneity in patterns of decision-making 
among groups of organisations. This is one of the standard assumptions of 
institutional theory: in a process of this kind, “ individual efforts to deal 
rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to 
homogeneity in structure, culture, and output”  (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b, 
p. 64).42 Variation is taken as an indicator of whether behaviour has been 
individually or collectively inspired. If everyone appears to have made the 
same decisions, then their shared preference is likely to have a common 
origin. 
 
Of course, that approach only works when it is possible to define clear group 
boundaries. According to the theory, the relevant criterion should be whether 
a collection of actors shared institutional routines at the start of the research 
period. In Dutch social housing this is not a problem, for the organisations in 
the field can be easily identified. There may be two kinds of significant 
groups. First, there is the national community of providers: the social housing 
sector. Common origins and a century of shared history have created a class 
of organisations that can be identified, not only by a shared legal framework, 
but also by common practices. This traditional bond among the national 
population could encourage collective innovation. But ties at the local level 
could be equally or more important. Since the national housing market is 
divided into various local markets, most providers are not dependent upon 
one another in their daily activities. Each provider will face only a limited 
number of colleagues and competitors in its local market, even in the large 
towns. They will be more familiar with these than with most of the others, as 
they have worked in the same area for decades. Moreover, local colleagues 
can directly affect one another’s businesses and for this reason their actions 
are more likely to draw the attention of their neighbours. The ties among 
these few may be far more conducive to collective innovation than those 
among the hundreds of providers at the national level. Consequently, it is 
conceivable that collective innovation occurs at the local level, even if it does 
not at the national level.  
 
An analysis of this quasi-market will thus need to measure homogeneity both 
at the national and the local level. When decisions of a certain type are 
generally the same across the country, or within a local market, then collective 
innovation would be a feasible explanation. For instance, when providers 
massively switch to a particular type of distribution system (as they have), 
then this could well by explained by copying, a reproductive process. It will 
take some more evidence to make the analysis conclusive, though, and this 
will be provided by the other two methods.      
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5.2.3 The method of fit 
 
The variation method thus shows whether decisions have been made 
collectively or individually, and if collectively, at what level of analysis. But it 
does not reveal how deep collective innovation goes. Even if providers take 
similar decisions, the homogeneity may be very superficial. Suppose, for 
instance, that a group of local providers all decorate their offices with pink 
wallpaper. They may do this collectively because they appreciate presenting 
one (pink) face towards their customers. But perhaps some of them were 
planning to redecorate their walls anyway and merely chose this specific 
colour because large quantities of pink paint happened to be available at the 
time. Trivial as the example is, the implications of the two processes are quite 
different. When providers follow each other only because it is convenient at a 
particular moment, they may do something completely different when it is 
not. But if they take decisions collectively because they want to act collectively, 
the choice in question may become matter-of-fact and group boundaries may 
be re-affirmed.      
 
This again brings me to the distinction between strategies and decisions (see 
3.7). Strategies represent the organisation’s view on how to secure vital 
resources in a context of uncertainty. Decisions are the practical choices that 
actors make. While strategies can be expected to influence decisions, this is 
not a given. For instance, an actor can side-step his own principles as a 
concession to other actors. When this happens repeatedly and in many areas 
of decision-making, the organisation’s own strategy may fade away and be 
replaced by a shared, institutionalised vision. But for this to happen, collective 
innovation processes would have to penetrate an actor’s deepest beliefs. To 
find out how strong they are, one has to compare actual decisions with the 
decisions that providers would have taken, had they followed their own 
strategies. If they have taken a different decision from what was expected, 
then it is clear that their actions were prompted by something other than their 
strategy. When the actions are similar to those of other actors, then one can 
surmise that they were chosen only because they were similar to those of other 
actors. If that is the case, then one can conclude that collective innovation 
processes exerted a powerful influence and will be more likely to lead to 
institutionalisation of the innovation in question.   
 
For instance, when I observe that a man has bought the same coat that 
everyone else is wearing, I could attribute his decision to a desire to be part of 
the group. But it is equally well possible that he needed a new coat anyway 
and that he simply went along with the popular choice for convenience. It 
saved him the trouble of going through all the shops and diminished the 
chance that he would end up with a bad bargain. If he did buy the coat out of 
the desire to be fashionable, then this tells me about the extent of his 
commitment to the group and, when I compare the shopping preferences of 
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several men who bought this same coat, about the reasons for the popularity 
of the garment. The man can be expected to keep buying fashionable 
garments. If it was the latter, his future shopping preferences are more 
difficult to predict. In that case, peer pressure may not have had as much 
influence on his decision as superficial observation of his behaviour would 
suggest. To find out which was the right interpretation, I would have to know 
how this man defines his clothing needs and then compare these with his 
decision to buy the coat.  
 
This is a method that came out of the observation that organisational activities 
and structures are not necessarily coherent (March and Olsen, 1976). It was 
found that actual goals can deviate from formal goals and that goals may be 
contradictory. Likewise, the concrete decisions that organisations make may 
be inconsistent with their strategies. To measure whether this is the case, one 
has to be able to identify the strategies of organisations without looking at 
what they have done in practice. This is unusual, since people’s ulterior 
motives are usually either presupposed or inferred from the decisions they 
make. But it is feasible to apply this method here since the actors in question 
are organisations. Unlike most individuals, organisations develop visions for 
years ahead and, what is very important, document them in policy papers, 
mission statements and so on. Resource dependence theory would argue that 
this is a method for the leadership to justify itself, both towards parties inside 
and outside the organisation. By demonstrating how they will reduce 
uncertainty, managers can consolidate their position. A simpler interpretation 
is that organisations have an inherent tendency to produce paperwork. Be 
that as it may, the availability of such material makes it possible to distinguish 
a general strategy independent from practical decisions.  
 
Such a strategy would define how the organisation intends to secure the 
resources that it needs. Resource dependence theory mentioned three types: 
finding other sources, finding alternative resources or controlling the actors 
who control the resources. Of course, these are only theoretical options, not 
the practical choices that actors make in a real-life context. The three abstract 
alternatives will therefore have to be translated into practical strategies for 
survival in Dutch social housing. Section 5.3.3 will apply the theoretical 
alternatives to this specific setting, yielding three potential strategies: a 
traditional strategy, a responsive strategy and a diversification strategy. This 
being done, it will be necessary to deduce what kinds of decisions follow from 
each of these strategies. This is a thought experiment that applies the logic of 
a strategy’s principles to a practical area of choice. Suppose, for instance, that 
one would like to know whether an organisation is likely to expand or not. If 
it has a diversification strategy, the belief that spreading risks is the best way 
of reducing uncertainty, so then the answer is yes. Section 5.3.4 will go 
through this process of logical extrapolation. It will do so for six types of 
decisions that are central to social housing provision. This will result in a 
number of expectations about organisational decisions. These can then be 
compared with actual decisions. If the actual decisions falls within the scope 
of expected decisions, then there is a “ fit”  between strategy and decision-
 84
making. The two will be in harmony. If this is not the case, there is a “ misfit” . 
For one reason or another, the provider will have chosen to deviate from his 
own principles. 
 
5.2.4 Crossing variation and fit 
 
When the methods of variation and fit are put together, they create four basic 
options, three of which are captured by the theory (see table 4.1). When 
decisions differ between providers, but are consistent with their chosen 
strategies, then they have apparently invented these decisions by themselves. 
This constitutes individual innovation. If decisions are generally alike, but 
they are consistent with individual strategies (assuming these are themselves 
diverse) then this is evidence of a rather shallow process of collective 
innovation. Organisations will have picked up bits and pieces from the 
knowledge scattered around their environment, but only insofar as they 
thought it useful. A third option is that they have gone so far as to bypass 
their own strategy. In that case, collective innovation processes will have 
penetrated deep into organisational decision-making. In both cases of 
collective innovation, one can make a further distinction on the basis of scale. 
The process may occur both at the national and at the local level.  
 
There is a fourth and final possibility, which is that there is neither fit nor 
homogeneity among decisions. In that case, the theory cannot explain what 
has happened. This is because its whole logic is based on the assumption that 
organisational decisions are made with reference to the environment. When 
organisations follow their strategy, they are reacting to the distribution of 
resources among the actors around them. If they deviate from that strategy, 
they do so because they work with or follow other actors. The two component 
theories, resource dependence and institutional theory, each in their own way 
attempt to explain behaviour within a larger context. But if neither 
interpretation makes sense, the theory falters. The explanation must then be 
found elsewhere, not in the environment, but in features specific to particular 
organisations. This causes a methodological problem, because it is impossible 
to study explanatory variables systematically before they are known -yet they 
cannot be known until after organisations have been studied systematically.  
 
Should this happen, two types of explanations seem most viable, given the 
nature of the field. First, there is the historical denomination of the 
organisations. The early history of organisations often influences their 
development in later years (Stinchcombe, 1965). In this case, the organisations 
were mostly founded at the time when Dutch pillarisation was strong. 
Therefore may be worth watching out for the influence of their historical 
denomination (socialist, catholic, protestant, municipal or otherwise). Another 
potential explanation is individual leadership. Resource dependence theory 
reacted strongly against “ managerialist”  explanations, but there is reason to 
believe that these may be useful in the social housing context. Given that 
social housing providers have traditionally been small and hierarchical, it is 
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conceivable that the idiosyncratic preferences of an individual have a decisive 
effect on organisational decision-making. These and other variables may offer 
an alternative explanation, but it must be stressed that the cases have not been 
selected on this basis –indeed, this would be almost impossible where 
leadership is concerned- and the evidence will be circumstantial rather than 
systematic.   
 
Table 4.1: Crossing the methods of variation and fit: the four interpretations 
of (quasi-)market behaviour suggested by the theory  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Homogeneity in decision-making 
  
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
Fit between strategy 
and decision 
 
 
Yes 
 
Collective innovation, 
consistent with 
organisational strategy 
 
Individual 
innovation 
  
 
No  
 
Collective innovation, 
not consistent with 
organisational strategy 
 
Decisions determined by 
organisational 
characteristics 
 
 
The alternatives each have consequences for the organisational field. It all 
depends on what the majority of providers do. When there is extensive 
collective innovation at the national level, then new routines are most likely to 
become institutionalised. Shared knowledge may then reach a point where it 
overwhelms the original differences between the organisations. However, 
when such processes are not prevalent, diversity will grow as each 
organisation goes its own way. When the majority pick up on trends only 
because it is efficient or convenient, then the harmonious appearance of the 
field will only serve to hide a submerged variety of ideas.     
 
5.2.5 The method of obtaining accounts  
 
Although the methods of fit and variation make for a plausible reconstruction 
of events, they are not sufficient in themselves. To begin with, they leave out 
bits of information that are necessary to understand what exactly happened. 
Even though they recognise collective innovation, they do not reveal much 
about the exact nature of such processes. On the local level, they cannot 
determine with any certainty whether innovation processes have occurred 
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through reciprocity or reproduction. Furthermore, they do not show who are 
the innovators and who are the followers. If one fails to identify where 
innovations come from, one more or less suggests that good ideas drop from 
the sky. There is a need for additional information to fill in these gaps.  
 
A second weakness of the two methods is that the evidence they produce is 
only indirect. It is risky to base the interpretation only on such broad 
evidence. Early attempts to prove the claims of institutional theory have been 
hampered by the inability to ward off rival interpretations (cf. Donaldson, 
1996). There is no doubt that the interpretation suggested by the analysis will 
be stronger in the face of rival explanations if the actors themselves confirm it. 
To begin with, they will verify whether the reconstruction of events that the 
theory proposes is the correct one. Furthermore, they will show whether the 
reasons actors provide for their actions are consistent with the motives that 
the theory ascribes to them. They should at least be consistent with the 
causality implicit in the interpretation. For instance, if I believe an actor has 
taken a decision because others have done so, his interpretation of events 
should confirm that he acted in response to the decisions of others, regardless 
of the specific reasons he affords for this action.   
 
5.2.6 Conclusion: three little pigs 
 
In this paragraph, I have proposed three methods for interpreting the 
empirical data. Studying the variation among decisions will reveal whether 
they have been individually or collectively inspired. Investigating whether 
these decisions are in harmony with organisational strategies shows how far 
collective innovation processes reach into organisational decision-making, 
whether similarities are superficial or more profound. Finally, the 
reconstruction of decision-making processes by members of the organisations 
themselves serves to solidify the conclusions and to add information that was 
previously lacking.  
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Table 4.2: the questions answered by the three methods  
 
Method Question 
Measuring variation in patterns of decision-
making 
Are innovation processes collective or 
individual?  
Determining the fit between strategies and 
decisions 
Is collective innovation superficial or 
profound? 
Reconstructing events on the basis of the 
accounts of the actors themselves 
Do the accounts confirm the interpretation 
suggested by the other methods?  
 
To illustrate this, suppose that an acquaintance saw me sitting in the pub “ The 
Pickled Herring”  with five friends. His observation is an application of the 
method of variation: he establishes that the population of six have all taken 
the decision to go to that particular place. He could guess that we have gone 
there together, since we live in a large town and it is unlikely that all six of us 
would have met at this same place at the same time by accident. Supposing 
we have gone there together, why have I chosen this pub? Perhaps because I 
like it, but perhaps only because my friends wanted to go there. As it 
happens, my acquaintance knows that I abhor stuffy old bars, and “ The 
Pickled Herring”  is certainly not a place he’d expect to see me. That lends 
credibility to his guess that I came there solely because my friends wanted to. 
But why exactly did I agree to come? Perhaps my desire to go out was so 
strong that I would have agreed to almost anything. Alternatively, I conceded 
only because my friends had promised to go somewhere else later in the 
evening. The only way to find out is to ask me. That would also reveal other 
details of this night out, such as who’d taken the initiative to go in the first 
place and what we talked about. In this way, variation, fit and accounts 
would give a fairly reliable picture of what had happened that evening.   
 
This triangle of methods will now be prepared for practical application. 
Paragraphs 4.3 and 4.4 will define the strategies for social housing provision 
and the decisions that logically follow from them. Paragraph 4.5 will discuss 
the implications of this approach for the methods of data collection.   
 
5.3 Strategies in social housing   
 
5.3.1 Putting abstract strategies in context 
 
Resource dependence theory identified three types of strategies that 
organisations can pursue to enhance their prospects of survival: (1) finding 
alternative sources for the resource on which they depend; (2) finding 
alternative resources that fulfil the same need; and (3) controlling the actors 
who control resources. They can help organisations to cope with the 
uncertainty that comes with operating on a market. However, the three 
general strategies will have to be translated into more specific alternatives 
that social housing providers can choose from. To do this, it will again be 
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necessary to look both at the product characteristics and the rules and 
structures of the social housing sector. Chapter two showed that these two 
variables had shaped the past history of the field. They also shape present 
choices.  
 
The main effect of the product characteristics of housing is to limit the 
flexibility of action (see 2.2). To recap, these characteristics are as follows: (1) 
the costs of the good are borne in advance and consumption will take place 
over a long period; (2) the costs are of such magnitude that they usually 
require either joint investment or loans; (3) stock changes slowly; (4) houses 
are stuck to the ground; and (5) they cannot be substituted for other types of 
goods. These features make investment in housing potentially very profitable, 
but also very risky. To begin with, the stakes are always high: there are 
always large sums of capital involved. Even minor changes in prices or 
interest rates can have major consequences. Moreover, a house combines 
long-term investment with short-term inflexibility. Whoever constructs a 
house should take into account not only the preferences of present consumers, 
but also those of customers in twenty, thirty, forty years time. If a house is no 
longer in accordance with the wishes of consumers, it will take considerable 
time, money and energy to adapt it. Some of the characteristics of housing, 
such as its size and location, can never or barely be changed at all. This leads 
to difficult dilemmas. For instance, supposing that future consumers will have 
more to spend, they may demand shelter of a more spacious kind, but present 
consumers may be unable to afford it. An additional problem is that 
individual owners cannot influence many of the conditions that determine the 
capital value and the quality of consumption. Variables such the development 
of neighbourhoods, state policy and regulation, economic conditions and 
demographics are all largely beyond control. In short, housing provision is a 
potentially risky business.  
 
The specific features of the Dutch social housing sector both exacerbate and 
diminish these risks. In some respects, housing policy has deliberately aimed 
to minimise the danger associated with provision. The very fact that social 
housing is a form of collective ownership means that providers have a 
broader basis for managing risks than owner-occupiers do. After all, the 
larger the stock, the easier it is to redistribute losses and gains. Providers hold 
considerable funds, both in their financial reserves or the solidified capital 
enclosed in the housing itself. The protracted struggle to meet housing 
shortages, a failure in policy terms, has actually favoured the providers 
themselves (Helderman, forthcoming). Not only has it given them a larger 
share of stock than they would otherwise have had, it has also made their 
stock very diverse: it cuts across the many styles and subsidy systems of post-
war construction. This makes providers less dependent on any single type of 
dwelling. Another positive feature of the sector is the existence of funds that 
support providers by guaranteeing their loans and bailing them out at times 
of crisis.  
 
But there are also features of the system that fuel financial risks, especially in 
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the long term. Housing providers usually operate only on one local market. In 
their early years this was actively encouraged by national housing policy, 
because it allowed efficient and effective supervision (Van der Schaar, 1987b). 
At a time of shortages and limited mobility, it could allow the creation of 
monopolies and oligopolies in the lower segments of the market (Van den 
Brink, Brandsen and Putters, forthcoming). Yet when the market is slacker, as 
it is likely to become in the long term, it will leave providers more vulnerable, 
because they will depend on the developments of a single small market. In 
addition, legislation has tied them to the housing market, so they cannot sell 
their stock and move elsewhere. In other words, the strategy of finding other 
sources of capital is severely constrained. Within the housing market itself, 
regulation prevents providers from exploring some of the more profitable 
sources of income, such as the construction for sale of stock in the expensive 
segments of the market. All in all, the specific features of the sector strengthen 
short-term security, but limit flexibility even further.  
 
5.3.2 Three strategies for social housing  
 
So inflexibility is the main problem in managing the risks of social housing 
provision. Even when tenants decide they do not like what is on offer and use 
their exit option, or when there are simply not enough tenants in the local 
market, providers cannot easily change their supply in the short term. They 
are also barred from many other sources of capital. Consequently, they are 
left with a choice of two alternative strategies. The first is to prevent tenants 
from using the exit option in the first place. If the supply can be sufficiently 
adapted in time, tenants may decide to stay and the risk will be averted. The 
other is to spread the risks incurred by the threat of exit. If tenants do leave, 
the blow will be softened.  
 
The longer tenants stay, the better. As shortages decline, they have more 
scope for moving about, which alters the relationship of dependence in their 
favour. One organisational strategy is to persuade them not to move by 
offering them a satisfactory product. Traditionally, the efforts of providers 
were mainly focused on the technical aspects of their product. Social housing 
providers were proud of the quality of their stock, and not without reason. 
When they carry this strategy into the new era, they are basically relying on 
an old routine to do the trick. It is based on the assumption that tenants (still) 
care most about the physical quality of their home. This entails high standards 
of maintenance and a quick and effective response to technical problems. An 
alternative strategy is to improve aspects of housing other than its physical 
quality. There can be more to a dwelling than bricks and mortar alone. It not 
only provides shelter, but also a space where people can fulfil other needs or 
adopt the lifestyle of their choice. Providers can take advantage of this by 
adding new characteristics to the traditional product, which will satisfy the 
needs and desires of their tenants. For instance, they can introduce shopping 
services for yuppies, home-based care for the elderly and discounts for home-
related purchases. This will create a (new) package deal, targeted at a specific 
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group of customers.  
 
A second option is not so much to prevent exit as to soften its impact. Risks 
can be spread through expansion and diversification, so that losses in one part 
of stock may be offset by gains in another. However, it is difficult to achieve 
this in short term by relying only on new construction or the adaptation of 
existing dwellings. This involves huge investment and only starts yielding 
results over extended periods. It is much swifter and less costly to co-operate 
with other providers and share the risks of existing stock. This can be 
achieved through all sorts of permanent or temporary alliances, involving 
either partial or comprehensive co-operation. If the partners are providers 
within the same local market, there is a smaller chance that tenants will move 
beyond the stock that is under joint control. This makes their exit from any 
one dwelling less harmful. Expansion into other geographical markets has the 
advantage of diminishing a provider’s dependence on market developments 
in any one area. Yet another option is to sell products on new markets; for 
instance, providers can use their technical expertise for offering maintenance 
services to businesses or other non-profit organisations. Theoretically, it is 
also possible that they will develop an entirely new product for a new market. 
When they invent a new service for their tenants, for instance, they can also 
offer it to homeowners. However, this may hit the legal bounds within which 
they are obliged to operate.  
 
All in all, three potential strategies emerge:  
 
1) The traditional strategy: the focus of the provider is the technical quality of 
the housing stock. This turns old routines into a survival strategy. In terms 
of resource dependence theory, it is a method for controlling the actors 
that control essential resources.  
2) The responsive strategy: the provider seeks to prevent exit by responding 
swiftly and effectively to the wishes of its tenants. This is a stronger 
departure from established practices and yet another method for 
controlling the actors that control key resources.   
3) The diversification strategy: the aim is to spread risks by offering a large 
and diverse supply of products. This is the most radical deviation from old 
routines. In terms of resource dependence theory, it is way of finding 
alternative sources for vital resources.  
 
These three strategies are roughly similar to the three types of social housing 
providers identified in the Woonverkenningen, a policy paper exploring 
housing policy over the next thirty years (Ministry of Housing, 1997).43 The 
strategies are all idealtypical and unlikely to be pursued in their pure form. 
However, since a strategy implies some sort of focus, organisations will tend 
to lean one way or the other. The labels for the strategies are descriptive only 
and are not intended to suggest that one strategy is better than another.  
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5.3.3 Types of decisions to which strategies will be applied  
 
Each strategy carries with it a predilection for certain types of decisions. There 
are obviously many matters on which providers will have to decide, but it is 
obviously impossible to discuss them all, nor are they all equally significant. 
The types of choices should therefore be limited to a small number that are 
relevant to the quasi-market analysis. To begin with, they should have some 
bearing on attempts to reduce uncertainty about survival prospects. This 
implies they ought to relate to actors who affect the distribution of key 
resources. Second, they must be activities that were within the providers’ 
discretion during the entire research period. For instance, rent setting has 
only been liberalised gradually and consequently rent differentiation by 
individual housing providers was still only in its infancy by the end of the 
period. There would consequently be little point in studying this type of 
decision. On the basis of these criteria, the following six areas of decision-
making have been selected:   
 
1. Interventions in stock: the housing stock that any provider has on offer 
can be altered through new construction, adaptation of existing stock, sale, 
demolition and acquisition. This has traditionally been the core task of 
social housing. 
2. Distribution: providers use certain rules and procedures to distribute 
vacancies among customers. This analysis will focus on the distribution 
system, the general method through which demand gets in touch with 
supply. Waiting lists are an example of such a method: potential tenants 
register their preferences and the provider offers a suitable dwelling when 
applications come top of the list.  
3. Interorganisational co-operation: providers may engage in collective 
action with other organisations in their environment, through mergers, 
alliances, or projects.    
4. Legal structure: organisations have a formal structure that determines 
who ultimately controls it. For instance, an association is officially 
governed by the meeting of members.  
5. Tenant representation: in addition to their “ exit”  option, tenants may have 
a “ voice”  option. This implies that their representatives negotiate directly 
with the management. Depending on their skill and formal rights, their 
participation may stretch from distant advice to close involvement.   
6. Organisational structure: like other organisations, social housing 
providers have a formal method that identifies distinct activities are co-
ordinates them in a consistent manner. A well-known example is the 
bureaucratic model that combines specialisation, standardisation and 
hierarchy.   
 
These types of decisions were all within the providers’ discretionary freedom 
at the start of the research period, even if legislation limited the number of 
alternative choices they could make. Moreover, these six areas capture the 
relationships with most of the major actors in the local network. Relations 
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with tenants are captured in stock interventions and distribution (important 
for the exit mechanism) and in tenant representation and legal structure 
(significant for voice). The ties to other providers and to local authorities are 
described under stock intervention, distribution and interorganisational co-
operation. Finally, internal relations are discussed with respect to legal and 
organisational structure. The overall picture should be a comprehensive 
representation of how social housing providers have reacted to the 
introduction of the quasi-market. Of course, that is not to say that these 
decisions are all equally important. Obviously interventions in stock and 
interorganisational co-operation can have a far greater effect on the market 
position of a provider than any of the other decisions. They influence 
relationships of dependence with other actors directly. Consequently, they are 
also most likely to affect the future sustainability of the system. However, for 
analytical purposes it is desirable to study a broad range of decisions.  
 
5.4 Expected decisions, given a fit with strategy 
 
This paragraph will predict what providers are expected to do, given that 
there is a fit between their decisions and their strategy. Of course, these 
expectations can only be defined broadly. The sector is in a state of flux and 
many of the conditions that influence the ultimate shape of decisions could 
not be known a priori. In any case, strategies usually determine the range of 
feasible options, but rarely the concrete choice that is finally decided upon. 
The expectations have been defined in relative terms or, when possible, in 
terms of discrete alternatives.  
 
5.4.1 Interventions in stock 
 
Providers can take various measures to change the physical aspects of their 
stock. These include additions (construction, acquisition), subtractions 
(demolition, sale) and changes to existing buildings.44 In the past, construction 
in particular was regarded as the prime task of social housing providers. 
Their post-war growth had been spectacular. By the early 1990s, their overall 
stock was ten times what it had been at the end of the 1940s (see table 2.1). 
However, with the housing shortages down considerably and the risks of 
interventions decentralised, one can expect decisions of this kind to be pegged 
to the strategy for survival. The regulation affecting construction and other 
activities was vast, but it largely affected the implementation of such 
decisions. For instance, social housing providers could not construct housing 
above a certain cost per dwelling (well below the market average). They were 
also forbidden from selling their stock at less than 90% of the current market 
price. However, the rules did not foreclose any of the options outright.    
 
Providers with a diversification strategy intend to spread their risks. 
Accordingly, they will try to build up a stock composed of various types of 
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housing and spread across various markets. They try to control uncertainty 
by regulating the flow of capital across their stock, cross-subsiding one part 
with the other. This means they will have no hesitation in “ cleaning up”  their 
assets to remove vulnerable parts. For instance, should a number of tenants 
wish to move to home ownership, they can choose to sell off part of their 
stock to satisfy that demand and use the revenues to invest elsewhere. The 
key to survival is handling the financial flows cleverly. More than the others, 
they will use all the options at their disposal and will not refrain from doing 
so on a large scale. Although they will be inclined to expand, that does not 
necessarily imply an emphasis on construction or acquisition. It is also 
possible that they will achieve expansion through co-operation with other 
providers, while simultaneously trimming down their own stock.  
 
Providers with responsive or traditional strategies will be somewhat more 
reserved towards large-scale changes of their stock. For a start, they focus on 
local markets, which means that their scope for rolling around capital is far 
smaller. This tactic is therefore less effective. Moreover, their strategies rely on 
a different way of managing uncertainty. Providers with a traditional strategy 
focus on the technical quality of housing and believe that this will in the end 
ensure the loyalty of their customers. This means they will intervene in their 
stock in order to upgrade technical standards and to construct housing that is 
up to date with present-day requirements. They will try to control uncertainty 
through other instruments, such as maintenance and distribution, and will 
refrain from taking risks that they cannot contain. These providers will 
therefore not be inclined to sell. This would imply a loss of control over 
sources over income, when the risk involved in such a decision cannot be 
sufficiently compensated for by spreading risks. Interventions will be limited 
and will primarily consist of constructing new housing and repositioning 
existing stock. 
 
Responsive providers focus their efforts on specific groups of customers and 
will provide whatever is necessary to please those groups. By implication, 
they will make targeted changes to their stock, specialising in certain 
segments and withdrawing from others. This means they will be more willing 
to intervene in the composition of their stock than traditional providers, but 
less so than those with a diversification strategy. On the one hand, the need to 
specialise will impel them to re-arrange the composition of their stock, so that 
it is most suitable for the customers they target. On the other hand, their focus 
on the local market gives them less scope for large-scale intervention than 
providers with diversification strategies, even if they have a larger toolkit (by 
virtue of their non-technical products) than their traditionally-minded 
colleagues. They will therefore be willing to intervene in all kinds of ways, 
but on a limited scale.  
 
These predictions are simple, but the actual decision-making processes will be 
complicated. This is because they are contingent on many other variables. In 
the first place, decisions of this kind will very much depend on the 
composition of existing stock and the nature of the local market. Each 
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provider has entered the quasi-market with a different set of assets and a 
different set of problems. Some may have too many houses in a particular 
segment, others too few; some may have stock that is easily adaptable to 
changing needs, others may have housing that leaves limited scope for 
change. Actual interventions can therefore not be predicted except in very 
general terms. Furthermore, many interventions are carried out collectively, 
as part of major construction projects or the revitalisation of neighbourhoods, 
in which many other actors are involved. It will be interesting to see how 
individual strategies are expressed in these large-scale processes.  
 
Table 4.3: the expected relationship between organisational strategy and 
interventions in stock 
 
Traditional strategy Limited intervention; new construction 
and changes to existing stock; no sale 
Responsive strategy Medium intervention; small-scale use of 
all options 
Diversification strategy Extensive intervention; large-scale use of 
all options 
 
5.4.2 Distribution system  
 
The distribution system is the formal administrative procedure that brings 
together supply and demand. It determines the general method by which 
tenants register their preferences and providers allocate their stock. The 
distribution of vacant units among individual tenants is handled through the 
criteria, categories and labels within the system. The system has three basic 
functions. Originally, it was an instrument of fairness. When there were great 
housing shortages, it was believed the meagre supply should be distributed in 
a standardised and transparent manner. Over time, the allocation of vacancies 
came to be handled through increasingly complex systems, with large 
numbers of categories (e.g. age, income, origin), criteria (e.g. registration 
period, special needs) and labels (what housing unit is suitable for which 
categories). These were designed to replace the price mechanism with 
standards of fairness. The local authorities traditionally had a large stake in 
the allocation process and often handled a major share of its administration. 
While regulation has been trimmed during 1980s and 90s, the influence of 
national and local authorities on distribution remains considerable. Indeed, it 
has been suggested that the relaxation of legal constraints has only broadened 
the discretionary freedom of local authorities (Rietman, 1993; Peeters, 1992).  
 
But with liberalisation, the distribution system has increasingly become an 
instrument for marketing and sales. It is one of the principal methods for 
attracting new customers: the “ shop window” . Since it is the means through 
which prospective tenants indicate their preference for particular types of 
housing, it is also a source of information for other decisions. A third and final 
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function of the distribution system is to determine who ultimately decides the 
allocation of specific dwellings. The formal criteria, categories and labels 
within the system determine the eligibility of individual tenants, regardless of 
the type of system. However, there is a difference in the opportunities 
systems allow for making exceptions. Tenants may have a right to the specific 
units for which they have applied, given that they are eligible. Alternatively, 
providers may be able to bar them from certain units, even if the rules oblige 
them to offer a substitute elsewhere. Only the latter two functions, marketing 
and control, are important to this analysis. After all, the theory assumes that 
actors care for self-preservation, not for justice.  
 
There are two aspects of the distribution system on which providers have to 
decide. First, there is the choice of procedure. This determines the relative 
discretion of suppliers and customers over the allocation of specific units. 
While public regulation regarding distribution is extensive, it does not 
determine that aspect of the procedure. Second, there is the control over the 
administration of applications. The implementation of the procedure can be 
handled by single providers for their own stock, or collectively for all 
providers in a local or regional market. There is also the issue to what extent 
local authorities should be directly involved in the administrative process. 
The systems that developed in the post-war period were often partially and 
sometimes wholly implemented by public officials. 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two types of procedures (cf. NCIV, 1993). One 
option is that the customer registers his preferences and receives an offer from 
the provider when he comes top of the waiting list. The alternative is a 
supermarket model, in which information about vacancies is made available 
to prospective tenants and they themselves pick out the house that best suits 
their wishes, given that they are eligible. The former type of system leaves the 
ultimate decision over allocation to the provider, the latter to the customer. Of 
course, there are various intermediary forms, depending on how exactly the 
process is organised. Before liberalisation, waiting lists had been a fact of life. 
It was only at the beginning of the 1990s that other types of systems came to 
be used on a large scale.  
 
If it were only a question of marketing, one would expect a general shift from 
waiting lists to supermarket types of systems. These turn over some of the 
control over the process of allocation to prospective tenants. Whereas they 
used to be dependent on providers to receive an offer, they will now be able 
to pick out the vacancies of their choice. This will allow them to include far 
more variables in their decision than would be possible if they registered 
through a standardised procedure. In other words, the supermarket system 
allows providers to be more responsive to the preferences of customers. This 
is an advantage in a quasi-market setting, in which customers have become a 
more significant power to reckon with. But it gets more complicated when 
one considers the issue of control. Providers may want to retain some 
influence over who gets which house. They used to be notorious for their 
favouritism, even when the selection process became more standardised over 
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time. Virtually everyone knew a story of someone who knew someone who 
got this very good house, allegedly because he knew one of the board 
members. But there are other, more legitimate reasons for making exceptions. 
For instance, providers may want to spread or keep out known 
troublemakers. As one respondent said: “ If there are two junkies in a street 
and I have the sneaking suspicion that this new applicant is going to be the 
third, what can I do? If I give him the right to live in that street, it creates a 
new problem.”  (3) Providers can also try to create a mix of tenants in a 
particular block, even if this means allocating vacancies to people who 
officially should not be there. They may also want to reward loyal customers 
by giving them priority over new applicants.45 All of this is done more easily 
within the traditional system, since it hides the final part of the allocation 
process from outside view. The transparency of a supermarket model makes 
it more difficult to deviate from formal procedure.  
 
In short, there is a dilemma. Distribution systems that leave the ultimate 
decision over allocation to tenants are more responsive, but they are also less 
flexible. By aiming to increase customer satisfaction indirectly, they limit 
ways to affect it directly. Organisational strategy will decide whether tenants 
lean one way or the other. Providers with a responsive strategy will favour a 
supermarket type of system, for they will appreciate its superior ability to 
meet the expectations of tenants. The latter will be less likely to be dissatisfied 
with their home, because they have themselves chosen it from the available 
supply. Those with a traditional strategy, by contrast, will favour waiting 
lists. Compared to the other strategies, their scope for adapting the product to 
the tenants is limited. Therefore they will be more inclined to adapt the 
tenants to the product, by carefully selecting who gets which unit. Providers 
with a diversification strategy, finally, should have a preference for the 
supermarket variety. Since they will be more likely to intervene by adapting 
stock, they have less need to intervene in the allocation process.   
 
As for the administration of the allocation process, it is fairly evident that each 
provider would like to control this aspect of distribution itself. For none of the 
strategies there is much benefit in involving other parties in implementation. 
Control over allocation is greater when it is handled privately. Even those in 
favour of a supermarket type of system would prefer to keep matters in their 
own hands. It may be more convenient for customers to have all the available 
vacancies advertised and administered collectively and in that sense it may be 
more responsive; but even a responsive strategy is still a strategy for 
individual survival, not for the ultimate benefit of clients. After all, 
supermarkets do not advertise and sell their goods together either. Providers 
are therefore expected to acquire or retain control over the distribution of 
their own stock, with as little interference from other providers or local 
authorities as possible.  
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Table 4.4: the expected relationship between organisational strategy and the 
choice of distribution system    
 
Traditional strategy Waiting lists; control over administrative process 
Responsive strategy Supermarket model; control over administrative process 
Diversification strategy Supermarket model; control over administrative process 
 
5.4.3 Interorganisational co-operation 
 
The discussion of interorganisational co-operation will be confined to 
relationships among the housing providers themselves. Co-operation with 
other significant actors –local authorities, tenant organisations, commercial 
businesses- will relate only to a limited number of activities and will be 
discussed when the need arises. Insofar as mergers are concerned, they must 
be limited to other providers require formal permission from the Ministry of 
Housing if it affects the legal structure of the organisations involved (see 
4.4.4). Another and related legal requirement concerns the area in which 
providers are allowed to operate. They are still bound to legally 
circumscribed geographical areas  (usually their local or regional housing 
markets) in which they are allowed to operate.46 It is a remnant of the old 
system, designed to create effective local authority supervision. To go beyond 
their traditional hunting-grounds, they will also need permission from the 
Ministry. So far, permission has usually been granted. Nowadays, it has 
become more common to operate on the regional market. Permission to 
operate nationally remains rare, though.     
 
The merger is resource dependence theory’s classic example of how 
organisations can diminish uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Ironically, 
it also brings to light one of its fundamental weaknesses. On the one hand, 
inter-organisational co-operation diminishes autonomy, which would lead the 
theory to predict low levels of interorganisational co-operation. On the other 
hand, co-operation allows providers to exercise more control over their 
environment. From that angle, resource dependence theory would forecast 
extensive co-operation. The difficulty arises because it is unclear what should 
be the unit of analysis: the organisation before or after the merger? The 
ambiguity makes it difficult to define general expectations about what 
organisations will do.  
 
However, it becomes easier when strategies are taken into account. Providers 
with a diversification strategy hope to spread risks. Given that the size of 
their organisation was small, as it nearly always was, it would be logical for 
them to expand their stock and move into other geographical markets or 
other market segments. Interventions in stock will not help to achieve this in 
the short term, since they are slow and very costly. This means that co-
operation is the principal method of expansion and that it should be pursued 
fervently. Providers with other strategies will find this less important. After 
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all, their aim is to stop clients from using their exit option, a goal to which 
expansion would not directly contribute. Those with responsive strategies 
could expect some gains through increased possibilities for product 
development. Since they need to develop new services, they may benefit from 
sharing and developing knowledge with other organisations. However, the 
focal point of their operations will still be the local market. If they do engage 
in co-operation, one would expect it to consist only of exchange on a limited 
number of areas. Providers with traditional strategies rely on established 
routines and have little to gain from co-operation, either in terms of 
expansion or innovation.  
 
Table 4.5: the expected relationship between organisational strategy and 
interorganisational co-operation 
 
Traditional strategy Low level of co-operation 
Responsive strategy Medium level of co-operation 
Diversification strategy High level of co-operation 
 
5.4.4 Legal structure 
 
The legal structure determines who has the ultimate hierarchical authority 
within the organisation. In Dutch social housing, the choice is legally limited 
to two types only: the association and the foundation. In associations, the 
meeting of members is the highest authority within the organisation. In most 
housing associations, tenants are capable of attaining membership. 
Sometimes, this also extends to prospective tenants and ex-tenants. Their 
power is based on the right to appoint and dismiss members of the 
association board, which in turn controls the managers. In foundations, the 
highest governing body in the organisation is an unelected board, which 
usually includes the management.47 Traditionally, most housing providers 
were associations. More often than not, the hard core of their membership 
was adamant that this was the most democratic decision-making structure of 
all. Providers with a foundation structure were often regarded with suspicion, 
as one manager indicated: “ At one time there was a political climate in this 
town, in which it was simply ‘not done’ to be a foundation. Once we were 
even excluded from a neighbourhood project for exactly that reason.”  (5)  
 
Theoretically, an increase in market risk could lead to a dilemma.  On the one 
hand, the foundation is a legal structure that gives the more leeway to the 
managers and therefore allows more flexibility for the organisation as a 
whole. This is certainly an advantage when uncertainty increases and the 
organisation’s activities have to be drastically reformed. On the other hand, 
one could apply the same logic used for distribution: the quasi-market will 
shift more control to tenants; an association grants greater power to its 
members, many of whom are tenants; therefore it is the more suitable 
structure. In other words, the association could be construed as a method for 
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controlling the environment. Organisational choices sanctioned by a 
representative body would be considered more legitimate and might 
encourage the commitment of customers. Again, there appears to be a 
dilemma between autonomy and control.  
 
But this time the first argument is likely to outweigh the second, since the 
foundation structure does not exclude the involvement of tenants in itself. 
Internal association bodies can be replaced with formally sanctioned, external 
tenant representation. In this way the provider can keep having regular 
discussions with its tenants, albeit in a more horizontal relationship. The 
benefits of an association can thus be partially retained under a foundation 
structure. More so, some would argue, for associations can rarely avoid 
conflicts of interest. The members, who are expected to take account of the 
organisation’s interests, are often tenants who are personally affected by the 
organisation’s decisions (e.g. through rent rises). This double bind may harm 
the organisation as well as the tenants themselves. Oddly enough, the formal 
voting power they have as members may prevent them from pursuing their 
personal interests as much as they would wish. In this sense they may benefit 
from replacing internal democracy with external representation. All in all, the 
foundation structure is better capable of solving the control/autonomy 
dilemma than the alternative.  
 
In a situation of greater uncertainty, providers can therefore be expected to 
choose the foundation structure, whatever their strategy. The need for such a 
structure will be greatest for providers with a strategy of diversification, since 
they are most likely to grow and operate in different areas. This makes an 
association structure even less suitable, as this work best for small-scale, 
locally concentrated organisations.  However, all types of providers benefit 
from increased flexibility and the association structure has insufficient 
benefits to offset it.   
 
Table 4.6: the expected relationship between organisational strategy and 
legal structure 
 
Traditional strategy Foundation 
Responsive strategy Foundation 
Diversification strategy Foundation 
 
5.4.5 Tenant  representation 
 
Tenant representation is “ voice” , the extent to which tenants can influence 
their provider’s actions other than through their exit option (cf. Hirschman, 
1970). The legal requirements concerning tenant representation are slim. At 
the moment of liberalisation, the law dictated that “ [the provider] will allow 
tenants the opportunity to voice their opinion on matters that could be of real 
consequence to them” , giving a list of various subjects (Ministry of Housing, 
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1993, article 18). This meant in practical terms that providers had to listen to 
their tenants, but were under no obligation to go further than listening (for 
example, responding). A few meetings with tenant representatives would in 
effect do. In 1999, a new law (also known as the “ wet-Duijvestein” , after the 
MP who proposed it) set some further requirements. Housing providers are 
now obliged, amongst other things, to (1) give information on a number of 
subjects, (2) to respond within a set period with arguments and (3) give 
financial support to the tenant organisation. However, this still leaves 
considerable room for local variation, as this is still no more than a basic 
obligation to at least ignore the opinions of tenant representatives explicitly. 
Any attempts to impose more stringent requirements have been rejected by 
parliament.  
 
The issue of tenant democracy is by no means a new one, although 
historically it used to be conceived of in terms of association membership, that 
is, in relation to the legal structure. Theoretically association membership and 
tenant representation are altogether different issues, in that members are 
expected to represent the interests of the organisation and not those of the 
tenants. However, in its historical evolution the issue of tenant democracy 
cannot be discussed without reference to legal structure. Present 
developments are often described as a move from “ internal democracy”  to 
“ external democracy”  (Van der Schaar, 1991). The analysis in the next chapter 
will indeed show a distinct empirical connection between the issues of legal 
structure, tenant representation and interorganisational co-operation.  
 
Again, the same theoretical dilemma presents itself. Tenant participation in 
organisational decision-making potentially reduces the autonomy of the 
management and from that point of view one would expect it to be low. Yet 
tenant representation could also be beneficial to providers, in the sense that it 
gives them a direct link with clients other than through their role as 
customers. It may be a source of information that allows providers to adapt 
before tenants vote with their feet. In the area of legal structure, the potential 
loss of power by tenants through association membership can be offset by 
representation within a foundation structure, if this was what providers wish.  
 
Knowledge of the providers’ strategies helps to predict what will happen. 
Providers with responsive strategies will have the strongest incentive to 
encourage tenant participation. Their approach hinges on the ability to pick 
up what tenants desire and act accordingly. Voice mechanisms will give them 
this information more effectively than the exit mechanism. They are therefore 
likely to go further than the others in making tenant representation part of 
their decision-making process. Representatives may be granted extensive 
rights and resources to fulfil their role as best they can. But if providers 
believe that the commitment of customers is tied to the technical quality of 
dwellings, they will be less interested in representation, since they require less 
information. While they may listen to their tenants, they will be less inclined 
to formalise the meetings. The same is true of providers with a diversification 
strategy. Plans for expansion require a high degree of flexibility. Moreover, 
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the small-scale nature of representation may be incompatible with an 
organisational decision-making process that increasingly transcends the local 
level.  
 
Table 4.7: the expected relationship between organisational strategy and 
tenant representation  
 
Traditional strategy Low participation 
Responsive strategy High participation 
Diversification strategy Low participation 
 
5.4.6 Organisational structure 
 
The organisational structure is the formal way in which the activities of 
members of the organisation are distinguished and co-ordinated with an eye 
to achieving the organisational goals.48 Traditionally, housing providers used 
to have a bureaucratic structure consisting of three pillars: the technical, the 
administrative, and the service departments. This combination of centralised 
decision-making and functional differentiation was well suited to the role 
they served under the old system. As one of the respondents put it: “ First 
there were the technicians, later came the administrators, who regarded the 
whole business of housing provision either from a technical or an 
administrative point of view. That there were tenants in our houses was 
actually rather annoying.”  (23) With the introduction of the quasi-market, one 
would expect at least some of the providers to look for an alternative shape.  
 
The choice of structure has been one of the most popular topics in 
organisational sociology. To define the alternatives that social housing 
providers can choose from, I will use Mintzberg’s well-known fivefold 
typology (Mintzberg, 1983). His model cleverly draws together material from 
other research on the subject, especially from the contingency studies of the 
1960s and 1970s. He mentions three dimensions of the environment that 
influence the choice of strategy: complexity, stability and market diversity.49 
Complexity refers to the organisation’s technology, the activities through 
which it transforms its “ raw material”  into products or services (Perrow, 1967; 
Woodward, 1965). When the technology is complex, the organisation will 
require a great deal of knowledge to carry out its activities, which means that 
it will have to decentralise some of the decision-making to lower-level staff. 
This is not necessary when the technology is simple. A typical example of a 
complex technology is surgery: the skills involved in this activity necessitate a 
large extent of discretionary freedom. When the tasks are simple, as in work 
on an assembly line, the management can take all decisions. Accordingly, 
organisations will be more decentralised as the technology grows more 
complex. Stability denotes the predictability of future conditions. The more 
predictable the environment is, the more the organisation can rely on 
standardised routines to do its job. But as the environment becomes more 
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dynamic, decision-makers have to gather a great deal of information and act 
upon it swiftly. By implication, standardised work processes and specialists 
must be replaced by flexible working methods and generalists. These two 
types of organisation are known as “ mechanic”  and “ organic”  (Burns and 
Stalker, 1961). Crossing complexity and stability, four types of structure 
emerge (see table 4.8).50  
 
Table 4.8: The relationship between complexity, stability and the choice of 
organisational structure (based on Mintzberg, 1983, p. 144)  
 
 Stable Dynamic 
Complex Decentralised 
Mechanic 
Standardisation of skills 
Decentralised 
Organic 
Mutual adjustment 
Simple Centralised 
Mechanic 
Standardisation of work processes 
Centralised 
Organic 
Direct supervision 
 
The third variable, market diversity, falls outside this neat little scheme. It 
refers to the number of markets in which an organisation operates. The more 
markets, the more likely an organisation is to create different units for 
different (sets of) markets. These divisions will be controlled through 
performance criteria (standardisation of outputs). The organisation then 
effectively becomes an interorganisational network (Lammers e.a., 1997, p. 
498). Each division will have to choose a structure of its own, depending on 
the market it operates in.     
 
The typology will here be used in a somewhat different way than Mintzberg 
did. His argument focuses on the relationship between organisational 
structure and conditions in the environment. However, it is important to keep 
in mind that such a decision is not based on the objective conditions in the 
environment, but on perceptions of these conditions. Organisations have 
different views on how they should deal with uncertainty. These views 
determine what they regard as their technology and what aspects of the 
environment they are interested in predicting. Suppose that a provider works 
in a market that is increasingly slack. If the provider believes that its main job 
is to provide high-quality technical maintenance, and that this is the key to 
preventing exit, it will have no need to loosen up decision-making, because 
the wishes of customers remain fairly predictable and there is no need or 
scope for change. On the other hand, if the provider believes that it can secure 
its position by offering new and more alluring products, then its prime task is 
the speedy acquisition of information about what customers want and the 
development of whatever products will keep them satisfied. In that case, it 
will have an incentive to shift the momentum of its activities to the lower 
levels of its organisation. The structure will therefore primarily reflect 
organisational strategy rather than objective conditions in the market. The 
typology is still useful, but with the qualification that it does not follow 
directly from conditions in the environment, but from interpretations of those 
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conditions. In Chandler’s famous words, structure follows strategy (Chandler, 
1962).  
 
Providers with a traditional strategy focus only on the technical aspects of 
housing and will therefore need relatively little information. Their activities 
require only medium skills and can easily be standardised. They will have no 
incentive to change the centralised, mechanic structure that until recently 
characterised all social housing providers. By contrast, a responsive strategy 
requires a more decentralised and organic structure.51 Its technology is 
complex in that it needs a sustained flow of information about what 
customers want. This calls for a decentralised structure. Because this 
information will have to be translated into new products swiftly and flexibly, 
the structure will also have to be organic. Providers with a diversification 
strategy will probably try to expand into other markets, so they will split into 
various divisions. The divisions themselves again face the choice which type 
of structure to adopt. Since the philosophy of their parent provider is based 
on flexibility and a broad resource base, one would expect them to choose a 
structure that encourages the acquisition and exchange of information, as well 
as the ability to pursue new resource bases when the opportunity arises. In 
other words, the type of structure of the local divisions should be 
fundamentally similar to that of providers with a responsive strategy.  
 
Table 4.9: the expected relationship between organisational strategy and 
structure  
 
Traditional strategy Centralised, mechanic structure 
Responsive strategy Decentralised, organic structure 
Diversification strategy Divisions; decentralised, organic structure 
 
5.4.7 Conclusion 
 
The previous sections have defined expectations about which decisions social 
housing providers are likely to take, given the strategies that they have 
chosen.  Table 4.10 sums them up. Now the method of fit can be accurately 
applied. All that remains is to determine how the empirical evidence will be 
collected.   
 
Table 4.10: the expected relationships between organisational strategies and 
decisions 
 
 Traditional strategy Responsive strategy Diversification 
strategy 
Interventions 
in stock 
Limited intervention; 
new construction and 
changes to existing 
stock; no sale 
Medium intervention; 
small-scale use of all 
options 
Extensive intervention; 
large-scale use of all 
options 
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Distribution Waiting lists Supermarket model Supermarket model 
Co-operation Low level of co-
operation 
Medium level of co-
operation 
High level of co-
operation 
Legal structure Foundation Foundation Foundation 
Tenant 
representation 
Low participation High participation Low participation 
Organisational 
structure 
Centralised, mechanic 
structure 
Decentralised, organic 
structure 
Divisions; organic, 
decentralised structure 
5.4.8  
5.5 Measuring the conditions for innovation processes 
 
The theory suggested the alternative options providers could choose and the 
conditions under which they were likely to choose them. This section will 
deal with the task of identifying the conditions under which providers have 
made decisions. The previous chapter mentioned three significant 
intermediary variables: (1) innovative capacity, (2) relations of dependence 
among providers, and (3) the social structure. Some of these can be assumed 
to be similar for all organisations in the field, given their uniform background. 
Others must be measured in each separate instance, using the evidence from 
the three methods discussed above.    
 
Innovative capacity is the first and most troublesome of the three 
intermediary variables. It is very hard to see how it can be measured other 
than through studying the outcome, which is the extent to which providers 
innovate individually or collectively. What makes organisations creative, 
receptive to new notions, more inclined to pick up ideas from outside the 
community it belongs to? The literature on the subject does not provide a 
clear answer to this. There are many ways of encouraging innovation: 
organisations can invest in long-term research programmes, devise an 
organisational structure that encourages creative thinking, attract new people, 
work on building elaborate social networks and so forth. What will be most 
effective will depend on the kinds of organisations concerned, the types of 
innovations that are required and the resources the organisations command. 
It is difficult to say in advance which variables are decisive in the present 
social housing context. It is even difficult to predict whether capacity will 
vary greatly or not. Given that social housing providers share so many 
characteristics, one could hypothesise that their potential for creating 
knowledge is similar. Then again, these are small organisations, and 
individual talents may matter a great deal. Given these complications, I will 
use the extent of individual innovation as an operational definition of 
innovative capacity. The more providers innovate autonomously, the more 
innovative capacity I will assume them to have. This will also show who are 
the innovators and who are the followers in collective innovation processes.   
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Relationships of dependence determine in which areas of decision-making 
collective innovation is likely to occur. In all instances, it will be assumed that 
providers are only dependent on other actors within their local market. This 
premise also underlies the selection of cases. The extent of mutual 
dependence within markets hinges on the kind of activity concerned. The 
previous paragraph has identified six: interventions in stock, distribution, 
interorganisational co-operation, legal structure, tenant representation and 
organisational structure. The first three are types of decisions in which 
providers can directly affect each other’s position within the housing markets. 
Consequently, these are the areas in which mutual dependence is strongest. 
On the others, mutual dependence is lower, since they are largely internal 
matters. In short, the extent of mutual dependence will be deduced from the 
nature of the activity. The cases will be selected to prevent any great 
asymmetries among the providers in terms of the resources they command.  
 
The social structure determines whether collective innovation is at all 
possible. For reciprocity, it is important that actors cannot easily use the exit 
option. This condition generally applies to social housing, where the supply is 
firmly rooted to the ground and where (at least initially) providers had all 
their supply concentrated in one local market. For reproduction, it was 
important that there should be elaborate communication channels. This, too, 
can be assumed to apply to social housing. Given their long involvement in 
local networks, their membership of the branch association and their long 
history in the social housing field, it can be assumed that all actors have access 
to local and national communication channels. Obviously, this should also be 
apparent from the extent of collective innovation and the accounts of 
respondents. However, it cannot be assumed that the local and networks are 
infused with trust. This too must be deduced from the accounts of 
respondents and from the extent to which they have actually co-operated or 
copied.   
 
In conclusion, it can be posited that (1) mutual dependence within local 
markets is high for interventions in stock, distribution and co-operation, 
lower for the other activities, and (2) the social structure favours collective 
innovation, both through reciprocity and reproduction. However, innovative 
capacity and trust must be measured in each individual instance by looking at 
decisions and accounts.   
 
5.6 Collecting empirical data 
 
What this chapter set out to do was to process raw empirical observations into 
material that fits within the theory’s framework. Real, observable decisions by 
providers can now be classified in terms of the theoretical alternatives they 
can choose from. But the methods work only with certain types of 
information. The method of variation only requires simple aggregate data on 
whether patterns of decision-making in the national and local populations 
show homogeneity or variety. However, the methods of fit and reconstruction 
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need information of a more detailed nature. It is important to collect the 
empirical data in a way that satisfies the entire triangle. Consequently, the 
evidence will be gathered primarily through case study research, with some 
additional statistical data acquired from other sources.  
 
The case studies will provide all of the material on the organisational and 
local levels of analysis. Case study research generally serves to uncover the 
logic of empirical phenomena, rather than the frequency of their occurrence. It 
implies the detailed study of a limited range of phenomena (for a more 
elaborate discussion of this methodological choice, see the appendix, A.4.1). 
These qualities make it the appropriate approach to this analysis. After all, 
this study aims to show what drives quasi-market behaviour. How exactly 
different types of behaviour are distributed across the population of social 
housing providers is in itself of less interest. The case studies will also provide 
the density of information that the analysis requires. Since it was necessary to 
gather evidence both at the local and the organisational level, local groups of 
providers have been chosen as the case units. Single providers will remain the 
unit of analysis, but evidence concerning their decisions will be collected on a 
group basis. This has various advantages. It allows a better understanding of 
collective innovation processes at the local level. Furthermore, it provides 
extra sources of evidence about the organisations within the cases, as 
providers will be able to give information about one another. Finally, 
studying local groups constitutes implicit minimisation of variance on the 
independent variable (see below). The cases will be confined to town borders, 
since it is here that ties are strongest. Accordingly, this is where traditional 
group boundaries should be located.  
 
The cases will be selected by maximising variance on the key independent 
variable, which will be the level of uncertainty. The theory suggests that this 
variable does not determine the choices organisations make. These depend on 
other variables, such as relations with other organisations and innovative 
capacity. To prove this, cases will be varied along this variable. The great 
advantage of studying the housing market is that it is possible to vary the 
level of uncertainty within the same regulatory framework. This is because 
the distribution of resources differs significantly between local markets. Due 
to variations in subsidisation, local markets and past decisions, some 
providers are far worse off than others. In addition, the gap between supply 
and demand is diminishing faster in some local markets than in others. 
Combining the state of the market with the financial state of individual 
providers yields a reasonably accurate indicator of the level of uncertainty. 
The differences between the cases should then give a good indication of how 
the level of uncertainty affects quasi-market behaviour. If the case variation 
results in outcomes of a radically different nature, then the theory must 
obviously be mistaken. But if the theory is correct, then it does not spell well 
for the effectiveness of state intervention.  
 
The variation among the cases should reflect homogeneity or diversity at the 
national level. After all, if the cases represent the population of providers 
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adequately, similarity in decision-making among the cases should reflect 
homogeneity among the overall population. The information required by the 
method of variation can thus be acquired by selecting a representative range 
of cases. However, any conclusions drawn from this type of evidence will be 
stronger when backed up by aggregate national data. These can be acquired 
from government statistics as well as from other studies on Dutch social 
housing. Since homogeneity is quite a simple indicator, broad aggregate data 
suffice. Varying uncertainty from high to low, four cases have been selected: 
Bear Pit, Tiger Town, Shark Pool and Elephant’s Corner. Bear Pit had a high 
level of uncertainty, Elephant’s Corner a low one, and the other two took up 
an intermediate position. Their general characteristics will be described in the 
next chapter. A detailed examination of the variables that led to their selection 
can be found in the appendix. The time frame within which they have been 
studied is the period 1994-2000, starting at the moment when financial risks 
were decentralised and ending when my funding ran out. All the cases were 
studied under the promise of anonymity, because some of the information 
was of a sensitive nature. 
 
Although case studies do not necessarily involve qualitative methods, they 
were definitely the appropriate choice for this analysis. There was as yet little 
knowledge on the inner logic of this field and it would have been hard to 
define solid quantitative indicators. Moreover, some of the information 
concerned relationships between actors in permanent working relationships 
and was less likely to be revealed in a survey than in a personal interview. 
Qualitative methods were therefore more reliable in this context. 
Documentation analysis and semi-structured interviews were most 
important, although there was an occasional opportunity for observation. 
Documentation consisted of policy documents, mission statements, records of 
meetings, annual reports and so forth. There were over forty interviews, with 
managers and staff from social housing providers, local officials and 
politicians, tenants and outside experts. They are listed anonymously in table 
A.1 in the appendix. Quotes will be followed by numbers referring to one of 
the respondents in this table.  
 
Where possible, I have verified the data by combining both different sources 
and different methods. The evidence from documents was compared with the 
interview transcripts. Moreover, the statements of respondents were always 
compared with those of others. This was possible because the cases were not 
single organisations, but communities of organisations, in which actors were 
usually well-acquainted with one another. Where the evidence was self-
contradictory or supported by only one source, I will indicate so.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
The main object of this book is to explain how the quasi-market works. My 
approach is to examine the behaviour of providers. To explain what they do, 
chapter three developed a theory based on the twin concepts of resource 
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dependence and cognition. The present chapter has attempted to bridge the 
gap between this theory and empirical reality. The theory recognises several 
alternatives providers can go for, but the actual behaviour that can be 
observed does not immediately present itself as this or that alternatives. The 
three methods developed in the previous paragraphs will help to interpret the 
raw empirical data in terms of the theoretical possibilities.  
 
Measuring variation in patterns of decision-making will give an indication 
whether innovation processes are of a collective or an individual nature. 
Determining the fit between strategies and decisions will reveal the real 
extent of variation in the field. Comparing the results of these two methods 
with the accounts of the actors themselves will make the conclusions more 
solid and allow a more accurate description of how innovation has come 
about. To measure the fit between strategies and decisions, it was necessary to 
define which strategies social housing providers can pursue. There were 
three: the traditional strategy, the responsive strategy and the diversification 
strategy. The first two try to prevent exit, the first by focusing on the technical 
aspect of housing, the second by offering targeted packages. The third 
strategy aims to spread the risks of exit. Each of these implies a preference for 
particular types of decisions. I have described these for six areas of decision-
making: interventions in stock, distribution, interorganisational co-operation, 
legal structure, tenant representation, and organisational structure. In this 
way, it can be determined whether actual decisions are in accordance with 
actual strategies.  
 
These methods require specific ways of collecting data. I have conducted four 
intensive case studies, consisting of local groups of providers. Within the 
cases, evidence was mainly collected through interviews and analysis of 
documents. National statistics were added, when available elsewhere, to 
strengthen claims about patterns of national decision-making. The research 
focused on the period 1994-2000. The cases were selected on the basis of the 
level of uncertainty. Because the housing market is fragmented, uncertainty 
differs between local markets, and this is a characteristic of which I have tried 
to take advantage. It will (hopefully) help to solidify the theory’s claim that 
the level of uncertainty does not in itself determine the choices providers 
make. In addition, it will add fuel to my effort to demonstrate that the scope 
for state intervention is limited. If the level of uncertainty does not influence 
the kinds of choices providers make, then by implication market incentives 
are instruments of limited use.      
 
Now the preparations for the empirical analysis are complete. Chapter five 
will finally get the job started.  
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6 The empirical analysis  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
At last the gear has been packed and it is time to venture into the jungle. The 
aim of the analysis was to discover how social housing providers have reacted 
to the introduction of the quasi-market. The analysis will describe their 
reactions as attempts to reduce uncertainty. It recognises two kinds of 
uncertainty. The first is caused by the need to secure the resources vital to an 
organisation’s survival, in this case, capital. The second kind of uncertainty is 
of a cognitive nature: how will organisations know what to do and how to do 
it? Routines that worked under the old system may no longer be viable in the 
quasi-market. There are two ways in which the providers can find out how to 
behave under these new conditions. One is to innovate autonomously, the 
other is to develop new solutions together with others, either through direct 
exchange (reciprocity) or copying (reproduction). The stronger the collective 
nature of innovation, the more likely the sector is to retain a single, shared 
identity.     
 
The empirical evidence to support this interpretation has been collected 
through intensive case studies and statistics from secondary sources. The data 
will be analysed with the help of three methods. The first measures whether 
there is overall homogeneity or diversity in patterns of decision-making. This 
will indicate whether innovation processes have been of a collective or an 
individual kind. The method of fit looks whether there is a logical connection 
between the strategy they have defined and the concrete decisions that they 
have taken. This will show whether collective innovation processes affect 
providers in a superficial or a more profound manner. Finally, the results of 
these methods will be compared with the accounts of the actors themselves 
concerning the developments that have occurred. This will both verify the 
interpretation suggested by the other methods and provide additional 
information about what has transpired.    
 
This chapter will describe the empirical evidence. Paragraph 5.2 briefly 
describes the four case studies. Subsequent paragraphs 5.4 through 5.10 
describe the strategies and decisions of social housing providers, as they 
emerged from the empirical investigation. They are discussed in the following 
order: strategies (5.3), interventions in stock (5.4), distribution (5.5), 
interorganisational co-operation (5.6), legal structure (5.7), tenant 
representation (5.8) and organisational structure (5.9). Paragraph 5.10 will 
sum up the results. Chapter six goes on to analyse the aggregate findings and 
to unearth the overall logic of the quasi-market. 
 
6.2 The four cases 
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This paragraph introduces the four towns and the providers that operate 
there. The cases were selected and ranked on the basis of the level of 
uncertainty, because this will help to discover the effect of the financial 
incentive that is central to the quasi-market. Uncertainty was measured by 
considering both the relation between supply and demand in the local market 
and the financial state of the providers in that market. The appendix contains 
a more detailed description of these variables (see A.4.3).  
 
6.2.1 Bear Pit: a sense of urgency  
 
Bear Pit was a town of over 100,000 people in a distant corner of the country, 
far removed from the urbanised Western part. Its housing market grew 
increasingly slack and by the time of the research period had already reached 
quantitative equilibrium. Simultaneously, there was the threat of a qualitative 
mismatch. There was a growing demand for single-family units, especially for 
home ownership, which the central city could not provide. Its stock consisted 
mostly of multi-family housing and 70% of it was in the rented sector. This 
resulted in the migration of families to the surrounding countryside and the 
threat of vacancies in Bear Pit itself. It has been said that what was happening 
in this town was a foreboding of future developments in other parts of the 
country. There were four major providers, who together owned about half the 
housing stock. There was one large provider with 16.000 units, Polar Bear, 
which came into existence when two local competitors merged in 1999.52 The 
other three providers, Grizzly, Panda and Koala were of roughly equal size, 
around 8000 each. They were all burdened with a weak financial state and 
relatively poor technical quality, although Koala was doing noticeably better 
than the others. In short, both the state of the market and the assets of the 
social housing providers were a cause for concern. The level of uncertainty 
was high.  
 
The local authorities and most of the providers regarded these developments 
as a major threat. The local authorities had a clear vision on how to react, with 
which the providers basically agreed. They all felt they had to act swiftly to 
prevent disaster. “ Whatever scenario you believe in, whatever’s going to 
happen in the Netherlands and in Bear Pit, it will always lead to a reduction 
of rented housing. The only potential disagreement is how much of it will 
go.”  (1) The consequence was that they agreed on major interventions in stock 
and in public spaces, which would result in a drastic change of the town’s 
post-war neighbourhoods (see 5.4). One provider, Koala, disagreed with the 
analysis of the housing market and withdrew from nearly all collective 
projects. “ A consultancy firm wrote a report that sketched a declining 
demand for rented housing. But we did not recognise the figures they 
presented. We told them it didn’t add up. I took the annual reports of my 
colleagues and looked at the present situation and past developments. We 
told the local authorities who were showing off these statistics that they 
didn’t add up. We also looked at the vacancy rates of other types of housing 
providers and they didn’t appear to have problems either. The statistics 
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presented by the local authorities were so –unreliable is such an ugly word- 
so flawed, that the analysis just wasn’t correct. People have started this 
process on the basis of misinformation and now they’re beginning to say 
they’re not following demand, but simply putting neighbourhoods ‘back on 
the map’. There’s no obligation for everyone to agree with that.”  (5) 
 
But otherwise there was a remarkable sense of co-operation. It is significant, 
for instance, that the parties agreed on a single monitoring instrument to 
provide information about the local housing market. Although it was 
developed and applied by the local authorities, its output was regarded as 
reliable by the three providers who participated in the grand plans. This 
expresses the cohesion within the local housing network. It is a striking 
contrast to Tiger Town, where there were strong disagreements, fought out 
over statistics.  
 
6.2.2 Tiger Town: adversaries in adversity 
 
Tiger Town was an attractive, middle-sized town with over 100.000 
inhabitants, the central city of a region wedged in between several populated 
urban areas. Potentially, the town faced the same kind of outward migration 
of middle-income families as Bear Pit, but its central location and good image 
sustained a far stronger demand. Moreover, a lack of new construction in the 
overall region limited available supply. This situation was not likely to last 
forever, though, with several large construction projects underway at some 
distance. The lack of building sites in and immediately around the town itself 
was therefore becoming a major problem. The local authorities of Tiger Town 
predictably turned their eyes to the surrounding suburban towns, which 
greeted these looks with great suspicion. Of the four major providers in this 
case study, all were in a poor financial state.53 Worst off was Siberian Tiger, 
the largest with a stock of 10.000, which combined a disastrous financial state 
with a poorly maintained stock.54 Of all the providers in this analysis, it was 
least likely to survive independently. Bengal and Paper Tiger, each with 3000 
units and Sumatran, a provider specialised in students’ housing (5000 units, 
15% of which had independent facilities) had overcome the worst by the end 
of the research period. The lack of construction and continued demand 
provided a breathing-space for them to clean up their act, but the growing 
threat of outward migration and especially the poor financial state of 
providers made the level of uncertainty higher than average.   
 
A difference with Bear Pit was that relations between the providers and the 
local authorities were not very good. Tiger Town had long had a dominant 
local alderman, who was sceptical about the ability of social housing 
providers to stand on their own feet. “ Oh, all those managers used to cry: ‘We 
want to be independent, we want to be free from the state!’ Well, now they 
àre independent and now they say: ‘Oh please, tell us what to do! Gives us 
rules!’ They’re just like real people, you know. I always tell them: ‘You’re still 
in the adolescent phase. You say you are up to it and that you don’t need 
 112
daddy any more, but you’re not adults yet, because you can’t do your job well 
enough.’ They get really angry when I say that, but that’s also part of 
adolescence.”  (17) In return, the providers described the alderman as “ old-
fashioned”  and “ patronising” . Whatever the truth, neither party undertook 
much initiative until the mid-1990s. The local authorities had no coherent 
housing policy and providers did little to fill the gap. When the parties finally 
agreed on a performance contract, it was of little substance. All that the local 
authorities had pushed for were limits on annual rent rises and reductions of 
core stock, the housing reserved for low-income households. A manager who 
had just come to work in Tiger Town remarked: “ I scanned that contract once 
when I got here and thought: is that it? Then I put it aside. It is vague and 
shows a lack of ambition. [...] It only stops us from actively harassing one 
another.”  (9) Negotiations on most subjects were characterised by mutual 
suspicion and took long to deliver tangible results.   
 
The story of the discussion on core stock is quite interesting. Unlike Bear Pit, 
the parties had no common basis for their analysis of the housing market; in 
fact, they had very little basis. There was no local monitoring instrument, 
which meant (inevitably) that a lot of the information for specific projects was 
collected by external consultants. In the case of core stock, they agreed after a 
lot of discussion that it should be reduced by only 1% a year –without 
specifying its size! Each party had previously hired a consultant of its own to 
calculate the required size, and, no doubt by coincidence, the results provided 
by these external advisors supported the claims of the organisations by which 
they had been hired. Finally they agreed to hire a third consultancy firm to 
find a common definition. What this clearly shows is that the facts about the 
housing market do not present themselves naturally. In this case, as in the 
others, the parties first agreed that they should find a collective solution and 
then went on to define the shared problem more precisely.   
 
6.2.3 Shark Pool: a sleepy suburb 
 
Shark Pool was a medium-sized town of some 50.000 inhabitants on the edge 
of a major urban area. During the research period, its housing market became 
more integrated with the larger regional market, even though the area 
remained divided into several local authorities. The local housing market was 
tight and the providers were well off, if not wealthy. Originally a picturesque 
village, Shark Pool had become a highly popular location for businesses, 
because of its geographical position at the edge of a major city and at the 
crossroads of various important motorways. As one respondent put it, “ if the 
local authorities wished to, they could put an office block on every corner of 
this town.”  (36) Although the types of housing prevalent in Shark Pool were 
not particularly different from those of the larger nearby town, its stock was 
far more popular due to its favourable location and its better condition.  The 
town therefore sat at the receiving end of the outward migration processes 
that threatened Bear Pit and Tiger Town. Predictably, the central city had 
been making take-over attempts, but these had met with stiff resistance. New 
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construction projects on the outskirts of the regional market were expected to 
draw households away from some segments in Shark Pool, particularly the 
more expensive rented housing. However, given the town’s popularity this 
was unlikely to result in any vacancies. On the whole, the level of uncertainty 
was quite low. 
 
Shark Pool’s three providers, Great White, Hammerhead and Nurse, were of 
roughly equal size, each with around 3000 dwellings. All had stock that was 
well-maintained and of reasonably good quality. Their financial position was 
solid, even though this was somewhat obscured by very cautious projections 
of future revenues. Their relations with the local authorities had steadily 
improved over the years. According to some respondents, this could be 
attributed to personal changes, especially among the local aldermen. 
However, more significant developments were occurring at the regional level. 
During the mid-1990s, there was a brief spell when the various local 
authorities in the region were actually willing to co-operate. This resulted in a 
regional housing plan, signed by all local authorities and providers in the 
region. It had far-reaching consequences for Shark Pool, especially in terms of 
interventions in stock and distribution. Later, as the central city made 
attempts to incorporate parts of its neighbours, the drive for regionalisation 
stopped dead in its tracks. However, by then the regional housing policy was 
already in place and many of the internal barriers in the regional housing 
market had been broken down.     
 
6.2.4 Elephant’s Corner: a safe haven  
 
Going from Shark Pool to Elephant’s Corner is moving from brick and 
concrete suburbs to the verdant green gardens of the Dutch countryside. The 
level of uncertainty was lowest in this town, since its housing market was 
stable and its one provider was among the wealthiest in the country. Lying in 
a rural area far away from the densely urbanised West, Elephant’s Corner was 
pleasant and peaceful, with just under 10.000 people. It had a small business 
community that amounted to a subregional centre of economic activity. 
Population growth in the region had slowed down over the past decade, due 
to declining birth rates and a surplus of outward migration. However, what 
with the growth of Elephant’s Corner’s business community and a decrease in 
household size, there was some pressure on a few segments of the housing 
market, particularly single-family dwellings and housing for the elderly. The 
Elephant provider was a most interesting one. It came into being in 1996, after 
the original provider in Elephant’s Corner merged with two colleagues in 
other towns close by. Since then, it had become somewhat legendary in the 
sector for its enormous wealth. Its reserves, relative to the size of its stock, 
were over three times the national average. It was also known for 
experimenting with innovations that had sometimes become popular 
throughout the sector. Its well-maintained stock consisted of about 7000 units 
overall, over a thousand of which stood in Elephant’s Corner itself. This 
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constituted about a third of the town’s stock and virtually its entire rented 
sector.  
 
Relations with local authorities were friendly, but uneven. They had not 
always been good and on occasion even hostile, but since the creation of the 
new provider in 1996, which was accompanied by a change of management, 
they had improved considerably. In fact, the local alderman was wildly 
enthusiastic about the Elephant provider. “ We have excellent relations with 
our provider. They’re better than anything we could have wished for. They 
themselves are also very happy about putting their headquarters here, rather 
than in one of the other two towns. [...] I told the manager: ‘You’re worth 
your weight in gold.’ The pleasant way we talk to one another, the 
marvellous understanding we have, the way we make deals and pass on 
information to one another, it’s absolutely great. I didn’t even know these 
people until a few years back! Many towns envy us.”  (40) Having listened to 
this cascade of praise, it was heart-breaking to hear the view of his 
counterpart. When the provider’s manager finally came round to discussing 
the local authorities in Elephant’s Corner (at my request, at the end of an hour 
of interviewing), he noted that “ the local authorities are not very important to 
us. We’ve told the local authorities in the three towns exactly where we stand 
and where they stand. We co-operate well, but they have no influence on 
what we do. [...] They have a problem with our merger plans, you hear about 
it through the grapevine, but that’s where it ends. We are an independent 
business and we plot our own course. We’re perfectly willing to co-operate 
and sign local and regional covenants –they do not have much substance 
anyway- but we make our own policy.”  (37)  
 
Indeed, the covenants in question did not go very far. They focused on 
distribution and the size of core stock (the part of stock necessary to house 
low-income groups), but mostly stuck to statements of intent. It shows that 
the Elephant provider was unwilling to tie its hands and was easily capable of 
getting away with it. Its local monopoly, its assets in other towns and its 
financial power meant that it needed to take little heed of the local authorities. 
As in most small towns, there also appeared to be a knowledge gap between 
the housing professionals and local officials and politicians. In fact, the former 
supplied most of the information that the latter based their views on. All in 
all, the relationship seemed quite asymmetrical. It has been hinted that this 
was exactly why the provider chose to establish its headquarters in Elephant’s 
Corner and not in the other, larger towns where it was active.  
 
 
Table 5.1: the four cases 
 
Case Size of 
town 
Providers Uncertainty Housing market Financial 
state 
 
Elephant’s 
Corner 
 
10.000 
 
Elephant 
 
Low 
 
Stable; tight in a few 
segments 
 
Excellent 
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Shark Pool 50.000 Great White, 
Hammerhead, 
Nurse 
 
Moderate to 
low 
Tight; no serious 
threats 
Good 
Tiger Town 100.000+ Siberian, Bengal, 
Paper, Sumatran 
 
Moderate to 
high 
Tight; distant threat of 
selective outward 
migration  
 
Poor 
Bear Pit 100.000+ Polar, Grizzly, 
Panda, Koala 
High Slack; immediate threat 
of selective outward 
migration 
Poor 
 
 
6.3 Strategies 
 
6.3.1 Classifying providers 
 
Social housing providers can pursue one of three strategies: (1) the 
diversification strategy, (2) the responsive strategy, and (3) the traditional 
strategy. For the method of fit to work, it is necessary to classify the real 
strategies of providers in terms of these three types.55 This was done using 
verbal accounts as well as written reports, policy papers and so forth. What 
made the process of describing strategies considerably easier is that 
organisations have the tendency, more so than individuals, to define explicit 
philosophies and to commit their ideas to writing. In this transition phase, 
they were discussing their future direction even more consciously and 
extensively than they normally would. What is more, their public 
responsibilities forced them to keep on justifying their actions to official 
authorities, policymakers and the media. All this encouraged transparency 
and was of great help in pinning them down as having one strategy or 
another.        
 
6.3.2 The diversification strategy 
 
The diversification strategy essentially aims to spread risks. This implies that 
it tries to deal with the consequences of exit rather than to prevent it. It 
encourages providers to strengthen the diversity of sources from which they 
can acquire resources. Accordingly, they will enter into a variety of 
geographical and product markets. These providers will have a formula that 
can be applied to any variety of circumstances (like supermarket chains). The 
strategy implies a flexible approach to capital. Because the immovable and 
unchangeable features of housing make it risky, providers should focus on 
those variables of housing that it can change with relative ease, such as 
ownership. They will therefore more readily acquire or abandon stock than 
the others. Nor will they afraid to follow even the most far-reaching desires of 
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their customers, even if that involves a radical change of activity. It is the 
organisation that matters, not the particular line of business it happens to be 
in. Three providers pursued this strategy: Polar Bear, Elephant and Siberian 
Tiger.  
 
Polar Bear was the most typical of them all. Its ultimate aim was to create a 
network of organisations, anchored by a national real estate fund with stock 
in several markets. The manager told me of his dream: “ Would it not be great 
if, in seven or eight years time, I’d be running this place from my little study 
in the attic? Of course, we’ll still have thousands of houses, but we will put 
them in a real estate fund. They could be the basis of a series of creative 
ventures by a network of small companies. Other providers can join in, if they 
wish.”  (1) These smaller companies would use the skills they had learned in 
the course of transforming the organisation, such as selling real estate and 
providing maintenance to owner-occupiers. There would also be extensive 
connections with outside parties, such as real estate agents and financial 
institutions. When they were no longer needed, the manager argued, they 
would simply stop their activities in housing provision altogether. “ But it will 
take us at least another ten years to get there” . This is the philosophy of 
diversification taken all the way.  
 
The strategy of the Elephant provider could be described as the “ Third Way”  
in housing. It placed a strong emphasis on individual responsibility and 
potential. “ Our current policy is to allow people to improve themselves. But 
they must do it, not we. We create opportunities for people to strengthen their 
position on the housing market. We keep asking ourselves: are we making 
people dependent or are we setting them free?”  (37) The provider applied this 
ethic to a whole variety of products, going well beyond the traditional 
boundaries of social housing provision. These products included job and 
training opportunities as well as the sale of housing on demand. This 
approach might be construed as a responsive strategy, yet it is fundamentally 
different because of the broad and universal application of the principles over 
a variety of markets. The Elephant provider did not focus on specific local 
groups, but developed a general and radical philosophy. This also meant that 
it was actively searching for markets elsewhere. “ If it was our policy to sit in 
nice, safe markets, we would have stayed where we were. [...] The 
organisation we are building has three legs: one is the urbanised countryside, 
one is the city and one is home care, at the national level.”   
 
Siberian Tiger sits somewhat uneasily in this category. It was a provider in a 
very sorry state, whose overriding priority was simply to secure its own 
survival. It is telling that its strategic plan was referred to as a rescue plan. It 
did not encompass a real philosophy as much as a list of measures to 
overcome a huge maintenance backlog and grave financial problems. My 
reason for classifying the organisation’s strategy as one of diversification is 
that the rescue attempt involved a strong focus on the acquisition of capital, 
either through the sale of a sizeable part of stock or a merger. It was unclear 
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whether a policy based on these measures would translate into a coherent set 
of decisions informed by a flexible capital approach.  
 
6.3.3 The responsive strategy 
 
The responsive strategy is based on the notion that providers should satisfy 
the desires of clients in whatever way possible to prevent them from using 
their exit option. Providers of this type will target specific groups of potential 
customers and develop a product that meets the needs of these customers, 
even if it means moving beyond the original product, the physical dwelling. 
The new product will usually be a package consisting of a house or office 
combined with services geared to the client’s needs (home care, insurance, 
fixed rent rise contracts, communication facilities etc). A somewhat suspect 
survey conducted by the branch association has indicated that a sizeable 
minority of tenants would decide not to move if they received such a package 
(Aedes, 1999).56 Since it is important to know what exactly clients want, social 
housing providers with this strategy will constantly need up-to-date and 
detailed information as well as sustained interaction their customers. They 
will therefore be more inclined to draw the latter into the decision-making 
process. This implies a focus on small, local working areas in which they are 
firmly entrenched. Four providers fell within this category: Bengal Tiger, 
Panda Bear, Paper Tiger and Sumatran Tiger. Within this group, there were 
differences of emphasis. The first two tended to stress the social ties necessary 
for responsiveness, the other two its targeting element.  
 
Bengal Tiger and Panda Bear both emphasised the importance of their local 
social networks. Bengal aimed to provide “ a broad living arrangement, 
geared to the needs of individual tenants.” 57 There were three groups of 
clients for which it intended to work: people with special needs, low-income 
households and high-income families on the verge of moving to home 
ownership. Bengal specialised in maintaining extensive relations with its 
tenants, both by allowing participation in decision-making and by stressing 
the social (rather than only physical) aspects of housing. “ Increasing 
specialisation and privatisation have removed social work from 
neighbourhoods and left a lot of loose ends, with little communication or co-
ordination. Social housing providers, with their extensive networks, would be 
excellently suited for taking up a co-ordinating role.”  It also intended to offer 
new products to its wealthier customers, such as shopping services. Panda’s 
strategy was much along the same lines, focusing on its role in 
neighbourhoods and the development of new package products, although it 
was less specific about which products exactly. It also stressed social ties as 
one of its prime assets. The manager noted: “ We have made a number of 
strategic choices. For a start, we want to remain autonomous. Our assets will 
not leave this town. We are also investing in one of our strong points, which is 
the management of relations with our tenants, making sure that people want 
to stay longer, developing additional products if necessary, making sure that 
we fully utilise every moment that we’re in touch with our clients and use it 
 118
to our advantage. [...] One should stick to where one’s roots have been for a 
hundred years, the place one understands. We have some stock in another 
town, but it’s just not the same.”  (4) Sumatran and Paper Tiger focused on 
more specific groups of clients. Sumatran had always targeted its efforts on a 
specific group of clients, as it was specialised in student housing. Originally, it 
had concentrated solely on university students, but it now planned to attract 
more polytechnic students, foreign students and young people in 
employment. It also wished to introduce additional services for its customers, 
like negotiating access to private landlords and bringing its customers in 
touch with the job market. Paper Tiger was specialising in the elderly and 
adapting a major part of its stock specifically to serve that group. It was also 
developing shopping services and home care packages with the help of local 
care providers. It also targeted young double-income families, though not on 
the same scale.  
 
6.3.4 The traditional strategy 
 
Like the responsive strategy, the traditional strategy intends to prevent 
customers from using their exit option, but it defines the needs of customers 
more narrowly. The house itself is seen as the key product. All other products 
are ultimately irrelevant, for it is high technical standards and maintenance 
that customers are interested in. This approach is closest to the routines 
typical of social housing before the introduction of the quasi-market. The 
focus on the physical aspect of housing does not imply that providers with 
this strategy regard their customers with a cold technical eye. On the 
contrary, these providers often had excellent relations with their clients. The 
difference with the responsive strategy is in the warmth of ties, but in the type 
of relationship at their basis. Since providers with a traditional strategy have 
little scope for reducing uncertainty by expanding their product or market 
range, they will hold on to existing methods of control. They will serve their 
tenants, support them, cherish them, but they will never let them participate 
in organisational decision-making. There were five providers with a 
traditional strategy: Grizzly and Koala Bear, Hammerhead, Nurse and Great 
White Shark. 
 
Koala was the most outspoken of the five. When asked whether privatisation 
had led to any major changes, the manager replied with an ironic smile: “ Oh 
dear, no. All the liberalisation meant was that a whole lot of money came our 
way. We used it as we saw fit, and that was that. It was just a matter for the 
bookkeepers. [...] Other than that, nothing has changed for this organisation at 
all.”  (5) It had made changes to improve its responsiveness, but most of these 
had occurred well before the introduction of the quasi-market and had mainly 
been confined to maintenance. There was no desire to specialise, to develop a 
range of new products or to expand.58 In its attitude, Koala was closer to the 
philanthropic housing associations of the past than any other provider in the 
case studies. “ Our staff are regularly reminded that tenants are our 
customers, but not like in a supermarket, where you have to make money out 
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of them. They are people who simply want to live pleasantly and who should 
not be ashamed when they invite their family and friends because we haven’t 
done our work properly. [...] But we are not easy on our tenants. If someone 
does not have his front and back garden in a proper condition, we will seize 
him by the collar. Our colleagues keep asking whether we are justified in 
doing that. Yes, we are. One ought to maintain one’s house and garden like a 
good family man. End of debate.”   
 
Whereas Koala might be described as an orthodox conservative, Grizzly was 
a progressive conservative. Its strategy contained elements of both the other 
types. For a start, it provided maintenance services outside the traditional 
segments, for homeless shelters, a psychiatric home and a supermarket. 
Furthermore, it had a fairly flexible attitude towards capital and was not 
reluctant to sell or cross-subsidise stock for purely financial purposes. “ What 
really annoys me is all that whining about the deficits my colleagues say they 
run up during new construction. They get angry when I say that in public. [...] 
Say I have a deficit of 60.000 guilders. I calculate it, it goes into the books, but 
I also make other calculations. If I sell them in ten years’ time at the current 
market price plus half the revenue, then do you have a deficit? I don’t think 
so.”  (3) What distinguishes these choices from those of other strategies is the 
way in which they were interpreted. The choice to provide maintenance to 
new sets of customers had a different rationale than the services that a 
responsive strategy would give rise to. A provider with a responsive strategy 
would seek out a segment of the market and then ally itself with providers of 
other services in order to deliver a better package. But Grizzly, a provider 
with a traditional strategy, simply delivered physical space and maintenance 
to a provider of other services. Its flexible approach to capital was confined 
only to the local market. “ The local authorities are our natural partner. We 
should agree on how our private organisation can help to realise local 
housing policy. That means I’ve got to have control over the capital enclosed 
in the real estate. If I have to justify my actions at the local level, through 
negotiation and transparency, then by implication I should control the real 
estate at that same level.”  This position makes Grizzly a progressive, but 
nevertheless traditional provider.  
  
The three providers in Shark Pool were less outspoken about their 
commitment to a traditional strategy. Great White may in fact have been in a 
transition phase on its way to a responsive strategy. It argued that it aimed to 
“ meet the needs of the individual consumer through product differentiation, 
product development and the offer of housing services in the broadest 
possible sense” .59 However, it was vague about the groups it targeted and the 
packages it intended to develop. The concrete changes it proposed, such as 
greater differentiation and choice in technical quality, were still fairly 
orthodox. Therefore I have classed Great White as traditional, with the 
qualification that its strategy may cross over to the responsive type in time. 
The other two providers, Hammerhead and Nurse, were more clearly 
traditional. They focused primarily on subjects like the level of technical 
quality and the significance on low rents, without any specific mention of 
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targeting particular groups or developing packages. It is telling that they 
defined products strictly in terms of physical buildings. Both stressed the 
importance of good contacts with clients, but in specifying this spoke mainly 
of support and communication during construction and renovation projects, 
not of participation in a more general sense.  
 
Table 5.2 sums up how the twelve providers fit into the three categories. On 
the whole, it proved surprisingly easy to classify the organisations as one type 
or another, with only a few that raised some difficulty. The resulting picture is 
very diverse. Each of the strategies is well represented in the cases and none is 
dominant overall. Strategy is a level of behaviour that does not appear to 
have been affected by collective innovation processes. But then where do 
strategies come from?   
 
Table 5.2: the strategies of providers in the four case studies 
  
Type of strategy Providers 
Traditional strategy Grizzly Bear, Koala Bear, Great White 
Shark, Hammerhead Shark, Nurse Shark 
Responsive strategy Panda Bear, Bengal Tiger, Paper Tiger, 
Sumatran Tiger 
Diversification strategy Polar Bear, Elephant, Siberian Tiger 
 
6.3.5 The significance of individual leadership   
 
The problem with the theory used in this analysis is that it is ill-equipped to 
discover the origin of strategies. Decisions can be explained either on the basis 
of collective innovation processes or strategies, but where do the strategies 
themselves come from? There are two patterns of choice that could be 
explained, one relating to the theory and the other to the case selection. The 
first would be overall homogeneity, a pattern which would suggest that 
strategies were shaped through collective innovation processes and shared 
throughout the organisational field.60 However, that was evidently not the 
case in Dutch social housing. Rather, there was great diversity. Another 
recognisable pattern would be related to the case selection. The quasi-market 
creates uncertainty over resources, the level of which varies between the four 
cases. It ascends from Elephant’s Corner through Shark Pool and Tiger Town 
to Bear Pit. If there was a link between the level of uncertainty and the choice 
of strategy, then that should obviously translate into a distinctly identifiable 
pattern, even if it is not clear what kind of link that would be. Indeed, there 
does appear to be a pattern in that most Tiger Town providers are responsive 
and all in Shark Pool traditional. That could suggest that as the level of 
uncertainty rises there is a move away from the traditional strategy, because 
that is the least flexible and therefore the most risky. But this interpretation no 
longer makes sense when the other two cases are included. In Elephant’s 
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Corner, where the level of uncertainty was lowest, the provider had a 
diversification strategy. In Bear Pit, where uncertainty was highest, two of the 
providers were traditional. In fact, all three strategies could be found in Bear 
Pit. So while there may be some pattern in the choice of strategies, it is not 
immediately apparent by what logic it is informed. It has no obvious 
connection to efforts to diminish cognitive uncertainty, nor to the distribution 
of resources.  
 
When all attempts to understand behaviour have failed so dismally, there is 
no other option but to look for the explanation in specific organisational 
characteristics. Although these have not been systematically examined, 
chapter four suggested two potential explanations that were worthwhile 
exploring (see 4.2.4). These were the housing providers’ historical 
denominations and the preferences of managers. The first can be ruled out, as 
there is little to suggest any link between the choice of strategy and religious 
or political origin. The providers in Shark Pool demonstrate this particularly 
well: they were originally social-democratic, protestant and catholic, but all 
pursued the same strategy. Many providers were in fact composites of 
providers with different backgrounds who had merged at one point. 
Examples are Siberian Tiger (protestant and municipal), Paper Tiger (socialist 
and catholic) and Polar Bear (socialist and municipal). The pillarisation is 
social housing, once quite strong, is now of little significance.     
 
A second and more promising explanation is based on individual leadership. 
Although it is increasingly rare for individuals to determine an organisation’s 
course single-handedly, the influence of managers in social housing appeared 
to be considerable. At the time the quasi-market was introduced, most 
providers were small organisations, with only a handful of people involved in 
the decision-making process. Moreover, all were initially organised along 
traditional bureaucratic lines, with a hierarchy that offered considerable 
power to the person at the top. Finally, few employees were specialised and 
highly qualified, which meant they could claim little professional discretion. 
Individual managers were therefore in an uncommonly strong position to 
inspire and direct strategy. There are a number of indications that this has 
been a significant factor in the choice of strategy. There are a few cases where 
the provider’s policy took a new turn after the arrival of a new director 
(Siberian Tiger, Great White Shark, Elephant). The Elephant manager 
described his own role in the following terms: “ Our provider became rich 
through luck, frugal policy and good policy. We’ve had luck in the past 
because the government often gave us good loans. Frugal policy, that’s what 
my predecessors of the 1950s and 1960s did. And we’ve had good policy since 
1985 [the year he became director].”  (37) It is also telling that many managers 
succeeded in reforming their organisations so drastically, including major 
reorganisations of the middle management. This is all just circumstantial 
evidence, of course. The importance of individual leadership is plausible, but 
not proven.  
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Of course, one could go on to ask where the preferences of managers came 
from. This was perhaps related to their professional background. For instance, 
Panda and Koala, providers with a traditional strategy, both had managers 
with a technical background, one having been head of the maintenance 
department. By contrast, the managers of Elephant and Panda used to be 
head of the departments for client contacts. However, the causal chain of 
events is not clear. Perhaps they became managers because their professional 
background was consistent with strategy. It is not yet possible to say how the 
recruitment of managers from outside the social housing sector will affect the 
choice of strategy. Nearly all managers encountered during the empirical 
research had either been promoted upward from within the organisation or 
recruited from other social housing providers. This “ in-crowd”  included very 
different minds. For instance, it included the managers of both Elephant and 
Koala.   
 
If it is true that managers played a decisive role in setting out strategy, then 
this could be interpreted in light of the trend towards managerialism in public 
service organisations.61 “ Managerialism”  is a management style blown over 
from the Anglo-Saxon countries that was popular at the time. It was 
characterised by strong leadership and an emphasis on market values like 
efficiency, responsiveness and effectiveness (Hood, 1991). It believes itself 
applicable in any context, a modern version of Taylorism (Clarke and 
Newman, 1997; Pollitt, 1996). Although it is not necessarily accompanied by 
privatisation or the introduction of quasi-markets, it is usually associated with 
such reforms. But even though there are similarities, the relation between 
developments in social housing management and the managerialist trend 
should not be overstated. To begin with, the strength of housing managers 
must be attributed to the nature of their organisations rather than to a 
deliberate policy change in favour of managerialism.62 They have always been 
the central decision-makers in social housing, except that until the 
introduction of the quasi-market they had relatively little to decide about. 
Had these same people been hospital directors, with greater numbers of staff 
and a high proportion of specialised professionals within their organisation, 
their managerial discretion would probably have been more limited. In social 
housing, too, individual leadership is likely to become less significant over 
time. As they are turning into larger and more complex organisations, these 
little kingdoms will become more difficult to control. Furthermore, a stronger 
and more business-like role of management does not necessarily translate into 
a single-minded focus on market values. In European public management, 
there is generally a greater emphasis on traditional public values than in the 
Anglo-American variety (Kickert, 1997). It will not show in this analysis 
because of its focus on behaviour motivated by self-interest, but that is a 
theoretical device rather than an empirical finding.  
 
6.3.6 Conclusion 
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Strategies have proved difficult to explain. The three possible types were all 
represented in the cases and none was dominant outright. The pattern in 
which they appeared could not be explained on the basis of their 
environments, so it was necessary to look whether the choice of strategy was 
related to specific organisational characteristics. The preferences of individual 
managers may be the crucial variable. This cannot be determined with 
certainty, but it is clear that managers were potentially very powerful within 
the small, bureaucratically organised social housing providers.  
 
6.4 Interventions in stock 
6.4.1 Variation and fit in the choice of interventions 
 
Interventions in stock are changes in the physical aspects of the housing 
product and include construction, acquisition, sale, demolition and 
(extensive) restructuring. It was predicted that providers with a 
diversification strategy would make the most extensive interventions, using 
all the tools at their disposal. The responsive ones would intervene on a 
smaller scale, but would also use all the available options. Providers with a 
traditional strategy, finally, would mostly limit themselves to new 
construction and restructuring, and would have less of an incentive than the 
others to intervene at all (see table 5.3). There are two angles from which 
decisions of this kind can be studied: as the efforts of individual providers to 
secure survival and as elements of large-scale urban processes. While the first 
is the focus of this analysis, the decisions cannot be understood without 
reference to the processes occurring at the local level. The most far-reaching 
interventions were conducted as part of large projects.  
 
Table 5.3: the expected relationship between organisational strategy and 
interventions in stock 
 
Traditional strategy Limited intervention; new construction 
and changes to existing stock; no sale 
Responsive strategy Medium intervention; small-scale use of 
all options 
Diversification strategy Extensive intervention; large-scale use of 
all options 
 
The issue that dominated urban regeneration was the migration from the 
central towns to the suburbs and surrounding towns, a process occurring in 
towns throughout the country (AB-Onderzoek, 1997). Many believed it would 
have a deleterious effect on the social composition of these neighbourhoods, 
which was in turn expected to lead to a loss of economic potential and various 
social ills. The problems should not be overstated, as the Netherlands have 
never known the kinds of sharp divisions that characterise major cities in 
some other countries.63 However, for providers it implied the loss of the top 
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segments of their customers as well as potential vacancies and a drop in the 
market value of their assets. The national government took various initiatives 
to contain or stem the tide, which can be roughly divided into two kinds. 
First, there were a number of large-scale construction projects inside or 
closely around the edges of major towns, consisting mainly of owner-
occupied units and up to 30% social housing (the so-called “ Vinex”  projects). 
Second, there were programmes targeted at the regeneration of post-war 
inner city neighbourhoods.64  
 
Nowhere were the efforts to revitalise inner city neighbourhoods more 
intense than in Bear Pit. The interventions in stock that took place during the 
research period were almost entirely integrated in the plans for restructuring 
the post-war neighbourhoods. These plans followed upon the interventions in 
the pre-war neighbourhoods that had mostly been carried out between the 
late 1970s and the mid-1980s. The discussion then moved on to the post-war 
neighbourhoods, with somewhat greater emphasis on quality over quantity 
(SEV, 1999). Although the process of revitalising neighbourhoods 
encompassed many policy areas, such as welfare services, housing, education, 
traffic control and so on, the initiative clearly came from the physical side. In 
that sense, housing was at the forefront. The proposed interventions were 
huge. They would involve no less than 80% of housing in these 
neighbourhoods and result in a 25% reduction of the social housing stock. 
During a twelve-year period, about 15% of post-war stock would be sold, 10% 
repositioned, 25% demolished and replaced, and 15% newly constructed. 
Nearly all the new houses would be owner-occupied. Any new social housing 
would have to be built on the outskirts of the town. Providers would have to 
invest heavily in their stock, the local authorities in public spaces and 
infrastructure. One provider chose to abstain, though. Koala co-operated with 
the others in one post-war neighbourhood project, but refused to go along 
with the grand plans of the late 1990s. It confined itself to smaller construction 
and renovation projects. Its approach is in line with its traditional strategy. 
However, all the others did go along, even when this entailed investment that 
went beyond their strategy’s requirements and, in some cases, beyond their 
means. The interventions were spread on the basis of market share, which 
may be fair, but only assuming that providers share the same approach. Had 
they followed their own strategies, Grizzly and Panda would have intervened 
on a smaller scale. 
 
The interventions in the other towns were not quite as organised, nor did they 
go as far. In Tiger Town, the local authorities had singled out one 
neighbourhood for a pilot regeneration project, but by the end of the research 
period this had not yet led to concrete agreements about investment. The 
relative lack of activity had not resulted in any major problems, since demand 
remained high. As Bengal phrased it in one its annual reports, “ we can still 
get rid of houses that the average applicant would spurn” .65 But parts of the 
local stock, particularly in the post-war neighbourhoods, would be vulnerable 
once supply in the surrounding region expanded. The bubble might burst at 
any moment, but this did not result in the drive that characterised Bear Pit. 
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Interventions were mostly undertaken by single organisations. Siberian had 
planned the sale of part of its stock, possibly as much as 10%, depending on 
its ability to attract outside financial support. The sale was necessary both to 
improve its poor financial position and to dispose of burdensome assets. Both 
sources of relief, sale and outside support, were long closed off because of 
internal political conflict (see 5.7). Bengal sold off fifty expensive rented 
dwellings and carried out a few small construction projects to acquire more 
single-family units and housing for the handicapped. Paper invested in 
constructing several dozen new units and refurbishing existing ones for its 
prime target group, the elderly. Sumatran made only minor changes to its 
student housing and focused on strengthening its position in the “ regular”  
market through the construction of new rented units. All this is pretty much 
in line with what was expected: the provider with the diversification strategy 
proposing fairly drastic changes, the responsive providers making more 
targeted interventions. There were increasingly definite plans to develop a 
large construction project inside the town, in which the local social housing 
providers would participate. This would slightly relieve the pressing shortage 
of available sites. However, the plans had not yet been finalised by the end of 
the research period.  
 
In Shark Pool, most of the early research period was characterised by new 
construction. All providers were involved in small projects and all but Great 
White were active in a large construction project on the outskirts of the town. 
Great White had withdrawn at an early stage, supposedly for financial 
reasons, but the new manager who came in midway during the research 
period indicated his scepticism. The alleged financial problems were caused 
by very cautious bookkeeping, when the actual financial prospects were fairly 
good. Later in the research period, all providers committed themselves to 
investment in existing stock as part of a neighbourhood regeneration 
programme. This involved four areas where they agreed to renovate, 
demolish and even sell parts of their stock, in addition to the construction of 
new single-family units and housing for the elderly. Although the plans did 
not go nearly as far as those of Bear Pit, they were more comprehensive than 
one would have expected, since demand was likely to remain high and since 
two of the providers were already involved in a large-scale building project.  
 
Elephant’s Corner was an exception in that there was no collective project to 
revitalise neighbourhoods. The local provider constructed a few dozen 
dwellings a year and showed itself keen to reposition old buildings, such as a 
cloister and a cinema. These were all small, isolated projects, rather than 
elements of a grand local scheme. The most important of its interventions was 
sale. It had sold close to 2000 units in the 1990s and was planning to intensify 
that effort. It kept growing, though, by merging with other providers (see 5.6). 
Its interventions in stock are consistent with the diversification strategy, in the 
sense that they comprise a variety of instruments. The emphasis on sales in 
particular demonstrates a clear fit: no other strategy would have warranted 
flows of capital on such a large scale. 
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Overall, it appears that many of the interventions in stock were carried out as 
part of collective projects. Such projects seem to have been popular in all 
major towns. They caused a number of providers to intervene more strongly 
than their strategy would suggest. Where there were no large collective 
projects, interventions were clearly in line with strategies.  
 
6.4.2 The benefits of neighbourhood regeneration programmes 
 
An interesting phenomenon is that the regeneration of neighbourhoods, 
which included plans for physical interventions in the housing stock, to some 
extent evolved separately from the problems that it formally addressed. All 
plans purported to prevent the decline of neighbourhoods and the 
concomitant social problems, such as crime, vacancies, lack of economic 
investment and so forth. However, it is clear that the extent of the problems 
differed widely between the cases. Shark Pool did not really have any 
problems to speak of. This is a town where local councilmen once spent part 
of a meeting discussing a stone thrown through a window. Tiger Town’s 
problems, though more serious than Shark Pool’s, pale in comparison with 
the developments in Bear Pit even by low estimates. Yet all three towns made 
(or intended to make) extensive plans for the regeneration of “ problem 
areas” , all based on similar notions, such as the need to mix income groups 
and to involve actors with many different professional backgrounds. In that 
sense, these processes appear to have a dynamic of their own. Of course, it is 
impossible to draw firm conclusions on the basis of housing alone, but it does 
appear that programmes proceeded regardless of the real extent of the 
problems.  
 
The homogeneity can be partly explained with reference to government 
efforts to encourage such programmes. But there were other reasons why 
actors were all too willing to invest in them. One was that there was no basic 
conflict between the interests of private parties and local authorities (cf. Klijn, 
1996). The revitalisation of neighbourhoods can be justified both as a 
commercial venture and as an instrument of social policy. For local 
authorities, it was a way of attracting and directing large-scale investment in 
neighbourhoods in order to prevent social problems. Social housing providers 
invested to retain customers and maintain the overall market value of their 
stock. Doing this as part of a collective project precluded a loss of competitive 
advantage and guaranteed that investments in private property would be 
accompanied by simultaneous investment in the public spaces surrounding 
that property. It is of little use renovating a house at great expense when the 
street is full of potholes and littered with garbage. In that sense, there was 
mutual dependence among providers and between providers and the local 
authorities. As one of the aldermen noted: “ [The providers] see that their 
assets will lose value if they don’t make a deal with the local authorities in the 
foreseeable future. So they’re ready to make that deal. It’s a good combination 
of the organisational goals and the public responsibilities to which they are 
bound.”  (34) Neighbourhood regeneration programmes were broadly 
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consistent with private interests. A cynic might say that they constituted a 
legitimate framework for social housing providers to strengthen their market 
position. Perhaps it made the gravity of the social problems somewhat less 
relevant.  
 
A second part of the explanation derives from the networking benefits of 
these programmes. In housing, they have helped to bring parties in the local 
network closer together. As a consultant in Shark Pool put it: “ When I was 
defending my company’s offer I said: ‘The best that could come out of all this 
is a network. That we do things together, that we fight and laugh and share. 
That’s more important than overhauling entire neighbourhoods’.”  (36) In the 
broader urban networks, the programmes have also created and re-affirmed 
relationships between actors that were barely in touch before. One public 
official noted: “ Sometimes we laugh about it. So much effort, and 95% of the 
investment comes out of our own pocket. [...] There is a lot involved, after all: 
reports, reviews, and all that for just a little bit of money. It all has a 
bureaucratic tinge about it. Our alderman once said: ‘Every self-respecting 
town has a problem with young Moroccans’. That’s just a thing he picks up 
from the newspapers. [...] But it helps to approach new partners and it forces 
you to think in the long term, with the explicit requirement to approach other 
parties.”  (22) Within the municipal bureaucracies, the plans have served to 
break down internal barriers and justify organisational changes. One should 
therefore beware of judging the results of these programmes only in terms of 
their effects on neighbourhoods. In their initial stages at least, they may 
primarily have solved the problems of urban networks. This would partly 
explain the homogeneity that researchers have found among such 
programmes in nation-wide comparisons (Denters, Van Heffen and De Jong, 
1999).  
 
Elephant’s Corner was an exception, because it would simply have been 
impossible to justify large-scale intervention in this town, even for the most 
hardened of consultants. The market was stable, with the prospect of neither 
great shortages nor surpluses. The local alderman was on his guard, though: 
“ You must take care that some kinds of people do not attract others, that you 
don’t get ghetto’s. [...] We do not have real problem areas, but we’re spoilt. I 
sometimes go to the big town and when I see the public spaces, I think: ‘Those 
people simply don’t care as much. People here are much less tolerant and are 
annoyed by the smallest things. Then again, garbage attracts garbage, and it’s 
the same in neighbourhoods. You attract the wrong people ... well, other 
kinds of people than you would like to see. They often don’t have jobs, have 
less to spend, don’t take care of public spaces, don’t tend their gardens. It’s 
sad to see that happening.”  (40) Incidentally, this was the only time any 
respondent mentioned the word “ ghetto”  during the interviews.  
 
6.4.3 The significance of local relationships  
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However, it is clear that there were also major differences in the speed and 
extent with which plans for collective interventions in stock proceeded. Bear 
Pit’s went faster and further than the others. In this case, the providers appear 
to have become involved in a process of collective innovation through 
reciprocity that caught them so strongly that some were willing to go further 
than they normally would have. The conditions for such a process were quite 
propitious. There was strong mutual dependence, as the parties needed one 
another to make their own investments more effective. There was a tightly-
knit social structure, fostered by years of close proximity and co-operation in 
past projects. Finally, there was a sense of urgency: the feeling that something 
had to be done swiftly. In that sense, the level of uncertainty has proved 
significant, not so much determining the nature of interventions as their 
timing and intensity.   
 
But Koala disagreed with the analysis of the housing market that was at the 
basis of these plans. “ The plans are too ambitious. The means are simply not 
available either to the providers or the local authorities. Anyway, the vacancy 
rate is not high enough to justify intervention on this scale. The local 
authorities should be prepared to reduce their plans to reasonable 
proportions.” 66 But although this dispute was cloaked in statistical terms, as 
disagreements often are, it also reflected a basic difference of opinion over 
strategy. “ As for interventions in stock, we’ve always invested in it. We 
developed a maintenance policy to keep our technical assets up to standards 
years ago. It’s an ongoing process, not an incidental project. We also make 
sure to acquire stock that meets present demands, like housing for the elderly. 
Or we make some changes, like putting in elevators. All these small 
interventions have made our stock look decent. There is really no need to 
intervene on a large scale. The technical state of our stock is good, the tenants 
are happy, so why should we do what our colleagues want?”  Koala’s 
approach fits its traditional strategy, but it is surprising that it isolated itself 
so deliberately. One explanation for this behaviour is that it was in better 
shape than any of the others, so it felt the urgency less keenly. Moreover, its 
strategy was orthodox even within the traditional group and was in stronger 
conflict with the plans for large-scale intervention than those of the others. 
Some of the traditional providers may have chosen their strategy only for lack 
of innovation (see 6.3), but Koala was firmly committed and implemented it 
flawlessly.  
 
The other providers in Bear Pit were not amused. Some respondents 
suggested, more or less explicitly, that this was free-rider behaviour. As a 
public official put it: “ What bugs the other providers is that they all make 
painful investments that Koala also profits from, even if it does not foot the 
bill. The local authorities are not too pleased about it either, because this 
operation is very hard to sell politically. You’re forcing poor people out of 
their homes -even if they do get ample compensation- to build new housing 
for the rich. In a town dominated by left-wing politics that is controversial. So 
when one of the social housing providers starts clamouring loudly that it’s all 
unnecessary, the alderman is not happy.”  (8) The other providers shared this 
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view, though in more guarded terms. “ There are considerable sums of money 
involved. When one party withdraws, it makes things more difficult. If you 
think about it, they too have housing in those neighbourhoods. Their 
products will become more valuable in economic terms because we have 
made sure there is the infrastructure, because we have lifted the overall 
quality. It’s difficult.”  (4) However, there was little the others could do to 
force Koala into joining. The local authorities were trying to find a legal 
remedy, but since Koala’s performance regarding its own stock was more 
than adequate, this had little chance of succeeding.  
 
In Tiger Town, it all went a lot slower and most providers had not yet made 
any serious financial commitments by the end of the research period. It is 
telling that the neighbourhood regeneration programme was initiated largely 
by the welfare rather than the housing and urban planning department. An 
outside official from the provincial authorities noted: “ When I got involved 
with the programme in Tiger Town, everyone kept wishing me good luck. I 
was surprised to see what they were doing. Time seems to have stood still in 
that place. The local authorities haven’t yet made the transition. People still 
accept each other’s traditional roles.”  (21) Some providers regarded the 
neighbourhood regeneration plan –a local authority initiative- with some 
suspicion. This, combined with the lack of a local housing policy, prevented 
the discussions on the neighbourhood programme from resulting in definite 
investments. As a local authority official put it, “ They’re perfectly willing to 
discuss the future of neighbourhoods, but when it actually comes to money, 
some jump up and leave. They say they have enough problems of their own 
to deal with.”  (19) Bengal was the only provider that took some initiative. It 
started a social project in a small area of the neighbourhood in question, 
comprising small renovations. As another official remarked, “ [Bengal] works 
two ways. They take their experiences back to the other providers. They make 
a profit and they can prove it. By taking the initiative, they can acquire 
subsidies. They prove that poverty need not stand in the way of initiative. It’s 
better than doing nothing, in any case, because otherwise higher-income 
groups will leave the neighbourhood.”  (20) But Bengal long remained an 
exception, although matters appeared to be improving a little by the end of 
the research period.  
 
There appear to be two reasons why the physical interventions involved in 
neighbourhood regeneration took so long to materialise in Tiger Town. The 
first is a lack of (perceived) market pressure. Although a number of housing 
managers noted the need to prevent the deterioration of neighbourhoods, few 
seemed to consider it a short-term problem. In other words, there was no 
sense of urgency. The lack of market information probably contributed to this. 
There was no comprehensive, systematic monitoring system for the local 
housing market. What meagre information existed was often disputed. A 
second reason for the slow start of the programme was the adversarial nature 
of relationships with the local housing network. There was simply no trust 
between the actors.  
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The evidence from Shark Pool suggests that the second reason may be more 
important than the first. Although they started somewhat later and the actual 
problems were less pressing, co-operation went far more smoothly and 
ultimately led to concrete projects. In this case, the attention to “ problem 
neighbourhoods”  was most definitely encouraged by the regional housing 
plan. While the large city nearby certainly had areas with serious social 
problems, Shark Pool had nothing that remotely compared with them. The 
decision to have a neighbourhood regeneration programme was taken even 
though the evidence of social problems was mainly “ statistical” , as one of the 
consultants involved put it, and there was no clear vision on how to proceed. 
As the same consultant put it, “ they didn’t have ideas at all. Sure, within their 
own policy areas, but about neighbourhoods, no. They had an open mind and 
thought it was all great fun.”  (36) It seems that the will to co-operate was in 
the end more productive than the need to co-operate.  
 
6.4.4 Attitudes towards sale 
 
The significance of collective processes should not obscure the fact that there 
was still variety caused by different strategies. These surfaced both in the 
interventions that were not part of collective projects and in the 
implementation of such projects. They were most visible in attitudes towards 
selling stock. Before the introduction of the quasi-market, sale was rare and 
even somewhat taboo. In the period 1977-89, social housing providers sold 
between 100 and 5000 units a year, on a stock of over two million (Ministry of 
Housing, 1991). By the mid-1990s sale had become more acceptable, though, 
encouraged by a relaxation of legal requirements. It was increasingly used as 
a source of revenue, a way of cleaning up the portfolio and an instrument for 
changing the composition of geographical areas. By the end of the research 
period, the number of sales had more than doubled (Ministry of Housing, 
Public Housing in Figures, 2000). A number of providers experimented with 
sale under certain restrictions, effectively creating intermediate forms of 
tenure. These usually consisted of provisions regarding the ownership of 
future capital gains and/or of service packages attached to the sales contract.67 
However, there remained great differences between the attitudes of providers 
to this instrument, differences that mostly ran along the lines of strategy.  
 
As expected, sale remained rare among providers with a traditional strategy. 
Only Grizzly, caught up in the whirl of Bear Pit’s great project, sold a sizeable 
part of its stock. This is less surprising considering its unusually flexible 
attitude to capital for a provider with a technical focus (see 5.3). Those with a 
responsive strategy were less averse to this type of intervention, as expected, 
and were the most eager to experiment with new forms of tenure. These 
allowed them to contain the risks involved in sale without precluding it 
altogether. Providers with a diversification strategy not only sold in greater 
numbers, but also refrained from any sort of restrictions on the transfer of 
tenure. This is logical, given their philosophy of revolving capital. The 
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Elephant provider’s policy was particularly interesting, because it constituted 
a radical break with past routines:  
 
We say: every tenant should be allowed to buy his own home, unless it contradicts our goals. 
That completely reverses the policy we used to have. There are still many providers who say: 
‘We will not sell’. We sell lots of housing. Because our customers want to. [...] There are many 
people who want to buy, but cannot, because they have no steady job. We say to them: “ We 
are prepared to keep the price at the present market rate for the time being, and sell, but only 
if you find extra income” . With a number of them, you see something very special happening. 
The husband starts working again or the wife starts working too. It is a social process we had 
never anticipated. There were areas where women didn’t get a job because it would lose them 
their rent subsidies. Sell to them and their goals change. They start moving. [...] At present, a 
lot of providers sell only with a number of restrictions. I don’t get that. It’s criminal, that’s 
what it is. When someone like me, who earns a little more than those tenants –well, perhaps 
more than a little- buys a house, I do so because I like the house and because maybe at one 
point I can sell it at a profit. It’s as simple as that. But many providers say: “ We’ve always 
patronised our customers, now let’s sell only with a compulsory maintenance service, because 
we just know they won’t maintain the house as well as we did” . Why not? Tenants are not 
stupid, they have education and a better pair of hands than I’ve got. And most of them have a 
brother-in-law who works in the construction business. So that’s not the problem. The second 
thing these providers say is: “ When we sell our stock, we will claim part of the profits people 
make when it is sold again. [...] What they’re effectively saying is: ‘Wait a minute, you have a 
low income, so you should not profit from home ownership” . It’s nonsense. Those are exactly 
the kinds of people that should be allowed to earn a little more. We sell our houses at 100% of 
the market price, but because they’re rented, that’s still 20% below actual value. Everyone’s 
happy.”  (37)  
 
The notion that buying one’s home should be a right was typical of this 
provider’s activation ethic and perhaps feasible only because of its rock solid 
financial position. However, the aversion to restrictions on sale was universal 
among providers with a diversification strategy. One of the Polar Bear 
managers remarked: “ I’m not all that enthusiastic about these intermediate 
forms. We’ve experimented a lot here in Bear Pit and most buyers are not 
keen on it. They have a strong feeling that once they buy the house is theirs. 
[...] There’s not really a market for insurance against income loss, market 
collapse and so forth, so you need other reasons to offer such packages, and I 
don’t know any good ones. The nice thing about home ownership is the 
ability to make a profit, isn’t it? [...] The only thing we tell people is: ‘You buy 
this and if it goes all wrong, call us and we’ll see what we can do. In some 
cases, people got in trouble due to no fault of their own and we bought back 
those houses at the current market value. But I’m not going to put that in the 
sale contract, because that would distort the market.”  (1)  
 
6.4.5 Conclusion  
 
Summing up, many of the interventions in stock have occurred as part of 
collective projects. These have resulted in processes of innovation through 
reproduction and reciprocity. The state played a crucial rule in disseminating 
programmes targeted at “ problem neighbourhoods” . In other words, this was 
reproduction strongly promoted by a dominant actor; in DiMaggio and 
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Powell’s terms, an instance of “ coercive isomorphism” ). In Shark Pool and 
Bear Pit the programmes sparked a process of reciprocity, which encouraged 
some providers to intervene more drastically than they would otherwise 
have. In these cases all the conditions were in place: mutual dependence (the 
need for combined public and private investment), an effective “ no exit”  
situation (providers cannot pick up their houses and leave) as well as trust 
between the providers and local authorities. Where there was no trust, as in 
Tiger Town, the programmes had difficulty getting off the ground. Where 
there was no collective innovation, providers executed their own strategies. 
Strategies also shone through in the implementation of interventions, 
particularly sale.  
 
6.5 Distribution 
  
6.5.1 Variation and fit in the choice of distribution system  
 
The distribution system is the general procedure through which potential 
customers indicate their interest in the housing supply. The introduction of 
the quasi-market has changed the relation between supply and demand, and 
can therefore be expected to affect the choice of system. Indeed, the patterns 
of decision-making show sweeping changes. Before 1990, all the providers in 
the four case studies distributed their stock through waiting lists. This is a 
system in which the provider takes the initiative in allocating specific units to 
specific households, based on its knowledge of the prospective tenant, the 
eligibility rules and the characteristics of vacant dwellings. The customer 
registers and waits until his name comes top of the list. But since 
privatisation, all but two providers have switched to a variety of the 
supermarket system. This advertises the supply of vacancies, from which 
applicants themselves can search out their preferred choice (provided they are 
eligible). When they have registered their interest in a particular unit, the one 
who is most eligible has the right to claim it. Provided that he has followed 
the proper procedure, the provider cannot refuse him.  
 
Table 5.4: the expected relationship between organisational strategy and the 
choice of distribution system    
 
Traditional strategy Waiting lists; control over administrative process 
Responsive strategy Supermarket model; control over administrative process 
Diversification strategy Supermarket model; control over administrative process 
 
Shark Pool’s providers all switched to an advertising system simultaneously 
with nearly all the other providers in their region in 1995. The Elephant 
provider introduced the new model in 1996, on its creation through a merger. 
Two of the three providers involved in the merger had previously switched to 
this system (one as early as 1991), but Elephant’s Corner’s original provider 
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had not. Given that Elephant was the only provider of social housing in 
Elephant’s Corner, its system was synonymous with the local distribution 
system for social housing. In 1998, it was extended to the regional level. Tiger 
Town introduced a local collective advertising model in 1993, which was 
extended to neighbouring municipalities in 1998. Sumatran refused to join the 
system in its early stages, but later agreed to incorporate part of its stock. 
However, it did not include student rooms with shared facilities, on the 
grounds that students switch rooms so quickly that it would overload the 
system within days. “ My colleagues get terrified if they have a 5% turnover 
rate. Ours is about 60%.”  (12) Bear Pit were the laggards, since they only 
adopted a collectively administered advertising system in 1998. One provider, 
Koala, refused to co-operate.    
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Table 5.5: Distribution systems at the start and end of the research period 
 
 Start of research period End of research period 
Providers with waiting lists   All 2 
Providers with advertising system None 10 
 
There was therefore a great deal of uniformity among the cases: (1) the same 
type of system was introduced in all four cases, (2) in every case it was 
introduced as a collective (local or regional) system rather than an 
organisational one (see table 5.5).  The trend towards an advertising system is 
also apparent in national figures, although it is stronger in urban than in rural 
areas (Kullberg, 1996). The model was first introduced in 1990 in the town of 
Delft (it is also known as the “ Delft model” ). In the following years it spread 
rapidly. By 1995, it had been adopted in 144 of the 633 Dutch municipalities, 
in 1996 in 213. Given that these included most of the large towns, the segment 
of the overall population covered by the new model increased to well over 
half. No figures are available about developments since then, although the 
spread of the model is likely to have continued. As noted above, two of the 
cases adopted it after 1996.   
 
The emerging dominance of a single type of system suggests a process of 
collective innovation through reciprocity. However, there is something 
strange about this. The theory predicted that providers with a diversification 
or responsive strategy would prefer a supermarket type of system that leaves 
the initiative to the prospective tenants themselves. Providers with a 
traditional strategy were expected to favour a system that ultimately left 
control in their own hands (see table 5.4). The prediction seems to have been 
right for most, but not for Grizzly and the Shark Pool providers. According to 
the theory, they should either have retained the old waiting lists or adopted 
some other type of distribution that left them at the helm. So most would 
have adopted this kind of system anyway, but for a minority it was 
something different from what they would have wanted. It is also remarkable 
that nearly all providers chose a system in which the advertisement and 
administration of vacancies were organised on a collective basis. In 
neighbourhood programmes, there were concrete benefits involved in 
working together; in distribution, however, one would have expected that 
more providers to have preferred their own “ showrooms” , as opposed to a 
collective catalogue. Only one provider, Koala, refused to go along. As in 
many things, Koala shows that providers can plot their own course, if they 
really want to. Then why this widespread display of collective action? To 
explain these two developments, it is necessary to study the cases in more 
detail.   
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6.5.2 The power of the collective 
 
Going over the accounts of respondents, it becomes clearer why providers 
banded together in this issue. In each town this has happened on somewhat 
different grounds In Tiger Town, they joined together primarily to remove 
control over distribution from the local authorities. In Bear Pit, the close co-
operation on neighbourhood regeneration spilled over into other decision-
making processes, including the issue of distribution. Shark Pool’s providers 
and local authorities were swept along in a brief, but powerful spell of 
regionalism. In all these cases, the reproduction of the advertising system at 
the national level was spurred on by reciprocity at the local level. 
Relationships in the local housing networks have in this respect proven to be 
of key importance. The exception was the provider in Elephant’s Corner, who 
had no close colleagues in its area and pretty much operated independently.   
 
During the bout of publicity surrounding the advertising model in the early 
1990s, the providers of Tiger Town quickly decides that they should switch to 
this new model. It would allow them to gain more control over the 
distribution process, which had so far been largely in the hands of the local 
authorities. As the Bengal manager noted, “ [The advertising model] allows 
you to get more grip on allocation. If you live in a small town, like some of 
our colleagues in this region, there used to be one public official in charge of 
distribution. If he got the flu, the providers got no candidates! It was a black 
box anyway, for all of us. You never knew how many people had applied for 
those vacancies. Now we do. [...] The position of providers will become 
different. Now we have our own distribution model with a face of its own, 
well designed and all. We will have advertisements with a clear identity. It 
gives providers a more visible presence.”  (10) But distribution was a highly 
controversial subject. Relations between providers and the local authorities 
were generally strained, but the notion of providers themselves administering 
the allocation process was bound to arouse great suspicion. This may have 
been rooted in a scandalous past: “ There used to be a time when housing 
providers administered their own distribution, and this was not entirely 
successful. Some really made a mess of it. Relatives of board members would 
end up in the most popular houses, things like that. The local authorities then 
took control and, in turn, overdid it.”  (10) This is why the first negotiations 
were conducted with low-ranking civil servants, without the knowledge of 
their superiors. These first meetings took place in secret and outside town 
limits. Eventually a deal was struck and in 1993 the advertising system was 
introduced. The providers took over part of the administration, although 
some types of applications (e.g. urgent cases) were still handled by local 
authorities.  
 
Some years later, though, the providers decided they wanted to run the entire 
show. They denounced the existing system as costly and slow –putting the 
blame on the local authorities- and argued they would be able to manage 
allocation more efficiently. The first discussions went quite well, as before, but 
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when the negotiations reached the management level they got hopelessly 
stuck. After this, providers temporarily abandoned their attempts to extend 
their control over the local system and instead focused on creating a regional 
system of distribution. There are different versions on why this happened. 
Housing managers say the transfer of the administration of distribution was 
obstructed because it would have damaged the political interests of the local 
alderman. Under the old system, the local authorities employed over a dozen 
people for its implementation. The housing providers were unwilling to 
guarantee that all these officials could stay on under the new administrative 
procedure. Though faced with the need for reorganisation and budget cuts, 
the alderman was initially reluctant to accept the consequences. The process 
was further delayed by the public officials in question, who finally resorted to 
stalling tactics (forgetting appointments, making last-minute changes etc.). 
After some time, the housing providers tried a different approach and 
approached colleagues in neighbouring towns to discuss the possibility of a 
regional rather than a local distribution system. Smuggling in the new 
distribution system as part of a regional effort was likely to increase its 
chances of success, since the smaller towns surrounding Tiger Town had long 
been suspicious of the central town’s colonial aspirations. The benefits of 
establishing regional co-operation even on such a relatively minor issue were 
likely to outweigh the political costs of transferring a few public officials. The 
alderman’s version of events is somewhat different. In his view, he had 
deliberately stalled the development of the new system so that he could force 
the providers in Tiger Town to seek co-operation with other housing 
providers in the region. Through this detour, it might prove possible for the 
local authorities in Tiger Town to reinvigorate their relations with other local 
authorities in the region.68 Both sides claim to have taken the initiative in this 
difficult process that took nearly three years. In any case, both plans 
succeeded as a regional system was set up in 1998.  
 
The housing providers not only changed the system, but also took over its 
administration. This involved considerable financial risks. The costs of the 
system were high (for example, it required a new computer system) and the 
revenues uncertain. These came from registration fees, but the projected 
figures were, as one housing manager admitted, “ based on nothing.”  (10) The 
local authorities used to pay for these activities, but were only willing to 
subsidise the new system for a maximum of four years, after which they 
effectively realised a substantial budget cut. The new system suited both 
sides. The providers gained more autonomy, while the local authorities shed 
a long-term financial burden. All in all, the introduction of the advertising 
system in Tiger Town had two faces. One shows providers choosing a new 
system more in line with their strategies, the other shows them wrestling 
control over distribution away from the local authorities. The advertising 
system came along at the right moment. 
 
In Shark Pool, the situation was different. The three providers adopted the 
new system in 1996 as part of the drive for regionalisation in housing, at the 
same time that the regional housing plan was presented (see 5.4). Again, it 
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looks as if the nation-wide diffusion of the advertising model was amplified 
by the regional network of providers and local authorities. In this case, 
however, it was not consistent with the providers’ strategies. When asked 
why they adopted it, all respondents referred to the regionalisation process, 
often without even indicating the advantages of the system itself. Moreover, 
some respondents hinted that providers retook some control over the 
allocation process by careful labelling (markers of which units are available to 
which type of applicant), which may indicate partial decoupling. However, 
this could not be verified.  
 
Like in Tiger Town, the new system allowed Shark Pool’s providers to gain 
more autonomy. The local authorities used to allocate 50% of all vacancies, 
but now they were forced to relinquish implementation entirely. 
Understandably, they were less than enthusiastic about the new system. They 
were also afraid (justifiably, as it turned out) that it would lead to a greater 
influx of tenants from the central city. However, their influence in the regional 
negotiations was limited. An employee of Great White pointed out that “ the 
local authorities adopted a ‘conservative’ attitude. Actually, they were dead 
against it, but they could do nothing to stop it. [...] It still bothers them. They 
would like to put the people of Shark Pool first.”  (24) But while it is easy to 
interpret the adoption of the advertising system as a drive for more 
autonomy, as in Tiger Town, the accounts of the respondents only partially 
support such an explanation. Although the providers welcomed more 
autonomy, they never strove for it as ardently as their colleagues in the other 
case. Relations between with Shark Pool’s local authorities had grown cordial 
over the years. Moreover, the providers did not take the initiative in the 
change of system. What the accounts of the respondents in this case suggest is 
rather that they were all carried along by the momentum of regionalisation 
(which later ground to an abrupt halt). With the force of dozens of colleagues 
and several local authorities behind it, it was not easy to defy. In addition, the 
advertising system came as part of a package containing several other 
measures and intentions. This made it even more difficult not to adopt the 
system. All in all, the evidence suggests that it was social pressure that made 
the organisations forgo their own strategies. Such a “ logic of appropriateness”  
is not recognised by the theory used in this analysis, but there is no other way 
to account for the collective innovation process in this particular instance.   
 
Something similar appears to have happened in Bear Pit. With the exception 
of Koala, providers collectively switched to the advertising system in 1998. 
Here an explanation based on the desire for autonomy is even less feasible. A 
number of years before, parts of the distribution process had already been 
delegated to a jointly controlled service centre. The introduction of the 
advertising system did not fundamentally affect this shared arrangement. 
Moreover, an attempt to wrestle control of the distribution process away from 
the local authorities would have come out of the blue. The local authorities 
and providers had just worked together closely on the regeneration of post-
war neighbourhoods and launched a joint plan with far-reaching 
consequences for the inner city (see 5.4). The atmosphere was one of co-
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operation rather than of contest. What rather appears to have happened is 
that the co-operation on neighbourhood revitalisation spilled over into other 
areas of decision-making, including distribution.   
 
There was one provider, Grizzly, which had accepted the advertising system 
although it was not in line with its strategy. The manager clearly indicated 
that he had taken this decision only to preserve the spirit of co-operation. 
“ [We joined this system] because our colleagues did. We were not too keen on 
it ourselves. [...] It is my belief that renting a house involves a contract 
between the tenant and the provider. Both parties should be convinced it is 
right to make that agreement. The advertising system denies the mutual 
nature of the contract, because the person who sends in his application and 
has waited longest can claim an automatic right to that house, regardless of 
what the other party thinks. I believe that is wrong in principle.”  (3) This was 
exactly the same kind of argument made by the manager of Koala, who had 
decided not to join the new local system. “ When you have the advertising 
model, you are obliged to give the house to whoever has the longest waiting 
time. It’s not right.”  (5) He also argued that the model was not fit for a market 
that was turning slack. Other providers were less openly critical, but hardly 
enthusiastic. On being asked why the system was introduced, one of Polar 
Bear’s managers shrugged his shoulders and replied: “ I’ve been wondering 
about that myself. It took six years of discussion and still they went ahead 
with it. It’s a bit late now. [...] Supply outstrips demand. That undercuts the 
advertising system. It is useful for market segments that are really scarce, but 
the rest is just folly.”  (2) Panda’s manager was least critical, which is not 
surprising since the model was most consistent with the strategy of his 
organisation. However, he too indicated that the advertising system was a 
compromise and not likely to last long.  
 
It appears that the advertising system had been a matter of discussion for 
several years, with the local authorities as one of its most fervent supporters. 
It was eventually accepted, but only with some concessions. The compromise 
was that providers would accept the advertising system, but that up to 30% of 
vacant units could be kept out of the regular procedure and allocated directly. 
But several respondents (including some from the providers themselves) 
indicated that the real number of vacancies kept out of the system was at 50% 
and rising. This is a clear instance of decoupling, since the advertising system 
is expressly designed to give customers a transparent and comprehensive 
overview of available supply. When the majority of units are withheld and 
distributed directly, actual work processes operate outside of the formal 
system.    
 
The lack of enthusiasm, the late time of adoption, and the partial decoupling 
of the formal system from actual activities: they all indicate that some of Bear 
Pit’s providers accepted the collective advertising system largely to preserve 
the spirit of co-operation that had grown in restructuring neighbourhoods. 
Polar Bear was unhappy about the collective nature of the system and Grizzly 
even disagreed with its basic design. The latter’s view of proper distribution 
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was the same as Koala’s, but the latter could afford to keep out of the 
distribution system because it had broken off co-operation anyway. “ If you’re 
working closely with others extensively there may be things you’re willing to 
accept, and I think there was at least one colleague who did it only on those 
grounds. But our own bonds with our colleagues were broken anyway, so it 
was only a small step to take. Well, the alderman was pretty upset, but that’s 
his problem.”  (5) Like in Shark Pool, the local network appears to have 
strengthened the diffusion of the innovation considerably.   
 
Finally, Elephant’s Corner was one of the first to introduce the advertising 
system. One of the three organisations that together became the Elephant 
provider in 1996 introduced its own variety as early as 1991, only months 
after the Delft model had been launched. This version was even more radical, 
leaving few possibilities to control distribution directly. Much to its regret, it 
did not get nearly as much credit for the innovation as its Delft colleagues. In 
the early 1990s, it participated in pioneer projects designed to test the new 
system. After the merger in 1996, the new Elephant provider applied the same 
system to all its local branches –no doubt because its director was the same 
one who had originally introduced it. The local authorities in Elephant’s 
Corner played no part in the allocation process and the providers making up 
Elephant all had local monopolies, so the introduction of the new distribution 
system was largely an internal matter. This is a clear instance of individual 
innovation. As it helped to invent and spread the new system, Elephant can 
be justly regarded as one of the innovators in the collective innovation 
process that unfolded in the 1990s.  
  
6.5.3 The advertising system: at the right place at the right time 
 
There is perhaps no clearer instance of collective innovation through 
reproduction than this. The advertising system was invented in the town of 
Delft and then rapidly gained popularity throughout the country, especially 
in the urbanised regions. Most respondents were well aware of where the 
system came from and how it had spread. This is unusual, for knowledge by 
diffusion is often elusive and difficult to trace to any particular source. It is 
more common to find that “ everyone was suddenly talking about it” , without 
anyone being able to tell where it came from. That the advertising system’s 
progress is so well known is a testament to its popularity, which can be 
attributed to the very favourable circumstances under which it was 
introduced.  
 
To begin with, it received wide backing from sector institutes and opinion 
leaders. It first originated in Delft, where local providers and researchers 
introduced it. The pioneers made sure to surround their innovation with 
extensive publicity. A national foundation for the encouragement of 
innovations, the Stichting Experimenten in de Volkshuisvesting (SEV) 
organised a number of pilot projects. These monitored the introduction of 
varieties of the Delft model among a small number of providers spread over 
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the country. The results of these projects were published regularly and have 
since been followed by various discussions and freely available reports 
(Priemus and Smid, 1996; Kullberg, 1996; 1993; Adrianow, Elsing and 
Hoenderdos, 1991; Bosch and Hanemaayer, 1990). These evaluations were 
generally positive. Since then, the new system has taken the country by storm. 
Interestingly enough, the Delft model now appears to be spreading to other 
countries through international networks. For instance, by the end of the 
1990s it was being tested in the UK (Oxley, 2000). 
 
Not only did the advertising system receive strong backing, it also landed 
upon fertile ground. In three of the four cases, its diffusion was strongly 
spurred on by developments within the local networks. The issue of 
distribution seems to have been used to re-assert the nature of the relations 
between the actors, either as adversarial (Tiger Town) or co-operative (Shark 
Pool, Bear Pit). Reciprocity strengthened reproduction. In other words, the 
innovation happened to be introduced at the right time. While this 
encouraged its diffusion in the short term, it is not a process that is likely to 
lead to the institutionalisation of the system. Many providers chose it for 
convenience and some went along merely because the others did. But this was 
done quite deliberately and sometimes without great enthusiasm. A couple 
were already considering future alternatives. It is therefore unlikely that the 
advertising model will become taken-for-granted, the “ natural”  way to 
organise distribution in a quasi-market. Instead, the theory would predict 
provider to draw distribution increasingly closer into their organisational 
sphere of influence. In short, the collective innovation process has reached far, 
but with little depth. The spread of this innovation has not contributed to the 
re-institutionalisation of the organisational field.  
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6.5.4 Conclusion 
 
Both kinds of collective innovation occurred in distribution. Where the 
advertising model was adopted, most of the conditions were in place: the 
sector’s social networks to carry the innovation across to local networks, 
mutual dependence over the collective system and mutual trust. However, 
some providers went along with a collective system when they could have 
stuck to their strategy by adopting a private one. In other words, they did 
have an exit option. It appears that co-operation on other decisions 
strengthened group bonds to the point where providers became too receptive 
to social pressure to use their “ exit”  opportunity. As a consequence, they were 
willing to accept an innovation that did not really fit in with their own plans. 
It is a phenomenon that was not anticipated by the theory.  
 
6.6 Interorganisational co-operation 
 
6.6.1 Variation and fit in interorganisational co-operation 
 
As noted before, the analysis focuses only on interorganisational co-operation 
between the providers themselves. It can take various forms. Organisations 
can work together on a project basis, mutually adjusting their activities for a 
specific occasion only, such as the regeneration of a neighbourhood. 
Collective action of this type will be discussed in relation to the kinds of 
activities it relates to. This paragraph concentrates on lasting co-operation 
involving several or all of an organisation’s activities. Providers can 
undertake joint action on a permanent basis, but only in a limited number of 
decisions. For instance, they can continue to operate independently, but have 
their administration handled by a single agency. As a third option, 
organisations can merge their activities altogether.  
 
The theory predicted that providers with a diversification strategy would take 
co-operation further than the others would (see table 5.6). By implication, 
there should have been more mergers among this group than among the rest. 
This expectation turns out to have been correct, yet it is striking to see how 
many of the others were also involved in mergers. Of the twelve providers 
left at the end of the research period, eleven had been involved in some form 
of co-operation with their fellow providers. Of these, eight involved 
mergers.69 Three more had shown themselves receptive to the notion of a 
merger, but had not (yet) decided to enter any definitive agreement. Only one 
provider rejected mergers outright. Permanent, but partial forms of co-
operation such as alliances occurred less frequently and less consistently. 
These alternatives often collapsed or acted merely a prelude to a merger at 
some later date.  
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Table 5.6: the expected relationship between organisational strategy and 
interorganisational co-operation 
 
Traditional strategy Low level of co-operation 
Responsive strategy Medium level of co-operation 
Diversification strategy High level of co-operation 
 
Mergers are by no means a new phenomenon in social housing, but they have 
occurred more frequently since the introduction of the quasi-market (see table 
5.7). Since 1990, the total number of providers has decreased by about a 
quarter. Given that many municipal housing companies were converted to 
private non-profits during this period, the total number of providers affected 
by mergers is larger than the figures suggest. While the average size has risen 
to under 3000, the size of providers that have merged has increased to nearly 
7000. The size difference is in itself only natural, since organisations that 
merge tend to become larger. However, it appears that the differences are 
likely to grow further (Van Veghel, 1999; Van der Zon, 1999). Many of those 
who have already merged plan to do so at least once more, while those that 
are still small wish to remain so. There are no systematic data on other types 
of extensive co-operation, partly because their nature is so diverse. 
Interestingly enough, their occurrence seems to have declined over time. The 
majority of providers in the case studies had entered into bilateral or 
multilateral alliances at one point, but by the end of the research period most 
had either withdrawn or converted the alliance into a merger. At the national 
level, some multilateral forms of co-operation such as the well-known 
Socrates alliance collapsed because some of their most prominent members 
withdrew. Mergers appeared to be the more popular alternative. 
 
Table 5.7: The numbers of private non-profit providers and municipal 
housing companies in the period 1990-1999 
 
  Number of private non-profits       Average size  Number of m.h.c.  
1990   824     1854   213 
1991   812     1909   204 
1992   805     1950   188 
1993   795     2046   168 
1994   793     2167   125 
1995   783     2257   90 
1996   805     2333   59 
1997   786     2348   44 
1998   762     2353   30 
1999   724     2351   24 
 
(Source: Ministry of Housing, Public Housing in Figures) 
 
These figures raise two issues. To begin with, it is surprising that so many 
providers engaged in costly efforts at co-operation when it was not a natural 
consequence of their strategy. Furthermore, one has to wonder why co-
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operation so often took the shape of mergers. There are other ways of pooling 
organisational resources that do not require the effort of full integration.   
 
6.6.2 Innovators and followers 
 
Underneath the similarities between the providers, there were two distinct 
groups that could be described as innovators and followers, respectively. 
These differed clearly in terms of the reasons they provided for their actions. 
The first consisted of those organisations for which the merger was an 
essential part of their strategy. For these, mergers were conducted with a clear 
image of their future organisation in mind. This group consisted of those 
organisations with a diversification strategy and appears to have set the 
standards for interorganisational co-operation in the field. The other group 
justified the mergers with reference to the actions of other providers in their 
local market.  
 
The first group was composed of Elephant, Polar Bear and Siberian Tiger. For 
the first two especially, the merger was an essential part of their strategy, a 
crucial instrument for creating an organisation with a specific identity. For 
Elephant, expansion into other markets created an opportunity to develop its 
activation ethic and its approach to sale and investment. Its possibilities for 
innovation were naturally limited in its traditional geographical home. Its 
mergers came early and easily. This is not surprising, as it was very, very rich. 
It was itself the product of a merger between three small providers in 1996, 
each from a small town in the area. Since then it has been very active in 
creating bonds with other organisations. It was one of the founding members 
of a national alliance of housing providers, designed to share expertise and 
redistribute funds. However, it quit its membership at the beginning of 2000, 
as did some other members. A second experiment was an interest-free loan to 
an organisation in another part of the country, which was later transformed 
into a (well-publicised) gift. This established Elephant as a symbol of the 
wealthy providers in rural parts of the country. However, both the national 
network and the gift were later denounced as failed experiments, which 
would be discontinued. The real transfer of the provider’s wealth was to take 
the form of mergers, one with a poor provider in a nearby region, another 
with a small, nationally operating organisation specialised in housing for the 
elderly. Given the unequal distribution of resources between the partners, 
these mergers were take-overs in all but name.  
 
Polar Bear, though far less secure in financial terms, showed a fairly similar 
development. It, too, was itself the product of a merger between two local 
organisations in 1998, which had followed a period of close co-operation. It 
joined the same national association of which Elephant was a member and left 
it at the same time. But it had plans for future co-operation that made those of 
Elephant look traditional by comparison. The vision of its managers was not 
merely to join forces with a few colleagues, but to have a colossal national 
organisation, in effect an entirely different type of social housing provider 
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than had previously existed in the Netherlands. What this would involve was 
that all stock from the organisations involved would be pooled in a national 
real estate fund, headed by an independent board of managers. The locally 
based organisations would continue to exist, but in effect only as divisions of 
the national provider. They would have a large share of autonomy in 
maintaining and marketing local stock; however, should they wish to make 
significant changes to it (construction, sale, demolition), they would have to 
submit proposals to the central real estate fund. The advantage of such a 
model is the ability to transfer funds on a national scale while retaining 
outlets with strong local roots. Another strength is the relative ease with 
which an organisation can join in: it will simply come under the umbrella of 
the real estate fund, without any need to integrate all its organisational 
processes or even to change its company name. It was a model explicitly 
designed to allow growth. From 1999 onwards, Polar had been co-operating 
closely with a provider in another part of the country –involving, amongst 
other things, a shared directorate- as an intermediate step to the division 
model. By this time other providers from around the country had expressed 
their interest in joining.  
 
Siberian Tiger was an exception in that its decision to merge was motivated 
not by a long-term vision, but by the desire to get out of the deep abyss in 
which it had fallen. It could either sell off over 10% of its stock or acquire 
money from elsewhere. The merger was preferable to the management, as this 
would also provide opportunities to solve other problems, particularly the 
dominant position of association members. All future plans were stalled in 
the face of this immediate concern. It finally agreed to merge with a colleague 
halfway across the country, after bitter internal struggle (see 5.7.2). It would 
have done so earlier, had it not been without management for over a year and 
had other parties been more willing to get close. However, it was still the first 
in Tiger Town to go ahead with a merger. Given that it was by far the weakest 
link in the new organisation, the merger had some of the hallmarks of a 
takeover (e.g. the choice of name). In many respects, it became the Tiger Town 
branch of its new partner.   
 
For the second group of providers, mergers did not follow naturally from 
strategy. Instead, they often reacted directly to mergers in their immediate 
surroundings. All the providers in Shark Pool started merger talks in reaction 
to the increasing concentration of other providers close by. The increasing 
concentration of providers in the regional market impelled Nurse to intensify 
existing co-operation with some of its colleagues. It was a member of a group 
of regional providers that exchanged expertise in various aspects areas such 
as treasury, construction projects and human resource management. In 1999, 
this alliance fell apart as some of its members wished to take the co-operation 
one step further and merge, whereas others thought the present arrangement 
was quite far enough. Nurse Shark joined the former group and thus became 
part of a larger, regional housing provider with branch offices in several 
towns. In response, the remaining two providers in Shark Pool, Great White 
and Hammerhead, immediately started merger talks of their own and 
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announced their intentions some time after. As an employee from Great 
White phrased it, with a wide grin: “ When Nurse merged with outsiders, we 
were not amused. It was like they were sleeping with the neighbours.”  (24) 
The same story in Bear Pit: Panda and Koala started negotiations when the 
large Polar was created out of two smaller providers. When asked why he 
had initiated a merger, Grizzly’s manager replied: “ The main reason was that 
our colleagues began snuggling up to each other. We felt we had to do the 
same.”  (3) The merger was eventually postponed, because the organisational 
cultures of the two organisations seemed incompatible at the time –not 
surprising, given their markedly different strategies. Co-operation was 
confined to areas such as project development and urban renewal. It included 
the sale of a group of dwellings set to be demolished from Panda to Grizzly, 
effectively a subsidy. This limited form of co-operation may yet lead to a 
merger, but there were no definite plans yet.   
 
This means that in the three towns that have just been discussed, seven out of 
eight providers have during the research period been involved in mergers or 
at least in serious negotiations. In Tiger Town, moves towards co-operation 
were least advanced in whatever form. As noted, Siberian Tiger merged in 
2000. Siberian and Paper Tiger shared a small agency for financial and 
administrative services, which was disbanded at the end of the research 
period. Bengal had had talks with several potential partners, but these had 
not resulted in a merger. Instead, it started a network with a number of 
providers elsewhere in the region for joint projects and the exchange of 
expertise. Finally, Sumatran, a provider traditionally focused on students’ 
housing, was set to join with a similarly specialised colleague in another 
town, but the deal fell through at the last moment. Co-operation with its 
prospective partner is still intense, but the organisations will as yet remain 
separate.  
 
Out of the four case studies, only two organisations remain that appear not to 
have engaged in serious plans for co-operation of this kind. Koala denounced 
mergers in principle, as it had rejected the urban renewal plans and the 
advertising system of distribution. Paper Tiger was more receptive to the 
notion, but its manager denied having definite plans. One should be careful 
not to take such a claim at face value. A couple of managers denied having 
definite plans for a merger during the interview sessions, only to publicly 
announce one shortly thereafter. In the case of Paper Tiger, other sources 
confirm there has been no opportunity for this provider to pop the question.  
 
It was expected that interorganisational co-operation would be most intense 
when organisations pursued a strategy of spreading risks. It is true that there 
was a strong fit between the activities of diversification-driven providers and 
their strategy. They could be expected to co-operate extensively. But other 
providers have also engaged in co-operation on a wide scale, even those for 
whom expansion is not a natural consequence of their strategy. In fact, the 
number of mergers might have been greater, had some negotiations not failed 
at the final hurdle. Apparently, there had been a process of collective 
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innovation, in which the actions of one group were reproduced by the others. 
Members of the first group started the process. The mergers of Polar, 
Elephant and Siberian did not come early in the research period, but what is 
important is that they encouraged other mergers in their immediate 
surroundings. Again, the local network appears to strengthen mimetic 
processes that occur on the national scale.   
 
This is reflected in the timing of the mergers. In all the cases where there was 
more than one provider, each was of roughly equal size at the start of the 
research period. This was the result of past mergers that had resulted in an 
overall balance. Providers with a diversification strategy were the first to 
abandon the status quo and start another merger wave. At the start of the 
research period, Bear Pit’s five major providers each had between 7000 and 
9000 units. When two merged into Polar in 1996, together they had 16000, 
twice as many as each of the others. The merger attempt by Grizzly and 
Panda followed soon after. Similarly, the mergers of the Shark Pool providers 
followed the creation of a massive provider of tens of thousands of dwellings 
in the central city some time before (putting the size difference at a ratio of 
10:1). In Tiger Town, Siberian was the first to merge and would have done so 
earlier, had this not been prevented by a prolonged internal struggle. It had 
been the largest provider since its creation in the 1980s and was now set to 
widen the gap. In the Elephant’s Corner area, there were no major size 
differences before 1996, when the three small providers came together.  
 
6.6.3 Why mergers?   
 
The interpretation of the merger trend as reproduction explains why co-
operation predominantly took the form of mergers. Even if growth was 
considered necessary, there is no natural reason why the merger should have 
been the preferred choice. There were various alternatives in the shape of 
networks that involved working together on a limited number of activities 
and/or the limited exchange of funds and knowledge. Moreover, there is no 
evidence to show that mergers are superior types of co-operation. In fact, they 
are known to fail quite often. Recently a study by KPMG suggested that 70% 
of all mergers fail – mostly because companies do not take the effort to 
examine thoroughly whether the organisations involved fit together (KPMG, 
2000). So why have mergers been so popular in social housing?   
 
Given that providers so clearly reacted to one another, it is only logical to 
interpret the popularity of this type of co-operation as yet another instance of 
mimicry. But then why did the innovators prefer it? They gave the reason 
themselves: to ensure that their partners would share the same vision, they 
needed a type of co-operation that guaranteed control. The Elephant manager 
insisted that its treasures should only go to the worthy. “ We noticed that 
weak providers are all too ready to hold up their hand without having a 
critical look at their own management.”  (37) He was certainly willing to share 
his wealth with others, but only on his own terms. Likewise, the Polar 
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manager argued that the transfer of capital must be accompanied by the 
transfer of power. “ Whatever way you look at it, if you are matching funds 
and you don’t just want to give away money, then you want to retain control 
over the stock. [...] Whatever model you’re going to choose, it has to include 
shared control.”  (1) Initially, they both participated in alliances of various 
kinds, but by the end of the research period they had both abandoned them. 
As the Elephant manager put it: “ In the past we’ve been too nice. We trusted 
too much in good faith. [...] This is not charity. It’s about management.”  (37) 
The rise in the occurrence of mergers can therefore be interpreted as a 
mimetic process with clearly identifiable innovators and followers. But the 
homogeneity in terms of co-operation is quite superficial. One would expect 
the organisations in the field to have drawn closer together, but the 
differences between providers actually became more pronounced. This is 
because the mergers were implemented in different ways.  
 
This shows in the choice of partners. For those with a strategy of expansion, it 
was imperative that prospective partners shared the same outlook. They 
wished to create an organisation with a new and distinct identity and 
therefore demanded that partners accept their formula. The Elephant 
provider was particularly picky, as it could well afford to be. It rejected two 
prospective partners, even through it had already given one a major interest-
free loan. It also withdrew from a national alliance, because some of the other 
members were unwilling to take the alliance beyond the exchange of capital 
and expertise (particularly capital). The manager stressed that he would only 
consider a merger with providers who make “ good policy” . “ We’re not just 
giving money away, because then it’s beg and go. [...] If a provider is not 
willing, then it doesn’t fit into our culture and the deal is off.”  (37) Although 
Polar’s aims were different, its attitude was much the same. It no longer 
wished to co-operate with those who were not ready to commit themselves to 
its strategy. “ Whatever model you choose, there’s got to be joint control. But 
that means local providers should be willing to let others have a say in their 
affairs. Not many are.”  (1)  
 
Others chose their partners locally and therefore had a more restricted choice. 
On Polar’s creation, Grizzly and Panda were virtually driven into each other’s 
arms, as they were the only providers left in the town left who were at all 
interested in co-operation. The providers of Shark Pool were part of a larger 
market, though, and potentially had greater choice. Nurse’s merger grew out 
of an alliance with a number of christian colleagues, who were in the 
manager’s own words chosen on the basis of their “ identity” . Yet when asked, 
the manager was regrettably unable to define the distinctive nature of 
protestant housing provision. Of course, it is also possible that it was largely a 
question of familiarity and a common background. The meetings organised 
by the protestant branch association NCIV had brought these organisations in 
touch. Great White and Hammerhead merged because they were the only two 
remaining providers in town, even though the regional housing market 
afforded far greater choice. Familiarity again played a part. Sumatran’s was 
an exception in that its (failed) merger attempt focused on an organisation 
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that was also specialised in students’ housing. Most of the organisations in the 
second group selected their partners locally, which is in accordance with their 
strategic choice to stay local. This may explain why some of these mergers 
failed or took long to materialise: partners were not chosen on the basis of 
compatibility, but availability.    
 
The result is that mergers, instead of establishing new shared routines, 
created growing divisions in the organisational field. Some providers 
expanded on a national scale, whereas others grew only locally. The size 
differences will probably grow, since providers with diversification strategies 
can be expected to continue expansion, albeit at a varying pace. The others 
have essentially remained true to their strategy, in that they have not 
abandoned their local basis. In that sense, they have reaffirmed rather than 
relinquished their guiding principles. If they continue to do this, they will be 
increasingly dwarved by large, nationally operating colleagues. This has 
profound consequences for the coherence of the social housing sector, as I will 
discuss in chapter six.   
 
That leaves the question why the followers felt compelled to deviate from 
their strategies in the first place. Their strategies implied a focus on the local 
market and the manner in which they implemented their merger indicates 
that they were not ready to abandon that focus. Then why merge at all? To 
understand this, it is useful to examine the one organisation that defied the 
trend. Koala kept resisting the social pressure and stayed true to its own 
strategy. Its manager dismissed all newfangled notions with an ironic smile: 
“ [A merger] would lead us nowhere. For a start, it won’t earn you any money, 
and it will also put you at a greater distance from your tenants. What is the 
ideal size for a housing provider? I don’t know. I have a second job as the 
manager of an organisation with a stock of only 1500. Believe me, despite its 
size, it is wonderfully efficient.”  (5) This was the same provider who had 
refused to co-operate with its colleagues on neighbourhood regeneration and 
on distribution. Indeed, it was somewhat reminiscent of the village of Asterix.  
 
The evidence from Bear Pit and Shark Pool suggests that agreement (or lack 
of it) on one decision may spill over into others –even when there is no 
reciprocity involved in the decision itself. One could argue that because 
collective innovation strengthens group bonds, it makes organisations more 
likely to follow one another in other respects. In Tiger Town, where 
interorganisational co-operation was less advanced than anywhere else, there 
had also been little agreement on other matters. Where co-operation was 
stronger, the merger trend was stronger. This interpretation is confirmed by 
the timing of events: the mergers followed upon joint decisions in other areas. 
Again, the local network appears to mediate and strengthen national trends..   
 
6.6.4 Conclusion 
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All in all, interorganisational co-operation followed a most interesting 
pattern. On the one hand, there was a clear merger trend, strengthened by 
local relations. Of course, reciprocity did not and could not occur in this area 
of decision-making, even though fortuitous conditions were in place. 
However, the process of reproduction was encouraged by group bonds. In 
this sense, what happened here was similar to developments in distribution. 
An innovation that spread throughout the sector was strengthened at the 
local level, because after previous collective efforts actors were more likely to 
take account of each other. Reciprocity on previous decisions apparently 
encouraged reproduction. On the other hand, the mergers were mostly 
implemented in accordance with strategies, which meant the differences 
between locally and nationally oriented providers would probably grow.   
 
6.7 Legal structure 
 
6.7.1 Variation and fit in the choice of legal structure 
 
The legal structure determines the ultimate hierarchical authority within the 
organisation. The law allowed only two alternatives, either an association or a 
foundation. The former puts members (in practice, mostly tenants) at the top 
of the hierarchy, whereas the latter is commanded by an unelected board, 
usually including the management. Traditionally, most social housing 
providers had started out as associations, in keeping with their philanthropic 
roots. When national housing policy had overtaken most of their vital 
functions, these old structures had been frozen in place. In the meantime, the 
organisations had grown far beyond their original size and become 
increasingly bureaucratic. There was an inherent tension between this 
professionalisation process and the voluntaristic decision-making typical of 
associations. However, since most of the organisations’ activities were 
strongly regulated and shielded from the risks of the housing market, this 
tension did not fully materialise until the liberalisation of the 1990s. The 
theory predicted that, whatever their strategy, providers would be inclined to 
switch to a decision-making structure that centralised formal power in the 
management. Consequently, all providers were expected to switch to a 
foundation structure, regardless of their strategy (see table 5.8). 
 
Table 5.8: the expected relationship between organisational strategy and 
legal structure 
 
Traditional strategy Foundation 
Responsive strategy Foundation 
Diversification strategy Foundation 
 
The evidence from the case studies appears to confirm this. Of all providers, 
no less than eight were a foundation by the end of the research period and 
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three more were in the process of becoming one. The Elephant provider 
became a foundation on its creation in 1996, although one of its constituent 
organisations was originally an association. In Bear Pit, all providers were 
foundations by the end of the research period. Grizzly and Panda had become 
foundations shortly before privatisation, in the latter case as part of a merger. 
Polar, a foundation, came into existence with the merger of an association and 
a foundation. Koala had been a foundation since its creation in the early 20th 
century. In Shark Pool, Great White changed to this structure during the 
research period and the other two had plans to do so in the course of a 
merger. Of the four in Tiger Town, only Sumatran was a foundation at the 
start of the research period. Bengal switched in 1998. Siberian had definite 
plans to switch in the course of a merger. Paper was the only one to remain an 
association without definite plans for a transition.  
 
All in all, there is a clear tendency towards the foundation structure (see table 
5.9). Five providers were foundations from the outset; others became so in the 
course of recent years. Three are still formally associations, but have definite 
plans to switch over. The conclusion must be that the theoretical prediction 
about legal structure was correct.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5.9: The numbers of associations and foundations in the case studies 
 
 Start of research period End of research period 
Associations 11 1 
Foundations1 5 11 
Total number of providers 16 12 
 
1 Including organisations who had definitely decided to make the transition at a future date.  
  
6.7.2 Stronger management 
 
The fit and variation patterns suggest a process of collective innovation, but in 
fact the homogeneity was only caused by legal restrictions. In this case, the 
collective nature of decision-making was very slim indeed. It was merely 
individual innovation coupled with coercive isomorphism, a radical limit on 
choice imposed by the state. This interpretation is supported by the accounts 
of respondents. They show that, as expected, the managers themselves 
initiated these transitions that would strengthen their position. They generally 
gave two reasons for their decision. The first was that it would lead to an 
increase in flexibility and autonomy, which was necessary to respond to the 
introduction of the quasi-market. As the Bengal manager put it: “ An 
association is no longer adequate in this day and age. For a start, you’re 
absolutely inflexible. We had skinned the procedures to the point that it was 
rarely necessary to consult our members and still a small group managed to 
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veto our budget for an entirely unrelated reason, simply because they wanted 
something we were not prepared to give. There was nothing we could do to 
stop them.”  (10) Another manager phrased it thus: “ I built that club from 
scratch [...] but at one point I was forced to bury my baby. It was a system 
from the late ‘70s, early ‘80s, and it simply wasn’t fit for a more business-like 
approach. Not that it bothered me, because my board and my members 
supported me throughout. I wouldn’t have been able to carry out all my crazy 
plans in the early ‘90s if they hadn’t. But the point is: it was never formalised. 
They could have told me to stop at any time. Crash, boom, finished.”  (37) The 
second reason was the association meetings were no longer functioning 
adequately. Membership rates and attendance at meetings had been dropping 
off gradually over the years. “ At the basis you could see interest fading. This 
made it easier for troublemakers to get in and this began to affect the quality 
of our meetings. There were fewer and fewer candidates.”  (37) Or, put more 
strongly: “ This entire democracy thing is bullshit. It’s a 0,0% turnout, even 
lower than the local elections.”  (17) Others stressed the fundamental tension 
in the association structure. “ You’re asking consumers to set their own rents!”  
(9) Notwithstanding some variation in emphasis, there was almost 
unanimous agreement on the need for a transition.  
 
Insofar as there were any differences between providers, it was in the 
difficulty with which the transition took place. For most providers, it was 
plain sailing. They switched quickly and without great difficulties. This is 
more remarkable than it sounds. The analysis has so far assumed a 
managerial perspective, in that it defines expectations in terms of what “ the 
provider”  will do. But on this issue, the decision requires the formal consent 
of another actor. The change from an association to a foundation implies that 
members vote themselves out of power. In many cases, this decision needed a 
majority of 90% (these structures were designed for eternity). With attendance 
at meetings down to an all-time low, it took only small minority of hard-line 
conservatives to veto the transition.  
 
This is exactly what happened at Siberian Tiger. It was in a pitiful state 
indeed. Standards of maintenance had fallen to an alarming low, the financial 
status was disconcerting and the organisation was in complete deadlock. 
However, the management and the leading association members disagreed 
on what action should be taken. The new director argued in favour of a 
merger with a rich colleague, that would allow a major transfer of funds. This 
would entail the change to a foundation structure. But some of the leading 
board members regarded this as no less than the demise of democracy and 
vehemently opposed it. The only alternative was the sale of several hundred 
dwellings, an option that no-one was really happy with. The conflict became 
increasingly bitter over time. On one side stood an alliance between the 
management, the staff and a group of association members involved with the 
external tenant organisation. Eventually, even the trade unions and the 
Housing Inspection supported their cause. On the other side stood a small 
group of members determined to block the merger at all cost. Relations 
between the two groups were not too good. One tenant representative 
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frequently referred to leading association members as “ warmed-up corpses”  
(with the express request to quote him on that). (13) In turn, the latter referred 
to their opponents as “ puppets manipulated by the management” .70 It was 
only after several years and an intensive campaign on both sides that the 
battle came to a head. By this time, the staff had threatened to go on strike if 
the changes were not approved. In a dramatic meeting, which even made the 
national newspapers, three leading members were finally voted out of office. 
This cleared the way for the merger, the change of legal structure and the 
financial rescue operation.  
 
Violent as this struggle was, it is remarkable that it did not occur more 
frequently. Siberian’s internal democracy was formally stronger than average, 
but not exceptional. Many housing associations appear to have had a 
hardcore of fanatical members. Respondents from other providers also 
described their members with terms such as “ ideologically committed” , 
“ emotionally involved”  or other carefully worded euphemisms. With low 
attendance rates and very strict voting procedures, it was possible for groups 
of less than ten members to block major changes. Then how is it possible that 
association structures, so well protected and timeworn, could be dismantled 
on such a large scale within less than a decade?  
 
6.7.3 The conditions for an easy transition 
 
The evidence suggests that the ease of the transition depended on a 
combination of three conditions. The most important was that the 
association’s internal democracy could be exchanged for external democracy 
by establishing an independent tenant organisation. The members of these 
organisations were generally also members of the association, which meant 
that they could often sway a considerable part of the vote. By promising to 
grant tenant organisations a bill of formal rights, managers could enlist their 
help in winning a majority for the change of legal structure. As one tenant 
described it: “ Our condition was that when the association became a 
foundation, there would be an independent tenant association and a signed 
contract. The contracts were signed simultaneously at the solicitor’s.”  (29) 
Although it is uncertain whether this deal was always played out overtly, 
tenant organisations did support the transition to a foundation because it 
would make them more powerful. It was a vital opportunity for them to 
establish themselves (see 5.8). The promise of greater voice was not enough 
for everyone, though. Veto opportunities have occasionally been exploited for 
more mundane purposes. In Bengal, a tiny group of members threatened to 
block the process unless they were allowed to buy their own home at a lower 
percentage of market value. This was an effective use of institutional 
opportunities, otherwise known as blackmail. The threat was averted, but it 
shows the vulnerability of a process that is so tightly constrained. 
 
A second condition for an easy transition was the existence of trust between 
the management and the association members. The effectiveness of the deal 
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described above rested largely on the belief that democracy would improve. 
At the time, the effectiveness of external democracy was untested and open to 
dispute. No matter how sound the arguments in favour of the new structure 
may have been, they were unlikely to be convincing when the intentions of its 
proponents were mistrusted. This problem lay at the heart of Siberian’s 
troubles. Indeed, the accounts of respondents have consistently indicated the 
significance of good relationships in bringing about a smooth transition. In 
the case of Elephant, for instance, it was exactly because of the manager’s 
previous commitment to the association and his good relations with members 
that he could propose a change of legal structure without raising suspicion. 
The change of structure often became feasible only after certain association or 
staff members left the organisation. This was encouraged by the turnover in 
staff (see 5.9), and, in the case of the ageing association members, by the 
natural cycle of life. Great White’s transition was eased by changes in the 
association board. One of Hammerhead’s tenants mentioned that “ Great 
White used to be like us, but they have had a rejuvenation of the board and 
now there’s a new spirit. Here we still have some of those old socialists, who 
haven’t yet realised Colijn is dead.” 71 (30) One of the socialists in question 
assured me that “ a foundation is the most undemocratic structure there is.” 72 
(31) The prospects for an easy transition improved when he left the 
organisation. 
 
Finally, opposition was often muted because the decision to change the legal 
structure was wrapped up with other choices. Five providers that changed 
their structure tacked it onto a merger. This presented members with a 
package deal that was difficult to reject: a veto on the foundation would 
imply a veto on the merger. Some of the managers even presented the change 
of legal structure as the inevitable consequence of the decision to merge. For 
instance, one manager literally said in a meeting with tenants that “ now that 
we are merging, we have no choice but to become a foundation.”  In the 
conflict over Siberian Tiger’s future, the most powerful argument against 
retaining the association structure was that it would block the merger and 
ultimately financial rescue. Yet there were other options. All that is legally 
required is that providers which merge must have the same legal structure. 
When two associations decide to merge, there is no reason why they could 
not retain the association structure. Indeed, mergers of this type have 
occurred in the past. It is also possible (albeit unlikely) that a foundation and 
an association blend into one large association. Transitions to another legal 
structure must therefore be treated as decisions in their own right. To present 
them as inseparable is a political trick.   
  
Paper Tiger presents a difficulty. It is not clear why this organisation 
remained an association. The director argued that “ if you have an association 
where there is trust between the board and the members, and communication 
is good, then there is no reason to switch to a foundation. We have to justify 
our course to our stakeholders. Whether these are members or just tenants 
does not matter very much, unless there’s a bad atmosphere. [...] The only 
advantage of a foundation is that you don’t have to organise an association 
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meeting two or three times a year.”  (11) Yet all the other associations where 
internal relations were good switched to a foundation anyway. According to 
tenant representatives, the management did wish to switch to a foundation, 
but could not yet convince association members to agree to such a transition. 
But if this was true, why was the management not more supportive of 
external tenant representation (see 5.8)? The evidence is not conclusive.   
 
6.7.4 Conclusion 
 
Overall, there appears to have been a calculated move to centralise control in 
the hands of the managers. Social housing providers appear to have shed one 
of the last remaining legacies of their voluntaristic origin. Yet despite the 
almost unanimous choice to go to a foundation, there was no evidence either 
of copying or of co-operation. Insofar as the process was collective, it was 
only as a kind of “ coercive isomorphism” , to use DiMaggio and Powell’s 
term. When managers decided to adopt a legal structure in which they had a 
stronger position –a decision in line with any strategy- the state effectively 
limited their choice to the foundation structure. Had this regulation not been 
in place, then it is possible (and indeed probable) that the field would have 
erupted into a wide variety of legal structures.  
  
6.8 Tenant representation 
 
Tenant representation is an expression of “ voice” , the mechanism through 
which customers influence the decisions of suppliers directly rather than 
through their power to spend. The theory predicted that tenant 
representation would be strong when providers had a responsive strategy, 
weak when they had either a traditional strategy or a strategy of 
diversification. This issue will require a somewhat lengthy discussion, since 
there are serious problems with its demarcation and measurement. It is an 
issue of power and therefore a methodological minefield. 
 
6.8.1 Measuring representation 
 
The analysis of tenant representation will focus only on tenant organisations. 
This is a simplification, for the leadership of those organisations may not be in 
touch with the wishes and moods of tenants. There have been some well-
publicised incidents (among them one in Bear Pit) in which a housing 
provider extensively discussed its plans with formal tenant representatives, 
only to find during the implementation phase that most of the other tenants 
were unaware of the discussions or the agreements that had been reached. 
The scope of the analysis will be further limited by including only those 
organisations that represent all the tenants of a provider’s stock, not just those 
of a specific estate or neighbourhood. This excludes the numerous tenant 
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committees that operate on a smaller scale. Finally, I will discuss only 
organisations that (intend to) function as permanent representative bodies. 
This excludes committees that emerge during large renovation projects or at 
times of crisis. It will be assumed that these interest groups are adequately 
represented by the overarching tenant organisation.  
 
My reasons for choosing such a narrow definition are of a twofold nature. To 
begin with, the empirical research has been restricted to practices that already 
existed before the introduction of the quasi-market. Likewise, tenant 
representation will be studied as the continuation of organisational 
democracy as it existed prior to this moment. It is clear that street committees 
and the like are not on the same par as association meetings. Only formal 
representative bodies at the organisational level can be regarded as 
substitutes for the association meetings that have by now been largely 
abolished (see 5.7). Another reason is that a systematic comparison of tenant 
representation would be far more difficult if it would include all the groups 
and committees that have sprung up over the past years. A restrictive 
definition will keep the results transparent.  
 
The question how to measure the actual influence of tenant organisations is 
even more complicated. Influence can be defined in terms of resources, but 
since representation is removed from the market context, the relevant 
resources will be different. One could spend a lifetime discussing the 
resources that determine influence, but I intend to settle the issue in this 
paragraph. I have confined myself to the two types of resources that were 
mentioned most frequently in the case studies, either as facilitating or 
obstructing tenant involvement: formal rights and the skills of 
representatives. This is the logical choice to make, since influence is ultimately 
a matter of perception. If providers wish to encourage (or discourage) tenant 
voice, their efforts will focus on the resources they consider crucial.      
 
The resources most commonly mentioned were formal rights. These can be 
classified along two dimensions. The first is the extent to which they involve 
tenant organisations in decision-making. There are three types: the right to be 
informed, the right to advise and the right to give binding consent. The right 
to advise can be divided into several varieties, depending on who takes the 
initiative and how the parties are expected to respond. Best-known is the 
right to give qualified advice, which means that tenants must be asked to give 
their opinion on a subject and that, unless the management respond to this 
advice in accordance with the formal procedure (usually in the form of a 
written reply, containing relevant argumentation, sent within a precisely 
defined period), they are obliged to act upon it. A second classification of 
rights concerns their scope. They pertain to different areas of decision-
making: the procedures for participation themselves, interventions in stock, 
rent levels, rent differentiation, tenant-provider contracts, technical 
maintenance, social maintenance (e.g. social caretakers), distribution and so 
on.  
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6.8.2 Variation in tenant representation 
 
Table 5.10 sums up the formal rights acquired by tenants at the end of the 
research period. Tenant organisations are divided into three groups, based on 
the extent and the scope of their formal rights. Those with a “ poor”  status had 
few or no rights at all. The status of “ moderate”  was conferred to those who 
had acquired rights to give qualified advice and/or consent, but with a scope 
limited to matters that directly affect tenants. These include rent increases, 
technical maintenance and the details of interventions in existing stock. The 
“ high”  status was awarded to tenants who had acquired the formal rights to 
give qualified advice or consent in areas of organisational decision-making 
that surpass the immediate concerns of tenants. These include the 
organisational strategy, interorganisational co-operation, overall rent policy 
and the choice of where to intervene in existing stock. The table shows clearly 
that formal rights are unevenly distributed. Six tenant organisations are poor, 
four moderate and only two high.  
 
Table 5.10: The formal rights acquired by tenant organisations at the end of 
the research period 
 
The scope and reach of formal rights 
 
 
 
poor moderate high 
Providers Hammerhead Shark, 
Nurse Shark, Paper 
Tiger, Sumatran Tiger, 
Grizzly Bear, Koala 
Bear  
Polar Bear, Panda 
Bear,  Great White 
Shark, Elephant  
Siberian Tiger, Bengal 
Tiger 
 
This is not to imply a simple notion of “ the more rights, the better” . Tenants 
may have real influence despite having few formal rights. This can happen 
when tenant representatives have informal ties with management, staff 
members or significant others. The opposite is also a real possibility. Formal 
rights are meaningless unless people have the ability to use them. The 
evidence suggests that tenant representatives also need certain personal skills 
to use their formal powers well. For a start, they need to be well-informed. 
Social housing abounds with regulations and technicalities, making it a 
complicated subject. Faced with professionals who have devoted their lives to 
the subject, tenants need to acquire knowledge to avoid being overwhelmed. 
Moreover, they have to be able to stand their ground at the negotiating table. 
The kind of research required to assess the skills of tenant representatives 
accurately was beyond my means, but it would have been a mistake to do this 
in any case. After all, it matters not so much whether individuals tenants have 
the requisite skills, but whether the tenant organisation has the means for 
absorbing and transmitting those skills over time. The evidence suggests there 
are two ways in which it can do this. One is to furnish representatives with 
training facilities; another is to delegate some of the work to professional 
aides, who will bring in skills of their own and keep the organisation running 
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as volunteers come and go. Several respondents emphasised the key role of 
their aides. One tenant of Bengal Tiger noted: “ [Our aide] has the gift of 
making us think what he thinks. He points out the essence of a matter and 
prevents us from losing focus.”  (14) When asked whether he received external 
support, a tenant from Siberian replied: “ Thank God, yes. We wouldn’t have 
been able to cope otherwise. Especially not at the beginning. What would I 
know about rent differentiation? [...] After all, you’re working with well-
meaning volunteers who don’t know a thing. There just had to be support. 
You have to learn the ropes, know the proper channels, know who’s who. 
[Our aide] grew with us.”  (13) A Great White tenant emphasised the 
importance of professionals to the continuity of the tenant organisation. 
“ You’re enthusiastic, of course, but at one point your term ends and there 
may be a vacuum. With an aide you can jump the gap and carry on. It’s a 
basis from which to start.”  (29) But training and professional support require 
significant and sustained funding. Therefore I have examined the available 
budget as well as the use of training facilities and professional aides. When 
skills are included in the analysis, the ranking order changes only slightly (see 
table 5.11). The “ poor”  were tenant organisations with either no rights or 
insufficient skills. Those of the “ moderate”  type had “ moderate”  rights and 
the skills to use them. The “ high”  organisations had “ high”  rights as well as 
the skills to use them. The tenant organisation of Polar has taken a step back. 
It had moderate formal powers, but appeared to be incapable of using these 
effectively. The overall picture is much the same.  
 
Table 5.11: The strength of tenant representation, as measured at the end of 
the research period 
 
Strength of tenant representation 
 
 
Providers 
poor moderate high 
 Hammerhead Shark, 
Nurse Shark, Paper 
Tiger, Sumatran Tiger, 
Polar Bear, Grizzly 
Bear, Koala Bear
  
Panda Bear,  Great 
White Shark, Elephant
  
Siberian Tiger, Bengal 
Tiger 
 
 
The diversity is confirmed by national figures. A survey conducted in 1999 
indicated that, whereas over 90% of providers claimed to have encouraged 
tenant representation, 40% felt that this had had no result whatsoever 
(Companen, 1999). A more detailed survey conducted by the national tenants’ 
association in the same year showed that only a quarter of providers had a 
representative body at the organisational level (Woonbond, 1999). Of all 
tenant representatives, two thirds had no professional support whatsoever. 
Financial support from providers ranged from one guilder per member to 
twenty. About a third of tenant organisations had access to copying facilities 
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and offices. Although both surveys are methodologically suspect, they reflect 
the inequality found in the cases.73 
 
Table 5.12: the expected relationship between organisational strategy and 
tenant representation  
 
Traditional strategy Low participation 
Responsive strategy High participation 
Diversification strategy Low participation 
 
6.8.3 The fit between strategy and tenant representation 
 
The provider in Elephant’s Corner had a tenant organisation from 1995 
onwards, since just before its merger. This was no co-incidence, since tenants 
mobilised in response to the approaching merger. Given the town’s small size, 
it never had the kind of tenant committees one would find in large urban 
estates. Instead, there were six neighbourhood commissions, which were tied 
to the tenant organisation through personal networks and overlap. The 
provider and the tenants signed an agreement in 1995, giving the latter the 
right of consent on a number of issues: participation procedures, the 
procedure for daily maintenance, service packages and projects involving the 
demolition and replacement of stock (though only on the decision to go ahead 
with the project and not on its specific form). Qualified advice could be given 
on various other matters, such as mergers, maintenance policy, and 
improvement of dwellings, rents and distribution. Tenant representatives 
were also allowed to appoint two members of the internal supervisory body. 
These rights go far, yet without affecting the discretionary freedom of the 
provider in a critical way. For example, decisions where and how to invest 
were open only to advice (at a time when tenants were wary about the 
housing manager’s ambitious plans, which took some of “ their”  money 
elsewhere). The tenant organisation’s two sources of income were 
contributions (one guilder a month per member) and subsidies from the 
provider. As one might expect from a rich provider, the facilities afforded 
tenants were excellent: contributions were doubled, with each neighbourhood 
commission getting an extra thousand guilders. This small budget could be 
used to make small improvements of their own choice. In one case, a group of 
tenants decided to erect a statue for the adornment of a new park. The tenant 
organisation was allowed the use of a small office, set up in a vacant house. 
By their own admission, the tenant representatives had reached the limits of 
their ambitions, save for further growth of membership (already at an 
impressive 55%). So they were well established, far better than the theory 
predicted.   
 
Tiger Town’s tenant representation was of a diverse nature. At one end stood 
the strong tenant organisations of Bengal and Siberian, at the other the 
weaklings of Paper and Sumatran. Bengal’s tenant organisation was the first 
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to blossom. It was set up in 1995 on the initiative of the provider itself. An 
agreement signed in 1998 granted the right of consent on procedures for 
participation, service packages and changes in rent contracts; the right to give 
qualified advice on all matters of investment, distribution and organisational 
change. This bill of rights was extensive, but not exceptional. The real eye-
catcher was a bilateral contract between the tenant organisation and the 
provider that restricted the latter’s discretionary freedom on a number of 
issues. These included rent increases, the use of money generated from sales, 
as well as the size of the provider’s core stock. For instance, the overall rent 
rise was set at an annual maximum for the duration of the five-year contract. 
The line of reasoning behind this arrangement was that it was more efficient 
to agree on a basic framework for decision-making for several years, rather 
than go through the same lengthy discussions again every time. As one 
would guess, the relations between the two parties were close. The chairman 
of the tenant organisation asserted: “ We refuse to become like one of those 
trade unions. We are here to represent the interests of tenants, but not at the 
expense of the provider. I’m not going to yell at anyone either. [...] Sure, our 
interests sometimes clash, but we have the same attitude.”  (14) The budget of 
this independent association was even larger than that of its counterpart in 
Elephant’s Corner. The local authorities doubled contributions of twelve 
guilders a year per member, with an additional sum from the provider for 
each member, with the membership rate at about a third of all tenants. With 
this it could afford part-time professional support from the local welfare 
organisation as well as an office of its own. These conditions were among the 
best in the country and well in accordance with the provider’s responsive 
strategy.  
 
Siberian’s tenant organisation eventually reached a comfortable settlement 
with its provider, but in the first years of its existence it had a very hard time. 
Its development was severely hampered by disinterest among its own 
members and hostility among the hard core of association members. When 
Siberian changed its legal structure at the end of the research period, the 
tenant organisation acquired a bill of rights almost as far-reaching as that of 
Bengal. It included the right of consent on long-term maintenance, sales and 
rent policy as well as participation procedures; qualified advice on 
maintenance plans, rent increases, new construction, interorganisational co-
operation and organisational strategy. Like its colleague at Bengal, it was 
planning to formalise short-term agreements through an additional contract. 
Its budget was up to eighteen guilders per dwelling. On top of this, it had its 
own office and permanent professional support. All this went further than the 
theory had predicted, given Siberian’s diversification strategy.   
 
Oddly enough, even though the other two tenant organisations in Tiger Town 
had access to many of the facilities their colleagues of Siberian and Bengal 
had, and their providers had responsive strategies, they did far worse. They 
received subsidies from the local authorities and could hire professional 
support from the local welfare organisation at a price significantly below that 
of the Woonbond (the national union of tenants). However, neither 
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organisation could use these facilities effectively. The tenants of Paper Tiger 
mobilised in 1996, but their board fell apart due to lack of enthusiasm and 
consensus. Shortly thereafter, the treasurer used the organisation’s budget to 
buy a new freezer, a computer and other necessities for his own use. The 
police were called in and the budget was eventually restored, but it was a 
major setback for the fledgling organisation. Its budget consisted of the usual 
contribution fee of a guilder a month plus local authority subsidies, as well as 
an annual subsidy from the provider of 30.000 guilders. This amounted to 
considerably less than local colleagues received, because the membership rate 
never got above 10%. Moreover, the provider had earmarked over a third of 
its subsidy for the tenant committees, which meant that in practice the tenant 
organisation got considerably less than one would think at first sight. Their 
rights did not extend beyond qualified advice on basic matters such as rent 
increases and maintenance. On the whole, the tenant representatives were 
pessimistic. One complained: “ Sometimes I think, Jesus, why am I doing 
this?”  (15) They even claimed some of their mail had been suppressed. 
Sumatran, the fourth provider in Tiger Town, had great difficulty in getting 
its tenants to organise. This was not surprising, given that its tenants were 
mostly students. As a result, tenant representation never got beyond the stage 
of an internal commission. 
 
But all things considered, representation in Tiger Town was on a distinctly 
higher level than that of Shark Pool. Hammerhead and Nurse did have tenant 
commissions, but attempts to set up tenant organisations met with a stiff lack 
of enthusiasm. One manager explained it like this: “ People are simply too 
content around here.”  (28) Whether or not that is the reason, tenant 
representation had little weight. Tenants had the right of consent only on 
basic matters such as the procedures for participation and service costs, 
qualified advice regarding construction projects, renovation and maintenance. 
In both cases there were only internal tenant boards, without membership, 
external support or funding. This is what was expected, since the providers 
pursued traditional strategies. Oddly enough, the third tenant organisation in 
Shark Pool did quite well. Tenants mobilised during a minor scandal that 
drove the former director into retirement and caused quite a stir in the 
otherwise sedate town. After some initial difficulties, an independent 
association came into existence, which grew to a membership rate of over a 
third (which was exceptionally high by Shark Pool standards). When the 
housing provider changed to a foundation structure in 1995, it gained the 
right of consent not only on participation procedures, but also on matters of 
maintenance, construction projects and renovation. It could give qualified 
advice on various other issues, including distribution, rent levels and sale. It 
was supported by a professional from the welfare organisation in a 
neighbouring town, paid for by contributions (fifteen guilders a year) plus 
subsidies from the provider (usually around 10.000 guilders). The difference 
with the tenant representation elsewhere in Shark Pool was remarkable.    
 
The Bear Pit tenant organisations, like their colleagues in Tiger Town, could 
benefit from local professional support. The effects on the strength of tenant 
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organisations seemed limited, though. On the face of it, Polar’s tenants had 
secured a handsome agreement: the right of consent on maintenance and 
renovation procedures, the right to give qualified advice on long-term 
maintenance and renovation plans, construction, interorganisational co-
operation and long-term strategy. Its budget was ten guilders per housing 
unit, which was a lot given Polar’s size. But the contract was only temporary 
and set to expire by the end of the research period. Moreover, relations with 
the management were strained. On a number of occasions the tenant 
organisation had simply been ignored. One of Polar’s managers said, with a 
laugh: “ Well, they have these rights of consent and advice, but we forget half 
the time. [...] Like when we entered this national alliance: we completely 
forgot to consult them! We rectified it afterwards, but it hasn’t improved our 
mutual relations. I’ve often told them, as bluntly as I tell you now: ‘Of course I 
will submit this decision to you, but whatever you think of it, I’m going to do 
it anyway.’ They can continue to play this game if they want, but it is only a 
game.”  (2) He did not hide the fact that he would curtail the formal rights of 
the representatives when the contract expired, regardless of whether they 
liked it or not.  
 
The situation was hardly better in Grizzly, where tenants barely got a 
foothold and had only qualified advice on maintenance, renovation and rents. 
The management was generally regarded as indifferent to tenant 
representation. No information was available on the tenant organisation’s 
budget. Panda, by contrast, had a very elaborate system of representation. 
The rights and budget were comparable to those of Polar, but relations with 
staff were quite tight. In keeping with the provider’s decentralised approach, 
there were also a large number of neighbourhood and estate commissions 
with rights of their own. Koala sat somewhere in between. Tenants had no 
rights of consent and no budget, but the tenants were well organised and 
relations with the provider were good. Money to cover expenses was almost 
invariably provided on request. Moreover, the management was responsive 
to tenants’ wishes, although it refused to grant the tenant organisation more 
extensive rights, as a matter of principle. All in all, the evidence from Bear Pit 
is in line with the theory’s predictions. Panda was the only provider with an 
incentive to encourage voice and the only one to do so.  
 
The overall results show that tenant representation in social housing was a 
muddle. There was great variety in the strength of tenant organisations, both 
within and between towns. Some were barely conscious, informal gatherings 
of a highly amateuristic nature. In social housing, it is often said that tenants 
discuss “ tap washers”  (“ kraanleertjes” ), trivial technical complaints, as 
opposed to matters of policy. When I once attended a meeting of tenant 
representatives in Shark Pool, I was shocked to find that they actually did 
discuss such details –the remark that “ the grates of our houses are not 
mouseproof”  particularly stuck in my mind.74 But other tenant organisations 
were established and respected partners, with adequate rights and facilities. 
The tenant organisations of Tiger Town even set up a local federation, which 
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published discussion papers and took part in tripartite negotiations with local 
authorities and providers.  
 
Five of the twelve providers did not have the kind of representation that the 
theory predicted (see table 5.12). Broadly speaking, the fit for providers with 
traditional and responsive strategies was stronger than for those with a 
diversification strategy. This raises the question why there should be a fit for 
some providers and not for others. 
 
6.8.4 Conditions that favour strong tenant representation 
 
A closer examination of the differences between the tenant organisations 
reveals the conditions that determine their strength. By far the most 
important was the occurrence of key moments in which housing managers 
needed their support.75 Each strong tenant organisation had had an 
opportunity to establish itself, usually during a change of legal structure 
and/or a merger. The large majority of votes needed for the transition (see 
5.7) and the opposition of hard-line association members made tenant 
organisations a valuable ally. They could mobilise support among their own 
members and also pose as a respectable alternative to the internal democracy 
of the association meetings. In return, managers could reward this support by 
granting the tenant organisation extensive formal rights and facilities. In 
short, the management’s desire to change the legal structure and the 
institutionalised veto power of association members put tenant organisations 
in a position to make demands. This explains why certain providers had 
strong tenant organisations, even when it was not consistent with their 
strategies.  
 
The tenant organisation of Siberian played a vital role in enabling a merger 
and a change of legal structure that saved the provider from bankruptcy or a 
major sell-out. Its explicit support and consistent lobbying among tenants 
were essential in winning the vote. The provider in Elephant’s Corner had 
been trying to set up a tenant organisation for years, always meeting with 
consistent apathy. It was only in 1995, with the merger in sight, that it could 
finally mobilise its tenants, taking advantage of the fear that its considerable 
financial reserves might leak away to other towns. Great White Shark faced a 
tenant riot during a major renovation project. This conflict was so vehement 
that it deeply affected the provider’s manager, who retired soon after. It was 
on the momentum of this upheaval that interest in tenant representation 
could be sustained. The contract between the tenant organisation and the 
provider was signed on the very day that the latter became a foundation. The 
same logic applied to providers for which strong representation was a matter 
of course. Bengal’s tenant organisation acquired its rights when their provider 
switched to a foundation structure. Panda also set up a new system of tenant 
representation after it had been created through a merger. Conversely, 
providers with low tenant participation either had not (yet) made the 
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transition to a foundation (Paper, Hammerhead, Nurse) or had made it before 
the research period (Grizzly, Koala, Sumatran). 
 
But according to the theory providers with a responsive strategy would have 
supported strong tenant voice anyway. They were expected to do so even if 
there was no opportunity for tenants to force their hand. Yet this does not 
appear to have happened everywhere. The two responsive providers who did 
not go through a change of legal structure or a merger during the research 
period both had weak tenant organisations. This could provide grounds for 
the claim that strategy is not important at all and that providers will only 
support strong tenant representation when it serves a more important goal, 
such as a change of legal structure. By implication, the rights of tenant 
representatives would be curtailed at the first opportunity. This is what 
appeared to happen at Polar Bear. The rights of tenants were fairly extensive, 
but they were not heeded and were expected to be cut down soon. 
 
However, such a conclusion is altogether too cynical and too simple. Most of 
the traditionally minded providers had excellent relationships with their 
tenants, but simply had different views on how to organise it. Koala’s 
manager visited all monthly tenant meetings and was praised as a good 
listener. Hammerhead invested great effort in the social aspects of renovation 
and maintenance plans, even though tenant representation at the 
organisational level was trivial. They appeared to listen carefully to their 
tenants, but were unwilling to involve them directly in decision-making. As 
for the responsive providers who did have strong representation, they both 
invested heavily in their tenant organisations and found inventive new ways 
to organise representation. Bengal drew up a five-year performance contract 
with its tenants and Panda developed a new and highly decentralised 
structure. These are indications that strategies do translate into a preference 
for external representation of a particular kind. All in all, the evidence is 
somewhat contradictory.  
 
The most plausible explanation for this ambiguity is that strategies do matter, 
but that they are overruled under specific conditions. In three of the five 
instances (Great White, Elephant, Siberian) where this occurred, the strength 
of voice can be attributed to coalition-building at key junctures in the 
organisation’s history. The two others had more specific reasons for deviating 
from their strategy. In Sumatran’s case, this may be related to the nature of 
the tenants. Most of these were students, whose workloads had grown 
considerably due to cuts in state grants. As was noted by a professional tenant 
aide: “ Their tenant board is unstable, and that is only logical: students don’t 
stay very long and there is little chance of continuity. They have no time to 
invest in such matters.”  (16) Sumatran had been trying to get a tenant board 
off the ground for some time, but had consistently failed. By the end of the 
research period, the signs seemed more favourable, though. In short, the 
composition of the tenant population may explain why representation never 
became stronger. But Paper Tiger’s refusal to encourage voice remains 
difficult to explain. Its tenant organisation did not receive the enthusiastic 
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backing of the management, even though it clearly pursued a strategy of 
responsiveness. One explanation that makes sense is that the provider 
intended to target the elderly with home care packages. Representation may 
not be the best way to reach out to this particular group of customers. 
Another explanation, suggested by an outsider, is that the Paper tenant 
representatives lacked the mental baggage and the guts to stake their claim 
effectively.76 But neither interpretation has sufficient evidence to back it up.   
 
6.8.5 Conclusion 
 
Summing up, the nature of tenant representation has proven very diverse. 
There has been no collective innovation of any kind. It is not surprising that 
there was no reciprocity on this issue, as it is one in which providers are not 
directly dependent on one another. However, there is no reason why 
reproduction could not have occurred, when it did in so many other areas 
and when all the necessary conditions were in place. It would have been easy 
to spread a standard bill of rights throughout the sector, but providers have 
tended to follow their strategies, except where they were forced to ally 
themselves with tenant organisations or where tenants were unusually 
difficult to mobilise. Apparently, they were selective in what they copied.  
 
6.9 Organisational structure  
 
6.9.1 Variation and fit in the choice of organisational structure 
 
Organisational structure was defined as the formal means by which the 
different tasks within the organisation are co-ordinated. It was predicted that 
providers with a traditional strategy would retain a mechanic, centralised 
structure, whereas those with responsive or diversification strategies would 
adopt one that was organic and decentralised. Providers with diversification 
strategies were expected to split into market-based divisions (see table 5.13).  
 
Table 5.13: the expected relationship between organisational strategy and 
structure  
 
Traditional strategy Centralised, mechanic structure 
Responsive strategy Decentralised, organic structure 
Diversification strategy Divisions; decentralised, organic structure 
 
There was a remarkable homogeneity among the providers. At the end of the 
research period, ten of the twelve organisations had adopted a so-called 
front/back office structure (see table 5.14). As the name suggests, this consists 
of two parts, the front office and the back office. The former is responsible for 
all direct contacts with clients, the latter for all other tasks. Originally, this 
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type of structure was developed by commercial businesses to save costs by 
spreading different functions geographically (Meester, 1993, p. 11). The 
particular variety popular in social housing had two distinctive 
characteristics. The first was that many providers used it as a means of 
changing their relations with clients, rather than (only) as a cost-saving 
device. Secondly, the structure usually involved the division of the front 
office into several smaller departments focused on geographical areas within 
the local market.  
 
It was adopted by all providers with either a diversification or a responsive 
strategy. Since the front/back office structure can be characterised as 
decentralised and organic, this is in line with expectations. In addition, all 
three providers with a diversification strategy had created structures 
consisting of local divisions, each active in one geographical area. For all these 
providers, the fit was perfect. But the evidence from organisations with a 
traditional strategy was mixed. Koala retained its bureaucratic structure. 
Grizzly was planning to adopt an altogether different model, one which 
deliberately gave greater prominence to the technical maintenance 
department than the popular front/back office model did. All this still fits 
expectations. However, the providers in Shark Pool switched to the 
front/back office model without exception, which is not consistent with their 
strategy.  
 
Table 5.14: Organisational structures at the end of the research period:  
 
 Start of research period End of research period 
Bureaucratic structure All 1 
Front/back office structure - 10 
Other - 1 
 
The analysis should accordingly wrestle with two issues. First, there is the 
popularity of this one structure. Second, there is the question why three 
providers adopted it in violation of their strategy.  
  
6.9.2 The grounds for choosing the structure 
 
The fact that such a specific model was so widely adopted indicates a 
collective innovation process. Indeed, several respondents remarked that it 
was “ trendy”  and that “ everyone was doing it” . The exact process of diffusion 
has been hard to trace, though. It did not benefit from extensive press 
coverage or pilot projects like many other popular innovations did. More than 
others, this innovation must have spread by word-of-mouth, through 
network meetings and advisors. One respondent described the process as 
such: “ I remember when this term had not yet been invented, in the late 
1980s. One of my department heads left and I said: ‘Guys, this is an 
opportunity to rethink our organisation. I’ll go spend three days in the 
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countryside and think.’ You used to have those concern-type structures in 
commercial businesses, you know, independent units. They inspired me and 
then I invented this new structure. Of course it looks different now, but quite 
similar too! [...] At the same time, there must have been other idiots like me 
who were thinking about this.”  (23) Perhaps the innovation was also inspired 
by the “ single service desk”  concept that was popular in the public sector at 
that time.    
 
What must have favoured the diffusion of this structure was its ability to kill 
two birds with one stone. It is an instance of what I have called “ fusing” : the 
process in which one activity or structure is adopted on different grounds. 
This is possible because an organisational structure is a package deal. This 
particular one combined both cost-saving opportunities and a service 
orientation. It allowed providers who had begun to operate in different 
geographical areas to reap benefits of scale. For providers with a responsive 
strategy, the most significant aspect of the structure was that it allowed them 
to improve contacts with customers. Some stressed its organic quality. “ It 
requires interdisciplinary co-operation between administrators and 
technicians, which will make the organisation more accessible. The new 
model forces that process.”  (9) Others argued that it would help develop a 
service ethic. “ It is all about the customer now. Other functions only have a 
supporting role. But say that and all the established positions in the 
organisation are in jeopardy. Consider this: many providers used to have 
three company cars, one for the head of maintenance, one for the director and 
one for the administrator. Why did the administrator need a company car? To 
visit the bank three times a week? It was a matter of power, of status. Change 
all that and things become different.”  (37) It is a little surprising that the 
front/back office structure was used especially for this purpose, even though 
it was originally a cost-saving device.  
 
That leaves the question why the three providers in Shark Pool adopted it too. 
This is especially surprising as the two traditional providers, Grizzly and 
Koala, reacted exactly as the theory had predicted. Koala basically retained 
the classic bureaucratic model, although it made changes to improve the 
responsiveness of the technical maintenance department. The manager left no 
doubt why: “ This front/back office model, it is complete folly. What are the 
problems tenants have? They’re technical problems, which should be solved as 
quickly as possible. The worst thing you can do is to let others decide how the 
technicians should do their job.”  (5) Grizzly’s reason for refusing to go along 
with the trend was exactly the same. “ In all those structures that were 
adopted, there was no longer a direct line between the manager and the 
technical maintenance department. The head of the front office came in 
between, as well as area manager. [...] In this, my colleagues underestimate 
the value of technical expertise.”  (3) It devised a new structure of its own, 
which retained the autonomy of the specialisms, including technical 
maintenance.  
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The three providers in Shark Pool each call for a different explanation of the 
misfit between structure and strategy. Nurse had been preparing for a merger 
with providers in other towns and its decision to adopt the new structure can 
be explained in that light. The merger itself may have been unexpected, but it 
does explain the choice of the front/back office model. What is more difficult 
to explain is that Great White adopted the new structure early and 
enthusiastically.77 It even went further in decentralising decision-making than 
most other providers, with largely autonomous teams of professionals. The 
only viable explanation is that it was leaning towards a strategy other than 
the traditional one. It was noted before that its strategy verged on a 
responsive one, although it had expressed this only in the broadest possible 
sense (see 5.3.4). This provider may have developed the structure associated 
with a responsive strategy before it developed the products typical of that 
approach. But that is speculation, which could only be resolved by examining 
this organisation at a future date. Hammerhead, finally, seems to have 
adopted the structure only because of the approaching merger. The manager 
in charge of the service desk uttered his scepsis: “ Sometimes I feel we’re just 
following the herd. The market does require certain changes [...] but there is 
no need for this forced front office/back office thing. We could just 
concentrate our activities partially [...] I did agree that we should adopt this 
model; if I had not, I would have damaged my personal interests. However, 
we should beware of consequences that we cannot foresee.”  (26) According to 
an internal inquiry, the organisation had been running smoothly and the 
transition was therefore hard to justify to the staff. Respondents expressed a 
certain reluctance to the change, which was also visible in the way it was 
implemented. While its colleague Great White developed a particularly 
organic front office, Hammerhead retained many traits of the old bureaucratic 
model. The former regarded this disparity as a potential problem, since the 
two organisations were set to merge. “ A merger does not help in developing 
the organisation. In fact, it can be very damaging in some respects. 
[Hammerhead] still has the three traditional bureaucratic pillars and it is 
unclear which of the two structures will be dominant.”  (24)  
 
There may have been another issue running through the change of 
organisational structure. It may have been used to force changes in the 
composition of the staff, particularly among the middle range of the 
organisational hierarchy. Sometimes the entire layer was removed. When I 
asked the manager of Siberian Tiger whether I could interview one of his 
department heads, he replied: “ They’re all gone. Well, there’s one left, but 
you’d better not talk to him. His view of events may be a little distorted.”  (9) 
It was impossible to study this in sufficient detail, since many providers were 
(understandably) reluctant to release information about personal changes. 
Those who did talk frankly (usually lowering their voice in the process) 
indicated that a number of staff members had been unable or unwilling to 
adapt to the new frame of mind that was required of them. Most had left 
voluntarily, some had been given a gentle nudge and some had been 
removed forcibly, depending on the culture of the organisation in question. 
There are indications that at least some of the managers used the change of 
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structure to “ clean up”  their staff. If this is true, it is an illustration of resource 
dependence theory’s claim that the choice of organisational structure is at 
least as much a reflection of internal power struggles as a response to 
environmental conditions. 
 
6.9.3 Conclusion 
 
Summing up, the choice of organisational structure appears to have been the 
result of combined collective and individual innovation. It is not an area in 
which collective innovation through reciprocity was likely to occur, since 
there was no direct mutual dependence on this issue. However, there was 
reproduction in that the front/back office model spread throughout the social 
housing sector by the same process that encouraged the diffusion of other 
innovations. Most providers would have adopted an organic, decentralised 
structure of this kind anyway. A couple of providers with traditional 
strategies stuck to their principles and created varieties of a mechanic 
structure that protected the autonomy of the technical maintenance 
department. Others went along with the trend, two because of imminent 
mergers, one (perhaps) because it was evolving towards a responsive 
strategy. 
 
6.10 Conclusion 
 
Chapter five has described how social housing providers have reacted to the 
introduction of the quasi-market for each separate decision. The findings are 
summed up in table 5.15 (variation), 5.16 (fit) and 5.17 (aggregate results). 
Chapter six will analyse the overall evidence. After that, it will be possible to 
answer the research questions!  
  
 
Table 5.15: The aggregate results concerning variation 
  
 
  
Interventions in stock 
 
Distribution 
 
Co-operation 
 
Legal 
structure 
 
Tenant 
representation 
 
Organisational 
structure 
 
BP 
 
Very strong 
collective 
intervention in 
neighbourhoods 
 
 
Adoption of 
advertising 
system by all 
but Koala 
 
All engaged 
in mergers 
except Koala 
 
All 
foundations 
 
Medium for 
Panda, low for 
the others 
 
Front/back 
office for Panda 
and Polar; other 
structure for 
Grizzly and 
Koala 
TT  
Little intervention; 
as yet no collective 
investment in 
neighbourhoods 
 
 
Adoption of 
advertising 
system by all 
 
Limited co-
operation; 
only Siberian 
merged 
 
All 
foundations, 
except Paper 
Tiger 
 
High for 
Siberian and 
Bengal, low for 
Paper and 
Sumatran 
 
Front/back 
office structure 
popular overall 
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SP Collective 
intervention in 
neighbourhoods; 
large-scale 
construction by all 
but one 
 
 
Adoption of 
advertising 
system by all 
 
All engaged 
in mergers 
 
All 
foundations 
 
Low for 
Hammerhead 
and Nurse; 
medium for 
Great White 
 
Front/back 
office structure 
popular overall 
EC Lots of sale; 
otherwise limited 
intervention 
Adoption of 
advertising 
system 
Engaged in 
number of 
mergers 
 
Foundation 
Medium level 
of 
representation 
Front/back 
office structure  
 
All 
 
Variation in 
intensity of 
intervention; most  
intense where 
collective 
 
 
Prevalence 
of 
advertising 
system 
 
Mergers the 
most popular 
type of co-
operation 
 
Dominance 
of 
foundation 
structure 
 
Diversity, 
although 
mostly low 
 
Front/back 
office structure 
most popular 
 
 
Table 5.16: the aggregate results concerning fit  
 
 
  
Interventions in stock 
 
Distribution 
 
Co-operation 
 
Legal 
structure 
 
Tenant 
representation 
 
Organisational 
structure 
 
BP 
 
Fit for Polar and 
Koala, others misfit 
 
Fit for all 
except 
Grizzly 
 
 
Fit for Polar 
and Koala, 
others misfit 
 
Fit for all 
 
Fit for all 
 
Fit for all 
TT Fit for all Fit for all Fit for all Fit for all 
except Paper 
Fit for Bengal, 
misfit for 
others 
Fit for all 
SP Misfit for all Misfit for all Misfit for all Fit for all Fit for all 
except Great 
White 
Misfit for all 
EC Fit Fit Fit Fit  Misfit  Fit 
 
All 
 
Fit for all except 
most traditional 
providers and 
Panda 
 
Fit for all 
except most 
traditional 
providers 
 
Fit for all 
except most 
traditional 
providers 
and Panda   
 
Usually fit 
 
Diverse picture 
of fit and misfit 
 
Usually fit, 
except for some 
traditional 
providers 
 
 
 
Table 5.17: the overall results 
 
 
  
Interventions in stock 
 
Distribution 
 
Co-operation 
 
Legal structure 
 
Tenant 
representation 
 
Organisational 
structure 
 
BP 
 
Diffusion of 
neighbourhood 
programme; 
interventions 
 
Diffusion of 
advertising 
system 
strengthene
 
Diffusion of 
merger 
strengthened 
by social 
 
Choice 
restricted by 
law; 
foundation 
 
Determined by 
strategy only 
 
Structures 
consistent with 
strategy; 
different 
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strengthened by 
strong co-operation 
d by social 
pressure 
pressure consistent 
with strategy 
varieties 
 
TT 
 
As yet no 
investment in 
neighbourhood 
programme; 
interventions 
determined by 
strategy only 
 
Diffusion of 
advertising 
system 
strengthene
d by local 
conflict 
 
Determined 
by strategy 
only 
 
Choice 
restricted by 
law; 
foundation 
consistent 
with strategy 
 
Determined by 
strategy, but 
stronger after 
change of legal 
structure 
 
Consistent with 
strategy; f/b 
office 
reproduced for 
convenience 
 
SP 
 
Diffusion of 
neighbourhood 
programme; 
interventions 
strengthened by co-
operation 
 
Diffusion of 
advertising 
system 
strengthene
d by social 
pressure 
 
Diffusion of 
merger 
strengthened 
by social 
pressure 
 
Choice 
restricted by 
law; 
foundation 
consistent 
with strategy 
 
Determined by 
strategy, but 
stronger after 
change of legal 
structure 
 
Collective 
reproduction of 
f/b office 
because of 
imminent 
mergers  
 
EC 
 
Individual 
innovation 
 
Invented 
variety of 
advertising 
system  
 
Individual 
innovation 
 
Choice 
restricted by 
law; 
foundation 
consistent 
with strategy 
 
Determined by 
strategy, but 
stronger after 
change of legal 
structure 
 
Consistent with 
strategy; f/b 
office 
reproduced for 
convenience 
 
All 
 
Interventions 
become stronger 
when undertaken as 
part of collective 
projects; 
neighbourhood 
focus encouraged by 
state 
 
Diffusion of 
advertising 
system 
made 
stronger by 
relations in 
local 
network 
 
More 
mergers 
after 
previous co-
operation; 
merger most 
popular  
 
Choice 
restricted by 
law; 
foundation 
consistent 
with strategy 
 
Decision 
determined by 
strategy, 
except in 
instances with 
potential 
conflict 
 
National 
diffusion of f/b; 
adopted for 
convenience or 
as necessary 
accompaniment 
to merger 
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7 Conclusion: the logic of the quasi-market 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
Quasi-markets are daring new constructs, designed to establish control over 
welfare state providers on a new footing while safeguarding social policy 
goals. To make them work it is vital to understand the logic that informs the 
behaviour of the providers. This book has tried to bring it to the surface, 
focusing on Dutch housing. In the postwar period, social housing became the 
prime vehicle for quenching the great housing shortages of the post-war 
period. These had been largely solved by the 1980s, but the downside was 
that the system of housing provision had become very complex and difficult 
to control. This led to a number of reforms in the 1990s, one of which was the 
introduction of a quasi-market, a new method of co-ordinating the activities 
of the private non-profit providers. It involved two steps: the decentralisation 
of financial risks and the imposition of a new system of regulations. Providers 
were less restricted by regulation, but in return they took over the financial 
risks involved in their activities. This book has examined how they dealt with 
this new system. Three questions have guided the research: (1) how they have 
reacted, (2) how this can be explained, and (3) how their behaviour affects the 
conditions that make the quasi-market effective.  
 
To answer these questions, chapter three developed a theory that approached 
(quasi-)market behaviour along two dimensions. First, how do providers 
ensure their financial well-being within the quasi-market? The 
decentralisation of risks has impelled providers to define strategies on how to 
guarantee the flow of resources they need. The second dimension of 
behaviour was cognitive: do providers know what they should do, and if not, 
how do they acquire that knowledge? The new system made the old routines 
for social housing provision less viable, which prompted a search for new 
ways of coping with uncertainty. Providers could invent them by themselves, 
but they could also find them collectively, either creating the required 
knowledge in direct co-operation with others (reciprocity) or by copying 
innovations from others (reproduction). All in all, they had to deal with two 
kinds of uncertainty: whether they could get the resources (the capital) they 
needed and what was the best way for them to achieve that.  
 
Chapter five described how the Dutch social housing providers have 
managed. Paragraph 6.2 attempts to explain the odd picture that emerged 
from this. On the one hand, there was a large extent of homogeneity in 
decision-making. On the other hand, there was great variety in the strategies 
underneath the decisions. What appears to have happened is that providers 
have innovated collectively so that they could change more swiftly than they 
would have been able to autonomously. However, they have done so on the 
basis of and in a manner consistent with their own principles. Therefore 
collective innovation has not brought them closer together. Rather, the old 
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social networks have begun to fall apart.  
 
Paragraph 6.3 focuses on the conditions that are expected to make the quasi-
market successful. There were four: (1) the market structure should be 
competitive, (2) providers should find ways to deal with uncertainty, (3) the 
relationship between local authorities and providers should be balanced, and 
(4) the state must have effective instruments for correcting undesirable 
behaviour. Although the second condition is amply satisfied, the other three 
may come under threat in the long term. This calls into question whether this 
system of provision can be sustained in the long term, although it is as yet too 
early to say anything with certainty. 
 
Paragraph 6.4 briefly sums up the conclusions of this part of the analysis. 
Paragraph 6.5 is a brief epilogue, which will discuss the future of the Dutch 
social housing sector. The sector is at present still very different from its 
counterparts in many other countries, because it is not targeted only at the 
poorest segments of society. However, there are developments that could 
reverse its fortunes. I will describe three developments that could lead to its 
marginalisation: the continued growth of home ownership, the use of social 
housing capital by the state to solve external problems, and plans by 
organisations in the sector to abandon their social housing status. Paragraph 
6.6 ends the book.  
 
7.2 Collective adaptation and fragmentation  
 
7.2.1 Widespread mimicry 
 
Something remarkable has happened. When the quasi-market was introduced 
in Dutch social housing, most organisations were small and groomed in an 
administrative tradition. One would have expected them to adapt slowly, but 
instead most have managed a major overhaul. They have changed their 
distribution system, organisational structure, legal structure and many have 
engaged in major construction or regeneration projects. How did they do it, 
when most had so little capacity? The answer, as the previous chapter 
showed, is that the organisations copied ideas from others on a wide scale 
and adapted them to their own purpose. What they might not have achieved 
autonomously, they managed to do collectively.  
 
Copying was especially widespread: in five of the six types of decisions that 
were studied, a majority of providers adopted approaches or structures that 
were popular throughout the sector. In DiMaggio and Powell’s terms, there 
was a great extent of mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b). In 
urban areas, interventions in stock were subsumed within programmes that 
focused on geographical areas and strongly encouraged mixing, both within 
the neighbourhoods themselves as well as in the network of actors 
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implementing the programmes. Distribution saw the rise of the advertising 
system, also known as the “ Delft model” . Interorganisational co-operation 
was characterised by the popularity of mergers. The overwhelming majority 
of providers chose the foundation as their legal structure, while the formerly 
dominant association structure was widely abandoned. Finally, many chose 
the front-office/ back-office model as their organisational structure to replace 
the traditional bureaucratic structure. The ubiquity of copying is not 
surprising, considering that the conditions for this kind of process were ideal: 
providers had the need as well as the means.   
 
To begin with, there was a great need for copying. With the introduction of 
the quasi-market, providers were faced with the unfortunate situation of 
having to make great and swift changes with only a limited capacity for doing 
so. Their staff usually numbered only a few dozen, in the smallest 
organisations no more than twenty to thirty. Most of the staff were low- or 
medium-skilled technicians and administrators. Therefore only a handful of 
people could be involved in thinking through the changes, landing the 
burden of innovations on the shoulders of a few individuals. Even the 
manager of Elephant, one of the most innovative providers, expressed his 
concern about this: “ To be honest, we have an internal organisation that still 
hinges on one or two people. That’s scary. When one of those has a stomach 
ache or a fight with his wife, there’s little to ensure the continuity of the 
organisation.”  (37) The same conditions that strengthened managerial 
discretion made the process of innovation more fragile (see 5.3.5). It was only 
logical that, with such little capacity to generate knowledge of their own, 
providers would be more inclined to attract it from the outside.  
 
The diffusion of knowledge was facilitated by the existence of suitable 
communication channels. The elaborate social infrastructure that had 
developed in social housing prior to the introduction of the quasi-market, on 
the local as well as the national level. This included personal networks as well 
as the meetings and media supported by the branch associations, the Ministry 
of Housing, research groups and other organisations. The branch associations 
(merged into one in 1999) have traditionally had an important role in guiding 
and training housing managers (for an overview of their past activities, see 
Gerrichhauzen, 1990).78 Their activities included the organisation of 
conferences and network meetings, as well as the publication of specialist 
journals and papers. Another important organisation was the Stuurgroep 
Experimenten in de Volkshuisvesting (SEV), an independent foundation that 
funds and publicises experiments with new products. For instance, the SEV 
played a prominent role in the dissemination of the advertising system of 
distribution, setting up pioneer projects and providing consistent publicity for 
the results. The director of the SEV once said: “ On the one hand, you see 
providers who are really at the forefront in terms of research and 
development. They are fully aware of their new tasks, their position and the 
particular product they have to offer. But there are some, to put it bluntly, 
which do nothing at all about research and development. What worries me is 
that they use the SEV as an excuse not to develop their own products and 
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organisations. They say: ‘we don’t have to do that. That’s what the SEV is for, 
isn’t it?’ It’s not that we don’t enjoy hearing that, but it’s not good for the 
sector.” 79 Finally, there were a few specialised university departments and 
research institutes who worked closely with housing providers on research 
and development. 
 
Knowledge also spread through professional consultants, although it is not 
clear exactly how important they were. Several of the organisations in the 
case studies had hired a consultancy firm at one time or another. The manager 
of Paper Tiger pointed out that “ [the consultancy agencies] put a lot of effort 
into their contacts. We are potential customers. They often approach us. [...] 
Social housing providers have money and, besides, there is a lot going on in 
this sector, which makes us feel insecure. We no longer depend on subsidies 
and have to plot our own course, which brings with it a measure of 
uncertainty, which we think we can overcome by buying research. Common 
sense ought to prevail in the end, but sometimes we allow others to think for 
us -at least, we think they do.”  (11) Consultancy agencies specialised in 
housing could be seen rotating around the sector more or less permanently 
(the second revolving fund?). It is difficult to assess how significant 
consultants were in spreading knowledge, since their reports were often (if 
only officially) unavailable to me and the actual relationship between 
consultants and their employers was usually shrouded in mystery.80  
 
Essential to the diffusion of knowledge is that channels of communication are 
infused with a measure of trust. If they are not considered reliable, they 
cannot be expected to serve as carriers of information. Zucker mentioned 
three types of trust: (1) personal trust, (2) trust based on shared characteristics 
and (3) institutional trust (Zucker, 1986). Innovations in the Dutch social 
housing sector were often backed up by two or three of these varieties. To 
begin with, there were many long-established personal networks between 
people who had worked in the sector for decades. As will be discussed 
further below, collective innovation was strongest within local networks. 
Furthermore, most of the housing providers shared a common historic 
background. Many had been founded in the same period, had gone through 
the same legal and social changes, and had faced similar problems for nearly a 
century. Finally, actors like the branch association, the SEV and research 
institutes could back up innovations with institutional trust. 
 
These conditions all encouraged the development, exchange and diffusion of 
new ideas. Because the conditions for the diffusion of knowledge were so 
fortuitous, the limited capacity for individual innovation could be 
compensated for by a great potential for collective innovation. The tightly-
knit structure of the social housing sector proved crucial in helping these 
small and often ill-equipped organisations to adjust. In most cases, popular 
innovations appear to have been adaptations of concepts popular among 
commercial businesses. The advertising system of distribution was similar to 
the marketing devices used by estate agents. The front-/back-office 
organisational structure derived from information-based industries (Meester 
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e.a., 1993). Mergers were generally popular among commercial businesses at 
the end of the 20th century. However, providers generally did not copy these 
innovations directly from commercial sectors. When asked where their ideas 
came from, most of them referred to parties within social housing itself. Other 
innovations were suggested by the state. The focus on neighbourhood 
projects was part of national policy, encouraged with instruments such as 
subsidies and contracts between the state and local authorities. The 
foundation structure, to which most providers switched, was one of only two 
legal structures permitted by the law.  
 
Innovators usually picked up ideas from other kinds of networks and 
adapted them for social housing provision. The Elephant manager, a well-
known innovator, observed: “ I get my inspiration from many different 
corners. I never confine myself to housing alone. I’m also very interested in 
what happens in retailing, in information technology. Some of it is most 
interesting and easily applicable to social housing.”  (37) Apart from 
commercial businesses, respondents also referred to universities and 
providers from other European countries as sources of knowledge. Innovative 
capacity therefore seems to have been a combination of network and 
organisational characteristics. On the one hand, innovators simply allowed 
knowledge to flow from one network to the other. As Granovetter has noted 
in the context of the labour market, “ weak ties” , connections between actors 
who are part of different networks of strong social ties, are a major source of 
new knowledge. “ Individuals with few weak ties will be deprived of 
information from distant parts of the social system, and will be confined to 
the provincial news and views of their close friends.”  (Granovetter, 1981, p. 
2). In that sense, innovations are not so much the creations of brilliant minds 
as commodities passed on by well-placed brokers. On the other hand, the 
innovators did apparently have a sense for where the action was. It was 
generally the same small group of organisations that came up with new ideas, 
which indicates that their success in picking up these ideas was not just a 
matter of chance. This was evident not only from the innovations they had 
pioneered, but also from the frequency with which they were mentioned in 
publications and by other respondents.   
 
There was not enough evidence to determine exactly why some organisations 
were innovative and some not. Those that were shared certain traits. To begin 
with, they were usually flat and organically organised. As the manager of 
Bengal noted, “ we have a few people here who love to invent new concepts 
and who are tireless in implementing them. We can trust each other blindly. 
Sometimes I go to town hall and someone tells me what a great thing it is that 
one of my staff members is doing. Often I don’t know the first thing about it, 
but I don’t care, because I know I can trust all of them.”  (10) In addition, 
innovative organisations all had managers and staff who were actively 
engaged in professional networks and made many public appearances. 
However, it is difficult to say what causes what. Creative individuals may 
construct organisations with a penchant for innovation, but it is also possible 
that innovative organisations attract creative people and encourage 
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innovative behaviour. In practice, it is likely to be a combination of the two.  
 
7.2.2 Co-operation at the local level: an extra push   
 
In addition to copying, the social housing providers also innovated by 
working together. This did not occur on the same scale, but where it did, its 
effects were more profound. In the projects for revitalising postwar 
neighbourhoods in Bear Pit and Shark Pool, social housing providers co-
ordinated their investments with each other and with the local authorities. 
This served all parties, because there was no fundamental clash between their 
interests. Neighbourhood programmes helped the local authorities to 
mobilise private investment and to influence it more strongly than they 
normally could have. Providers could invest strongly in the knowledge that 
all their competitors did the same –in other words, that there would be no 
free-riding behaviour- and that the interventions in the housing stock would 
be accompanied by simultaneous investment in public spaces and 
infrastructure. It appears that in such processes providers seemed to be 
willing to go one step further than they would separately. A number of them 
invested on a larger scale than their organisational strategies encouraged 
them to. For instance, the total investment target in Bear Pit was distributed 
among providers on the basis of their relative market share. That criterion for 
dividing the burden implies a shared view on how much should be invested 
in stock. However, the strategies of the organisations differed and would 
probably have resulted in different levels of investment, had each made its 
decisions separately. Collective investment was higher than the sum of 
organisational investments would have been. In the Tiger Town case, where 
providers and local authorities did not co-ordinate their investments, overall 
investment was far lower.    
 
Interestingly enough, co-operation in one area of decision-making appears to 
have spilled over into other areas. Some of the providers in Bear Pit switched 
to a collective advertising system even though they were not very eager, but 
they did so mainly to preserve the spirit of co-operation that had arisen 
during negotiations on neighbourhood revitalisation. Likewise, the providers 
in Shark Pool adopted the advertising system as part of a regional housing 
package, which made it difficult for them to resist one of the measures when 
they had already accepted the others. Developments in interorganisational co-
operation were even more remarkable. There were never direct negotiations 
about mergers between all the providers in a local market –that would have 
been illegal- yet they did take account of one another: when one or two of 
them merged, the others soon started mergers of their own. This happened 
only where providers had previously co-operated on other matters. Some of 
them merged even though their organisational strategy did not call for such a 
move.  
 
What appears to have happened is that co-operation on one decision 
strengthened group bonds, making it more likely that the organisations 
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involved would use each other as a point of reference. This interpretation, 
suggested by the patterns of decision-making, is supported both by deviant 
cases and by the accounts of the actors themselves. In Bear Pit, providers who 
went along with the advertising system and the mergers explicitly referred to 
one another to justify their decisions. Koala, which had withdrawn from the 
neighbourhood revitalisation plans, also refused to accept the advertising 
model and did not have plans to merge with anyone. The manager explicitly 
pointed out that the decisions were connected: “ If you’re working closely 
with others extensively, then there may be things you’re willing to accept, 
and I think there was at least one colleague who did it only on those grounds. 
But our own bonds with our colleagues were broken anyway, so it was only a 
small step to take.”  (5) In Tiger Town, relations were adversarial rather than 
co-operative. In the only instance where they did co-operate, on distribution, 
it was only to present a united front against the local authorities. As one 
might expect, it did not spill over into other areas like neighbourhood 
regeneration.  
  
What this means is that some decisions appear to have been inspired by a 
“ logic of appropriateness”  (March and Olsen, 1984). Explanations of 
behaviour based on norms and social pressure were deliberately not included 
in the theory (see 3.3.2), but in some instances there seems to be no way of 
getting around them. It is a side-effect of overcoming cognitive limits 
collectively: when actors create and adopt new knowledge together, they 
create a shared characteristic and become more like a group. They will then be 
more likely to use each other as a point of reference for other decisions. This 
sets other mechanisms into motion, such as social pressure. So was it wrong 
to exclude normatively inspired processes from the interpretation of quasi-
market behaviour? As I see it, the answer would be both yes and no. On the 
one hand, the theory has obviously taken too narrow a view of organisational 
behaviour. It is not all instrumental. On the other hand, the limited focus has 
helped to distinguish different kinds of processes more precisely and in doing 
so has made them come out stronger. Past organisational studies have proven 
vulnerable because they were unable to separate the different influences on 
organisations. For instance, in many studies on isomorphism, it is not clear to 
what extent homogeneity among organisations is caused by coercion, social 
pressure and/or the need for knowledge. The theory used in this analysis 
failed in that it overlooked an important aspect of human behaviour. The 
empirical analysis shows that it cannot be ignored.  
 
But why did this urge to look to one another extend only to distribution and 
mergers, but not to other decisions such as organisational structure? It so 
happens that these were the decisions in which mutual dependence was 
greatest. Providers are directly linked through the local housing stock, in 
which they each have their own share. Interventions and distribution affect 
their market position in relation to one another, mergers their relative market 
share. Given that during the research period providers all still depended 
primarily on their traditional local market, they were locked in a “ no exit”  
situation in which they were effectively dependent on other providers and on 
 178
local authorities. Mutual dependence was less on matters such as 
organisational structure and tenant representation, in which the decisions of 
one organisation had a less immediate effect on the other. Accordingly, the 
urge to act collectively was weaker in those areas.  
 
Another way in which co-operation in one area affected others was that 
national trends spread faster because local groups of providers adopted 
innovations collectively. In other words, reciprocity strengthened 
reproduction. The popularity of the advertising system of distribution and of 
mergers were national trends, as the statistics show. But they were adopted 
most widely in those towns where the ties within local networks were 
strongest. Some of the providers in Shark Pool and Bear Pit might never have 
merged or accepted the advertising model, were it not that co-operation 
within the local networks was at a high. By contrast, the providers who had 
not been working closely together were less affected by these trends. This is 
because when a couple of the organisations pick up on some innovation, the 
others will be more inclined to follow when the group bonds are stronger. All 
in all, processes of collective innovation piled on top of one another.  
 
7.2.3 Similarity and diversity combined 
 
There is a paradox here. On the one hand, there is great homogeneity in 
decision-making. On the other hand, there was great variety in the strategies 
that organisations pursued. Chapter three mentioned four alternative 
categories of behaviour, which were succinctly summed up in chapter four 
(repeated here in table 6.1). The first was one in which decisions were 
consistent with organisational strategy, but chosen as part of a process of 
collective innovation. The second category consists of decisions chosen as part 
of a collective process and not in line with strategy. The third includes those 
decisions invented by the organisation itself in line with its strategy. Finally, 
there was a category that could be explained neither by strategy nor by 
collective processes. In this last instance, the theory can offer no explanation.  
 
Looking back at the evidence, it appears that the overwhelming majority of 
decisions fell within the left-hand side of the table. In about a third of these 
instances, decisions were not in line with strategy. Accordingly, these fall 
within the bottom left category. This phenomenon could largely be explained 
on the basis of social pressure: organisations were willing to forgo their own 
strategies in a process of collective action. But most decisions fall within the 
top left category. It means that providers mostly picked and used innovations 
in accordance with their own views. These views, as noted before, differed 
widely. This is where the method of fit pays off: it shows the variety 
underneath the outward similarity.  
 
Table 6.1: Four alternative kinds of behaviour  
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Homogeneity in decisions 
  
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
Fit between strategy 
and decision 
 
 
Yes 
 
Collective innovation, 
consistent with 
organisational strategy 
 
Individual 
Innovation 
  
 
No  
 
Collective innovation, 
not consistent with 
organisational strategy 
 
Decisions determined by 
organisational 
characteristics 
 
 
 
Some innovations appealed to organisations with different views. For 
instance, the choice to switch to a foundation structure expressed a common 
desire to increase the autonomy of the management. However, it was one of 
only two options allowed by law. Had there been more alternatives, one 
might have expected that more considerations would have come into play. 
Some of the providers with a diversification strategy might have changed into 
a limited liability company to attract more capital. But for the moment the 
foundation was the only viable option. Even more interesting was the popular 
choice of organisational structure, the front/back office model. Its organic 
quality was of most importance to providers with a responsive strategy, while 
its decentralised nature was essential to those with a diversification strategy. 
No doubt this quality to “ fuse”  different interests added to its popularity.  
 
7.2.4 The significance of strategy 
 
But interesting as this is, it does beg the question whether strategy matters at 
all. There are basically two ways of answering this: either strategy does not 
matter or it matters in a way that is not immediately apparent. To start with 
the first, one could argue that since decisions turn out very similar, the 
strategies that organisations pursue do not make much difference. This would 
make the notion of "fit" and the complicated methodological procedure that 
accompanies it seem rather pointless. However, I would argue in favour of 
the second interpretation, which is that strategies do shine through, but that it 
takes close examination to show that. They were reflected both in the way 
that decisions were implemented and in the choice of innovations.   
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First, strategies revealed themselves in the way that decisions were 
implemented. Even where formal decisions were similar, they were often in a 
manner that was consistent with strategy and therefore quite varied. This was 
a phenomenon not anticipated in the theoretical design, but it revealed itself 
quite clearly in the empirical evidence described in the previous chapter. In 
distribution, providers who had been reluctant to adopt the collective 
advertising system often handled part of their distribution process outside of 
the formal system (see 5.5). Some of the Bear Pit providers even openly 
admitted that they allocated over 50% of their vacancies directly! In this way, 
they seemed to go along with the other while in practice they were doing 
something quite different. Mergers were also implemented quite differently 
(see 5.6). Those who had diversification strategies generally chose their 
prospective partners outside their traditional local area, while those with 
locally focused strategies merged with partners inside their local market. 
Most providers adopted a front/back-office structure, but filled in this 
structure quite differently (see 5.9). Providers with traditional strategies 
retained bureaucratic traits, while those with other strategies chose to develop 
them in a more organic manner. Since this aspect of quasi-market behaviour 
was not included in the theory, I cannot claim to have studied it as 
systematically as I have strategies and decisions. Moreover, some of the 
details of implementations (like taking vacancies out of the formal 
distribution system) were largely hidden and difficult to measure. However, 
the accounts of respondents have suggested very emphatically that the 
variety between providers was considerably greater than the formal decisions 
in themselves would suggest.  
 
What this shows is that it is not sufficient to look merely at formal decisions, 
but that it is also important to examine how these are translated into actual 
practices. This is in fact the message implicit in Meyer and Rowan's 
identification of "decoupling". In some cases, actual practices may be partly or 
entirely separate from formal structures. In the schools which they studied, 
Meyer and Rowan found that actual teaching methods differed strongly, even 
though curricula and organisational structures were all similar (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1992). By looking only at the formal requirements, one might wrongly 
have concluded that schools were doing pretty much the same overall. Yet 
this message has been little heeded by many subsequent institutional 
studies.which have focused exclusively on formal decisions. For example, in 
their well-known study of city reforms, Tolbert and Zucker looked only at 
major formal changes, not at the way these were enacted (Tolbert and Zucker, 
1983). This is a theoretical flaw that the present analysis shares: only strategies 
and decisions were included in the theory, without attention to the 
implementation phase of organisational decision-making. The difference is 
that intensive research has at least allowed me to detect this mistake along the 
way. It was the respondents themselves who alerted me to the significance of 
implementation. It allowed me to pay more attention to this aspect of quasi-
market behaviour during the remainder of the project, even though it was 
difficult at that stage to include it systematically. By contrast, many previous 
institutional studies have relied solely on statistical methods and have 
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therefore excluded a major opportunity for learning "on the road". The lesson 
that has been learnt is of a twofold nature. To begin with, organisational 
research should make more use of intensive methods, which allow greater 
scope for trial-and-error. Mistakes may be excusable, but research should be 
designed in such a way that they are not unduly repeated. Furthermore, the 
implementation of organisational decisions should feature more strongly in 
the institutional theory of organisations. In the present analysis, this phase of 
decion-making turned out to be crucially important for showing that 
strategies not only represent variety on paper. They express themselves in a 
diversity of practices. 
 
Another marker of the significance of strategy was that tenant representation 
was the one area of decision-making that was not subject to trends. It easily 
could have been: there were model contracts between providers and tenant 
representatives, developed by the national tenant association and others. 
Providers could easily have adopted them for their own tenants. So why 
didn’t they? The most plausible explanation flows straight from resource 
dependence theory: the only thing that distinguishes tenant representation 
from the other decisions is that it diminishes rather than enhances the 
autonomy of the management. Theoretically, the legal requirements could 
have served as a model for tenant representation, but they set only minimum 
standards. They were therefore unacceptable for those providers who either 
favoured strong representation and for those who allowed it as part of a 
trade-off (see 5.8.4). By contrast, they were quite fine for those who did not 
wish to give tenants any direct influence on decision-making. All the model 
agreements went further than these providers would have wished. Providers 
thus appear to have been somewhat selective in the knowledge they adopted. 
Previous studies have concluded that many organisational decisions can be 
understood as reflections of internal power struggles. The exclusion of tenant 
representation from processes of mimicry seems to confirm this.  
 
So strategy does appear to matter after all. Then why was so much of the 
innovation process conducted collectively? The most plausible answer is that 
this helped them to go through great changes quickly. Innovation is a process 
that demands a great deal of effort. When there is a perceived need to change 
extensively and quickly, and organisations have only limited capacity, as was 
the case, then they will look for ways to handle the process of change more 
efficiently. Many collective choices therefore seem to have been made for 
convenience: the organisations were looking for innovations of a particular 
type and found useful pieces of knowledge floating around in their 
environment. These were types of innovations that they would have chosen 
anyway, even if there had been no opportunity for doing it collectively. In 
practice, there was no contradiction between pursuing idiosyncratic views 
and “ following the leader” .  
 
That raises the intriguing question whether this knowledge will take hold and 
develop into routines shared throughout the field. That would mean, for 
instance, that providers would come to adopt advertising models of 
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distribution and front/back office structures unquestioningly. If this is to 
happen, then knowledge must be widely shared and continually reproduced. 
Only when routines are confirmed again and again will they be internalised. 
This means that if both strategies and decisions emanate from collective 
innovation processes, there is a relatively high chance that innovations will 
become institutionalised, for they will be systematically and coherently re-
affirmed. By contrast, if all organisations innovate individually, then 
knowledge has no shared basis and is unlikely to become taken-for-granted. 
But what happens when most decisions are made collectively, yet on the basis 
of different organisational strategies? Again, one could reason two ways. One 
could argue that since the innovations are usually in line with strategy, they 
are more acceptable and therefore more likely to take hold. But one could also 
reason that these innovations have been picked up strategically because they 
were suitable at the time, but that they will probably be dumped as soon as 
something better comes along. The literature affords little help on this issue, 
since the distinction between strategies and decisions has rarely been looked 
at in this manner. Perhaps the only effective way out of this dilemma is to 
look whether there is a basis for reproducing these pieces of knowledge in the 
coming period. As it turns out, this is highly questionable.  
 
7.2.5 Fragmentation   
 
The fact that strategies do matter means that, in spite of the homogeneity in 
decision-making, organisations are becoming more different. Differences in 
the implementation of decisions can be quite dramatic. Arguably the most 
striking effect of these differences is variation in size. Some organisations 
have expanded only within their local markets, while others have diversified 
at the national level. It means that size differences are only likely to grow, 
since the former will ultimately remain confined to the limits of their home 
ground, whereas the latter have a wider variety of partners to choose from. 
The latter may become large national real estate funds with local branches, 
while the former remain small local service providers. They will compare like 
supermarket chains to local shops. But even within these categories there is a 
great deal of variety. Among the locally oriented providers, there are 
differences between organisations with traditional and responsive strategies. 
Even among providers with similar strategies there are marked differences in 
emphasis. Some traditional providers focus solely on their traditional task, 
while others use their technical expertise for commercial ventures. Some 
responsive providers target their efforts very specifically on particular types 
of clients (e.g. the elderly) while others try to establish a broad, pivotal 
position within a small local community. Likewise, providers focused on 
diversification have different views on where expansion leads. Some aim for a 
national real estate fund, which can keep growing perpetually, while others 
have the more modest ambition of creating a sufficiently diverse portfolio. 
There are also major differences in the way that the relation between the 
national organisation and the local branches is shaped. All these differences in 
aim and emphasis have major consequences in practice. In short, the 
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introduction of the quasi-market has  resulted in increasing diversity.  
 
Of course, greater diversity was only to be expected and even desired. But if 
the trend continues, it will have far-reaching consequences for the sector’s 
social structure. The social housing providers of the past were united by 
shared characteristics. Not only did they share a common historical and legal 
background, but they were also similar in terms of size, structure and 
practices. But these similarities were disappearing fast. The questions and 
answers that matter to one organisation may become increasingly less 
relevant to another. As a consequence, they will increasingly interact only 
with those who are in a similar position. The old social networks will start 
falling apart. This process already appears to be taking place. For example, 
some of the more innovative providers have expressed increasing 
dissatisfaction with the formal meetings of the branch organisations, which 
they regarded as the territory of reactionaries. When asked whether the 
branch association was important to his organisation’s own innovations, the 
Elephant manager replied: “ Nóóó. Well, sometimes they do pass through the 
branch association, but I’m tempted to say that’s a guarantee for failure. 
That’s not a very nice thing to say, I know. But look, there’s a network of 
housing managers in this country who know one another well and who meet 
in the course of innovative projects. [...] When I meet people like [a fellow 
manager] on different occasions, I know I can trust this guy.”  (37) One of the 
Polar Bear managers remarked, in relation to the branch network meetings, 
that “ we feel we don’t really belong there. They think the steps we are taking 
are threatening. [...] We’re stigmatised: ‘Oh, it’s those guys again.’ In any case, 
all those meetings where colleagues chat about one subject for an evening, I 
don’t care much for those anymore. They make little progress.”  (1) 
 
If the old social networks are indeed falling apart, then it is very unlikely that 
present innovations will be institutionalised. There will be no stable social 
structure to support such a process. As a matter of fact, it is unlikely that the 
great surge of collective innovation that characterised the period immediately 
after the introduction of the quasi-market could ever occur again. Information 
about innovations will increasingly pass through informal channels of like-
minded individuals rather than through public fora where these innovations 
may encounter resistance or apathy. In other words, the social capital that 
made large-scale collective innovation possible after the introduction of the 
quasi-market is diminishing. The population from which relevant innovations 
can be drawn will be smaller. Besides, it is doubtful whether the social 
networks that are now emerging have equal innovative capacity. Although 
this cannot be backed up with hard evidence, there are indications to suggest 
that innovators preferably associate with other innovators. This is only 
logical, since those are the contacts that will be most rewarding. It means that 
their ideas will no longer spread as easily as they did before. Moreover, the 
innovations they develop may become less relevant to many of their 
colleagues, as they are based on a different philosophy and designed for a 
different type of organisation.    
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The growing diversity also has repercussions for policymakers, who need to 
devise a regulatory framework that covers all types of organisations. This is 
less of a problem in regular markets, where the legal requirements are 
relatively basic. In quasi-markets, though, the regulation is dense and 
prescribes the do’s and don’ts fairly strictly. This becomes more difficult as 
the organisations it governs have widely different views on what is 
permissible. What is acceptable for one type of organisation may not be so for 
others. For instance, what may be a risky venture for a small local 
organisation may be manageable for a large, national one. Uniform 
supervision may become more complicated, as it will have to assess the 
legitimacy of different practices based on different philosophies.  
 
The increasing variation will affect the branch association, too. It was 
important in spreading innovations, but the fragmentation of social networks 
will erode that function. The diversity will also complicate its representative 
role. It is expected to be the spokesman for all providers at the national level, 
but it is facing increasingly different constituencies. Size differences have 
become particularly problematic. As a manager from Polar Bear phrased it: 
“ What is going to be a problem is that the branch organisation has a number 
of large members and a whole lot of little ones. The latter are unlikely to 
change soon, but still they will exert great influence through the association 
bodies. [...] In two, three years it will all be different. Once we have our 
organisations in order, we’ll demand special status. We’re probably going to 
block a lot of policies they’re making at present. Their tasks will be confined 
to training facilities for small providers, who don’t have the expertise 
themselves. That’s fine by me. They should also act as employers’ 
organisation, lobbying in parliament. But then they would be protecting our 
interests, rather than being involved in joint policy-making as they appear to 
be at present. The branch association is regarded as too close to the Ministry 
and not as a real interest group. That’s a critical issue.”  (1) These difficulties 
are to some extent typical of any representative body and may be overcome, 
but the branch representatives will have to walk on a tightrope. 
 
These findings differ markedly from many other organisational studies, 
which showed how great external shocks were followed by the gradual 
stabilisation of the organisational fields and the re-affirmation of social 
capital. For example, Fligstein’s study of American businesses showed how 
legal changes disrupted old routines and how new shared strategies arose in 
response. Although the organisational field was disrupted and changed in 
composition, it kept reforming (Fligstein, 1990). What makes social housing 
different is the nature of the housing market. In markets where suppliers are 
dipping into the same pool, they are dependent on one another and benefit 
from shared rules of the game. Uncertainty is greatly reduced when other 
organisations act in a predictable and similar manner. This encourages 
institutionalisation. In addition, when there is also great asymmetry between 
companies, due to size differences and/or vertical relationships, large 
organisations can use their market power to impose innovations on others, 
effectively forcing institutionalisation. Neither was the case in social housing. 
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Local markets were relatively isolated due to the limited mobility of supply 
and demand. Moreover, there were (as yet) no great asymmetries between the 
different providers. The greatest extent of collectively inspired action was in 
those areas where mutual dependence was greatest, but only within local 
markets and not on the national scale. Even within local markets, it occurred 
only in a limited number of areas. In other words, the nature of the 
relationships of dependence appears to have a major influence upon the 
coherence of an organisational field.  
 
7.2.6 Conclusion 
 
On the whole, the theory has proven an adequate tool for interpreting quasi-
market behaviour. Behaviour is shaped by the subtle interaction of various 
social ties between providers: the mutual craving for the same resources, the 
historical bonds in local communities and the broad national networks in 
which they are embedded. There were some phenomena the theory failed to 
explain or did not take into account: the origin of organisational strategies, 
the implementation phase, normative bonding within local groups of 
providers. But all the same it managed to afford a consistent interpretation for 
the bulk of the empirical evidence. This testifies to the great explanatory 
potential of its components, resource dependence theory and the institutional 
theory of organisations.  
 
The implications are interesting. What emerges from this is that the claim that 
market incentives in themselves lead to better provision must be treated as a 
fairytale. It is more complex than that. Market incentives only create 
uncertainty, and uncertainty in itself does not give any direction to behaviour, 
good or bad. Proof of this is not only that the theory’s alternative 
interpretation works; due to the fragmented nature of the housing market, it 
was actually possible to measure the effects of variation in the level of 
uncertainty. This did not produce any recognisable regularities, neither for 
strategies nor decisions. While there was variation between strategies, it did 
not appear to be clearly related to the variation on the independent variable 
(see 5.3). The choice of strategy may have been related to organisational 
characteristics, but not to the level of uncertainty. As for decisions, they 
showed homogeneity that cut right across the cases (see 5.10). So uncertainty 
itself does not ultimately determine choice. By implication, if one sees a 
provider making a bad choice, it is no use trying to increase uncertainty (e.g. 
by intensifying competition). It will ultimately not determine the nature of his 
choice.  
 
But it is true that the level of uncertainty does appear to have made a 
difference in terms of intensity. The providers in Bear Pit had more precisely 
defined strategies than their colleagues in Tiger Town and Shark Pool, where 
the markets were tighter. In addition, the decisions the former made were 
more radical, especially in those areas essential to survival (interventions in 
stock and interorganisational co-operation). Incentives appear to push 
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providers into action, yet without determining the direction in which they are 
headed. This is good news in that it has forced providers to “ come of age” . It 
has caused organisations to re-invent themselves, to develop new activities 
and to engage in large-scale investment. In this sense, a market incentive can 
be compared to a car engine: it can be turned on or off, made to go slower or 
faster, but it does not determine where the car is headed.  
 
Theoretically, this is significant because it validates one of the assumptions of 
the theory used in this analysis. Empirically, it may have implications for state 
attempts to intervene in the quasi-market (see 6.3.5).  
 
7.3 The effects of behaviour on the conditions for an effective quasi-
market  
 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter two identified four conditions that should be met, if the quasi-market 
in social housing is to be effective:  
 
- Market structure: the market structure within local markets must be 
competitive.    
- Information: providers must find a way of dealing with the uncertainty 
inherent in a market-based system.  
- Intervention: the state must have effective instruments for correcting 
undesirable behaviour.  
- Local specification of targets: the relationship between local authorities 
and social housing providers must be balanced.  
 
I will now consider how the behaviour of providers affects these conditions, 
in light of the empirical evidence from the previous chapter.  
 
7.3.2 Market structure 
 
Competition is one of the defining elements of any quasi-market. Customers 
should have the possibility of exit by switching to another provider. This 
creates uncertainty, which is expected to encourage providers to improve 
their behaviour. The empirical evidence showed that uncertainty in itself does 
not determine choice, so in that sense one should not expect miracles from a 
competitive environment. However, it does apparently give providers an 
incentive to innovate more quickly and to invest more heavily. These may be 
regarded as worthwhile goals in themselves. However, the merger trend may 
be diminishing competition by reducing the numbers of providers within 
local markets.  
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It could be argued that the market structure was not wholly conducive to 
competition in the first place (Van den Brink, Brandsen and Putters, 
forthcoming). There are still many local markets with shortages, but these 
could disappear over time. More serious are the impediments to competition 
enclosed in the structure of the sector itself. This is due to both product 
characteristics and the legacy of past policy. Housing is an indispensable 
good, as few people would choose to be homeless, whatever the costs. Not 
only do most people need a home, they will not easily change it. Moving 
requires a great investment of time, money and emotion. Moreover, people 
are tied to particular areas through their social networks and jobs. The effect 
of all this is that demand is relatively immobile, even though the recent 
relaxation of regulation has eased it up somewhat. Since supply is even less 
mobile, competition will be largely confined to local markets. The problem is 
that each market has only one or a few providers. This used to be encouraged, 
because it allowed more effective local authority supervision. In the new 
quasi-market system, however, this has in some instances resulted in 
monopolies and oligopolies. Mergers are concentrating market power further.  
 
The decentralisation of financial risks has increased the level of uncertainty, 
but the concentration of providers may roll it back again. This would be a 
pity, since increasing competition might have spread the benefits of this 
mechanism to a broader group of customers. During the research period the 
strongest competition came from home ownership, which has grown 
spectacularly in recent years. This can be expected to favour tenants in the 
upper ranges of social rented housing, who have the option of buying a home. 
However, the problem of diminishing competition should not be overstated. 
The regionalisation of housing markets is broadening the playing field, 
especially in urban areas. Moreover, concentration has not progressed nearly 
as far as in some other markets, like Dutch social security. However, the 
problem will grow more serious in the long term if the merger trend 
continues at its present rate. Whether this will happen is uncertain, although 
many providers that have merged in the past have indicated they plan to do 
so again (see 5.6). In that respect it is worrying that policy documents have 
systematically failed to address the issue of market structure. Surprisingly 
enough, this is not uncommon in quasi-markets (cf. Bartlett, Roberts and Le 
Grand, 1998).  
 
7.3.3 Information 
 
In their analysis of quasi-markets, Bartlett and Le Grand argued that this type 
of system can only work when providers have adequate access to information 
and face limited uncertainty. However, it is unlikely that all necessary 
information can be acquired – if it is at all clear what is needed- and providers 
therefore need to find an effective manner of curbing their information 
requirements. One such way is to adopt a strategy believed to secure the 
organisation’s prospects. In other words, the question is not whether the level 
of uncertainty providers face is too high, but whether they can deal with it. If 
 188
they cannot cope with the many contingencies of the market, then their 
adaptation will at best be slow. This aspect of behaviour was one of the basic 
elements of the theory.  
 
It is evident that social housing providers coped with uncertainty far more 
effectively than one would have expected. The reasons for this interesting 
phenomenon have been discussed in the previous paragraph. Most of the 
providers in the case studies had found a clear direction in which to go. 
Processes of collective innovation helped to translate these broad views into 
practical action. This is not to say that these choices in dealing with 
uncertainty will always be successful. That will only become apparent in the 
long term. What matters here is that they have made clear choices. This has 
helped them to re-invent themselves relatively quickly. If the changes they 
have made prove to be beneficial for tenants, then the introduction of the 
quasi-market will have started to pay off after only a short period.  
 
7.3.4 Local specification of targets 
 
When the quasi-market was introduced, the state showed a distinct 
preference for decentralised decision-making. Rather than specifying detailed 
targets for all social housing providers, it only bound them to vague 
performance criteria. They were issues rather than practical goals. The real 
targets were meant to be negotiated between local authorities and providers 
at the local level. This, as was argued in chapter two, requires a balance 
between the two parties. If the local authorities dominate the interaction, then 
the autonomy of providers will in practice be a fiction. The former will 
effectively be able to exploit the housing capital at will. However, if the latter 
dominate, there is no guarantee that they will act in accordance with the 
collective interest. What really binds the two together is not their abstract 
roles as representatives of public or private interest, but the mutual 
dependence that exists in practice. The local authorities control public 
facilities and spaces, while the providers own a considerable share of the 
housing stock. Neither can achieve their goals without the support of the 
other. The neighbourhood regeneration programmes in the Bear Pit and 
Shark Pool cases bear witness to the benefits that such a relationship can 
produce. Unfortunately, there is a danger that the balance will tilt towards the 
providers.   
 
The change of system required a major transition for all parties concerned. 
Each had to get used to its new role. It was regularly noted in the cases by 
respondents from both types of organisation that the private providers 
adapted more quickly than the local authorities. Whatever the reason, the 
necessary changes in formal structure and attitude took longer to materialise. 
“ What you see is that providers have made that transition, forcibly or not, 
and that we are running behind, that there is a gap. They want to move ahead 
and we struggle to follow them.”  (19) Obviously, this gave providers an edge 
over their local counterparts. However, that might be dismissed as a 
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temporary phenomenon. More significant is that some providers now operate 
in several local markets, which fundamentally affects their relationships with 
local authorities. As shown before, collective decision-making is most 
effective is situation where actors are mutually dependent and when there are 
no exit options. As social housing providers become less dependent on any 
local market, they can shift at least some of their resources from one to the 
other, which makes their relationship towards local authorities less 
symmetrical. Of course, they will still need public investment to maintain the 
value of their stock, but their negotiating position will much improve when 
they can argue that their investment is also needed elsewhere. This could 
seriously weaken local authorities, since these have no tools to force the 
private investment they feel is required. Again, as with market structure, the 
problem should not yet be overstated. Most providers still operate only in 
their traditional area. However, those that diversify into other geographical 
markets undermine the practice of decentralised policymaking.  
 
7.3.5 Intervention 
 
Chapter three argued that, if the theory used in this analysis was correct, it 
would call into question whether the state can intervene effectively in the 
quasi-market. It turns out that the theory has been adequate in explaining 
quasi-market, which greatly pleases me. However, it is a somewhat less 
fortunate conclusion from a policy perspective. The state has two main 
instruments for correcting undesirable behaviour: regulation and incentives. 
It is possible to correct undesirable behaviour with additional regulation, but 
when this is done too often, the process of policy accumulation that 
characterised housing before the introduction of the quasi-market will simply 
start over again. Regulating behaviour too strictly may stifle not only the 
dangers, but also the opportunities of a market-type system. One of the points 
of establishing a (quasi-)market is that autonomy will encourage actors to be 
diverse and innovative in performing particular tasks. Beyond a certain point, 
constraints could well smother the drive that the system was supposed to 
encourage. Incentives are not effective either, because they only affect the 
level of uncertainty, which does not determine the nature of behaviour in 
itself. Providers can respond to increased incentives for better or for worse. 
This is even more of a problem in social housing than in other quasi-markets, 
because all subsidies have been given in advance. This precludes the use of 
“ smart incentives” , because it means the state can only affect uncertainty 
indirectly. All in all, the prospects for effective intervention are not good.  
 
The only way out of this would be, not to add regulation, but to change the 
present system of rules quite rigorously. Yet this would imply a marked 
deviation from the style of intervention it has so far adopted. Since the 
introduction of the quasi-market, the Ministry of Housing has relied on 
incremental policymaking, making small changes step by step (Lindblom, 
1959). The logic behind this approach is that small interventions require less 
information and that the information that is gathered in the course of the 
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process will be more up-to-date. Furthermore, little changes cause less conflict 
than drastic ones, which means that the legitimacy of policy will be greater. In 
a recent evaluation, this method of policymaking was again endorsed 
(Ministry of Housing, 2000). But in the present context, this line of reasoning 
may backfire (quite apart from the fact that small changes will probably not 
suffice). Incrementalism in (quasi-)markets raises a serious dilemma, 
especially in the early stages (cf. Bergsma and Van den Brink, forthcoming). 
Interventions becomes potentially more effective over time, as more 
information about market behaviour is becoming available. Yet, as time 
progresses, the legitimacy of interventions steadily diminishes.  
 
The phenomenon that actors adjust to policy is in itself not confined to a 
(quasi-)market. The difference with the situation before the introduction of 
this system is that actors have a larger share of autonomy, which means they 
can react to a new regulatory framework far more quickly, often even before 
it has come in force. By the time the state has gathered sufficient information 
to intervene in what it perceives as undesirable practices, these practices will 
already be in full swing. The gap between policy and its object will have 
become great enough to make the supposedly small steps rather drastic. To 
give a recent example, a number of providers had set up in-house estate 
agents of their own, arguing that they needed the services of estate agents so 
often they might as well do it themselves. At the end of the research period, 
the Ministry banned this activity on the grounds that it was not a proper part 
of social housing provision. Of course, the providers involved could well 
argue that it was a bit late to ban these practices, when they had been 
prepared and sometimes even running for some time. In this case 
incrementalist policymaking has the paradoxical effect, not of enhancing the 
legitimacy of policy changes, but of detracting from it.81  
 
Another difference with public sector provision is that developments may be 
more difficult to reverse. For example, the emergence of large, nationally 
operating providers has by now become difficult to stop, even if it does erode 
the basis of local policymaking. There is little that can be done to counter this 
development, short from breaking up these private organisations or 
intervening quite strongly in their internal decision-making. These would be 
radical changes contradicting both to the logic of incrementalism and the 
principle of autonomy central to this system of provision. The period just 
before or after the introduction of a (quasi-)market is the stage at which 
providers arm themselves against the effects of the market (Groenewegen, 
1992). It is a brief lull from which they can take full advantage. By the time the 
new system comes into force or policymakers are ready to adjust it, providers 
may be well entrenched.   
 
7.3.6 Conclusion 
 
The evidence shows that most of the conditions necessary to make the quasi-
market successful are under threat. The good news is that providers have 
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managed to deal with their new position far more successfully than one 
would have expected. However, competition is diminishing, the balance 
between social housing providers and local authorities is tilting dangerously 
towards the former and the instruments for intervention may be ineffective in 
the long term. Does this mean that the quasi-market is doomed to fail? The 
experiences in other quasi-markets have so far not been encouraging. In the 
UK, where the introduction of quasi-markets came earlier than in the 
Netherlands, these systems of provision have rarely worked as intended 
(Bartlett, Roberts and Le Grand, 1998; Bartlett and Le Grand, 1993). It has 
proven especially difficult to sustain managed competition in the long term. 
At the very least, it shows that it is not easy to make a quasi-market work. 
Should we do as Rabbi Lö w ultimately did with his golem, and let it return to 
clay?  
 
Perhaps that is not necessary just yet. To begin with, the negative 
consequences of the developments I have observed have not yet fully 
materialised. Insofar as any reliable evidence is available, it does not indicate 
that the quality of social housing provision has declined. My personal 
impression is that it has improved considerably. Moreover, ethical 
considerations have not been included in the analysis, and they may make all 
the difference. Most importantly, it may still be possible to intervene at this 
point in time. The problem with intervention may be endemic to quasi-
markets, but the other difficulties are mainly caused by the merger trend. It 
will be difficult to reverse the effects of past mergers, but if future mergers are 
blocked or more strongly regulated now, the damage may be contained. At 
present, the number of providers working at the national level is still 
relatively small and there is still enough scope for competition within regional 
markets. However, it would take radical steps to stop the rot, and 
policymakers presently appear committed to the illusionary safety of 
incrementalism. I am not optimistic.   
 
7.4 The conclusions 
 
7.4.1 The logic of quasi-market behaviour 
 
The introduction of the quasi-markets was one of the most significant 
elements of recent welfare state reform. This book has constructed a theory 
that aims to explain how these systems of provision work. For the quasi-
market in Dutch social housing, it has proven an adequate interpretation. 
Although it has disregarded some aspects of behaviour that proved 
empirically significant, it has generally managed to explain why providers 
acted as they did.   
 
The creation of the quasi-market made providers more dependent on the 
market, which made their situation more uncertain. However, what it also did 
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was to spark a search for new knowledge. Under the former system, 
providers had developed routines, established methods for handling what 
little uncertainty they faced. Given the tight and uniform legal framework 
from which they emerged, these routines were similar throughout the 
organisational field. These no longer applied in the quasi-market and 
therefore they had to develop new ones. In other words, decisions by 
organisations in a (quasi-)market should not only be interpreted as efforts to 
secure income, but also as efforts to find effective ways of securing income.  
 
The empirical analysis showed that this latter aspect of behaviour was 
extremely important for understanding what happened after the transition. 
Copying innovations was one of the chief methods by which providers 
adapted to the new system. This shows that collective innovation through 
reproduction (what DiMaggio and Powell have called “ mimetic 
isomorphism” ) is more than an oddity: it is an essential mechanism through 
which organisations adapt to changed circumstances. The elaborate social 
infrastructure at the national level was very suitable for spreading knowledge 
quickly and reliably. Likewise, collective innovation through reproduction 
(also known as “ learning”  in policy literature) was a crucial process in local 
networks. At the local level, the relations of mutual dependence and the 
difficulty in exiting from this dependence created a kind of “ micro-
corporatist”  arrangement that encouraged co-operation. 
 
The widespread occurrence of collective innovation created homogeneity 
within the sector, at least on the face of it. But looking more closely, one could 
see that there was also great variety. Although they adopted similar 
innovations, organisations often differed wildly in their views on social 
housing provision. This behaviour can be explained as an effort to save 
energy at a time when old energy-saving routines must be discarded. 
Collective innovation simply requires less effort than individual innovation. 
Providers could go through great changes, despite their limited capacity to 
innovate autonomously. The innovations that became popular had the benefit 
of corresponding to different strategies. Moreover, strategies could be enacted 
by implementing innovations in a particular way.  
 
7.4.2 The fragmentation of social capital 
 
The result was a strange mixture of similarity and diversity. The 
organisations mirrored one another, but the reflections did not create a series 
of perfect reproductions, but a multitude of twisted images. It was a 
wilderness of mirrors, where variety was multiplied rather than smoothed 
down.82 The effect was organisations became more diverse and, as a 
consequence, that the sector became steadily less coherent. While in some 
cases group boundaries were (re-)established at the local level, the overall 
picture shows that the old social networks are falling apart into several 
smaller networks, organised along different lines. As organisations are 
becoming more different, they seek out organisations with similar views and 
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characteristics. Social capital helped the budding market to grow, but was 
partly consumed in the process.   
 
This presents a marked contrast with previous studies, which showed that 
collective innovation processes strengthened group bonds and created new 
shared routines. The reason for the difference is that, compared to most other 
markets, the housing market is very fragmented. Most providers are not 
dependent on one another, nor are there any dominant players within the 
field who can impose their views on the others. This is a crucial difference 
between the housing market and many other markets. All this underscores 
the starting premise, which was that each (quasi-)market has a distinct 
character and that it is very difficult to define a general logic of market 
behaviour. A market analysis must take account of context-specific elements 
such as product characteristics, the legal framework, the social ties among 
suppliers and the distribution of resources.  
 
7.4.3 The conditions for a successful quasi-market  
 
Four conditions were identified as essential for the success of the quasi-
market: (1) the market structure should be competitive, (2) providers should 
find ways to deal with uncertainty, (3) the relationship between local 
authorities and providers should be balanced, and (4) the state must have 
effective instruments for correcting undesirable behaviour. The good news is 
that providers have dealt with their new situation far more effectively than 
one would have guessed. This was largely due to the extensive collective 
innovation processes. Unfortunately, collective innovation has also 
encouraged mergers that threaten competition within local markets. 
Moreover, the fact that some providers now work on the national scale means 
that their negotiating position in relation to local authorities has considerably 
improved. This may become a problem when the local performance targets 
have to be specified. Finally, the main instruments for intervention, incentives 
and rules, can be effective only up to a point.  Market incentives only push 
providers into action, but cannot determine where they go. They set the pace, 
but not the motion. Of course, it may be worthwhile to spur on providers in 
itself, but it will not help to encourage desirable behaviour or curb 
unacceptable behaviour. Regulation is more effective, but when it is used too 
often it strangles the autonomy of providers and along with it most of the 
benefits of a market-based system.  
 
On the bright side, these threats have not yet materialised and may yet be 
averted. However, it will require drastic steps at a time when policymakers 
have expressed their faith in an incremental approach. This approach is in 
itself likely to arouse controversy, because it does not work in a market-based 
system where developments are quick and often difficult to reverse. In any 
case, it will probably prove inadequate to solve the problems that threaten the 
quasi-market in the long run.   
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7.5 Epilogue: the future of Dutch social housing 
 
7.5.1 Introduction 
 
The research questions have been answered and the analysis is at an end. But 
before the book is closed, I will permit myself a few moments of reasoned 
speculation. What will the future of Dutch social housing look like? This 
depends not only on the effectiveness of the quasi-market, but also on other 
elements of state policy, such as the fiscal treatment of different types of 
tenure. This paragraph will discuss directions in which the social housing 
sector could be heading. None of the thoughts that follow can be backed up 
with hard evidence. They are reflections at the end of a long and weary 
journey.  
 
7.5.2 Convergence and divergence in European social housing provision 
  
In the second chapter, it was argued that there are basically two types of 
housing provision: mass and residual (see 2.6). These are crude categories, but 
they suffice for the present argument. In the mass type, social housing 
comprises a large section of the overall housing stock and covers various 
segments of the population, including a large share of the middle classes. In a 
residual model, social housing is a welfare state facility targeted at the 
poorest, who cannot procure a dwelling of adequate standards on the regular 
housing market. Most of the population will prefer home ownership. The 
social housing sector can be said to decline when it moves from the mass to 
residual type, for it will cease to be a full member of the housing market. At 
present, Dutch social housing is still in the mass category, beyond any doubt. 
The providers control over a third of the total stock and social housing 
therefore serves a major share of the population. But will it last? Opinions 
differ widely on this. Like the general welfare state debate, housing research 
has both convergence and divergence advocates. The former basically argue 
that all national systems of provision will evolve towards a residual type, 
while the latter maintain that the differences between mass and residual 
systems will persist. 
 
Torgerson once described housing as the “ wobbly pillar”  of the welfare state 
(Torgerson, 1987). This phrase has come to represent the notion that social 
housing provision is bound to become marginal in the long term, barring 
unusual circumstances. For instance, Harloe argues that housing provision in 
Western Europe has generally been converging towards the residual type. 
“ [...] the residual form of provision has been incorporated within welfare 
capitalist regimes on a more or less permanent basis. In other words, this is 
the normal form of social rented housing provision in ‘normal’ times”  (p. 7). 
In his view, the mass provision of the late 20th century must be regarded as a 
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temporary phenomenon that was never likely to last. “ The mass model, 
which cuts across private market provision more significantly than the 
residual form, gains major significance and state support only in ‘abnormal’ 
times, that is, when varying combinations of social, economic and political 
circumstances limit the scope for private provision and when this limitation is 
of strategic significance for certain aspects of the maintenance and 
development of the capitalist social and economic system”  (p.7). This is 
because “ housing is property and in capitalist societies the defence of all 
forms of private property rights is deeply entrenched”  (p. 536). In other 
words, the inherent properties of housing make it unlikely that social housing 
will persist as a broad welfare state arrangement. This would mean, by 
implication, that in the long term the Dutch social housing sector could not 
survive in its present form.   
 
Others argue that, while there may be some measure of convergence, the 
present differences between systems of housing provision will fundamentally 
persist. They place less emphasis on the intrinsic properties of housing than 
on the characteristics of national systems of provision. For instance, Kemeny 
has accorded great significance to variations in the method of rent calculation 
(Kemeny, 1995). The price of social housing is based on cost, whereas the 
price of owner-occupied and private rental housing is based on current 
market value. In some countries, this is the ground for regarding the 
participation of non-profit providers in the regular housing market as unfair 
competition. Accordingly, the state will impose restrictions to confine social 
housing to a small segment of the population. In other countries, non-profit 
and for-profit providers are allowed to compete in a single, integrated 
market. This will force for-profit providers to bring their prices down to a 
level closer to cost. Kemeny argues that current changes in the latter type of 
system are merely cycles in the interplay of the two market segments, not a 
trend towards residualisation. The implication of arguments like his is that 
the Dutch system of housing provision could retain its present character.   
 
The empirical evidence from international comparative studies does not 
clearly point one way or the other (Doling, 1999; Boelhouwer and Van der 
Heijden, 1992). Be that as it may, Dutch social housing is at present still far 
removed from marginalisation. In the years following the introduction of the 
quasi-market, their market share has remained stable. However, there is still 
the possibility that the sector could residualise in the long term. As noted in 
chapter two, this would involve (1) a significant drop in the share of social 
housing in the overall stock, combined with a rise in home ownership rates, 
and (2) a shift within social housing from a diverse, high-quality to a low-
quality, targeted stock. Obviously, I cannot say whether this will happen, but 
what I can do is show how it would happen. The long-term sustainability of 
the present system of provision depends on the decisions of the three major 
parties involved: the tenants, the state and the providers. Some of these could 
at one point “ exit”  from the system (Helderman and Brandsen, 2000). What 
this entails will be described in the following sections. Should these events 
occur, they would bring residualisation considerably closer. One of them 
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relates directly to the introduction of the quasi-market, the other two to 
housing policy at large. Of course, they are just possibilities that may never 
materialise. But they are not unrealistic.        
 
7.5.3 The continued growth of home ownership: the exit of tenants  
 
Home ownership and social rented housing are different types of “ tenure” , 
the legal basis for occupying a dwelling. One of the essential differences 
between the two is in their effect on the distribution of capital. The money 
invested in home ownership is controlled individually and returns are not 
necessarily re-invested in the housing stock. By contrast, the returns of social 
housing are redistributed across the tenant population and across generations 
of tenants. This means that, contrary to popular perception, rents do not 
simply “ disappear” . In that sense, social renting is the counterpart of 
redistributive arrangements in areas like social security and health. The rent 
rises of the 1980s and 90s had adverse effects on the tenant population of that 
time, but to some extent they compensated for the low rents that past 
generations of tenants had enjoyed. Because of its product characteristics, 
housing affords many opportunities for this kind of temporal redistribution 
(see 2.2).  
 
The debate about tenure focuses not only (or even primarily) on how different 
types affect the distribution of capital, but also on how they affect individual 
well-being. Discussion on this theme tends to be drenched in ideology and 
many assumptions go untested. For instance, it has been argued that home 
ownership provides a heightened sense of “ ontological security” , in that it 
carves out a niche for people to shield themselves from forces beyond their 
control (Saunders, 1986). The supporters of home ownership have been 
particularly eloquent in their praise. Commonly mentioned advantages of 
owner-occupancy are greater commitment to the house and the 
neighbourhood (leading to better maintenance, vigilance, stability etc.) and 
opportunities for individual capital accumulation. But the alleged superiority 
of home ownership is not undisputed. Kemeny in particular has launched 
scathing criticism at what he calls “ the myth of home ownership”  (Kemeny, 
1981). He has mentioned various disadvantages of home ownership, such as 
its role in strengthening job market inequalities, the limits it sets on job 
mobility and the frequent failure of owner-occupiers to secure long-term 
maintenance and re-investment.   
 
It is not my intention to take position in the tenure debate, which is often 
rather crude.83 What matters here is that social housing has been steadily 
losing ground to home ownership. Rates of home ownership have been rising 
from the 1960s onwards and particularly swiftly in the 1990s. In 1999, home 
ownership eclipsed renting as the dominant form of tenure (see table 2.4). The 
proportion of owner-occupiers is still fairly low by international standards, 
but it continues to rise. There are various developments that account for the 
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rapid shift in tenure (SCP, 1998). Access to home ownership has become 
considerably easier. The Netherlands can boast not only of the largest social 
housing sector in Western Europe, but also of the most luxurious tax benefits 
for home ownership. Until as late as the end of the 1990s rents on mortgages 
were fully tax-deductible; since then deductions have been restricted to the 
first home and housing-related expenses only. Interest rates have also been 
fairly low in the 1990s, partly due to fiscal policy. While home ownership has 
thus become more attractive, social rented housing has become considerably 
more expensive. Cuts in subsidies have raised rents by over a quarter since 
the early 1980s (see table 2.3). This was necessary to reduce state expenditure 
and to make the social housing providers financially independent. With that 
in mind, it has been argued that “ the shifts in preference towards owning 
over renting in the Netherlands are entirely due to government policy”  
(Dieleman, 1998, p. 6). But it should be added that banks have become more 
lenient in granting mortgages, demanding a considerably lower mortgage-
income ratio. In addition, the economic prospects have been unusually 
favourable from the mid-1990s onwards (the fruits of the “ Dutch Miracle” ), 
which has made more people confident enough to buy.84 
 
While social housing still commands a considerable share of the housing 
stock, it can only continue to pose a real alternative to home ownership when 
it commands a broad and solid financial base. This, in turn, depends on a 
large, well-maintained, diverse stock and sufficient reserves. This, in turn, 
implies that it has to appeal to broad sections of the population (cf. Harloe, 
1995). As the socio-economic middle classes leave for owner-occupied 
housing, the long-term basis of social housing will steadily erode. There is 
also the issue of social status. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, social housing 
tends to have a poor reputation. In the Netherlands, there used to be no such 
stigma, but there are indications that this situation is changing. Recent 
surveys show an outright majority preferring individual ownership to 
renting. It is a trend that should cause concern among housing managers. 
Moreover, there has been a change in the composition of tenants. Over past 
decades, the decline of private renting and the growth of home ownership 
have resulted in an influx of tenants at the lower end and an outward 
migration of tenants at the top end of the income scale. The legitimacy of 
renting could decline rapidly. While the proportion of social housing in 
overall stock has only dropped marginally so far, the long-term effects of the 
growth of home ownership could deal a decisive blow to the prospects of a 
mass social housing sector. In that sense, Dutch housing policy is remarkably 
schizophrenic .  
 
7.5.4 Dipping into the pot of gold: the exit of the state 
 
Housing requires a large investment prior to the use of the object. This means 
that the housing stock constitutes a huge amount of capital enclosed in bricks 
and mortar. It affords great opportunities for shifting benefits and costs over 
time. In addition, housing provision has many external effects. There is 
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always the possibility that housing policy is made with an eye to those effects 
rather than to housing concerns. In the past, it has frequently been used to 
solve the problems in other policy areas. For instance, in the postwar 
reconstruction period it was used to boost employment or, conversely, to 
dampen economic growth. This has led Helderman to describe Dutch housing 
policy as an “ emergency exit”  (Helderman, forthcoming). It is conceivable 
that the same will happen again, even now that the quasi-market has been 
introduced. The social housing stock is in effect a large pot of gold at arm’s 
length. By its nature, the ownership of this wealth is disputed. It derives both 
from state subsidies and from the contributions of tenants. In addition, it is 
managed by organisations with a private status. All parties can morally claim 
a part of the capital. This ambiguity is partly responsible for the spectacular 
growth of the private non-profits in the postwar period (see chapter two). At 
present, though, it could allow the state to dip into the pot of gold to solve its 
present problems.  
 
At the start of the millennium, the Secretary for Housing threatened to force 
the sale of half a million social housing dwellings to alleviate pressure on the 
market for home ownership – which, as noted before, was largely caused by 
state policy. The state was to indicate which types of dwellings ought to be 
sold. The plans have been stalled and it is unclear if and how they will be 
implemented, but it hardly needs saying that the sale of such a large part of 
stock could have adverse consequences for the future of social housing. A 
strong social housing sector depends on ownership of a large, varied slice of 
the housing stock as well as the allegiance of broad sections of the middle 
class. A forced sale would endanger both. Since it would be mostly the top 
segments of the stock that would be sold, the remaining stock would be 
targeted more strongly on the poor sections of society. The sale would also 
undermine the premises upon which the quasi-market is based, because 
markets of any kind are based on the principle of autonomy. What does 
autonomy amount to if an external party can force organisations to sell off 
part of their assets?   
 
7.5.5 Opting out: the exit of providers  
 
In 1988, the German government decided to abolish the tax-privileged status 
of non-profit housing providers. As Harloe describes it, “ there was little 
opposition to the virtual abolition of the sector. And the non-profits were 
divided: many welcomed the changes because they were no longer tied to the 
‘socially binding’ non-profit rules. They were now free, as private sector 
organisations, to compete with the private market for the more solvent 
demand.”  (Harloe, 1995, p. 466). The German non-profits were in many ways 
different from the present Dutch social housing providers. However, it is 
conceivable that at least some of the latter would welcome the opportunity to 
opt out of the regulatory framework. It was noted earlier that a number of 
providers are straying quite far from their traditional ways. These are 
especially the larger providers, who have begun to operate in various 
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geographical markets and who have developed a number of new, commercial 
activities. Now that they are emerging from the early stage of the quasi-
market, they have in some instances found that their future progress is 
blocked by quasi-market regulation. For example, the state has curtailed 
commercial activities such as broking or the acquisition of certain types of 
land and real estate. The more these providers unfold their wings, the more 
likely they are to hit the boundaries of the legal framework within which they 
are encaged. At the same time, the benefits of the social housing status are 
decreasing. A few of the tax privileges will be abolished, since they are 
thought to create unfair competition (MDW-Werkgroep Woningcorporaties, 
1999). Some social housing providers may come to feel that the benefits of 
their status no longer outweigh the costs. The threats by the Secretary of State 
to force the sale of stock will have brought this moment somewhat closer.    
 
It speaks for itself that they could only leave the system if they were formally 
allowed to do so. The present regulatory framework does not allow this, but a 
government paper issued at the start of the new century tentatively raised the 
possibility of an opting-out clause (Ministry of Housing, 2000). Providers 
would no longer enjoy the benefits of the social housing status, but they 
would be liberated from its constraints. Freedom would almost certainly have 
to be bought at a price: the state would demand the return of at least some of 
the capital that was accumulated through past subsidies. Yet this hardly 
seems an insurmountable obstacle to organisations with such vast resources 
at their disposal. They would in any case retain less tangible assets that are 
vital to their success: innovative capacity and social capital at the local level. 
What with their capital assets, expertise and contacts, it is unlikely they 
would be short of support from other commercial businesses. Alliances with 
commercial housing providers and financial institutions or even entry on the 
stock exchange could easily compensate for the financial losses incurred by 
opting out.     
 
Of course, when providers leave the social housing sector their stock does not 
evaporate into thin air. Nor is it likely that they will abandon traditional 
market segment in which they have a strong and comfortable position. 
However, the state will have lost its most important source of control, as well 
as any guarantee that the capital these providers own is used where it is most 
needed. In the German case, the government eventually found itself forced to 
introduce new subsidies to solve emerging problems. Moreover, opting out 
would mean that some of the most innovative and ambitious providers 
would be lost to the organisational field. It would leave a smaller and more 
traditional social housing sector, one that would more easily succumb to a 
residual role.   
 
7.6 The end  
 
If the state manages to master the difficulties inherent in the quasi-market, 
then it will have gained a powerful new instrument. However, the difficulty 
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in sustaining the conditions for its effectiveness may hamper its long-term 
success. Furthermore, the social housing sector could suffer from housing 
policy’s ambiguity and schizophrenia. So far, the potential problems 
described in this chapter have not come to the surface. However, housing can 
be a time-bomb. It takes a long period to find out what the effects of policy 
will actually be. The stakes are very high. The choices of the past few years 
may in time prove highly significant. In terms of size and strength, the Dutch 
social housing sector is among the top. In terms of commitment to housing, 
the Dutch welfare state needs no alibi. The strength of the sector does not 
make it invulnerable, though. The exit of a number of providers or the forced 
sale of stock would imply a considerable loss. Allowing large segments of the 
middle classes to leave the social housing sector could in the long term prove 
a fatal error. However, at this point it is not yet possible to say what Dutch 
social housing is coming to. It will be some time before we know.   
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10 Appendix 
11   
11.1 A.1 Introduction 
 
The appendix has two purposes. First, it elaborates on the theoretical position 
of the analysis within the social scientific debate. In addition, it contains a 
more thorough justification of the methodological choices made in chapter 
four. Related sections in the main body of text are usually summaries of or 
excerpts from the more elaborate discussions found here. I have chosen to set 
these discussions apart to improve the readability of the book, since they will 
be of interest only to a dedicated few. As a result, this appendix is a bit of a 
hotchpotch and designed for occasional consultation rather than front-to-back 
reading.     
 
Paragraph A.2 will describe the background of the theory. It discusses the 
fundamental premises of the analysis (A.2.1) as well as the historical 
background of the two component theories, resource dependence theory 
(A.2.2) and institutional theory (A.2.3). The remaining two paragraphs will 
focus on methodological issues. The three methods used for fitting the raw 
empirical observations into the theoretical scheme will be dealt with in A3: 
the method of variation (A.3.1), the method of fit (A.3.2) and the method of 
obtaining accounts (A.3.3). The collection of data will be examined in A4: the 
approach to the object (A.4.1), the criteria for case selection (A.4.2), the 
variance between the four selected cases in terms of uncertainty (A.4.4) and 
the methods of data collection used in the fieldwork (A.4.4).  
 
11.2 A.2 The background of the theory 
 
11.2.1 A.2.1 Reality as a social construction  
 
The analysis has focused on social reality, that is, the reality created by social 
action. In Weber’s terms, social action is action that is invested with meaning 
and that takes account of the actions of others (Weber, 1968, p. 4). In that 
sense, all social action is interaction, because it is always taken with reference 
to other actions, even when these are just imaginary. The creation of a social 
reality through interaction is necessary because human beings have no 
biological mechanism that naturally selects and organises the relevant, 
“ meaningful”  aspects of the world. Since the actions that men undertake 
serve as a reference point for the actions of others, they effectively construct 
social reality together (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, pp. 68-69). It can only 
exist as long as there is a degree of order. Order consists of predictable 
regularities in the behaviour of actors at the level of the collective. Individual 
social actions can reinforce or violate these collective regularities.  
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Theories of the social construction of reality differ in their conceptualisation of 
the interaction between individual action and the collective order. Actors can 
reproduce or deviate from the collective order consciously and deliberately. 
Alternatively, they can reproduce regularities passively, either because they 
are powerless to change them or because they are unaware that they exist. 
This happens when collective regularities in behaviour are experienced “ as 
existing over and beyond the individuals who happen to embody them at the 
moment”  and “ as possessing a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the 
individual as an external and coercive fact”  (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p. 
76). This analysis starts from the position that actors rationally choose 
whether they wish to conform to routines or not, but recognises that these 
may become internalised to the point that they are reproduced unknowingly. 
However, this does not imply that collective patterns of behaviour are simply 
the aggregate of individual actions. The theory recognises that these actions 
are in turn shaped by the collective routines that they contribute to, but 
emphasises that an explanation of such routines must have a theoretically 
integrated micro-foundation.   
 
Another difference between the various theories of social construction lies in 
the aspects of reality on which they focus. In his discussion of 
institutionalism, Scott has made a useful (if not watertight) distinction 
between the regulative, normative and cognitive orders (Scott, 1995). The 
regulative aspect of order consists of rules that constrain and enable 
behaviour by force or incentives. The normative aspect of order indicates 
what is “ appropriate”  and consists of norms and values. Finally, the cognitive 
aspect of order consists of what is known and operates through meaningful 
knowledge. The analysis in this book emphasises the cognitive aspect of social 
order, although the other aspects have been incorporated where necessary.    
 
The theory for the analysis of the quasi-market in Dutch social housing was 
constructed on the basis of two other types of theories, resource dependence 
and institutional organisational theory. Each has its own version of what 
constitutes social reality and how it is constructed. The substance and 
application of the two theories have been discussed in chapter three. I will 
here give a brief description of their historical background, so that the 
analysis can be placed in context. The description focuses on the way in which 
the theories are continuations of or reactions against earlier traditions in 
organisational theory.85 
 
11.2.2 A.2.2 Resource dependence theory 
 
Resource dependence theory is a variety of the political economy perspective. 
This perspective focuses on the relationship between the polity and the 
economy, that is, between the realms of power and exchange (Zald, 1970). At 
the national level, it discusses the relationship between the state and the 
economy. Resource dependence theory applies it to the study of 
organisations. Its focus on the interaction between organisations and their 
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environment derives from the contingency studies of the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, its emphasis on conflict and politics was inspired by the work of 
the Carnegie School. 
 
The theory’s claim that organisations should be analysed in relation to their 
environments is accompanied by an explicit rejection of the focus on internal 
processes that characterised the organisational research of the previous 
decades. Early studies in organisational sociology had focused on single 
organisations in order to test the empirical value of Weber’s description of 
bureaucracy (e.g. Blau, 1955, Gouldner, 1954). Resource dependence theory 
argues that it is wrong to examine the organisation’s internal processes in 
isolation, as these are closely connected to its exchanges with other 
organisations. This is because the acquisition of resources (and hence the 
organisation’s survival) are determined by those exchanges.  
 
The notion that action is shaped by dependence on the environment was not 
invented by resource dependence theory. Earlier interorganisational studies 
of the 1960s and 1970s had already focused attention on the exchange of 
resources that takes place between an organisation and other organisations in 
its direct environment (Levine and White, 1961). In studies from the same 
period, advocates of the structural contingency perspective had examined the 
fit between organisational structure and its economic and technological 
environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Woodward, 1965). What the 
resource dependence theory inherited from these earlier studies was not only 
its focus on the interaction between organisations and their environments, but 
also an appreciation of the diverse nature of environments. It upholds the 
basic assumption that there is no universal environment and, by implication, 
that there is no one best way for an organisation to deal with this 
environment (as early organisational theorists such as members of the 
Taylorist school had suggested).  
 
There are two ways in which resource dependence theory adds a new twist to 
the contingency perspective. First of all, it allows organisations an active role 
in relation to their environments and rejects the notion that organisational 
decisions are determined by those environments. Proponents of the 
contingency perspective had suggested that the organisation has no choice 
but to adapt and that those who do not will not perform well. By contrast, the 
resource dependence theory emphasises that organisations are capable of 
influencing their environment. The relationship is not one-sided: while an 
organisation’s actions are partially determined by relationships of 
dependence, it can employ a number of strategies to limit this dependence. 
Earlier studies had revealed instances of such behaviour, but never give them 
the prominence that resource dependence theory has. A famous example is 
Selznick’s description of how the Tennessee Valley Authority co-opted local 
interests in order to stabilise its position in a hostile environment (Selznick, 
1949).   
 
A second feature that sets the theory apart from earlier organisational studies 
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is its emphasis on the political nature of organisational action. Its advocates 
have been very critical of the so-called “ managerial perspective” : the 
assumption that organisations are rational instruments designed to attain a 
set of given goals. Resource dependence theorists would rather ask whose 
goals are being attained (cf. Zald, 1970). They regard the organisation as an 
arena that harbours several actors, each with its own set of private goals. The 
actor who appears to be most capable of securing the organisation’s survival 
wins the top position and manages to make the organisation’s goals his own 
(Perrow, 1967). Whether the dominant party can ensure survival is a different 
matter altogether. The theory makes no claims about the ultimate result of 
organisational action. It may be optimal or not, if different parties can at all 
agree on what the optimal outcome should be.    
 
This concept of the organisation as a political arena was first explicitly 
touched upon in Cyert and March’s A Behavioural Theory of the Firm (Cyert 
and March, 1963). However, it was implicit in many prior studies, including 
many of those criticised as having a managerial perspective. One of the 
characteristics of the bureaucratic model that Weber described was that it 
“ segregates official activity from the sphere of private life”  (Weber, 1968, p. 
957). Its system of rules and incentives  was designed to prevent the misuse of 
public resources for private interests. The post-war studies of bureaucracy by 
Merton, Blau, Gouldner and others have discussed intra-organisational 
conflicts of interest between employers and employees (Merton, 1964; Blau, 
1955; Gouldner, 1954). Blau and Scott identified four different parties within 
the organisation and explicitly asked the question which of these benefited 
most from particular organisational arrangements (Blau and Scott, 1962). It is 
true, though, that these conflicts were generally discussed in relation to the 
attainment rather than the formation of organisational goals. In resource 
dependence theory, conflict is a central rather than a frictional process. 
Donaldson suggests this focus was inspired by the political New Left 
(Donaldson, 1995).   
 
11.2.3 A.2.3 The institutional theory of organisations 
 
Institutionalist organisational theory is older and goes back as far as the 
founding days of sociology, even though organisational theory only became 
an established scientific discipline in the second half of the 20th century. At the 
basis of this tradition stands Max Weber’s description of the bureaucratic 
idealtype and his analysis of how it took on its historically and geographically 
specific shape (Weber, 1968). Subsequent research criticised and expanded 
this work, taking empirical studies of actual organisations rather than general 
theory as their starting-point. Blau and Merton especially have made famous 
critiques of the bureaucratic model, each noting that formal bureaucratic 
structures can spark informal norms and practices that subvert official goals 
(Blau, 1955; Merton, 1949). Selznick’s analysis of the TVA, mentioned earlier, 
is another well-known study of informal practice that runs counter to formal 
intentions (Selznick, 1949). The work of these researchers was crucial in 
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establishing organisational sociology as a distinct academic discipline.  
 
What distinguishes present institutional theory from these and other studies 
from the 1950s and 1960s is its emphasis on the cognitive rather than 
normative aspects of institutions; in other words, it does not stress 
consciously enacted norms as much as views, methods of sense-making, 
which in some cases can acquire a taken-for-granted character. In this, it has 
drawn inspiration from the work of Herbert Simon and his followers. It also 
tends to emphasise fragmentation and disconnectedness over order. Finally, it 
shows an increasing concern with the power of actors to shape their own 
environment. However, as Selznick himself has argued, the difference 
between the “ old”  and the “ new”  institutionalism should not be overstated 
(Selznick, 1996). There have been shifts of focus and emphasis in this 
theoretical tradition, but no fundamental breaks.   
 
But current institutionalist theory does represent a break with the economic 
approach that had become very influential in organisational analysis, as 
elsewhere. The latter entailed a focus on instrumentally rational, non-
embedded actors who operate with great foresight (in economic terms, with 
complete information). It understands collective processes as the mere 
aggregate of individual choices. From the 1960s onwards, economists have 
increasingly applied this analytical framework to subjects that were 
traditionally the hunting-grounds of other academic disciplines. To name a 
few examples, Gary Becker analysed what were regarded as “ sociological 
subjects” , such as discrimination and family issues, in terms of instrumental 
rationality (Becker, 1976). Mancur Olson used an approach borrowed from 
economic theory to analyse collective behaviour (Olson, 1965). Niskanen 
analysed government offices as the arenas for budget-maximising bureaucrats 
(Niskanen, 1971).  
 
In this respect, neo-institutionalist literature in organisational theory is part of 
a broader movement that also has branches in economics and political science. 
The neo-institutionalist tradition is so diverse that it is difficult to capture 
except in the simplest of terms. What unites all the streams is the claim that 
institutions matter, but this is not to say much, since the definitions and 
assumptions used by the various “ institutionalisms”  and the way that they 
break with previous work in these disciplines differ strongly. For instance, the 
purely instrumental definition of institutions in neo-institutional economics is 
incompatible with the cognitive focus of many sociological studies. There 
have been various attempts to describe neo-institutionalism, both on the basis 
of disciplines and of theoretical characteristics. Scott has ordered the diverse 
studies by focusing on the extent to which they are internalised. On this basis 
he distinguishes the three dimensions or “ pillars”  mentioned before (see 
A.2.1): regulative, normative and cognitive (Scott, 1995). Hall and Taylor use a 
different type of classification, which is based on two main variables: (1) how 
the interaction between behaviour and institutions is conceptualised, and (2) 
how institutions originate and change (Hall and Taylor, 1996).86 These 
overviews show the difficulty in bringing all institutional theory within one 
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framework. The analysis in this book is based solely on the variety that has 
recently emerged in organisational sociology.  
 
11.3 A.3 Three methods for interpreting the empirical data   
  
Chapter four described three methods for fitting empirical observations into 
the theoretical model constructed in chapter three. This paragraph discusses 
the reasoning behind this choice of tools somewhat more elaborately. The 
methods of variation and fit were inspired by previous studies in institutional 
organisational sociology. The method of obtaining accounts was added to 
avoid the kinds of challenges that these studies have (justly) faced.   
 
11.3.1 A.3.1 The method of studying variation in decision-making 
 
Studying the variation in patterns of decision-making has been one of the 
principal methods of institutional theory for detecting processes of collective 
innovation. The assumption underpinning this method is that such processes 
will encourage homogeneity, and that a lack of diversity can therefore be 
used as an indicator of their occurrence. What it proves is that organisations 
have for some reason become more similar over time. However, the problem 
with the method is that it is in itself insufficient to draw any firm conclusions 
about the mechanism behind the homogeneity. By implication, it also has 
difficulty in discounting other interpretations. The original discussions of 
isomorphic processes drew a line between competitive and institutional 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991b). The former would apply 
especially when there was open competition, the latter when there was not. 
However, this is a vulnerable position. To begin with, it downplays the extent 
to which institutional processes occur in competitive environments, if the two 
can be distinguished at all. Furthermore, it leaves open the question what 
exactly causes homogeneity.  
 
To start with the first point, there has been plenty of evidence to show that 
institutional isomorphism (in Powell and DiMaggio’s sense) occurs in 
competitive environments. Well-known examples are Orrù, Biggart and 
Hamilton’s analysis of Oriental businesses and Fligstein’s research on large 
American companies (Orrù, Biggart and Hamilton, 1991; Fligstein, 1990). On 
the basis of data about Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese companies, 
Orrù, Biggart and Hamilton argue that the distinct characteristics of business 
relationships in these countries are not only the result of technical 
requirements, but also of institutional and normative factors. Fligstein’s 
analysis shows how organisational strategies spread through the business 
community through a combination of coercion and mimicry. Such evidence 
even calls into question what is the exact difference between the two types of 
isomorphism and whether it is at all useful to distinguish between them.   
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More important, though, is that the method of variation has no way of 
discounting rival interpretations. Imitation, the action that drives collective 
innovation through reproduction, does not in itself suggest the motive behind 
the organisation’s choice.87 When their competitors merge and control a larger 
share of the market, organisations may merge in response in order to control 
an equal market share. Alternatively, they can merge because they feel it is 
appropriate. Yet another option is that they do not know well what to do and 
therefore follow their peers until they have acquired enough information to 
pursue their own course. These are resource dependence, normative and 
cognitive interpretations respectively. The variation in the patterns of 
decision-making offers no clue which of these is the correct interpretation. 
Conclusions drawn from patterns of decision-making alone cannot even stand 
up against functionalist interpretations, which attribute similarity to “ market 
forces”  – theoretically weak though such explanations may be.     
 
11.3.2 A.3.2 The method of fit 
 
The method of fit grew out of attempts to overcome this weakness. It was 
inspired by observations that organisational activities were not as coherent as 
had often been supposed. Different aspects of organisations were found to be 
“ loosely coupled” , organised along different principles. For instance, Meyer 
and Rowan found that American schools conformed to general structural 
features such as curricula, exams and certain administrative procedures; 
within the classroom, however, there were major differences that were largely 
invisible from the outside (Meyer and Rowan, 1992). In this way the schools 
could secure their state funding and simultaneously adapt to whatever was 
required in their local community. Likewise, organisations often do not do 
what they claim to be doing or what they feel they ought to do. Selznick’s 
study of the Tennessee Valley Authority showed how the organisation started 
out with the intention of developing poor regions in the southern US, but 
eventually ended up consolidating the status quo (Selznick, 1949). 
Paradoxically, it needed to co-operate with established local interests to 
achieve the reforms that would help underrepresented groups like small 
farmers. In this case, the deviation from strategy became permanent, as co-
operation with the rural establishment became too close. The TVA found itself 
defending their interests instead.   
 
The method of fit focuses on cases like this, in which an organisation makes a 
decision that is not in accordance with its own strategy. What the method 
proves is (1) the real extent of variation in the field, and (2) the differences 
between actors. By dissecting actions into various layers, it discerns diversity 
that may not be visible on the surface. This, in turn, shows the true nature of 
relations within the field. When organisations only conform to trends on the 
surface, like American schools, but continue to follow their own course, then 
the collectively adopted innovation may be abandoned when it is no longer 
useful. However, if they consistently flout their own principles, as the TVA 
did, then the innovation may have a more lasting effect.  
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Since the method can be applied to units of analysis below the level of the 
organisational field, it can also be used to detect differences between 
subgroups or single organisations. It is for this purpose especially that it has 
been applied. Studies using this method have mainly attempted to prove a 
difference between innovators and followers in terms of fit or misfit. For 
instance, In Rumelt’s study of the relation between division structures and 
diversification strategies, he confirmed Chandler’s maxim that structure 
follows strategy (Rumelt, 1974; Chandler, 1962). However, he also found that 
as time progressed the fit began to weaken. From this he concluded that late 
adoption was based on mimicry. Tolbert and Zucker demonstrated that civil 
service reforms made early in their research period were related to city 
characteristics, whereas later reforms were inspired by definitions of what 
was legitimate (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). The authors then went on to 
suggest that city characteristics were related to effectiveness and that late 
reforms must therefore have been less effective. But, as Donaldson argues, 
this merely shows that decisions were related to different variables, not that 
they are less effective (Donaldson, 1995, p. 89-90). The weakness of Tolbert 
and Zucker’s claim follows from the regrettable assumption that misfits must 
necessarily lead to ineffectiveness. This, in turn, follows from the assumption 
that collective innovation is an “ irrational”  phenomenon.  
 
But there are also rational ways to account for a misfit. When an organisation 
does not have the capacity to innovate in the way that it would like, it may be 
temporarily more rational to follow than to innovate. For instance, a new 
company may believe that it can effectively and cheaply market its products 
by establishing close relations with its clients through specialised local 
branches, rather than by advertising in the mass media. However, as long it 
has not acquired the specialist knowledge and created the networks that its 
strategy requires, it may choose to engage in costly advertising battles with its 
competitors. This is more secure in the short term, even if it does produce a 
misfit, because the company cannot rely on a strategy that it cannot yet 
implement. Moreover, many misfits can only be understood by relating them 
to other decisions. To return to Meyer and Rowan’s research on schools, they 
might have concluded that the formal curricula and structures did not fit well 
with the internal requirements for effectiveness and were therefore irrational. 
That would have been a misinterpretation, since the formal requirements to 
which the schools conformed helped secure their state funding. What was a 
misfit with respect to one goal was a fit in relation to another.  
 
These are explanations that cannot be proven without examining a number of 
related decisions closely. What has hampered the empirical validation of 
institutional theory is the dominance of field-level analysis and the related use 
of statistical methods. Its weakness has been less the accuracy of field-level 
indicators than the exclusive reliance on such indicators. While variation and 
fit may be useful in detecting collective innovation processes, the exact nature 
of those processes will elude researchers unless they gather more detailed 
knowledge of a broader variety of decisions. Misfits may well be irrational, 
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but that can only be proven when rational choices that also involve a misfit 
have been discounted. It is for this purpose that I have studied several related 
aspects of social housing provision and that I have added a third method.    
 
11.3.3 A.3.3 The method of obtaining accounts 
 
The third method consists of obtaining the accounts of the same respondents 
that were described with the help of the other methods. This has two 
advantages. For a start, it provides pieces of information that fit and variation 
have left out. In addition, it verifies the interpretation suggested by the other 
methods.  
 
The evidence afforded by the other methods does not show the exact nature 
of innovation processes. It may not be clear whether these processes are 
caused by reciprocity or reproduction, nor which organisations are the 
innovators and which the followers. The innovator/follower problem could 
in theory be overcome by looking at the timing of events. In a collective 
process, innovators will obviously adopt new knowledge sooner than the 
followers. One can therefore suppose that the timing of decisions will reflect 
the nature of the process.88 But this may be treacherous, since it may simply be 
a matter of relative attention. Organisations usually have a limited capacity 
and may be unable to implement all the innovations they desire 
simultaneously. The fact that some adopt particular innovations later than 
others may simply reflect different priorities. A far sounder method is to ask 
members of the organisation why and how they came up with this 
innovation. Their accounts will fill up the gaps in the evidence and allow a 
more detailed description of what happened.   
 
Furthermore, the accounts will verify the interpretation suggested by the 
other methods. Without such confirmation, it can be easily challenged by rival 
explanations. It is possible, for instance, that what appears to be collective 
innovation is simply the sum of several individual innovations. Although this 
is unlikely, the methods of fit and variation are incapable of rejecting such an 
alternative explanation decisively. It is also important that the reasons 
respondents give for their actions are consistent with the motives that the 
theory expects them to have. After all, action is not mechanistic, but informed 
with social meaning. If the explanation of decisions is totally at variance with 
the accounts given by the actors themselves, then there is a high probability 
that the analysis is simply imposing its own version of reality on the object 
rather than helping to understand the reality as actors perceive it. It would 
not be consistent with its own social constructivist basis.  
 
It is not necessary for respondents to agree with the theoretical interpretation 
completely, as long as they support its basic scheme of causality.89 For 
instance, suppose that the other methods suggests that one actor has adopted 
a certain innovation because his neighbours have done so before. His account 
should at least indicate that the decision was taken with reference to the 
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decisions of others, whatever specific reason he provides for following them. 
If the accounts of respondents flatly contradict the interpretation suggested 
by the other methods, there is a problem. To return to the example: if the 
actors denies outright that his decision had anything to do with its adoption 
by others, then the evidence is contradictory and it will be difficult to draw 
any firm conclusions. In that case, the analysis ought to try and explain the 
discord.  
 
11.4 A.4 Collecting data  
 
11.4.1 A.4.1 The approach to the object  
 
The methods for interpreting the empirical data have implications for what 
these data should be like and how they need to be collected. The method of 
variation requires simple statistical information on whether patterns of 
decision-making in the national and local populations show homogeneity or 
diversity. The other two methods, by contrast, ask for fairly detailed 
information. This means that the research design should accommodate two 
different approaches: one extensive, the other intensive. The 
intensive/extensive distinction was introduced to bypass the 
qualitative/quantitative duality (Harr   and Secord, 1972). Intensive research 
consists of the examination of a large number of related variables in a small 
number of cases (Harr   and De Waele, 1976). By contrast, extensive research 
comprises less comprehensive inquiries into a large number of cases.   
 
Detailed information on the organisational level can best be acquired through 
intensive case studies. There is some confusion over what case study research 
is exactly, but I interpret it as an approach to the research object that combines 
the following features:  
 
• It studies phenomena in their real-life context, rather than under 
controlled conditions (as in an experiment). 
• It studies a selective number of elements from the overall population 
intensively. This can be done both with quantitative and qualitative 
methods of data collection, although the latter is more usual.   
• The aim is not to make statements about the frequency with which 
empirical phenomena occur, but about the logic through which they occur. 
Yin has called this “ analytical generalisation”  (Yin, 1989).90 Of course, even 
the results of such a generalisation can only be valid within the specific 
population in question (Swanborn, 1995). Only similar studies in other 
populations can prove the validity of the conclusions in another context.  
 
The case study approach is very suitable for the present analysis. Since the 
population is large (over 600 organisations) and the information that has to be 
collected is of a detailed kind, it is impossible to study the population as a 
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whole. This forces a selection of representative elements of the population. 
Since the aim of the inquiry is to discover the logic of the quasi-market, it is 
sensible to select case studies rather than a statistical sample. Furthermore, the 
cases provide the density of information that a proper use of the theory 
proscribes. It is perhaps true that the case study approach has become too 
dominant in Dutch public policy and administration research (De Vries, 2000). 
However, in this instance it is clearly the best approach.  
 
Since it is necessary to collect information about single organisations as well 
as local communities, it is most prudent to select cases consisting of local 
communities of providers (although single providers will remain the unit of 
analysis). This allows me both to study single organisations as well as 
processes at the local level. The cases are restricted to towns, since it is here 
that ties are strongest and collective innovation is most likely to occur. In the 
future, regionalisation may broaden local communities, but as yet it would be 
premature to look beyond the traditional municipal boundaries.   
 
As for information about national patterns of decision-making, it can be 
acquired in two ways. The variation in the case selection (see below) should 
reflect homogeneity or diversity at the national level. After all, if the cases 
represent the population of providers adequately, similarity in decision-
making among the cases should reflect homogeneity among the overall 
population. However, this inference will be stronger if it is backed up by 
national statistical data. These can be acquired from government sources as 
well as from other studies on Dutch social housing. Since homogeneity is a 
simple indicator, broad aggregate data will suffice. These kinds of statistics 
have been available for most areas of decision-making.  
 
11.4.2 A.4.2 Case selection 
 
There are two choices in the process of selecting cases (Swanborn, 1994). The 
first is between maximisation and minimisation of the variance between 
variables (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Minimisation helps to solidify a 
theoretical interpretation, but only under very specific conditions. 
Maximisation of variance tests how far its explanatory power will stretch. The 
second choice in case selection is whether to vary on dependent or 
independent variables. Varying on the dependent variable will show under 
what conditions certain outcomes can be expected, but it is considered a 
methodological fallacy.91 Minimisation of variance on independent variables 
turns a comparative case study into the replication of one type of case, which 
is useful when the state of knowledge about a particular phenomenon is low. 
Maximisation of variance on independent variables helps to reveal the 
sensitivity of  the dependent variables to shifts in the parameters of the cases. 
 
While little is yet known on the dynamics of social housing, there is an 
increasing body of empirically grounded material on markets and quasi-
markets in other fields. It is on that basis that it has proven possible to 
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construct such an elaborate theory. That is why it is feasible to move on to 
maximisation of variance on a key independent variable. This variable is the 
level of uncertainty. One of the questions central to this analysis is the effect 
of the financial incentive inherent to the quasi-market. The effect of this 
financial incentive is to increase the level of uncertainty. The great advantage 
of studying social housing is that it is possible to vary the strength of 
uncertainty (and by implication, of the financial incentive) within the same 
regulatory framework. This is because the distribution of resources differs 
significantly between local markets. Due to variations in subsidisation, local 
markets and past decisions, some providers are far worse off than others. In 
addition, the gap between supply and demand is diminishing faster in some 
local markets than in others. The differences between the cases should then 
give a good indication of how the financial incentive affects quasi-market 
behaviour. Implicit in the theory is the assumption that this variable will not 
affect the direction of decision-making. Increased uncertainty may kickstart a 
process of change, but the kinds of choices organisations make are expected to 
be influenced by other variables, such as their innovative capacity and social 
relations. Should uncertainty prove decisive in determining the direction of 
change, then there will be a serious theoretical problem.   
 
Uncertainty should be highest where markets are slack, that is, where there is 
a surplus in supply. Where markets are tight, uncertainty should be lowest. A 
second variable that influences uncertainty is the financial position of 
individual providers. It includes not only regular cash flows and accounts, 
but also the “ solid capital”  enclosed in bricks and mortar. While this is an 
organisational rather than a local variable, it can be established that variation 
on this variable was clearly smaller within than between towns (though not 
within sections of regional markets). Combining these two variables, it is 
possible to select cases on a descending level of uncertainty.  
 
These criteria have led to the choice of four cases. The case with the highest 
level of uncertainty is Bear Pit, where the market is slack and providers are 
financially weak. One step below comes Tiger Town, where the market is 
tight, but providers are poor. Next is Shark Pool, where the market is tight 
and providers financially comfortable. Last comes Elephant’s Corner, whose 
wealthy provider operates in a stable market. Unfortunately, it was not 
possible to do more than four. The intensity of the research and the need for 
sufficient variation were conflicting requirements, given the limited means at 
my disposal. Obviously the analysis would have been stronger if the number 
of case studies had been larger, but the variation is still sufficient to provide 
firm conclusions. It was of course essential that the cases should not affect one 
another, as that would have contaminated the results (cf. Rosenthal and ’t 
Hart, 1994). Fortunately, that is highly improbable, given the fragmented 
nature of the housing market and the geographical distance between the 
cases.   
 
The time frame within which the cases have been studied is the period 1994-
2000. This covers the years between the decentralisation of financial risks and 
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the date until which the deadline of the empirical research phase could be 
successfully postponed. This period is not long enough to allow strong 
relative changes of the level of uncertainty between the cases.   
 
11.4.3 A.4.3 The four cases 
 
The cases have each been described in chapter five. This section will elaborate 
on the variables by which they have been selected. For each case, I will start 
by charting the nature of the regional housing market. This will include the 
relation of supply to demand and movements within key segments of the 
market. Then I will go on to assess the financial state of the social housing 
providers in those markets, measured in terms of their solvability, their net 
assets per housing unit and the quality of their housing stock (the “ solid”  
capital). The data were taken from various reports published by the providers 
themselves and by local authorities. The figures are only meant to give an 
indication of the level of uncertainty and will be stylised, both for the sake of 
transparency and of anonymity. The one snag is that data are only as strong 
as the beliefs they are based on. What matters is not whether statistics on local 
housing markets are accurate by an external standard, but whether the actors 
involved believe them to be true. Therefore I will only use market data which 
are known and supported by the social housing providers in the cases. If there 
is any disagreement, this will be mentioned and incorporated into the 
analysis. There will be no such problem with estimates of the providers’ 
financial state, since these were drawn from reports by the providers 
themselves.    
 
Bear Pit had four major providers, which together owned about half the 
housing stock. Provider Polar Bear with its 16.000 units came into existence 
when two local competitors merged in 1999.92 Though its stock was not in the 
best of shape, its solvability and net assets per housing unit had reached 9% 
and 5000 respectively. Grizzly was a composite of two organisations, one a 
traditional provider and another a provider of students’ housing. The 
separation was temporarily maintained because of the marked difference 
between the two organisation’s bankbooks. The former, with just under 9000 
units in good shape, had a solvability of about 3% and a net assets per 
housing unit of well over 2000, whereas the latter had to cope with – 5% and -
3000 respectively, as well as ill-maintained stock. However, the long-term 
prospects of the weaker part were improving and a merger of the two 
organisations was now being considered. Panda with over 8000 dwellings 
was among the poorest of the Bear Pit clan, with solvability at – 5% and only 
expected to reach 0% in several years time. Its net assets per housing unit 
stood in the red by over a thousand. Koala, finally, was best off, its solvability 
at 7% and net assets per housing unit at just over 3500. These were set to fall 
in the near future, though. By everyone’s admission, Koala’s stock of over 
7000 was the best in town.  
 
The relatively poor financial state of Bear Pit providers added to growing 
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fears over an increasingly slack market. During the research period the local 
housing market reached quantitative equilibrium, but at the same time it 
faced a growing qualitative shortage of single-family units and owner-
occupied homes. The city itself could not match this demand, as a major share 
of its stock consisted of rented multi-family units. By contrast, nearby towns 
and villages had built to cater for this type of demand, beyond their own 
needs. The predictable consequence was that many households left the central 
city to settle in the surrounding countryside. Simultaneously, the number of 
young entrants on the market was dropping steadily. This put pressure on the 
stock in Bear Pit, especially on expensive and multi-storey rented housing. It 
has been said that what happened in this town was a foreboding of future 
developments in other parts of the country. However, in the 1990s there were 
still few housing markets as slack as this. The local authorities and most of the 
providers regarded these developments as a major threat. Already there were 
rising vacancies and faster rates of mutation. If the trend continued, their 
stock would be hard hit, since less than a quarter of their stock consisted of 
units that were in high demand. It would also cause a greater social divide 
between the countryside and a central city that was not without problems to 
begin with. The incentive to act was therefore quite strong. It should be noted, 
though, that one of the providers, Koala, disagreed with the dominant 
analysis of the housing market. It estimated that current figures were 
interpreted incorrectly and that shifts in demand would not be as problematic 
as had been predicted. However, the other providers and the local authorities 
based their plans on the gloomy scenario.    
 
Tiger Town potentially faced the same kinds of movements as Bear Pit, but its 
central location and its good image were likely to sustain a far stronger 
demand. Moreover, a lack of new construction in the region delayed the 
migration outwards. This situation was unlikely to last forever, though, with 
several large projects underway at some distance. The lack of construction 
sites in the town itself was becoming a major problem. The local authorities of 
Tiger Town had predictably turned their eyes to the surrounding suburban 
towns, where they met with great suspicion. None of the four providers in 
this case was particularly wealthy, but Siberian was in a worse shape than any 
of the others. It was the largest of the four providers in Tiger Town, with a 
stock of about 10.000. Its net assets per housing unit were at – 2500 and 
solvability was down to -4%. The real problem, however, was the technical 
state of its stock, as all but the most urgent maintenance had been postponed 
for several years. In short, its situation was disastrous. The others were 
stronger, both in terms of financial assets and technical quality, though none 
more than moderate. Bengal had seen its solvability and net assets per 
dwelling (on a total of about 2500) rise to 16% and over 10.000, even though 
these were both at zero at the start of the research period. This was largely 
due to the sale of assets. Paper Tiger had a solvability of almost 7% and net 
assets per housing unit of just under 8000, on a total of 3000. Both were 
expected to rise in the coming years. Sumatran specialised in students’ 
housing and consequently over 80% of its stock consisted of units with shared 
facilities. With a solvability of 8% and rising, it was among the more 
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comfortable in the town.93 Yet the drop in students’ numbers was expected to 
affect its future prospects significantly.  
 
Although the providers of Tiger Town entered the quasi-market in a poor 
state, developments in the housing market were still in their favour. 
Continued demand and the lack of new construction afforded some breathing 
space. Expensive rented dwellings were becoming more difficult to let, but 
other types of rented housing were not yet in the danger zone. Meagre assets 
and a lack of construction sites did limit their options, but there was no 
immediate threat. Siberian was an exception in that it faced grave short-term 
problems due to a huge maintenance backlog. The level of uncertainty for this 
provider could be described as strong, whereas it was moderate for the 
others.   
 
In Shark Pool, the level of uncertainty was relatively low. Since most of the 
town had been built in the early post-war period and new construction was 
sparse in the early 1990s, the elderly made up an uncommonly large 
proportion of the population (nearly a quarter, almost 10% over the national 
average). While the composition of Shark Pool’s stock in terms of housing 
types was not radically different from that of the large city nearby, it was a far 
more popular destination. This was probably due to the relative absence of 
social problems, as well as the affordability and healthy state of its stock. The 
regional housing market was still tight, but this was likely to change over the 
coming years, since there were a number of large construction projects in the 
region. These additions to the housing stock (mostly owner-occupied single-
family units) were expected to turn the overall shortage into a surplus. Under 
such conditions, expensive and moderately expensive rented dwellings were 
likely to be vulnerable assets. However, the stock in Shark Pool was unlikely 
to be hit hard in the short term because of its favourable location. It sat at the 
other end of the migrations that threatened towns like Bear Pit and Tiger 
Town. The major problem, according to the local authorities’ housing plan, 
was the lack of (adequate) housing for the elderly. Some of the respondents in 
the case have suggested that even that problem was overstated.    
  
The three providers all had stock that was well-maintained and of reasonably 
good quality. Financially, Great White seemed to be in poor shape, with a 
solvability of – 5% and negative net assets per housing unit of about 3000. 
However, these figures were quite deceptive. A number of years before the 
management (since retired) had decided to deduct all investments in existing 
stock from its balance immediately, rather than to apply the more usual 
method of spreading costs over time. As a result, the net assets per housing 
unit and solvability were set to rise rapidly in the near future. Hammerhead 
had net assets per housing unit of just over 3000 and a solvability of about 6%. 
These rather poor figures were caused by recent large-scale investment in a 
building project. Again, they must be eyed with caution. The prognosis of 
revenues from newly constructed dwellings was uncertain and deliberately 
conservative. Actual revenues were expected to be much higher. Nurse Shark 
was very similar. Its solvability had slumped to 6%, also due to recent large-
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scale investment that had dampened its immediate financial prospects. 
However, when it merged with two other providers at the start of 2000, its 
solvability jumped to nearly 10% and net assets per housing unit to over 7000. 
All in all, the providers in Shark Pool were fairly comfortable. The only cloud 
in the sky was the nature of their stock, which consisted mainly of multi-
family dwellings and units in multi-story buildings. These types of housing 
were generally becoming less popular. Only some of these units could be 
converted into housing for the elderly, since many lacked basic facilities such 
as elevators. However, short-term problems were unlikely because of Shark 
Pool’s favourable location and image.   
 
The local Elephant’s Corner market knew neither large surpluses nor large 
shortages. Population growth in the region had slowed down over the past 
decade, due to falling birth rates and a surplus of outward migration. 
However, what with the growth of Elephant’s Corner’s business community 
and a decrease in household size, there had been increasing pressure on a few 
segments of the housing market. Single-family units and housing for the 
elderly were particularly in demand. Most of the existing stock consisted of 
owner-occupied single-family units, with social rented housing comprising 
less than a third. There was only one housing provider, but this was a most 
interesting one. It came into being in 1996, after the original Elephant 
provider merged with two regional competitors. Since then, it had gained 
quite a reputation in the social housing sector; partly because it was 
innovative, headed by one of the best-known entrepreneurs in the field; but 
no less because of its enormous wealth. Its solvability was close to 30% in 1999 
and expected to reach 60% in ten years’ time. Its net assets per housing unit 
amounted to well over 25.000 guilders. For social housing providers, this was 
the stuff that dreams were made of. The Elephant provider’s stock of a little 
under 7000 dwellings was technically some of the best in rented housing in 
the region, most of it in excellent condition. Over 80% consisted of single-
family units and housing for the elderly, whereas unpopular housing types 
made up only a small fraction. In short, the position of the Elephant provider 
was rock-solid.  
 
11.4.4 A.4.4 Methods for collecting data   
 
Case study research is often associated with qualitative methods, but strictly 
speaking that is not the only option. It is very well possible to conduct 
quantitative case studies, for example, by quantifying the results of 
standardised observation. However, that is unrealistic for the current 
analysis. Too little is yet known about developments in the social housing 
field to define accurate quantitative indicators, at least if one is willing to dive 
below the surface. This difficulty is aggravated by the state of flux that the 
providers are going through. Furthermore, some of the data were of a 
sensitive nature and less likely to be revealed in a survey than in a personal 
interview. Qualitative methods are therefore more reliable in this context.   
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While there is no fundamental reason to use multiple methods, as Yin 
suggests, triangulation does strengthen the validity of the evidence (cf. Yin, 
1989).94 In this case, it was possible to acquire data both through 
documentation analysis and semi-structured interviews. Documentation 
consisted of policy documents, mission statements, records of meetings, 
annual reports and so forth. There were over forty interviews, with managers 
and staff from social housing providers, local officials and politicians, tenants 
and professional advisors (see table A.1). There was the occasional 
opportunity for observation. Where possible, I have verified the data by 
combining both different sources and different methods. The evidence from 
documents was compared with that from interview transcripts. Moreover, the 
statements of one respondent were compared with those of another. This is 
the advantage of choosing cases at the local level: people were quite familiar 
with other actors and able to provide additional information. This would not 
have been possible if only the (small) organisations themselves had been 
studied. Where evidence was self-contradictory or supported by only one 
source, I will indicate so. 
  
The Shark Pool and Tiger Town cases were the first to be studied, which is 
why they were examined in more detail than the other two. It turned out that 
some of the interviews were largely superfluous. To be specific, it usually 
proved sufficient to interview only the top people of social housing providers. 
In organisations of a different type (e.g. hospitals) this approach would have 
been unacceptable. However, in these small, hierarchical organisations, where 
staff had relatively little professional discretion, it yielded an adequate picture 
of decision-making. This was especially so since the statements of 
respondents could be checked with the findings from documentation analysis 
as well as with the statements of respondents from other organisations. 
Likewise, it soon became clear that tenant representation could be assessed by 
relying on the accounts of a few well-informed representatives and by 
checking these against the results of documentation analysis and accounts by 
other types of respondents. This allowed the Bear Pit and Elephant’s Corner 
cases to be examined more efficiently.  
 
All the cases were studied under the promise of anonymity. Some of the 
information concerns relationships between people or organisations that are 
in a permanent working relationship. When they are highly critical of one 
another, they are unlikely to say so in public. To loosen their tongues I have 
thought it necessary to hide the names of people, organisations and places. 
This is regrettable, but it brings to light pieces of information that would 
otherwise have been unobtainable. When so little is yet known of the 
dynamics of the field, every scrap of evidence is useful. 
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Table A.1: the respondents interviewed during the empirical research, listed 
by reference number, case, organisation and function. 
 
Number Case Organisation Function during research period 
1 Bear Pit Polar  Manager, holding company 
2 Bear Pit Polar  Manager of local provider 
3 Bear Pit Grizzly  Manager   
4 Bear Pit Panda  Manager 
5 Bear Pit Koala  Manager 
6 Bear Pit Koala tenant organisation Chairman 
7 Bear Pit Tenant support organisation Co-ordinator 
8 Bear Pit Local authorities  Staff member of housing department 
9 Tiger Town Siberian Manager 
10 Tiger Town Bengal Manager 
11 Tiger Town Paper Manager 
12 Tiger Town Sumatran Manager 
13 Tiger Town Siberian tenant organisation Chairman 
14 Tiger Town Bengal tenant organisation Chairman 
15 Tiger Town Paper tenant organisation Chairman 
16 Tiger Town Local welfare organisation Professional specialised in tenant 
support 
17 Tiger Town Local authorities Alderman in charge of housing 
18 Tiger Town Local authorities Alderman in charge of welfare 
19 Tiger Town Local authorities Head of housing and planning 
department 
20 Tiger Town Local authorities Co-ordinator of urban renewal pilot 
project 
21 Tiger Town Provincial authorities in Tiger 
Town area 
Staff member of housing department  
22 Tiger Town Urban renewal pilot project 
agency 
Co-ordinator 
23 Shark Pool Great White Manager 
24 Shark Pool Great White Head of maintenance department 
25 Shark Pool Hammerhead Manager 
26 Shark Pool Hammerhead Head of customer services 
27 Shark Pool Hammerhead Head of maintenance department 
28 Shark Pool Nurse Manager 
29 Shark Pool Great White tenant 
organisation 
Chairman 
30 Shark Pool Hammerhead tenant 
organisation 
Chairman 
31 Shark Pool Hammerhead association Board member 
32 Shark Pool Nurse Member of supervisory board 
33 Shark Pool Local authorities Alderman in charge of housing 
until1998 
34 Shark Pool Local authorities Alderman in charge of housing from 
1998 onwards 
35 Shark Pool Local authorities Head of housing department 
36 Shark Pool Consultancy agency  Housing consultant 
37 Elephant’s Corner Elephant Manager 
38 Elephant’s Corner Elephant Staff member of customer services 
department 
39 Elephant’s Corner Elephant’s Corner’s tenant 
organisation 
Chairman 
40 Elephant’s Corner Local authorities Alderman in charge of housing 
41 (none) Housing Inspection Senior advisor 
42 (none) Housing Inspection Senior advisor 
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13 Summary 
 
 
The introduction of quasi-markets 
 
One of the most important elements of welfare state change during the 1980s 
and 1990s was the introduction of quasi-markets in the implementation of 
social policy. Quasi-markets are markets in which supply and demand are 
more tightly bound to rules than regular markets. In such a system, suppliers 
(the providers of welfare state goods and services) have more autonomy than 
they would if their relationship to the state was strictly hierarchical, but they 
are forced to remain within certain limits. For instance, suppliers in a regular 
market may focus exclusively on the most profitable clients, while suppliers 
in a quasi-market are usually specifically forbidden from doing so.  
 
The question central to this book is how the quasi-market experiment has 
worked out. It is typical of market-based systems that they are based on 
incentives and, by implication, on assumptions about how the actors will 
react to these incentives. The success of quasi-markets therefore hinges on an 
understanding of the logic behind the behaviour of these actors. This book has 
tried to add to the knowledge of the phenomenon by dissecting the quasi-
market in Dutch social housing. The analysis draws on theoretical insights 
from organisational sociology, combining a political economy approach to 
organisations with the cognitive focus of recent institutional theory. Evidence 
was gathered primarily through four intensive case studies using qualitative 
methods.  
 
Social housing in the Netherlands 
 
The social housing sector in the Netherlands was a suitable empirical object 
because it was introduced relatively early and because its basic framework 
has not been changed significantly since (which is uncommon). The 
protagonists, the Dutch social housing providers, originally arose as small 
semi-philanthropic institutions, founded by gentry and businessmen in the 
late 19th century. After the Second World War, they became part of the 
government’s drive to eliminate the immense housing shortages. This meant 
that all of a sudden these small organisations run by amateur boards were 
eligible for vast subsidies. The flip side of the coin was that regulation 
concerning social housing became very dense, up to the point that the 
housing providers effectively became extensions of national housing policy. 
All major decisions regarding construction, sale, prices (rents), distribution 
and even organisational structure were heavily regulated and/or controlled 
directly by local and national authorities. Their rents were well below market 
levels due to the systematic infusion of state funds. Under this strict regime, 
the providers kept growing. By the 1980s they controlled about 40% of the 
total housing stock, oddly high by international standards.  
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But during that decade housing policy started a period of radical reform. A 
parliamentary enquiry had painfully exposed the intransparancy of the 
system of housing subsidies. Furthermore, the housing shortages had all but 
disappeared, which meant that housing policy plummeted down the list of 
political priorities. In the end it resulted in a major shake-up, including the 
liberalisation of the social housing regime. By the mid-1990s, subsidies had 
been abolished and the social housing providers had been given financial 
responsibility for their own actions, in exchange for a relaxation of 
behavioural controls. This was effectively the introduction of a quasi-market. 
Their goals were only defined broadly at the national level. These would be 
specified in negotiations at the local level between providers and local 
authorities. In other words, they gained more freedom, but less security. Their 
sound financial position and the backing of two sector funds took the edge off 
this insecurity, but the policy change still left them in a position of greatly 
increased uncertainty. How did they cope?  
 
Coping with uncertainty  
  
With the advent of the quasi-market, social housing providers faced two 
different kinds of uncertainty. To begin with, they no longer had the 
guarantee that they would receive the money they need to ensure their 
financial continuity. The risk they faced was that tenants would leave them 
and opt for another provider or for home ownership. This forced providers 
(quite intentionally) to develop strategies to attract and retain tenants. 
Simultaneously, they were confronted with a second kind of uncertainty: 
what to do? The kind of behaviour that had worked when they were in effect 
administrative agencies was inappropriate in the new setting, where they 
were forced to think in a more business-like manner. They had to discard old 
habits and develop a new approach to their task, one more suitable to the 
quasi-market. In other words, they had to deal with a problem of knowledge.  
 
On the face of it, the organisations seemed ill-equipped to cope with this 
cognitive challenge. Developing new knowledge is a costly and time-
consuming enterprise, since it is by definition not a routine activity. Yet most 
social housing providers consisted only of a few dozen people, most of them 
technicians and administrators. In each organisation there were in practice 
only a handful of people in a position to create new policy. Moreover, most of 
the staff dated from the period before the introduction of the quasi-market, a 
time when their role was an entirely different one. With such little capacity 
for innovation, one would expect that changes would have occurred only 
slowly and with difficulty.  
 
Collective innovation 
 
In fact, they appear to have adjusted fairly quickly. Within the span of short 
number of years, a great number of social housing providers have completely 
re-invented themselves. Many have switched to new organisational structures 
(from a traditional bureaucracy to a front/back-office structure), a new 
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distribution system (from waiting lists to advertising) and a new legal status 
(from associations to foundations). Many have developed new products 
(services, new types of rental contracts, hybrid forms of tenure) and engaged 
in elaborate and innovative plans for regenerating inner city neighbourhoods. 
Moreover, there has been a great extent of interorganisational co-operation, 
particularly through mergers. This is a remarkable paradox: the organisations 
have little capacity to innovate and yet they innovate tremendously. How can 
this be explained?   
 
The answer is fairly simple: the providers have joined their efforts and 
innovated together. There are two ways in which they have done this. The 
first is through direct negotiation. Policy scientists have noted that in a 
process of repeated exchange, actors may reach joint decisions that are 
innovative in nature (a process also referred to as “ learning” ). This is not 
simply a matter of reaching a collective decision, but also of creating a 
decision that did not belong to the old repertoire. A second way of innovating 
together is by copying (borrowing, stealing, what one will) from one another 
(what DiMaggio and Powell have called “ mimetic isomorphism” ). In each 
group of organisations there are a few innovators who have the capacity to 
improve their performance by coming up with innovations. Other 
organisations then copy the ideas of these innovators, rather than innovate 
themselves. Particular innovations will thus gradually spread throughout the 
group. This is a way of pooling the capacities of the various members of the 
group, which is why I refer to it as “ collective innovation” .   
 
Providers thus adjusted by exploiting the considerable innovative potential of 
the social housing sector as a whole. This is not surprising, given that there 
was a number of conditions very favourable to processes of collective 
innovation. Co-operation at the local level was encouraged by the mutual 
dependence in which providers and local authorities were caught. Investment 
in stock is far more effective and less risky when other providers do the same 
and when the local authorities upgrade public spaces. There is much to gain 
from co-operating. Moreover, these were actors that had usually operated in 
the same area for decades and were therefore thoroughly familiar with one 
another. Copying was made easier by the extensive social networks that had 
developed under the old regime. There were many long-established personal 
networks between people who had worked in the sector for decades. 
Furthermore, the branch associations (merged into one in 1999) have 
traditionally had an important role in guiding and training housing 
managers. Their activities include the organisation of conferences and 
network meetings, as well as the publication of specialist journals and papers. 
Other organisations, such the Stuurgroep Experimenten in de 
Volkshuisvesting (SEV) and specialised university departments and research 
institutes actively encouraged the development, exchange and diffusion of 
new ideas.  
 
Diversity and similarity combined 
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One could say that the social capital built up in past years helped the social 
housing providers to adjust to the quasi-market with relative ease. Past 
studies have noted that such processes tend to add interest to this social 
capital. When organisations look to each other for guidance and put faith in 
similar ideas, they are increasingly likely to become a clear and identifiable 
group. The common identity built up over decades of shared history would 
be replaced by a new common identity.   
 
But surprisingly, that does not appear to have been the case. Under the 
surface there were in fact growing differences among the organisations. Even 
though they picked up on the same kinds of innovations, they often had very 
different notions of how to operate in a market. There were roughly three 
types of market strategy. The first is a fairly traditional one that assumes 
tenants only want a house that is in technically good condition, and no fuss. 
Others felt that more was needed to keep their customers satisfied. They 
expanded their original product with services, new types of contract and so 
forth. Home care packages are the result of such an approach. Finally, there 
were providers who focused on diversifying their portfolio. The line of 
reasoning behind this strategy is that risks can be better handled when they 
are spread over various groups of customers and local markets. If there is a 
setback in one segment, the organisation can rely on others to compensate for 
the losses. When applied, these three idealtypical strategies ultimately result 
in markedly different types of organisations. Neither of the types appears to 
be dominant in the social housing sector or likely to become so.  
 
This diversity of strategies appears to be at odds with the previous 
observation that housing providers all adopt the same kinds of innovation. 
However, this is only an apparent contradiction. Many of the innovations that 
became popular over the past years were compatible with different strategies, 
which may partly explain why they became popular in the first place. For 
instance, the front/back-office organisational structure is as suitable for 
providers who wish to diversify and expand as for those who wish to put 
more emphasis on their service departments. Moreover, there are various 
ways in which similar decisions can be implemented. For example, while 
there was a merger trend among providers of different types, they executed 
this drastic move along very different lines. Providers with a diversification 
strategy would merge with colleagues in other local markets, in order to 
create a mixed portfolio. By contrast, those with other strategies would merge 
within their traditional local areas. In that sense similarity and diversity are 
not mutually exclusive. Organisations save energy by going along with 
popular trends, but retain their specific identity by implementing ideas in a 
manner consistent with their own strategies.  
 
Splitting the sector 
 
The developments in the social housing field have resulted in organisations 
that are increasingly disparate in terms of size, shape and ambition. This, in 
turn, has begun to break up the social networks so useful for spreading 
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knowledge. As organisations come to have increasingly different goals and 
ambitions, they are less likely to regard one another as “ significant others” . 
They are more likely to establish and maintain contacts with colleagues with 
similar views and similar characteristics. This is a process that is slowly 
unfolding, but already quite visible. It has resulted in the demise of 
interorganisational alliances and is even causing tension within the branch 
organisation. Some providers feel that their views are no longer adequately 
represented. In other words, social capital is shrinking rather than growing.  
 
Why is social housing different from other markets, where processes of 
collective innovation have brought organisations closer together? In the 
literature on the subject, the main explanations why organisations in a market 
come to share common views are either that it increases predictability and 
therefore reduces uncertainty, or that large organisations impose their ways 
on smaller ones. The crucial difference then appears to lie in the nature of the 
housing market, because neither of these explanations appears to apply. 
Because in the housing market supply has a fixed location and demand tends 
to move only within limits, there tend to be numerous local housing markets 
that are to some extent detached from one another. What happens in one 
market will have relatively little effect on developments in another market. 
This implies that while providers may be socially connected to a large 
community of organisations, they are generally dependent only on the small 
number of colleagues in their local market, because only these can affect their 
market share significantly. When they are not dependent on others, the 
predictability of their market behaviour becomes less relevant. Moreover, 
there are no organisations powerful enough to impose their views on others, 
except in isolated instances.  
 
Eroding the basis of the quasi-market 
 
The analysis in this book has described how social housing providers have 
reacted to the introduction of the quasi-market. Understanding the logic of 
their behaviour is essential for making the experiment a success. Of course, 
that begs the question whether the quasi-market in Dutch social housing has 
indeed been successful. It is early to answer this question with any finality. To 
attribute the current housing situation to the policy change is as yet 
premature, because its full effects will only become known over a longer 
period. However, what is possible is to determine whether the conditions for 
a successful quasi-market have been met.  
 
On the basis of literature on the subject, I identified four such conditions: (1) 
the market structure should be competitive, (2) providers should find ways to 
deal with uncertainty, (3) the relationship between local authorities and 
providers should be balanced, and (4) the state must have effective 
instruments for correcting undesirable behaviour. The good news is that 
providers have dealt with their new situation far more effectively than one 
would have guessed, due to extensive collective innovation processes. 
Unfortunately, collective innovation also encouraged mergers that threaten 
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competition within local markets. Moreover, some providers have become so 
large that their position in relation to local authorities has grown unbalanced. 
This may become a problem when the parties have to negotiate over local 
performance targets. Finally, the main instruments for intervention in the 
quasi-market, incentives and rules, are effective only up to a point.  Market 
incentives spur providers into action, yet without setting the direction for 
such action. They set the pace, but not the motion. They do not in themselves 
encourage desirable behaviour or curb unacceptable behaviour. Regulation is 
more effective in that respect, but when it is used too often it strangles the 
autonomy of providers -and along with it the chief benefits of a market-based 
system.  
 
All in all, the quasi-market appears to have been successful in the short term, 
but the conditions that make it successful may be under threat in the long 
term.  
 
Structure of the book 
 
Chapter one starts with a description of recent welfare state changes, one of 
which was the introduction of quasi-markets. This raises a number of 
questions: how have welfare state providers reacted to the new quasi-
markets, how can their behaviour be explained and how does it affect the 
conditions under which a quasi-market can be effective? The chapter 
discusses the choice of research questions, empirical object and theoretical 
approach.  
 
Chapter two describes the empirical object, the Dutch social housing sector. 
First comes a description of the principal characteristics of housing, the 
product around which the quasi-market revolves. Next is an overview of the 
history of Dutch housing policy from the late 19th century to the present, 
culminating in the recent policy reforms. The chapter ends with a short 
discussion of the role of housing in the general welfare state debate.  
 
Chapter three constructs a theoretical framework for the analysis. It starts 
with a description and assessment of the two component theories, resource 
dependence theory and the institutional theory of organisations, and ends by 
forging them into a single tool. This helps to identify the choices that social 
housing providers can potentially make and to predict under what 
circumstances they will make which specific choices.  
 
Chapter four serves to clarify the methodological aspects of the research. The 
empirical evidence will be analysed with the aid of three methods: an analysis 
of the variation between organisational decisions, an analysis of the 
consistency of decisions, and a comparison of the findings of the previous two 
methods with the accounts of respondents. The next part of the chapter 
focuses on the methods by which the empirical data have been collected: 
intensive case studies, handled mainly with qualitative research methods.  
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Chapter five describes the empirical data. First there is a brief introduction to 
the four case studies: Bear Pit, Tiger Town, Shark Pool and Elephant’s Corner. 
After that there is an elaborate discussion of the data, grouped by six themes 
central to social housing: physical interventions in stock, distribution, 
interorganisational co-operation, legal structure, tenant representation and 
organisational structure. The data are analysed using the three methods 
presented in chapter four.  
 
Chapter six uses the findings from the previous chapter to draw general 
conclusions about the behaviour of providers in this particular quasi-market. 
The chapter also indicates how this behaviour affects the conditions vital for 
the quasi-market to be successful. A short epilogue describes three 
developments that could undermine the Dutch social housing sector in the 
long run.  
 
The appendix comprises a more elaborate treatment of certain aspects of the 
analysis previously discussed in the main body of text. These are, 
respectively, the background of the theoretical framework, the methods used 
for interpreting the empirical data, and the methods for collecting these data. 
At the end there is a list of (anonymous) respondents.  
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14 Samenvatting 
  
 
Quasi-markten: een experiment 
 
E n van de belangrijkste onderdelen van recente veranderingen in de 
verzorgingsstaat was de introductie van quasi-markten in de uitvoering van 
sociaal beleid. Quasi-markten zijn markten, waarin vraag en aanbod sterker 
dan in “ gewone”  markten aan regelgeving zijn gebonden. In deze constructies 
zou, althans dat was de verwachting, de doelmatigheid en effectiviteit van de 
markt kunnen worden ingezet om publieke goederen en diensten te leveren. 
Aanbieders in dergelijke markten hebben meer vrijheid dan in een 
hiërarchische relatie met de overheid, maar worden gedwongen binnen 
bepaalde grenzen te blijven. Zo geldt voor de volkshuisvesting, centraal in 
deze studie, dat sociale verhuurders zich niet uitsluitend op dure woningen 
voor de meest lucratieve doelgroepen kunnen richten, maar verplicht zijn ook 
sociaal-economische zwakke groepen te blijven bedienen. Ook krijgen ze 
slechts beperkte ruimte om koopwoningen te bouwen, zelfs al zou dat 
commercieel gezien zeer winstgevend zijn.    
 
Typerend voor marktsystemen is dat ze werken op basis van prikkels en 
daarmee op basis van (veelal impliciete) veronderstellingen over hoe 
aanbieders op die prikkels reageren. Het succes van quasi-markten berust dan 
ook op een juiste inschatting van de logica achter het gedrag van de 
aanbieders. Deze studie poogt daaraan bij te dragen en stelt het gedrag van de 
aanbieders centraal, in dit geval het gedrag van de woningcorporaties. 
Daarbij gaat het niet om de uiteindelijke effecten van de stelselwijziging voor 
huurders, maar om de manier waarop aanbieders zich aan de stelselwijziging 
aanpassen.  
 
De Nederlandse woningcorporaties bezitten op dit moment ruim een derde 
van de nationale woningvoorraad. Van oorsprong waren deze organisaties 
privaat en formeel zijn ze dat ook altijd gebleven, maar na de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog raakten ze in de praktijk sterk verstrengeld met het nationale 
volkshuisvestingsbeleid. Het gevolg was dat ze hun autonomie in feite 
grotendeels verloren. In de jaren negentig werden ze echter financieel 
verzelfstandigd. Hun activiteiten werden minder strikt omschreven dan 
voorheen. In plaats daarvan moesten ze aan een aantal ruim geformuleerde 
wettelijke taakstellingen voldoen, die in overleg met de gemeenten in hun 
werkgebied nader zouden worden gespecificeerd. Door deze 
beleidsverandering kregen de corporaties meer vrijheid, maar liepen ze ook 
grotere risico’s. Hun veelal goede financiële positie en de achtervang van 
sectorfondsen haalden daar weliswaar de scherpe kantjes van af, maar 
niettemin was hun positie veel onzekerder dan voorheen. Hoe gingen ze daar 
mee om?  
 
Weinig capaciteit en toch veel verandering 
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De corporaties stonden voor een forse klus, want ze kregen te maken met niet 
 n, maar twee soorten onzekerheid. In de eerste plaats moesten ze op de 
woningmarkt inkomsten verdienen, waarmee ze hun voortbestaan konden 
verzekeren. Een belangrijk risico daarbij is uiteraard dat huurders kiezen voor 
een andere corporatie of een koopwoning. De corporaties werden gedwongen 
een strategie te ontwikkelen, om hun huurders binnenshuis te houden. 
Tegelijkertijd werden ze geconfronteerd met een tweede soort onzekerheid, 
namelijk: wat voor strategie moet dat dan zijn? Het stond niet vast dat gedrag 
dat succesvol was binnen het oude systeem, toen ze meer administratieve 
kantoren dan ondernemingen waren, ook in de quasi-markt succesvol zou 
zijn. Het was niet alleen onzeker of de benodigde middelen zouden blijven 
komen: het was ook onduidelijk wat de beste manier was om hier aan te 
komen. Met andere woorden, de aanpassing aan de quasi-markt vergde ook 
nieuwe kennis. 
 
Ze waren echter slechts beperkt toegerust om deze grote opgave te lijf te 
gaan. De ontwikkeling van nieuwe idee  n is geen routinematige activiteit en 
vereist dan ook relatief veel energie en tijd. De meeste corporaties bestonden 
echter slechts uit enkele tientallen mensen, waarvan het merendeel technici en 
administratieve krachten. In de praktijk was veelal enkel een handjevol 
mensen in staat om over nieuw beleid na te denken. Bovendien stamde een 
groot deel van het corporatiepersoneel uit de periode vó ó r de quasi-markt, 
waarin de organisatie een ander soort rol vervulde. Je zou dus verwachten 
dat de veranderingen langzaam verliepen.  
 
Deze verwachting slaat de plank echter geheel mis. De corporaties blijken 
zichzelf in vrij korte tijd opnieuw te hebben uitgevonden. Binnen enkele jaren 
is een groot aantal overgestapt naar een nieuwe organisatiestructuur (van een 
klassieke bureaucratie naar een  n-loketmodel), een nieuw 
woningtoewijzingssysteem (van wachtlijsten naar woningkranten) en een 
nieuwe juridische structuur (van woningbouwverenigingen naar 
woningstichtingen). Verder hebben veel corporaties nieuwe producten 
ontwikkeld (allerhande diensten, nieuwe typen huurcontracten, woon-
zorgcombinaties, huur/koop-constructies etc.) en meegewerkt aan 
verstrekkende en vernieuwende wijkontwikkelingsplannen. Tenslotte heeft 
een groot aantal corporaties deelgenomen aan samenwerkingsverbanden of 
fusies. Dat is een opmerkelijke paradox: organisaties met een beperkte 
capaciteit voor vernieuwing blijken zich heel snel aan de markt te kunnen 
aanpassen. Hoe kan dat?  
 
Collectieve innovatie 
 
Het antwoord is vrij simpel: corporaties hebben het niet alleen, maar samen 
gedaan. Er zijn twee manieren waarop dit kan plaatsvinden. De eerste is door 
direct met elkaar samen te werken en uit de confrontatie met elkaars belangen 
nieuwe idee  n te ontwikkelen (in de beleidswetenschap ook wel “ leren”  
genoemd). Dit kwam met name voor bij de wijkontwikkeling, waarbij 
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corporaties die samenwerkten veel radicalere stappen namen dan corporaties 
die niet samenwerkten. Een tweede vorm van gezamenlijke vernieuwing is 
dat organisaties idee  n van elkaar kopi  ren (wat DiMaggio en Powell als 
“ mimetische isomorfie”  hebben aangeduid). Een mooi voorbeeld daarvan is 
het systeem van woningkranten, dat begin jaren negentig in  n plaats is 
geïntroduceerd en zich sindsdien door het gehele land heeft gespreid. 
Hierdoor kon de vindingrijkheid van enkele organisaties worden benut door 
organisaties in het gehele veld, door het collectief. Om die reden verwijs ik er 
naar als vormen van “ collectieve innovatie” .  
 
Wat dit verschijnsel mogelijk heeft gemaakt is de hechte sociale structuur van 
de corporatiesector, zoals die zich in de loop der tijd heeft ontwikkeld. Er 
bestaan vele kanalen waardoor kennis zich kon verspreiden: de 
bijeenkomsten van de koepelorganisatie, gespecialiseerde media en sociale 
netwerken. Door de jarenlange contacten en de gedeelde uitgangssituatie 
konden nieuwe idee  n sneller als relevant en betrouwbaar worden 
beoordeeld. Op deze manier kon kennis relatief snel worden verspreid. 
Samenwerking werd gestimuleerd door de lokale situatie, waarin corporaties 
en gemeenten veelal indirect van afhankelijk zijn van elkaars investeringen.  
 
Soortgelijk gedrag en toch groeiende diversiteit 
 
Corporaties groeiden dus in hun rol door samen te werken en door idee  n 
van elkaar over te nemen. In eerder onderzoek naar dit verschijnsel 
geobserveerd dat het de sociale banden tussen organisaties versterkt. Dat lijkt 
ook heel logisch: actoren die sterk op elkaar letten en soortgelijke idee  n 
oppikken worden steeds meer een herkenbare groep. In het geval van de 
sociale huursector zou dat betekenen dat de identiteit die corporaties in het 
verleden deelden zou worden vervangen door een nieuwe gezamenlijk 
identiteit. Het sociale kapitaal dat vernieuwing mogelijk maakte zou zichzelf 
hebben bestendigd.     
 
Maar verrassend genoeg is dat niet gebeurd. Wie onder de oppervlakte kijkt 
ziet juist groeiende verschillen. Hoewel corporaties soortgelijke innovaties 
oppikken hebben zij vaak heel verschillende idee  n over hoe organisaties in 
een markt moeten opereren. Grofweg zijn er drie typen marktstrategie  n te 
onderscheiden. De eerste is een traditionele, die er van uit gaat dat huurders 
een technisch goede woning willen en verder geen fratsen. Andere 
corporaties breiden hun product steeds verder uit. In combinatie met de 
woning bieden ze steeds meer diensten aan, zoals het populaire 
woonzorgpakket. Weer andere corporaties zoeken hun heil in diversificatie. 
Dit houdt in dat ze hun risico’s spreiden over verschillende typen huurders 
en lokale markten, zodat ze niet te zeer worden getroffen door tegenslag in 
 n type marktsegment. Vanuit deze verschillende strategie  n ontwikkelen 
corporaties zich naar heel verschillende typen organisaties. Er is niet  n type 
strategie dat dominant is of lijkt te gaan worden.   
 
Deze diversiteit in strategie  n lijkt op gespannen voet te staan met de 
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observatie dat corporaties allemaal dezelfde innovaties oppakken, maar dat is 
slechts een schijntegenstelling. Veel idee  n die de afgelopen jaren populair 
zijn geworden zijn te verenigen met verschillende marktstrategie  n, wat een 
verklaring zou kunnen zijn voor hun populariteit. Zo is een  n-loketmodel 
handig voor organisaties die de dienstverlening voorop willen zetten, maar 
ook voor organisaties die willen groeien. Verder blijkt dat corporaties 
dezelfde idee  n heel verschillend kunnen uitwerken. Zo wordt er veel 
gefuseerd, maar corporaties die graag kleinschalig werken gaan samen met 
lokale partners, terwijl corporaties die willen diversificeren juist in het bootje 
springen met collega’s aan de andere kant van het land. In dat opzicht sluiten 
diversiteit en homogeniteit elkaar niet uit. Organisaties kunnen met populaire 
idee  n meegaan en daarmee veel energie te besparen, en tegelijkertijd een 
eigen koers te volgen. Zo beschouwd moet de beslissing om een trend te 
volgen niet noodzakelijk als “ irrationeel”  worden beschouwd, zoals veelal 
gebeurt (ook in de wetenschappelijke literatuur over dit verschijnsel). Trends 
bieden de mogelijkheid om met beperkte middelen ver te komen, zonder 
noodzakelijkerwijs de eigen voorkeuren tekort te doen.   
 
De groeiende variatie leidt er toe dat de organisaties qua grootte, vorm en 
activiteiten steeds verder gaan verschillen. Dit leidt er vervolgens weer toe 
dat de eerder genoemde sociale netwerken in stukken beginnen te breken. Als 
organisaties niet dezelfde doelen nastreven en zich niet in elkaar herkennen 
hebben ze ook weinig met elkaar te bespreken. Corporaties zullen wat dat 
betreft eerder geneigd zijn contact te zoeken met organisaties met een 
soortgelijke strategie. Enkele samenwerkingsverbanden zijn uiteen gevallen 
en ook binnen de koepelorganisatie bestaan spanningen. Het sociaal kapitaal 
neemt dus af.   
 
Waarom vallen de traditionele banden in de sociale huursector uiteen, terwijl 
uit andere onderzoeken blijkt dat collectieve innovatieprocessen de banden 
tussen organisaties juist versterken? Het verschil zit in het karakter van de 
woningmarkt. Vraag en aanbod in deze markt zijn niet of beperkt mobiel zijn, 
omdat huizen nu eenmaal vast op de grond staan en bewoners veelal slechts 
binnen een beperkt gebied verhuizen. Daardoor is er in feite een grote 
verzameling lokale markten. Wat in de ene markt gebeurt heeft betrekkelijk 
weinig effect op andere markten. Dat betekent dat corporaties weliswaar 
sociaal verbonden zijn met een groot aantal andere organisaties, maar voor 
hun marktpositie slechts direct afhankelijk zijn van een beperkt aantal lokale 
collega’s. Wanneer ze niet van elkaar afhankelijk zijn, hoeven ze minder 
rekening met elkaar te houden en zich minder naar elkaar te richten.   
 
Knagen aan het fundament van de quasi-markt 
 
Bovenstaande analyse geeft een beeld van hoe organisaties die belast zijn met 
de uitvoering van sociaal beleid hebben gereageerd op de introductie van een 
quasi-markt. Begrip van dat gedrag is essentieel om het experiment tot een 
succes te maken. Vervolgens kun je de vraag stellen wat de bevindingen 
betekenen voor de beoordeling van de quasi-markt. Het is mooi dat we meer 
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weten over quasi-markt gedrag, maar heeft het nu gewerkt?  
 
Het is nog te vroeg om een definitief oordeel uit te spreken over de quasi-
markt, maar zoals het er nu naar uitziet moeten de conclusies gemengd zijn. 
Enerzijds is het natuurlijk gunstig dat corporaties hun gedrag zo snel hebben 
kunnen aanpassen aan de nieuwe omstandigheden. Anderzijds kunnen 
sommige elementen van dat gedrag de quasi-markt op de lange termijn 
ondermijnen. De fusietrend is niet bevorderlijk voor de concurrentie, die een 
essentieel element van marktwerking is. Met name in de grote steden neemt 
het aantal corporaties snel af. Even zorgelijk is dat een aantal corporaties 
boven zijn traditionele plaatselijke werkgebied uitgroeit, waardoor hun 
positie tegenover de lokale overheid verschuift. Dat maakt het moeilijker 
lokaal op gelijkwaardige voet afspraken te maken over hoe de betrokken 
partijen hun sociale taak gaan vormgeven. Al met al lijkt de quasi-markt op 
de korte termijn succesvol, maar er zijn ontwikkelingen die op de lange 
termijn haar succes kunnen ondermijnen.  
 
Opbouw van het boek 
 
Bovenstaande analyse is in het boek iets uitgebreider uitgewerkt. Het eerste 
hoofdstuk begint met een korte beschrijving van de veranderingen in de 
hedendaagse verzorgingsstaat en de opkomst van quasi-markten, die daar 
deel van uitmaakt. Hieruit vloeien enkele vragen voort: hoe hebben de 
aanbieders binnen de verzorgingstaat op de komst van quasi-markten 
gereageerd, hoe kan hun gedrag worden verklaard, en wat voor gevolgen 
heeft dat gedrag voor de effectiviteit van quasi-markten? Vervolgens 
verdedig ik mijn keuze om deze vragen vanuit een sociologische benadering 
en met de huisvesting als onderzoekscase te beantwoorden.  
 
Hoofdstuk twee beschrijft het empirische object, de Nederlandse sociale 
huursector. Eerst beschrijf ik de kenmerken van het product, de woning. 
Daarna loop ik met grote stappen door de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse 
volkshuisvesting, met als hoogtepunt de recente stelselwijziging. Het 
hoofdstuk eindigt met een korte verhandeling over de plaats van de 
volkshuisvesting in de verzorgingsstaatliteratuur.  
 
Hoofdstuk drie bouwt een theoretische benadering voor het onderzoek. De 
twee componenten van deze benadering, resource dependence theory en de 
institutionele theorie van organisaties, worden afzonderlijk uiteengezet en 
vervolgens aan elkaar verbonden. Op basis van de theorie wordt 
onderscheiden welke keuzes organisaties in een (quasi-)markt kunnen maken, 
en welke keuzes onder welke omstandigheden kunnen worden verwacht.    
 
Hoofdstuk vier gaat in op de methodologische kant van het onderzoek. Er 
zijn drie methoden, waarmee het empirisch materiaal zal worden 
geïnterpreteerd: een analyse van de variatie tussen beslissingen, een analyse 
van de consistentie van beslissingen, en een vergelijking van de bevindingen 
van de twee voorgaande methoden met de verhalen van respondenten. 
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Vervolgens geef ik aan hoe het empirische materiaal zal worden verzameld: 
via intensieve case studies, met behulp van voornamelijk kwalitatieve 
onderzoeksmethoden.  
 
Hoofdstuk vijf doet verslag van de empirische bevindingen. Na een korte 
kennismaking met de vier cases (Bear Pit, Tiger Town, Shark Pool en 
Elephant’s Corner) wordt het gedrag van woningcorporaties ten aanzien van 
zes verschillende thema’s beschreven. De bevindingen worden vervolgens 
voor elk van de thema’s geanalyseerd met behulp van de in hoofdstuk vier 
beschreven methoden.  
 
Hoofdstuk zes trekt de bevindingen over de afzonderlijke thema’s bij elkaar 
en komt tot algemene conclusies over het gedrag van de corporaties in de 
quasi-markt. Daarnaast geef ik aan in hoeverre de quasi-markt vanuit haar 
eigen logica succesvol kan worden genoemd. Het hoofdstuk eindigt met een 
epiloog. Deze beschrijft drie ontwikkelingen, die het voortbestaan van de 
sociale huursector in haar huidige vorm kunnen bedreigen.  
 
De appendix gaat dieper in op enkele aspecten van het onderzoek, die eerder 
in het boek aan bod zijn gekomen. Dit zijn de achtergrond van de gebruikte 
theorie  n, de methoden om het empirisch materiaal te interpreteren en de 
methoden om dit materiaal te verzamelen.  
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15 Endnotes 
                                                 
 
 
1 Atkinson has noted that the evidence regarding the link between welfare state size and 
economic performance is inconclusive (Atkinson, 1999). Others have questioned the simplicity 
of the globalisation thesis (Rhodes, 1996). 
 
2 Mayntz has argued that “ what is involved here may be more than a difference of 
perspectives; the structure of the economy may in fact have become increasingly network-
like”  (Mayntz, 1993, p. 4). There are indeed indications that globalisation and information 
technology have encouraged the emergence of new economic structures (Lane, 1998; Castells, 
1996a). 
 
3 Peeters argues that deregulation in housing has tended to invite more regulation. This is 
because of (1) a decentralised, layered type of implementation, which leaves margins for 
interpretation and invites regulatory responses; (2) the use of undefined terms in statutes, 
which need new legislation to be specified; and (3) the proliferation of policy goals, which 
require co-ordination. Whether or not regulation actually does increase is up to the central 
and local authorities. This means that, ultimately, deregulation has extended their 
discretionary powers. 
 
4 The reason why Le Grand and Bartlett describe welfare state provision as universal is 
probably that most of the early quasi-market research was conducted in the UK and especially 
in health care. 
 
5 Since housing is by most people’s standards a necessary good, withdrawing from the 
housing market altogether is not an option.
 
6 The standard defence against many attacks on the unrealistic nature of neo-classical 
economic theory is that it studies aggregate and not individual behaviour. “ Economists are 
not congenitally stupid. They realize that human actions may be motivated by altruism, desire 
for power or prestige, the urgings of the subconscious, and many other things. It is obvious 
also that people don’t always know what they are doing. [...] But to develop economic 
hypotheses one need not suppose that people are perfectly informed and rational, or that they 
respond only to material advantage. We need suppose only that material advantage is an 
important motive, which operates along with others to shape personal behavior; and that 
there is some rationality and consistency in people’s behavior patterns. If this is true, we can 
predict that most people will respond in a certain direction to certain stimuli.”  (Reynolds, 
1966, p. 11). This, in turn, is possible because societies have a basic order. “ It is possible to 
generalize about human behaviour because when human beings live together in organized 
society they behave most of the time in orderly – and predictable- ways. If they did not, chaos 
would result and civilized living as we know it would be impossible”  (Peterson, 1967, p. 11). 
But there is increasing evidence to suggest that even aggregate behaviour cannot be 
satisfactorily explained with such a lean theory. The failure to understand economies other 
than those of the Anglo-Saxon type has been startling. Moreover, the line between 
methodological and empirical assumptions is in practice often a thin one.   
7 Even though this type of work originated with European thinkers such as Weber, Polyani 
and Pareto, the “ new”  economic sociology was first institutionalised in the US during the 
1990s. Convert and Heilbron distinguish three strands within the American branch approach, 
those originating in network theory, cultural-historical studies and organisational sociology 
(Convert and Heilbron, 1999). The first focuses on the importance of social networks in 
economic processes, both at the macro- and the micro-level. A nice example is Granovetter’s 
study of how people find jobs through their personal social contexts (Granovetter, 1981). 
Adherents of the cultural variety have done ethnographic research into economic exchange, 
examples of which are Zelizer’s study of the meaning of money in different contexts and 
Abolafia’s ethnographic research on the Wall Street bond and stock markets (Zelizer, 1994; 
Abolafia, 1984). The strand in organisational sociology, finally, encompasses authors such as 
Powell, Scott, Meyer, DiMaggio and Fligstein, whose work will be discussed extensively in 
the course of this book.
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8 The label “ actor-centred”  is often associated with the individualist, game-theoretical work of 
Fritz Scharpf (Scharpf, 1997). Scharpf’s work is of major significance, but not all studies with 
an actor-centred perspective must necessarily develop along his game-theoretical lines. The 
point of using the term “ actor-centred”  is primarily to distinguish the type of institutionalist 
perspective of this study from the structuralist varieties of the past.     
 
9 For overviews of Dutch housing policy in English, see Lundqvist 1992; Harloe, 1995. 
 
10 Parts of this chapter are a translation of my contribution to De Herverdeelde Samenleving 
(Brandsen, 1999). This, in turn, owes a great deal to the small number of historical studies 
about Dutch housing policy that have appeared over the last few decades (Helderman, 2001; 
Faber, 1997; Van der Schaar, 1996; 1987a; 1987b). 
 
11 Helderman uses the term “ logic of provision”  to denote the effects of product characteristics 
(Helderman, 2001). While the term has its merits, innocent researchers run the risk of being 
bogged down in endless discussions about the meaning of “ logic” . I will therefore stick to 
“ product characteristics” , as I have elsewhere (Van den Brink, Brandsen and Putters, 
forthcoming). 
 
12 None of these characteristics are absolute, of course. If we were nomads living in tents, 
housing would be cheap and mobile. In the future, homes may all come on wheels or wings. It 
is only in the present Western capitalist society that product characteristics may be regarded 
as fixed.    
 
13 This is disputed, though. The effects of homogeneous neighbourhoods on lifestyle and 
status are far from clear-cut and the empirical evidence is contradictory. There are also grave 
doubts about efforts to combat social problems through housing. For instance, plans to 
improve neighbourhoods by mixing housing types have been criticised on the grounds that 
mixing homes does not necessarily mix people, that many people spend the bulk of their time 
and money elsewhere, and that it is a way of spreading rather than solving problems 
(Duijvendak and De Rijk, 1998; Blokland-Potters, 1998). Blokland-Potters has argued that 
neighbourhoods are bureaucratic constructions to which policymakers attribute problems and 
solutions, because programmes targeted at problem groups rather than places  are more 
difficult and controversial.  
 
14 In Dutch these are called “ corporaties” , but the English term “ corporations”  has 
connotations that are not appropriate in this context. This is why I have used the term 
“ provider” .  
 
15 Since Klijn does not mention it, let me note that the term “ silent revolution”  originally comes 
from Inglehart (Inglehart, 1977). 
 
16 This is a reconstruction rather than a strictly historical account, since the actual process of 
policy change was muddled and gradual. For instance, the decentralisation of financial risks 
to the non-profits was proposed a few years after the initial liberalisation plans.
 
17 Of course, it is not “ the organisation”  that takes decisions, but its management. The 
managers have a strong incentive to prevent financial disaster, because if the Ministry steps 
in, they will probably be the first to go. This once happened to a provider in Limburg, the 
WBL, which was in deep financial trouble. It should also be noted that providers are formally 
required to remain financially healthy – it is one of the performance criteria- and that their 
financial state is monitored continuously. 
 
18 An idealtype is an abstraction of the aspects of a phenomenon considered essential, which 
can then be used to help describe actual phenomena by means of comparison and contrast. In 
Weber’s own words, it is formed by “ the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of 
view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and 
occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those 
one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its conceptual 
purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality”  (Weber, 1949, 
p. 90). The most famous example is Weber’s idealtype of bureaucracy (Weber, 1968, pp. 956-
58). 
 
19 Annaniassen has argued that Esping-Andersen overstates the differences at the expense of 
historical similarities (Annaniassen, 2001). 
 
20 This is clearly related to his idea that housing, due to its product characteristics and its place 
in the capitalist system, follows a markedly different trajectory from other policy areas. From 
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that perspective, an overall classification of welfare states would include areas that operate 
according to different logics and would therefore make little sense. 
 
21 Harloe actually distinguishes three types of housing provision: mass, residual and co-
operative. Co-operative housing is a type of tenure that falls midway between individual and 
collective ownership. It allows individuals to buy or sell a share in a (small) collective housing 
stock. In this way, some of the benefits of the two types of tenure can be combined. My reason 
for not including it is that it is of very little significance in the Dutch context.  
22 Kemeny explains this on the basis of differences in the meaning of “ corporatism”  (Kemeny, 
1995). In the labour movement approach followed by Esping-Andersen, corporatism is 
analysed in terms of political power. “ Esping-Andersen’s view of corporatism as the product 
of class compromise contrasts with the working-class ascendancy in social democratic 
societies”  (pp. 64-65). This is different from the conventional view of corporatism, which 
regards it as an instrument for political consensus-building. A country like Sweden would be 
corporatist in the latter sense, yet Esping-Andersen places it in the social-democratic cluster. 
When countries are classed as corporatist in the traditional sense, it turns out that they tend to 
have a unitary market, whereas liberal welfare states have a dualist system.  
 
23 Interestingly enough, the “ managerial”  perspective that resource dependence advocates 
argued against has come into vogue once more. Recent studies have again focused on issues 
such as management methods and individual leadership (Brandsen, 1998; Clarke and 
Newman, 1997; Pollitt, 1996). 
 
24 Of course, uncertainty is a lasting condition for those without the power of divination. What 
matters is the level of uncertainty that is considered acceptable, which in turn depends on 
perceptions of which resources crucial to its survival and of the ease with which they can be 
acquired. The term “ risk”  has been used to denote the social acceptance of uncertainty, as 
opposed to uncertainty in an objective sense. Beck defines them as “ a systematic way of 
dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself”  (Beck, 
1992, p. 21). The economist Frank Knight was the first to make the distinction between risk 
and uncertainty (Knight, 1921). 
 
25 I deliberately use the term “ influence”  rather than “ power” , for the latter is associated with 
an elaborate and complicated discussion. As a definition of power, asymmetric resource 
dependence is too simple. Power does not necessarily involve conflict and may be exercised in 
more subtle ways than through control over resources (Lukes, 1974). The analysis in this book 
is not intended to address such grand concepts and therefore the less heavily burdened term 
“ influence”  will do just fine. 
 
26 It has been suggested that resource dependence theory is associated with the New Left, 
which would explain its emphasis on resistance and conflict (Donaldson, 1995). 
 
27 It is not my intention to argue that this is necessarily a bad thing. “ Soft contracting”  may in 
fact be a better guarantee for quality than a forced show of competition. However, the exit 
option is central to the quasi-market concept and in that sense long-term relationships 
between providers and clients will undercut its principles.    
28 Pfeffer and Salancik have gone as far as to describe organisations themselves as “ quasi-
markets for influence and control”  (p. 37).  
29 The metaphor is taken from a presentation by David Stark at the conference “ Economic 
Sociology at the Edge of the 3rd Millennium”  held in Moscow on January 14-15, 2000. 
 
30 Behaviour inspired by norms can also serve self-interest, but not the kind of self-interest 
referred to here. If people feel good about themselves because they have done “ the right 
thing” , their actions might be construed as serving self-interest (although that is rather 
stretching the concept). Even if this is true, it is not self-interest in the sense of market 
survival, as it is defined in this analysis. It is also possible that conformity to norms has 
benefits that do serve market survival. For example, such behaviour may allow an 
organisation to receive subsidies. However, if it conforms with an eye to those benefits, its 
behaviour is not normatively inspired. A true believer complies with rules even if they do not 
serve survival. 
 
31 I use the term “ innovation”  to emphasise that switching routines is not a mechanical 
process, but a costly and uncertain quest for new knowledge. The term is used in a relative 
sense (cf. Leene, 1997). An innovation does not need to be new in an absolute sense, but only 
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in relation to former routines. It will be considered new when it is perceived as such by the 
actor concerned.   
 
32 By “ autonomously” , I mean independently from other organisations in the same field.  
 
33 Solutions arrived at in this way are not necessarily the best. For instance, Janis has described 
how a team of decision-makers in the US government developed a collective frame of mind 
regarding the Bay of Pigs invasion, that filtered out all signals that the invasion was likely to 
fail (Janis, 1982). Institutions do not necessarily have good effects, even if they present a 
triumph of co-operation.     
34 One could argue that imitation lends legitimacy to the organisation that originally spread an 
innovation. However, in most cases this is unlikely to be a direct exchange, since the 
innovating organisation may not even be aware that its innovations are being diffused. 
Moreover, if it is to be conceptualised as an exchange at all, it is not one that creates the kind 
of dependence that the resource dependence perspective is concerned with. 
 
35 This shows there is no basic incompatibility between rational choice and institutional theory 
(Dowding, 1994). There is no need, as suggested by March, to separate processes of 
innovation and institutionalisation from theories that emphasize calculation (March, 1999). 
Incorporating elements of rational choice into institutional theory will only strengthen the 
latter by helping to explain how institutions originate and change.
 
36 One cannot suppose that collective innovation will occur because that would best for the 
actors concerned. The decision to participate in such a process cannot be justified (only) with 
reference to the objective superiority of the innovation or its benefits for the overall 
population. This would be to suppose, by implication, that the prisoner’s dilemma 
automatically resolves itself in the best possible manner. If actors do not receive individual 
benefits from innovation, or have insufficient guarantees that potential benefits will 
materialise, it is difficult to see why they should bother. Even if the process does occur, one 
should still be able to explain why it happened, and why not sooner or later. 
37 This is usually spoken of as “ pressure” , but the need to innovate is double-edged. Actors do 
not only cave in to pressure to innovate: they may want to innovate to solve certain problems. 
The notion of environmental pressure must be conceived of somewhat more broadly than as a 
one-way street. My limited knowledge of physics tells me that pressure can also arise when 
there is a vacuum at one end. In such a case, it is not a matter of the environment imposing its 
weight, but rather of the organisation pulling in the environment.
 
38 The popularity of the concept can be partly attributed to the theoretical developments 
sketched before, but also to recent developments in business. Enterprises working on a global 
scale increasingly take the form of shifting networks between organisations and between 
organisational units (Castells, 1996; Piore and Sabel, 1984). The increasing number and speed 
of transactions and the need for swift market conquests do not allow for ex ante co-ordination. 
Inside businesses, elements of the production process must be organised simultaneously 
rather than sequentially; between businesses, networks must be able to coalesce and dissolve 
smoothly. This means that on both levels there must be some form of interpersonal or 
interorganisational trust to make interaction possible (Lane, 1998). Another source of 
uncertainty is not so much associated with the scale and volatility of networks as with the 
characteristics of products. In many public service markets, for instance, the quality of 
products such as health is very difficult to measure, so much so that it is impossible or at least 
expensive to monitor contracts effectively. In practice, this encourages stable 
interorganisational contacts regulated by trust rather than shifting encounters governed by 
competition (Bartlett, Roberts and LeGrand, 1998).
 
39 This is similar to the claim of organisational ecologists that organisations will use their own 
population as a reference point, even if populations are not very clearly defined (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989). Haveman combines the two approaches (Haveman, 1997).  
 
40 The question is not whether such test cases ultimately prove anything about the “ objective”  
quality of proposed innovations. In Dutch social housing, the evidence provided by pilot 
studies is often of a very preliminary nature. However, what is most important is that it is 
perceived as providing proof for the quality of an innovation.  
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41 The stories of the golem are set in the Old Jewish Town of Prague and tell of the rumoured 
exploits of a rabbi who lived in the late 16th century. They have probably inspired Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein. The quotes are from the version by Petiska, 1991, pp. 78-80. 
 
42 It is theoretically also possible that collective choices lead to more variety. For instance, the 
decision to decentralise decisions to the local level may result in greater diversity rather than 
homogeneity. However, this is unlikely to happen in cognitive innovation processes, since the 
point of collective innovation is that it saves effort in reducing uncertainty. The collective 
choice to be diverse only creates new uncertainty.  
 
43 The Woonverkenningen identify three types: the administrative organisation, the real estate 
company and the service provider. These correspond to providers with traditional, 
diversification and responsive strategies respectively. However, the construction of the three 
types is not explained and their description is a little suggestive. The three strategies 
described in this chapter are not meant to carry normative connotations.      
 
44 This analysis focuses only on those interventions in stock that significantly affect the market 
position of that stock. To include minor alterations would be a practical impossibility. 
 
45 If providers do this systematically, it obviously amounts to a rule rather than an exception. 
The point is, though, that they can do this at will. 
 
46 With liberalisation, the Ministry was more willing to grant providers permission to work on 
a regional rather than a local scale. However, it was not an automatic right. Providers still 
needed to request permission themselves. Permission to work on the national scale was given 
more rarely and under strict conditions regarding the financial health of the provider.    
47 For practical purposes, this analysis makes no distinction between the management and the 
foundation board. This is to assume either that the two are one and the same or that the board 
had delegated a major share of decision-making to the management. The results of a survey 
conducted in 1995 suggested that this was empirically justifiable (Godfroij and De Jager, 
1997). The evidence from the case studies later confirmed this.      
 
48 The focus on the formal system is not meant to suggest that it is more important than the 
informal structure. What matters here is the choice rather than the effect of structure. 
 
49 Mintzberg mentions a fourth dimension, hostility, which will not be discussed here because 
it is not a vital part of the model and empirically irrelevant in this analysis. 
 
50 I have retained Burns and Stalker’s original label “ mechanic”  because this is more consistent 
and less confusing than Mintzberg’s term “ bureaucratic” .     
 
51 Note that I deliberately used the label “ more” , because it is not likely that Dutch social 
housing providers will ever be like Mintzberg’s adhocracies. Stability may be relatively high 
or low within social housing, but compared to commercial business it will generally be high.      
52 There is some difficulty in discussing a provider that has come into existence during the 
research period, when the two (or more) of the providers that made up its component parts 
were also part of the case study. I have chosen to present them as they were at the end of the 
research period because that will make things considerably easier.  
 
53 There were actually five major providers, but one of these refused to participate and will 
therefore be ignored from this point onward. Fortunately, it did not play a crucial role in any 
of the decisions made by the others. 
 
54 The reasons why Siberian was so much worse  off than the others are quite interesting. It 
was created in the 1980s through the merger of three smaller providers, one of which was the 
municipal housing company. The latter owned some very undesirable, ill-maintained stock, 
which the local authorities passed on to Siberian. What made things worse was that at one 
point the association meeting decided to shut down all but the most pressing maintenance, in 
order to save money for “ doing nice things”  (like low rent rises). The local authorities, when 
still in a supervisory role, might and perhaps should have intervened at one point, but they 
did not. It was hinted by some respondents that this was because the alderman used to head 
the association board of Siberian back in the 1980s and was not eager to draw attention to the 
provider’s past mismanagement. That was only a rumour, of course.     
55 It speaks for itself that none of the providers fit their category perfectly. Actual strategies 
will mostly contain elements of at least two of the types. Furthermore, it is possible that 
strategies shift over time. For instance, providers may move away from their traditional 
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strategy as time progresses. The question is which strategy has dominated during the research 
period.
 
56 I cannot mention the precise percentage because the survey report does not give one. 
Tenants who decided (in theory) not to move after all were divided into those whose 
alternative was home ownership (18% changed their minds), those who would move to other 
rented housing (30%) and those who were not sure where they would go (40%). There is no 
aggregate percentage, nor an indication of the size of the population and the exact sampling 
criteria. In short, the evidence from this survey must be treated with caution.    
57 Bengal Tiger, annual report 1998.  
58 Koala did provide home care packages in a section of its stock, but made it clear this activity 
had grown historically through past involvement with other protestant organisations, rather 
than as a part of its present strategy.
 
59 Great White, discussion paper on future strategy. 
 
60 In that case, one type of strategy has become institutionalised. It has become what Fligstein 
calls a “ conception of control” , a view on how to deal with uncertainty that dominates and 
shapes an entire organisational field (Fligstein, 1990). 
 
61 It has been questioned whether the drive towards managerialism has been as strong as some 
commentators suggest. A survey conducted in the early 1990s found that the evidence for 
such a trend was actually rather slim (Carrol and Garkut, 1996). 
 
62 It should also be emphasised that the central position of management has not been the 
theoretical starting-point of the analysis, as it is in many studies inspired by the managerialist 
approach. Although the analysis uses the organisation’s management as the methodological 
anchoring point from which to develop hypotheses, this does not imply that managers 
ultimately take the decisions. I could just as well have found that the organisations were in 
practice externally controlled.  
63 In some other countries, the large-scale flight of middle- and high-income groups from the 
cities has led to sharp geographical divisions between “ good”  and “ bad”  areas. Castells has in 
this respect spoken of the “ adolescent attitude”  towards cities, especially in the US: you have 
a problem and you run away. “ We come here to escape the problems in Europe and then here 
we go the cities. There are problems in the cities, we escape to the suburbs. There are 
problems in the suburbs and we escape to the exurbs. Soon we’ll colonize the moon”  (Castells, 
1996b).  In the Netherlands, these processes are not likely to occur on the same scale. To begin 
with, socio-economic differences are generally smaller, in part due to more elaborate welfare 
state arrangements. Moreover, it is simply not possible to run too far in the Netherlands: you 
end up in the sea or in Germany. Finally, the Netherlands have long had a policy of active 
intervention in urban stock, which means there are no large-scale dilapidated residential areas 
(Teule, 1999).  
 
64 These processes are much more complex than they are described here. To begin with, they 
involve more than investment in the housing stock, although the physical aspect has tended to 
dominate. Moreover, there are many other actors involved, even in the housing pillar of urban 
revitalisation. These include commercial housing providers, individual landlords, 
neighbourhood committees, commercial businesses and various local authority departments. I 
have kept these aspects of the processes out of the analysis, though, as they do not appear to 
be necessary to explain why social housing providers made particular interventions. They 
might make for more interesting reading, but in the end their inclusion is not essential. 
 
65 Bengal Tiger, annual report 1997. 
 
66 Koala Bear, annual report 1999. 
 
67 Service packages were effectively forced upon buyers by selling only a minority of units 
within a single apartment complex and retaining the majority as rented units. Providers could 
then take majority decisions in the association of owners, the decisions of which are legally 
mandatory for all members. They could then decide to adopt a collective maintenance service 
and contract it out to themselves.  
 
68 The alderman did not mention his staff in explaining his decisions on distribution.  
 
69 I have also counted inclusion in holding companies as mergers. Even if this keeps 
organisations financially separate, it does mean they delegate decision-making power to a 
single body. 
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70 The term is from a pamphlet drawn up by the group of association members that opposed 
the merger and the change of legal structure. 
 
71 Colijn (1869-1944) was the Dutch prime minister at the time of the Great Depression and one 
of the social-democrats’ most hated opponents. 
 
72 The respondent who made this comment passed away during the research period and here I 
would like to express my thanks for his co-operation.  
 
73 The study by Companen was conducted among providers, the survey of the Woonbond (the 
national tenants’ association) among tenant organisations. Both studies are therefore one-
sided. In addition, there were major potential biases in the samples that were accounted for in 
neither study. Given these shortcomings, the studies can at best be regarded as exploratory 
excursions, not as accurate measurements of representation.     
 
74 This comment was made at a meeting between Hammerhead staff and tenant 
representatives in 1997. 
 
75 Although not a crucial point, it is worth noting that the strongest tenant organisations 
usually received backing not only from their providers, but also from local authorities. This 
came in the form of direct financial support, but also through the supply of relatively cheap 
professional aides. These came predominantly from local non-profit organisations, not from 
the national tenants association (Woonbond) or from commercial agencies. In Tiger Town, 
support was provided by the municipal welfare organisation.75 The local authorities of Shark 
Pool had never even considered giving support to tenant democracy – when asked, the notion 
seemed somewhat alien to them- but the tenants of Great White were fortunate enough to be 
able to hire support from the welfare organisation of a neighbouring town. In Bear Pit, 
support came from an independent organisation set up especially for that purpose and 
financed jointly by the local authorities and local providers. Since these sources of 
professional help were all subsidised, they could work at rates well below those of the 
Woonbond. They could also provide more specialised local expertise. When teams of local 
professionals supported several tenant groups within an area, they tended to act as the spider 
in the web, exchanging information, co-ordinating various efforts and in doing so elevating 
the level of representation on the local scale.  
76 This outsider was one of the tenants from Siberian Tiger. 
 
77 Great White’s manager was one of the pioneers of the model in a previous job, but the 
reorganisation in Great White had already started by the time he arrived.
 
78 Many of these activities were separated from the new branch organisation and privatised in 
1999. 
 
79 “ Veel corporaties zien ons als excuus-truus om zelf vooral niet aan R&D te hoeven doen” , 
interview with Henk Westra, director of the SEV, Corporatiemagazine, 1998, 14. 
 
80 Let me make two more notes on this subject. Both are based on my personal impressions 
rather than hard evidence. First, there seem to be strong links between professionals in 
consultancy, government and science in this field. There is a great potential for conflicts of 
interest. Second, the nature of the consultants hired by parties in social housing may change 
over time. Specialised agencies were very significant during the research period, but larger 
and broader have increasingly set their sights of the sector. They may take over some of the 
market in due course. However, since I have myself been employed by one of these 
companies, my view may be biased. It may take participatory observation to find out more 
about the role of professional advisors in this field. 
 
81 This is a moral argument. By granting more autonomy to a set of organisations, the state has 
rearranged its relationship with those actors. This could be interpreted, not merely as an 
instrument of policy, but also as a moral commitment to a new set of mutual rights and 
obligations. To tamper with the contract unilaterally is, to put it very simply, to break a 
promise. It may be justified when the bounds of proper market behaviour have been 
transgressed, but often – and social housing is no exception- the criteria have been defined 
broadly and are only specified (if at all) at some later date. It could lay policymakers open to 
the charge that they are filling in the small print as they go along. 
 
82 The term “ wilderness of mirrors”  is from T.S. Eliot’s “ Gerontion” . 
 
83 The debate about which type of tenure is preferable has been criticised on various grounds. 
To begin with, the meaning of tenure is culturally and nationally specific (Kemeny, 1995; 
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1981). Several of the poor countries in Africa and Asia have high rates of home ownership, but 
that hardly puts their system of housing provision in the same category as those of the UK or 
New Zealand. There is also major variation in how housing provision ties in with other 
welfare state arrangements and, more generally, with the organisation of the life cycle. This 
obviously affects the value of each type. For instance, Castles and Ferrara have observed how 
home ownership interacts with Southern European pension systems (Castles and Ferrara, 
1998). It is amazing that the enormous and varying impact of tenure patterns on the lifecycle 
and on other welfare state arrangements such as health and social security have not been 
studied more widely. In any case, the effect of tenure will depend strongly on the system in 
which it is embedded. Another objection is that tenure is a continuum rather than a duality. 
There are various intermediate forms, such as co-operative renting/ownership (which for 
historical reasons have never been significant in the Dutch context). 
 
84 Interestingly enough, the economic recovery was greatly encouraged by a rise in domestic 
spending, a major share of which was financed on the basis of the surplus value of owner-
occupied housing.   
 
85 This paragraph is particularly indebted to the overviews of organisational theory by 
Lammers e.a. (Lammers, Mijs and Van Noort, 1997) and Morgan (Morgan, 1986), as well as 
the introduction to the neo-institutional bible by DiMaggio and Powell (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991a).  
 
86 In terms of the first variable, Hall and Taylor distinguish between a calculus approach and a 
cultural approach. The calculus approach assumes instrumental, utility-maximising actors 
who goals have been exogenously given. Institutions provide actors with degrees of certainty 
about the behaviour of other actors through information and enforcement mechanisms, which 
affect the calculation individual actors make. Institutions are continuous because they embody 
a Nash equilibrium (that is, each individual is worse off when change occurs). By contrast, 
proponents of the cultural approach assume that actor behaviour, even if it is rational, is 
bounded by cognitive and moral templates for action, filters for interpretation. Preferences are 
therefore not exogenous, but provided by institutions. These institutions are continuous 
because they are taken for granted and shape the choices for potential reform.
 
87 This is because the notion of imitation only defines action with reference to other actions, 
without reference to the nature of the action itself.  
 
88 This is essentially an extension of the method of variation. 
 
89 It is in fact very unlikely that the real reasons respondents provide will agree with the 
theoretical interpretation, since the latter is based only on the pursuit of self-interest. 
 
90 Research that encompasses the entire population is excluded from this definition. If case 
studies had no ambition to generalise, cases could not be distinguished from populations, 
except on trivial grounds (such as the size of the research object). 
 
91 Swanborn argues that this is generally inadvisable, since it will be impossible to separate the 
influence of various independent variables and since the value of the dependent variables 
(and consequently assessments of the variance between them) may shift over time (Swanborn, 
1994).  
92 There is the question of how to present a provider that has come into existence during the 
research period, when the two (or more) of the providers that make up its component parts 
were also part of the case study. To avoid unnecessary confusion I have chosen to present 
them as they were at the end of the research period. 
 
93 Given that most of its units were students’ rooms, giving the figures for net assets per unit 
would in this instance be misleading.
 
94 In social science “ triangulation”  (a term from land planning) does not necessarily refer to the 
use of three methods, but only to the application of two or more independent methods of data 
collection (Denzin, 1978). 
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